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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis analyses fiscal effects of aid, first of health aid on health spending for a sample of 
developing countries and then broadly for Ethiopia and Tanzania. Particular attention is paid 
to data quality and the severe difficulties in achieving a reliable disaggregation of aid into its 
on-budget and off-budget components.  The first essay assesses the sensitivity of estimated 
health aid fungibility to how the missing data (often considerable) are treated and explores a 
novel (at least in economics) method of multiple imputation. The second essay provides a 
conceptual framework for the disaggregation of (sector) aid into its on-budget and off-
budget components. Given that complete binary distinction is not feasible, the aid-spending 
relationship is explored from a broader fiscal effects angle. This yields new insights on 
assessing the effect of health aid on health spending. 
Contributing to the growing body of evidence based on time-series methods, two essays 
adopt a case study approach to analyse distinct fiscal dynamics in Tanzania and Ethiopia, 
invoking detailed understanding of qualitative economic and political context to 
complement the quantitative data. Both essays employ current Cointegrated Vector Auto-
Regressive (CVAR) techniques to distinguish long run equilibrium relationships from short 
term adjustment mechanisms, test for variable exogeneity and identify which variables 
adjust to disequilibrium. The fifth and final essay addresses the differences between donor 
and recipient data records for the two countries, demonstrating that the direction of the 
discrepancies is not necessarily predicted from the outset and affects the estimated fiscal 
effects of (and on) aid. These essays contribute to the growing literature using country case 
studies to assess the fiscal effects of aid. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
The core declared purpose of foreign aid1 is economic development and extreme poverty 
alleviation. The empirical evaluation of aid effectiveness is thus centred on the effects of aid 
on economic growth. Despite a considerable (and growing) body of theoretical and empirical 
literature, from simple models of the growth process, through to the literature on the direct 
impact of aid on growth, to sophisticated panel econometric studies, pioneered by the 
arguments for conditional aid effectiveness (Burnside and Dollar, 2000, subsequently 
challenged by Hansen and Tarp, 2001, among others), the aid effectiveness literature has 
not yielded a consensus over which, how, when, where aid works (i.e. delivers positive 
growth effects) or otherwise. Even the meta-studies arrive at conflicting conclusions (see 
Doucouliagos and Paldam, 2008, and Mekasha and Tarp, 2013).  
The fragile conclusions vary with aid components considered (i.e. eliciting the directly 
growth-promoting component of aid, investment), growth model, panel dimensions (sample 
length and country coverage), empirical specification (explanatory and omitted variables, 
and conditional factors), econometric methodology, accounting for endogeneity of aid or 
ŽƚŚĞƌǁŝƐĞ ? ĚĂƚĂ ƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ ?  ĂŶĚ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌƐ ? ƉƌŝŽƌƐ ? ƐĞĞ ƌŶĚƚ Ğƚ Ăů ?  ? ? ? ? ? ) ĨŽƌ Ă ƌĞǀŝĞǁ ŽĨ
                                                          
1 Aid, or foreign assistance, as defined by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), refers to concessional financing 
(grants and subsidised loans) delivered in form or financial flows, technical assistance, or commodities 
designed to promote economic development (see Radelet, 2006, for a comprehensive primer on 
foreign aid). 
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recent literature, with a more comprehensive account available in McGillivray et al. (2006). 
,ĞƌǌĞƌ ĂŶĚ DŽƌƌŝƐƐĞǇ  ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ĂƌŐƵĞ ƚŚĂƚ ŝŶ ĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ  “ƵƐŝŶŐ ŐƌŽǁƚŚ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ
dependent variable but levels as independent variables; and the endogeneity problem of 
ǁĞĂŬŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚƐ ? ?ŝƚŝƐƚŚĞ unaccounted cross-country heterogeneity that compromises the 
robustness of the empirical aid effectiveness (although see Juselius et al., 2011).  
ƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂůƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶŽĨĂŝĚŝƐĚŝƐďƵƌƐĞĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?ƐŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂŶĚƚŚƵƐĐĂŶ
be expected to affect its fiscal decisions. Given the centrality of the government to economic 
performance (both in terms of fostering and hindering effects), especially at the early stages 
of economic development, understanding the fiscal effects of aid is a prerequisite for 
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ŝƚƐ ďƌŽĂĚĞƌ ŵĂĐƌŽĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ĞĨĨĞĐƚƐ ? ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ ĂŝĚ ?Ɛ ĞĨĨĞĐƚ ŽŶ ŐƌŽǁƚŚ Žƌ ŽŶ
human development (McGillivray and Morrissey, 2000; Morrissey, 2012). Aid should 
ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?ƐƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐĂŶĚĐĂŶŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞƚŚĞĐŽŵƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůůǇĞvolution) 
of spending: potentially promoting development spending over recurrent expenditures, or 
prioritising certain sector components, such as social-capital-enhancing spending on health 
or education (Gomanee et al., 2005). Aid can increase or decrease tax collection: it provides 
an alternative, arguably politically cheaper, source of government revenue and thus can 
provide perverse incentives to relax tax collection efforts or substitute for domestic 
(borrowing) deficit financing; or it can enlarge the tax base through growth, strengthen the 
revenue institutions and push for reforms. See McGillivray and Morrissey (2004) for a 
thematic review of the potential fiscal consequences of foreign aid and Morrissey (2014) for 
a review of recent empirical applications.  
A considerable body of the fiscal effects literature attends to the aid-spending relationship, 
ǁŝƚŚ ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ĨŽĐƵƐ ŽŶ ĂŝĚ ĨƵŶŐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ? ŝ ?Ğ ? ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ ĂŝĚ ŝƐ ƐƉĞŶƚ ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ ĚŽŶŽƌ ?Ɛ
intentions. Empirical findings here, too, give rise to conflicting views. Part of the problem 
arises from operational definitions: McGillivray and Morrissey (2004) distinguish between 
general fungibility (diversion of aid intended for public investment into government 
consumption spending), sector fungibility (whereby aid intended for a specific sector is 
(intentionally) spent under a different heading), and full additionality (assessing whether the 
total public spending in the sector increased by the amount of aid). A more substantial 
problem arises from the (donor) data records: for (earmarked) aid to be linked to a specific 
ĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚŽĨƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐ ? ŝƚŚĂƐƚŽďĞĚŝƐďƵƌƐĞĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?ƐŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂŶĚďĞ
recorded on the budget as aid revenue. Donor aid figures, however, include aid that is not 
disbursed through tŚĞƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?ƐŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ŝŶƐƚĞĂĚĚĞůŝǀĞƌĞĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŶŽ-governmental 
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organisations or in the form of donor projects), or may not even be spent in the recipient 
country (funding donor activities such as research, consulting, administration, and the like). 
Van de Sijpe (2013) demonstrates that unless the on-budget aid component is appropriately 
disaggregated from its off-budget component, the estimated extent of fungibility will be 
biased. Given the current state of (donor) aid records, a complete binary distinction between 
on-budget (potentially fungible) and off-budget (less likely to be fungible) sector aid is not 
feasible, thus preventing conclusive statements about the degree of sector aid fungibility.  
Despite the efforts to standardise fiscal accountinŐĂĐƌŽƐƐĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ?Ğ ?Ő ?ƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚEĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?
^ǇƐƚĞŵ ŽĨ EĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĐĐŽƵŶƚƐ ) ? ƚŚĞƌĞ ĂƌĞ ƌĞƉŽƌƚŝŶŐ ŝŵƉĞƌĨĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ ŝŶ ƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚƐ ? ƌĞĐŽƌĚƐ ?
Appropriate data collection, storage and processing is a costly process, and may not 
constitute a top priority or be infeasible for the recipient country agencies (see Jerven, 2013, 
for discussion). Lu et al. (2010) point at one of the bigger elephants in the room  W the 
pervasiveness of missing data (whereby an observation is not recorded or reported). The 
way the missing data ĂƌĞ ŚĂŶĚůĞĚ  ?Žƌ ŝŐŶŽƌĞĚ ) ŵĂǇ ũĞŽƉĂƌĚŝƐĞ ƚŚĞ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌ ?Ɛ ĂďŝůŝƚǇ ƚŽ
draw valid inferences. Yet, the detail on how the missing data are treated is often itself 
missing: international organisations (the go-to source of development data) impute 
observations that are indistinguishable from the truly observed data, without an indication 
of what assumptions have been taken to impute the missing values, thus with measurement 
error exacerbating the problem.  
Building on the recent (and influential) Lu et al. (2010) study that addresses the fungibility 
(or, more correctly, additionality) of health aid in low- and middle-income countries, Chapter 
2 assesses the sensitivity of the estimated health aid fungibility results to how the missing 
ĚĂƚĂĂƌĞ ‘ƚƌĞĂƚĞĚ ? ?/ŶƉĂƌƚŝcular, we explore the novel (at least in economics) methodology of 
multiple imputation, proposed (but not appropriately applied) in the original study. Multiple 
imputation is a simulation-based approach used for analysing incomplete data. Multiple 
distinct datasets are created where the missing data are replaced by plausible values; these 
are individually analysed using standard econometric techniques; and the results are then 
combined to generate a single set of estimates, whose standard errors reflect the 
ƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚŵŝƐƐŝŶŐĚĂƚĂ ?>ŝƚƚůĞĂŶĚZƵďŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ) ? “ǀĂůƵĂďůĞĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶƚŽĂŶǇ
ĚĂƚĂ ĂŶĂůǇƐƚ ?Ɛ ƚŽŽůŬŝƚ ?  ?^ĐŚĂĨĞƌ, 1999:4) as multiple imputation may be, we issue an 
important warning against imputing the outcome variable  W a strategy undertaken by Lu et 
al. (2010)  W and demonstrate that in simple applications it may generate a bias of ambiguous 
direction. Comparing two widely used data sources for public health spending aggregates, 
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World Health Organisation and International Monetary Fund, we demonstrate that even the 
data that could be seen to be of best quality (as it is observed across several core data 
sources) can contain considerable measurement error. The discrepancy across measures of 
the same variable is on average 0.5  W 0.7 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in low- 
and middle-income countries over 1995-2006. Given that total public health spending 
averages 2  W 2.5 per cent of GDP, this represents a discrepancy of about 20-30 per cent 
across sources.  
Retaining the focus on health aid and spending, Chapter 3 provides a conceptual framework 
for the disaggregation of (sector) aid into its on-budget and off-budget components, 
commenting on the degree of potential fungibility. After reviewing disaggregation strategies 
of health aid data available in the literature (namely, Lu et al., 2010, and Van de Sijpe, 2013), 
keeping identical modelling and estimation methods we demonstrate that the currently 
available estimates of the relationship between health aid and spending are not as 
conflicting as currently stated, despite the stark differences in disaggregated (and aggregate) 
sector aid data. However, if an inevitably ad hoc binary disaggregation of data is imposed in 
an attempt to produce fungibility estimates, the results can yield conflicting conclusions and 
policy implications. We show that this largely depends on whether donor projects, estimated 
ƚŽ ŚĂǀĞ ƚŚĞ ŵŽƐƚ ƌŽďƵƐƚ ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞ ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ ǁŝƚŚ ƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ƚŽƚĂů ŽǀĞƌĂůů ĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚ ƚŽ
health spending, are attributed to ĂŝĚ ?ƐŽŶ- or off-budget component.  
The most important limitation of aid fungibility studies is that they ignore broader fiscal 
effects of aid and the dynamics of fiscal relationships, especially on tax revenue and public 
(non-concessional) borrowing. In the past, the research on fiscal dynamics relied on the 
seminal Heller (1975) framework for fiscal response models, based on maximisation of 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ƵƚŝůŝƚǇ ĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶ ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚ ďǇ ĚĞǀŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ ĂĐƚƵĂů ĨŝƐĐĂů ĂŐŐƌĞŐĂƚĞƐ ĨƌŽŵ
target levels. Criticisms (see Binh and McGillivray, 1993, among others) to this framework 
include both theoretical and empirical issues, such as equal treatment of overshooting and 
undershooting the government targets, and unavailability of the actual data on these 
government fiscal targets; McGillivray and Morrissey (2004) illustrate the sensitivity of 
results to the data.  
With the passage of time (it has been fifty years since the first United Nations Conference on 
dƌĂĚĞ ĂŶĚ ĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ƚŚĂƚ ůĂƵŶĐŚĞĚ  “Ă ĚĞďĂƚĞ ĂďŽƵƚ ŚŽǁ ŵƵĐŚ ŵŽŶĞǇ ƌŝĐŚ ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝes 
ƐŚŽƵůĚ ŐŝǀĞ ƚŽ ƉŽŽƌ ŽŶĞƐ ƚŽ ƌĞĚƵĐĞ ƉŽǀĞƌƚǇ ĂŶĚ ďŽůƐƚĞƌ ŐƌŽǁƚŚ ? ?The Economist), the 
increasing availability of data has allowed for applications of time series methods. 
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Recognising the heterogeneity of fiscal mechanisms, a growing body of country case studies, 
stemming from Osei et al. (2005), employ the Cointegrated Vector Auto-Regressive (CVAR, 
Juselius, 2006) methods to analyse the fiscal (and growth) effects of aid. Although 
demanding of the data, CVAR is particularly useful in this context as it allows distinguishing 
long run equilibrium relationships from the short term adjustment mechanisms, and testing 
for variable exogeneity rather than imposing it from the outset. We employ the CVAR 
framework to explore the fiscal dynamics in two East African countries: Ethiopia2 (Chapter 4) 
and Tanzania (Chapter 5). The advantage over existing similar CVAR applications stems from 
significantly longer time-series dimension (47 versus 26-39 yearly observations) and the fact 
that data are obtained from a single domestic source, thus reducing the extent of 
measurement error (through conversions and corrections) and, crucially, capturing the 
ƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞ ŽĨ ĂŝĚ  Wwhat is effectively disbursed through the budget and the 
government is aware of.  
The atheoretical ŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨ ƚŚĞsZ  ‘ĂůůŽǁƐĚĂƚĂƚŽƐƉĞĂŬ ĨƌĞĞůǇ ? ƚŽĚŝƐĐƌŝŵŝŶĂƚĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶ
competing hypotheses and theories, and does not impose a priori assumptions and 
restrictions, such as residual normality or variable exogeneity, instead allowing to test for 
these in the dynamic multiple equation setting. However, since the estimation of 
simultaneous long and short run equations involves a large number of parameters, the CVAR 
requires large samples.  As 47 yearly observations do not constitute a statistically large 
sample, the CVAR analysis is complemented by a detailed qualitative understanding of the 
country-specific economic and political context, which ensures sound model specification 
and sensible interpretation of estimated results.  
Modelling several variants of a model between total (central) government expenditure 
(possibly disaggregated into capital/development and recurrent components), domestic 
revenue (possibly disaggregated into tax and non-tax), aid (grants and loans), and, in the 
Tanzanian case, domestic public borrowing, we fail to identify any perverse or adverse 
effects of aid, while still illustrating differences in fiscal adjustment mechanisms between 
countries. We fail to identify any negative effect of aid on tax revenue. In Ethiopia, tax 
revenue is positively associated with both modalities of aid (grants and loans), with only 
grant aid adjusting to departures from long-run equilibrium (possibly reflecting donors 
rewarding reforms). In Tanzania (although the results are generally more fragile), too, only a 
positive association can be identified between aid and tax, again with only aid exhibiting any 
                                                          
2 Chapter 4 on Ethiopia is a result of collaboration with Giulia Mascagni, at the time PhD Candidate in 
Economics at the University of Sussex, who provided the data.  
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adjusting behaviour (although aid and borrowing could be seen as substitutes). So while, 
rather plausibly, on-budget aid does not drive domestic revenue collection, it does not 
discourage (or substitute for) the collection of tax revenue.  In terms of public spending, the 
aggregate expenditure is positively associated with aggregate aid flows, with aid adjusting to 
departures from equilibrium (financing the excess spending/deficit). Finally, disaggregation 
of spending components gives further insight into what aid (and its modalities) is funding: in 
both countries capital expenditure is strongly positively associated with aid, although the 
adjustment mechanism differs. In Ethiopia, aid (and particularly grants) adjusts to capital 
expenditures, whilst in Tanzania it is mainly the development expenditures that adjust to 
(shortfalls or windfalls) in aid.   
With this thesis arguing strongly for the importance of disaggregation of aid into its on- and 
off-budget components and sensitivity of the estimated results to data and its sources, the 
final essay, Chapter 6, conducts an exercise assessing the sensitivity of the estimated fiscal 
effects of aid to its data soƵƌĐĞ ?ĐŽŵƉĂƌŝŶŐƚŚĞƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚ ? )ĚŽŶŽƌƚŽƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?ƐĂŝĚĚĂƚĂ ?
In relation to the early chapters of the thesis, the DAC data represents a mixture of on- and 
off-ďƵĚŐĞƚ ĂŝĚ ĚŝƐďƵƌƐĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? ǁŚŝůĞ ƚŚĞ ƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞĐŽŶƐŝƐƚƐ ĞŶƚŝƌĞůǇ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŽŶ-
budget aid flows only. However, eliciting the off-budget component is not possible due to 
the presence of non-traditional (i.e. non- )ĚŽŶŽƌĚŝƐďƵƌƐĞŵĞŶƚƐŝŶƚŚĞƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?ƐĚĂƚĂ ?/ƚ
is shown that recipient and donor data differ, and not necessarily in a direction predictable 
ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ŽƵƚƐĞƚ P ǁŚŝůĞ ĨŽƌ dĂŶǌĂŶŝĂ ƚŚĞ ƚŽƚĂů  ĂŝĚ ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞ ĞǆĐĞĞĚƐ ƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ŽǁŶ
records by more than three times (signalling a large proportion of DAC grants delivered 
through donor projects, or spent in donor countries), in Ethiopia the total amount of 
ĚŝƐďƵƌƐĞĚ ĂŝĚ ŝƐ ŚŝŐŚĞƌ ŝŶ ƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ƌĞĐŽƌĚƐ  ?ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞ ŽĨ ŶŽŶ-traditional 
donor funds). Depending on which source is relied upon for aid data, the results can differ 
substantially. The comparison of the simple CVAR estimates of models with recipients versus 
DAC donor data reveal that the two aid measures do not even co-vary sufficiently to yield 
qualitatively consistent estimates. The estimated (long run) coefficients of aid can contrast 
in terms of sign (as in the Tanzanian case) or reflect different adjustment behaviour (the 
Ethiopian case). 
The conclusion to this thesis (Chapter 7) provides a brief overview of the findings and the 
core lessons drawn from them, as well as their limitations, together with a brief indication of 
potential avenues of future research. Appendices A, B, C, D, and E (corresponding to 
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Chapters 2 through 6) contain the complementary materials that are referenced in the 
respective chapters and can be found at the end of the thesis.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Data Imputation vs. Data Amputation: 
An Application of Multiple Imputation 
in the Context of Aid and Health Spending 
 
1. Introduction 
Aid donors tend to be interested whether the official development assistance funds are 
ƐƉĞŶƚ ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ  ?ĚŽŶŽƌƐ ? ) ŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƐ ? ^ŝŶĐĞ ,ĞůůĞƌ ?Ɛ  ?  ? ? ? ) ƉĂƉĞƌ ? ĨƵŶŐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞ3 
attempts to estimate whether aid earmarked for specific activity (such as health) is fully 
ĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůƚŽƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?ƐƉůĂŶŶĞĚƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐŽƌŝƐŝƚĚŝǀĞƌƚĞĚĞůƐĞǁŚĞƌĞ4. The study by Lu et al. 
(2010) has received substantial attention since its publication in The Lancet, both in 
economics (aid) and medical contexts, media and broader philanthropic community. Its key 
contribution to the aid fungibility5 debate is the finding that each health aid dollar disbursed 
ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ ƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ƌĞĚƵĐĞƐ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐĂůůǇ ĨƵŶĚĞĚ ƉƵďůŝĐ
                                                          
3 The key references include Pack and Pack (1990, 1993, 1999), Feyzioglu et al. (1998), World Bank 
(1998), Franco-Rodriguez et al. (1998), Devarajan et al. (1999), McGillivray and Morrissey (2000, 2001, 
2004). 
4 &ŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ DĐ'ŝůůŝǀƌĂǇ ĂŶĚ DŽƌƌŝƐƐĞǇ  ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ĂŝĚ ?Ɛ ĞĨĨĞĐƚ ŽŶ ƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ƌĞǀĞŶƵĞ ĂŶĚ ďŽƌƌŽǁŝŶŐ ŝƐ
ƚĞƌŵĞĚ ‘ĨŝƐĐĂůƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ? ?ĂďƌŽĂĚĞƌĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƚŚĂŶĨƵŶŐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ? 
5 Lu et al. (2010:1376) define fungibility ĂƐ “ĂŝĚƐƵďƐƚŝƚƵƚ ?ŝŶŐ ?ĨŽƌĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐ ? ?ĂŶĚ
thus in effect are concerned with additionality of aid funds rather than whether the aid funds are 
allocated to sectors intended by donors (see McGillivray and Morrissey, 2000, 2001). This is discussed 
in depth in Chapter 3.  
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expenditures on health in low and medium income countries by USD$ 0.46 in the short run 
and by $1.14 in the long run, therefore concluding that health aid is largely fungible. 
The renewal of interest in aid fungibility has been partly based on increased availability of 
data (Van de Sijpe, 2013a). The quality of data presents a considerable challenge in 
development economics research. Together with inappropriate choice of econometric 
techniques and economic modelling, it may compromise the empirical conclusions.  Lu et al. 
(2010) point at one of the bigger elephants in the room  W the pervasiveness of missing data.6 
The way the missing data are handled (or ignored) may jĞŽƉĂƌĚŝƐĞƚŚĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌ ?ƐĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽ
draw valid inferences. Yet, the detail on how the missing data are treated is often itself 
missing: international databases impute observations that are indistinguishable from the 
truly observed data, without an indication of what assumptions have been taken to impute 
the missing values, so measurement error exacerbates the problem.  
Building on Lu et al. (2010), this chapter explores the sensitivity of the estimated health aid 
fungibility results to how the missing datĂĂƌĞ ‘ƚƌĞĂƚĞĚ ? ?/ŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ?ǁĞĞǆƉůŽƌĞƚŚĞŶŽǀĞů
(at least in economics) methodology of multiple imputation, proposed (but not 
appropriately applied) by the original study. The chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 
discusses the data, with Section 3 discussing the missing data. Section 4 introduces the 
ĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞƚŽŽůƐƚŽ ‘ƚƌĞĂƚ ?ƚŚĞŵŝƐƐŝŶŐĚĂƚĂĂŶĚŝƐƐƵĞƐĂŶŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚǁĂƌŶŝŶŐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚŝŵƉƵƚŝŶŐ
the outcome variable  W a strategy undertaken by to Lu et al. (2010). The results are 
discussed in Section 5. Section 6 further assesses the appropriateness of imputing the 
dependent variable. Section 7 explores whether the supposedly better quality data are 
indeed any better. Section 8 concludes. Additional information is provided in Appendix A.  
2. Data 
For the purposes of this chapter and to provide directly comparable estimates, the original 
dataset of Lu et al. (2010) is used. The dataset contains 1117 countries over the period 1995-
 ? ? ? ? ? &ŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ŽƌŝŐŝŶĂů ƉĂƉĞƌ ?Ɛ ǀĂƌŝĂďůĞ ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶƐ ? ǁĞ ĞůĂďŽƌĂƚĞ ŽŶ ƚŚe 
appropriateness of their construction and other relevant comments.   
                                                          
6 It must be born in mind that appropriate data collection, storing and processing is a costly process, 
and such process, requiring compliance with multitude of certain statistical standards or consistency 
over time may not constitute a top priority or be altogether infeasible for the recipient country 
agencies (see Jerven, 2013, for discussion). 
7 Initial sample contains 113 countries; however, Lu et al. (2010) omit Angola and Eritrea for the 
analyses. For the purposes of comparison, we will follow their sample size of 111 countries.  
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Government health expenditures as agent (GHE-A) represent the total spending on health 
from government budgets, funded both domestically (e.g. through tax receipts) and 
externally (e.g. health aid disbursed through government agencies). Two organisations 
provide datasets containing information on government health expenditures as agent: 
World Health Organisation (WHO)8 and International Monetary Fund (IMF)9 (two separate 
datasets)10. The variable is expressed as percentage of GDP for country i in year t; the 
observations obtained from the WHO (IMF) are scaled by the GDP data obtained from WHO 
(IMF, respectively). 
The Development Assistance for Health (DAH) is exceedingly difficult to trace to a recipient 
country or agency. Ravishankar et al. (2009) attempt this Sisyphean task.  In the original 
study, Ravishankar et al. (2009:2114) define the ,ĂƐ “ĂůůĨůŽǁƐĨŽƌŚĞĂůƚŚĨƌŽŵƉƵďůŝĐĂŶĚ
private institutions whose primary purpose is to provide development assistance to low-
income and middle-ŝŶĐŽŵĞ ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ? ? DŽƌĞ ƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂůůǇ ? ŝƚ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ  “ƐƵŵ ŽĨ ŐƌŽƐƐ ǇĞĂƌůǇ
disbursements on all health-sector grants and loans, and health-related programme 
expenditures from the channels of assistance, net of any transfers to other channels of 
ĂƐƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞƐƚƵĚǇ ? (Ravishankar et al., 2009:2114) ?,ĞĂůƚŚĂŝĚŝƐĚĞĨŝŶĞĚĂƐ “Ăůů
disease-specific support and general health-sector support, and excluded support for allied 
sectors such as water and sanitation, education, general budget support, and humanitarian 
ĂƐƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞŵĞĂƐƵƌĞŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐ “ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĨƵŶĚĞĚďǇ,ĐŚĂŶŶĞůƐŽĨĂƐƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ ? ?ďƵƚ
ĞǆĐůƵĚĞƐ “ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚďǇŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚĚŽŶŽƚŵĞĞƚŽƵƌĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨĂĐŚĂŶŶĞůŽĨĂƐƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ ?
(Ravishankar et al., 2009:2114). This DAH measure includes the OECD DAC data, 
 “ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƐ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ 'ůŽďĂů ůůŝĂŶĐĞ ĨŽƌ sĂĐĐŝŶĞƐ ĂŶĚ /ŵŵƵŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ  ?'s/ ) ĂŶĚ ĐŽƌĞ-
ĨƵŶĚĞĚ ĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ ŽĨ t,K ? ? ĂƐ ǁĞůů ƐŽŵĞ ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞ ƉŚŝůĂŶƚŚƌŽƉǇ ĨůŽǁƐ  ?ǁŚŝĐŚ ĂƌĞ ? ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?
limited to certain US donors) and (only) US-ďĂƐĞĚE'KƐ ?ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƐ. Aid flows from non-
traditional (i.e. non-OECD) donors are not included. Further challenges are presented by 
ďůƵƌƌĞĚĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ‘ŚĞĂůƚŚ ?ĂŶĚ  ‘ŚĞĂůƚŚ-ƌĞůĂƚĞĚ ?ĂŝĚĚŝƐďƵƌƐĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?ĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƐ ?
or disbursements11; as well as double counting, timing of fiscal years across countries and 
                                                          
8 WHO. National Health Accounts. Geneva: World Health Organization, 2009. 
http://www.who.int/nha/country/en/ (accessed Dec 17, 2009). 
9 IMF Fiscal Affairs Department. Total Health Spending Database. Washington, DC: International 
Monetary Fund, 2009. 
10 The analyses on these two distinct datasets for the GHE-A variable are carried out separately and 
thus two sets of results are provided in the Chapter.  
11 Ravishankar et al. (2009:2113). 
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organisations, and identifying which institutions count as channels of assistance.12 Thus it 
includes aid spent (delivered) in both recipient and donor countries, through both 
governmental and non-governmental organisations.13 
ZĂǀŝƐŚĂŶŬĂƌĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? ? ? )ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĞĚĂƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂůĂŵŽƵŶƚŽĨĚĂƚĂ “ĐŽƌƌĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?ĞƐƚŝŵĂƚŝŽŶ ?
projection, and imputation.14 The authors estimated ƚŚĞ  ‘ƵŶĚĞƌ-reported disbursement 
information to [OECD] CRS ďĞĨŽƌĞ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ĂƐ ǁĞůů ĂƐ ƐŽŵĞ ŽƚŚĞƌ ŵŝƐƐŝŶŐ ĚĂƚĂ ? ďǇ
predicting/projecting disbursements from the observed data, using basic yet untestable 
assumptions.15 Furthermore, their DAH measure includes an estimate16 of technical 
assistance and programme support component; this in-kind17 component reportedly ranges 
from 9.2 to 13.7 per cent of the financial transfers for the study period of 1990  W 2007 (and 
from 9.2 to 11.4 per cent18 in our sample period 1995-2006). Technical assistance and funds 
spent mostly in donor countries (i.e. programme support or research expenses, the exact 
relative magnitude of which is not reported by the authors) do represent aid, but they do 
not represent cash flows from donors to recipients (see GHE-S paragraph below)19. Table 2.1 
below reports the total DAH estimates in 2007 US dollars by Ravishankar et al. (2009) for the 
period of 1995-2006, and illustrates the substantial increases in health aid.  
Table 2.1: Total Development Assistance for Health Estimates 1995-2006 (Billions 2007 
USD) 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
DAH* 8.0 8.1 8.4 8.7 9.8 10.7 10.9 12.4 13.6 15.6 17.9 19.0 
*Total Estimated DAH (billions 2007 USD), Ravishankar et al. (2009:2116). 
Defining health aid, accounting donor flows, dealing with missing data are not the only 
challenges facing the aid data. Figure 2.1, extracted from Ravishankar et al. (2009) 
webappendix20 highlights the recipient-wise traceability issues with (total) DAH measure. 
                                                          
12 And, of course, there are significant differences depending on whether the values in domestic 
currencies are first converted into dollars and then deflated, or vice versa (authors pick the former); 
see Ravishankar et al. (2009, Webappendix, p. 19). 
13  See also Van de Sijpe (2013a) and Dieleman et al. (2013) for further debate over this issue.  
14 And thus the DAH variable, too, suffers from missing data problem. 
15 See Ravishankar et al. (2009, Webappendix, pp. 18-24). 
16 See Ravishankar et al. (2009, Webappendix, pp. 53-55). 
17 In-kind component also includes commodities, such as drugs and medical supplies. 
18 d ?ƐŽǁŶĐĂůĐƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐďĂƐĞĚŽŶZĂǀŝƐŚĂŶŬĂƌĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? ? ? )ĚĂƚĂ ? 
19 This issue is particularly discussed in Van de Sijpe (2013:4). This will overstate the extent of 
estimated fungbility of aid.  
20 Available online at 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0140673609608813#appd001  
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dŚĞ ŐĞŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐĂůůǇ  “ƵŶĂůůŽĐĂďůĞ ? ƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ AH ranges from 43.9 to 61.5 per cent of 
total estimated yearly DAH.  
Figure 2.1: Traceability of estimated DAH flows to the Recipient Region 
 
Source: Ravishankar et al. (2009, Webappendix p. 4). Original caption P “tĞďĨŝŐƵƌĞ ? P,ĨƌŽŵ ? ? ? ?
to 2007 by focus region. All quantities are in real 2007 US$. DAH Funds for which we have no recipient 
ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇŽƌƌĞŐŝŽŶŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĂƌĞĐŽĚĞĚĂƐ “ƵŶĂůůŽĐĂďůĞ ? ? ? 
The key focus of Lu et al. (2010) study is to estimate the extent of health aid fungibility 
depending on whether the DAH is disbursed to recipient government sectors, or through 
non-governmental bodies. For this purpose, they use a final variation in DAH tracing 
discussed in Ravishankar et al. (2009): the decomposition of DAH by channel of assistance. 
This decomposition traces the DAH through: recipient governments; multilateral 
organisations (European Commission, UNICEF, UNAIDS, UNFPA, WHO); global health 
partnerships (GAVI and GFATM); International Development Association; NGOs, private-
public partnerships, and other channels (excluding GAVI and GFATM); the residual is coded 
ĂƐ ‘ƵŶƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĞĚ ? ?dŚĞĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚƐŚŽƌƚĐŽŵŝŶŐƐŽĨƚŚŝƐĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĚĞĐŽŵƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĂƌĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚŝŶ
the following paragraphs.  
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Development Assistance for Health disbursed through Government (DAH-G) is 
constructed21 by Lu et al. (2010:1378) as the funds identified to be disbursed to the recipient 
government plus  “ĚŝƐďƵƌƐĞŵĞŶƚƐ ƚŚĂƚ ůĂĐŬĞĚ ĂŶǇ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ĂďŽƵƚ ƚŚĞ ĐŚĂŶŶĞů ŽĨ
ĚĞůŝǀĞƌǇ ? ?Figure 2.2 below illustrates why this may be a problem: as much as over a half of 
ƚŚĞ ?ƉƌĞƐƵŵĂďůǇŐĞŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐĂůůǇƚƌĂĐĞĂďůĞ )ƚŽƚĂů,ŚĂƐĂŶ ‘ƵŶƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĞĚ ?ĐŚĂŶŶĞůŽĨĚĞůŝǀĞƌǇ ?
Treating these flows as going through the recipient government is likely to overestimate 
DAH-G and influence22 the estimated results (see GHE-S paragraph).  
Figure 2.2: DAH Composition by the Channel of Delivery 
Source: Ravishankar et al. (2009:2117).  
                                                          
21 Lu et al. (2010) exclude DAH provided in form of loans.  
22 Lu et al. (2010: 1378) reportedly test the sensitivity of their findings to this assumption, and claim 
them to be robust to final conclusions (see Lu et al., 2010,  Webappendix  p.6), although it is not clear 
whether they redefine/re-estimate GHE-S accordingly.  
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Development Assistance for Health disbursed through non-Governmental sectors (DAH-nG) 
represents health aid disbursed through non-Governmental organisations.  
To elicit domestically funded public health expenditures, Lu et al. construct variable 
Government Spending as Source (GHE-S)23. It is estimated by subtracting the health aid 
disbursed through the government (DAH-' ) ĨƌŽŵ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ƚŽƚĂů ŚĞĂůƚŚ Ɛpending as 
agent (GHE-A).  Some key problems arise here in addition to the problems with constructing 
the components (especially potentially overestimated DAH-G), primarily because this way of 
constructing the (dependent) variable assumes that aid is (or is required or intended to be) 
fully spent in the fiscal year it was received. If this is not the case, aid will be estimated as 
fungible by construction.  
Aid may not be spent in the year it was received for multiple reasons. Firstly, in cases where 
aid flows are volatile24 ?ŝƚŵĂǇďĞŝŶƚŚĞƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚnot to spend 
the received (in cash) health aid in its entirety in the fiscal year it was received. In the 
ƉƌĞƐĞŶĐĞŽĨ ƐƵĐŚĂŝĚ  ‘ƐŵŽŽƚŚŝŶŐ ? ? ƚŚĞ ĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ ĂŝĚ ŝƐ ĨƵůůǇ ƐƉĞŶƚ in the year it has 
been received inherent in the definition of GHE-S may lead to estimated coefficients 
associated with conclusion that it is fungible by construction.25 Secondly, in the same issue of 
The Lancet, Ooms et al. (2010:1403) hypothesise further  ‘ĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚƉŽůŝĐǇĐŚŽŝĐĞƐ ?ĞǆƉůĂŝŶŝŶŐ
ǁŚǇ ĂŝĚ ŵĂǇ ŚĂǀĞ Ă ĐƌŽǁĚŝŶŐ ŽƵƚ ĞĨĨĞĐƚ ? ŶĂŵĞůǇ ƚŚĂƚ  “ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐ ĂŶƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞ ůŽŶŐ-term 
unreliability of international health aid by stalling possible increases of recurrent health 
ĞǆƉĞŶĚŝƚƵƌĞ ? ? ^ƵĐŚ ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ǁŽƵůĚ ďĞconsistent with IMF encouraging developing 
countries to build up financial reserves as a buffer against future adverse shocks, including 
aid shortfalls. In a way withholding (or smoothing) spending of the received health aid could 
enliken26 rather than endanger the sustainability of health spending. Finally, if DAH-G is 
ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůůǇ ŽǀĞƌĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞĚ  ?ŝ ?Ğ ? ŝĨ Ăƚ ůĞĂƐƚ Ă ĨƌĂĐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ  ‘,-ƵŶƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĞĚ ? ĂƐƐƵŵĞĚ ƚŽ ŐŽ
through the recipient government in fact does not flow through the recipient government, 
or a fraction of the aid is not in cash), the domestically funded component of government 
health spending (GHE-^ )ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞĚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƚŽŚĞĂůƚŚ
will be underestimated by construction (reinforcing the downward bias from the assumption 
                                                          
23 Lu et al. (2010) acknowledge that due to lack of reporting standards, it is not always certain 
whether GHE-A or GHE-S is reported in the original National Accounts.  
24 And/or not fully predictable. 
25 Altogether, it may severely disrupt recipient reporting as resources would be transferred across 
years, and it may not be clear whether spending is domestically or externally funded.  
26 Assuming the health aid saved is later indeed spent on health. 
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that all aid is spent in the year it is received). GHE-S is the dependent variable in Lu et al. 
(2010).  
/ƚŝƐŶŽƚĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚƚŽĂŐƌĞĞǁŝƚŚ>ƵĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? )ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚ “ ?Ğ ?ŶŚĂŶĐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƉƵďůŝĐ
financing of health is important for the long-term financial sustainability of the health 
ƐĞĐƚŽƌ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĂƚ ŝĨ  ?Žƌ ǁŚĞŶ )  “ƚŚĞ ĚŽŶŽƌ ĨƵŶĚŝŶŐ ĚĞĐůŝŶĞƐ Žƌ ƐƚŽƉƐ ? ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ĂŝĚ-
funded health programmes would be difficult without the financial support of the domestic 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ? ?ƵŶůĞƐƐ ?ĂƐĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚĂďŽǀĞ ?ƐŽŵĞŽĨ the aid is consciously saved up indeed to 
ensure such continuation). However, authors provide no clear discussion over what 
ŝŶĐĞŶƚŝǀĞƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ ŝƐ ŝŶƉůĂĐĞĨŽƌƚŚĞƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƚŽĂĚŽƉƚƐƵĐŚ  ‘ůŽŶŐ-ƚĞƌŵ ?ǀŝĞǁ
rather than manage the funds available to them given the short term urges; in practice, they 
may have little incentive not to fungor27 - especially when donors do not provide any clear 
depiction of (health) aid exit strategy. As Ooms et al. (2010:1403) note, DAH is relatively 
more generous28 than ŽƚŚĞƌ ĂŝĚ ? ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐ ŵĂǇ  “ĐŽŵƉĞŶƐĂƚĞĨŽƌ
exceptional international generosity to the health sector by reallocating government funding 
ƚŽŽƚŚĞƌƐĞĐƚŽƌƐ ? ?dŚŝƐŝƐ ?ŝŶĨĂĐƚ ?ƐŽŵĞǁŚĂƚĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚǁŝƚŚconsistent with Paris Declaration 
on ŝĚĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐ ?ŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŽĂůŝŐŶĂŝĚǁŝƚŚĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ?ŽǁŶƉƌŝŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ29, when 
the aid is not distributed uniformly across sectors (see also McGillivray and Morrissey, 2000, 
2001 on welfare-optimising response from a rational recipient government). 
General Government Spending (GGE) captures the government size (data from the World 
Bank).30 It is worth noting that in Lu et al. this measure includes the GHE-A.  
Debt relief disbursement (DR), constructed from OECD CRS Action Relating to Debt 
database, is included in the model, potentially to control for the effects of the PRSP31-type 
                                                          
27 Fungor (latin)  Wperform, enjoy.  
28 To put this in numbers, in addition to Table 2.1 ĂďŽǀĞ ?  “ŚĞĂůƚŚ ĂŝĚ ŚĂƐ ŐƌŽǁŶ ƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞ ƚŽ ŽƚŚĞƌ
foreign aid: development assistance for health (DAH) increased by 251 per cent between 1995 and 
2010 (Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation, 2013), while official development assistance (ODA, 
ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐŚĞĂůƚŚĂŝĚ ) ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚďǇŽŶůǇ  ? ?ƉĞƌĐĞŶƚ  ?dŚĞtŽƌůĚĂŶŬ ?  ? ? ? ? ) ? ?  ?ŝĞůĞŵĂŶĞƚĂů ? ?
2013:1755). 
29 ŝĞůĞŵĂŶĞƚĂů ?  ? ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ? )ƉŽŝŶƚŽƵƚ ƚŚĂƚ  “ƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚŐovernments prioritise health in much the 
same manner as they always have. In 1995, the average low- and middle-income country spent 9.3 
per cent of total general government expenditure (GGE, which includes some ODA) on health. In 
2010, the share of GGE on health increased only to 9.4 per cent. In an environment characterised by 
an increasing share of aid for health but relatively constant government prioritisation, it is plausible 
that rational governments reallocate funds and displace domestic government health expenditure. 
dŚŝƐƌĞŶĚĞƌƐŚĞĂůƚŚĂŝĚĨƵŶŐŝďůĞ ? ?EĞǀĞƌƚŚĞůĞƐƐ ? ŝƚŵƵƐƚďĞŶŽƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐĞƐƚĂƚŝƐƚŝĐƐ ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ
total amount spend on aid increased at least in line with total government spending.  
30 World Development Indicators Online Database. Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2009. 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20398986~menuPK:6
4133163~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html (accessed Sep 11, 2009). 
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programmes, which are expected to route the released funds into social sector spending 
(including health). It excludes capitalised interest and is assumed to be evenly distributed (in 
dollar, rather than relative, terms) over 10 years.  
As increments in the standard of living have been empirically established to be associated 
with increased health expenditures, Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDPpc) (in USD 
2006 values) is also controlled for, constructed using IMF World Economic Outlook and UN 
Population Data32. It is noteworthy that Lu et al. (2010) use the non-logged version of this 
variable.  
HIV prevalence rate (HIV), from UNAIDS database33, is used to control for the spread of 
infectious diseases.34 The positive correlation between aid and burden of disease is not 
necessarily informative about the direction of causality. Over35 provides a brilliant summary: 
 “/ĨǁĞďĞůŝĞǀĞƚŚĂƚŚĞĂůƚŚĂƐƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞƐŚŽƵůĚƌĞĚƵĐĞĚŝƐĞĂƐĞďƵƌden, then we might expect 
this correlation [between the total disease burden in a country and the total amount of 
health assistance it receives] to be negative. If we believe that health assistance should be 
directed to places with higher burdens, then the correlation should be positive. If we think 
the main criterion for allocating foreign assistance should be the cost-effectiveness of 
spending opportunities, not the size of the burden, and that many other factors influence 
health beside health assistance from abroad, then we should expect that the correlation will 
be weak. If we believe all of these things at once, as most of us do, then we have no prior 
belief whatsoever about the correlation between burden and assistance and will find it to be 
uninterestŝŶŐ ? ?
All variables, except HIV prevalence and GDP per capita, are expressed as a percentage of 
GDP36 for country i in time t. A general comment may be worth noting here. It is rather 
doubtful that government officials plan revenues and expenditures in terms of percentages 
                                                                                                                                                                      
31 Highly Indebted Poor Countries Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper.  
32 IMF. World Economic Outlook Database. Washington DC: International Monetary Fund, 2009. 
http://imf.org/external/data.htm (accessed Feb 1, 2009);  
United Nations Department of Economics and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population 
Prospects: The 2006 Revision. 2007. CD-ROM Edition-Extended Dataset in Excel and ASCII formats 
(United Nations publication, Sales No. E.07.XIII.7) 
33 UNAIDS, WHO. HIV data. Geneva: UNAIDS, 2009. 
http://www.unaids.org/en/KnowledgeCentre/HIVData/ (accessed Jan 20, 2010). 
34 HIV is correlated with GHE-A just about as much as with DAH-G.  
35 Over (2009, Blog Entry): http://www.cgdev.org/blog/%E2%80%9Cwho-what-where-when-how-and-
how-much%E2%80%9D-international-health-aid-%E2%80%93-not-%E2%80%9Cwhy%E2%80%9D  
36 GDP figures from the World Bank are used for variables other that GHE-A/GHE-S. It is not clear why 
ǁŽƵůĚƚŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌƐĚĞƉĂƌƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ/D& ?t,KƐƚĂƚŝƐƚŝĐƐ ?tĞǁŝůůƐƚŝĐŬƚŽ>ƵĞƚĂů ? ?ƐŵĞƚŚŽĚ ? 
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of (hardly predictable or properly calculated) future GDP figures (and incorporating 
forecasted GDP growth rates) rather than in level terms, in domestic currency. 37 Clearly, 
expressing variables as percentage as GDP allow for international comparisons, but that 
inevitably introduce extra variation that is not at all in direct control of the recipient 
government.38 
Table 2.2 below provides summary statistics for the explanatory variables (summary 
statistics for the dependent variable, GHE-A/GHE-S are provided in the Results section due 
to pervasive missing values). Appendix Figure A1 depicts the distributions of each of the 
variables, illustrating that these are skewed. The correlation coefficients among the 
independent variables are provided in Table 2.3.39 The highest correlation coefficient in the 
sample is observed between the aid variables (firstly, between DAH-G and DAH-nG, but also 
with debt relief). This may (but does not necessarily) reflect common trends in aid funding 
(i.e. if donors increase their disbursements, they do so across delivery channels).  Strong 
negative correlation between health aid disbursements (and debt relief) and GDP per capita 
may reflect decreasing aid funding with increments in standards of living. Disease burden, 
proxied by HIV prevalence, seems to bear positive (albeit not large) correlation with DAH-G, 
possibly favouring the argument that donors allocate more health aid to countries with 
higher identified disease burdens, or that health aid is at least partially contributing to 
disease diagnostics and recording.  
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics (Explanatory Variables) 
 DAH-G/GDP DAH-nG/GDP DR/GDP GDPpc GGE/GDP HIV 
Mean .0027 .0007 .0048 2285 .1445 .0275 
Std.d. .0045 .0019 .0139 2825 .0635 .0516 
Min -.000 0 0 89 .0255 0 
Max .0386 .0198 .1517 21414 .5160 .2892 
N 
YO 
111  
1332 
111  
1332 
111  
1332 
111  
1332 
111  
1332 
111 
 1332 
                                                          
37 Unless knowingly assessed on exactly such measures by some institution that can pose any credible 
sanctions if some specific targets are not lived up to (e.g. donor holding-off next aid disbursement 
until some pre-set condition is fulfilled).  
38 Even the total government spending is not fully predictable at the time individual spending 
components are planned.  Nevertheless, expressing key variables of interest (namely, GHE-A, GHE-S, 
DAH-G, and DAH-nG) as percentage of total government spending may more appropriately reflect the 
intended (or acknowledged) variation in and prioritisation of public health spending compared to 
other public spending components, still allowing for international comparisons. However, the possibly 
unrelated shocks to government spending may introduce variation just as bad as from GDP, just in 
other direction. 
39 A word of caution is worth mentioning: if the variables follow I(1) processes (and in such short 
sample variables expressed as proportion of GDP are likely to be), the correlation is spurious. 
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Table 2.3: Correlations across Explanatory Variables 
 DAH-G 
/GDP 
DAH-nG 
/GDP 
DR/GDP GDPpc GGE 
/GDP 
HIV 
DAH-G/GDP 1      
DAH-nG/GDP 0.4859 1     
DR/GDP 0.3039 0.2546 1    
GDPpc -0.3453 -0.1927 -0.2038 1   
GGE/GDP -0.0004 0.0322 -0.0610 0.1359 1  
HIV 0.2323 0.1284 0.0385 -0.0809 0.2267 1 
   Note: Table reports correlation coefficients.  
3. Missing Data 
Lu et al. (2010:1376) raise an important issue of missing data in developing country records 
of government total health spending (GHE-A): 
 “AM QAN t,K ŝƐ ĨŽƌĐĞĚ ƚŽ ĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞ ŵŝƐƐŝŶŐ ĚĂƚĂ ĨŽƌ Ă ƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂů ƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
country years [of GHE-A variable]. The actual data and estimates are not always 
distinguished in the published tables, and detailed information about imputation 
ŵĞƚŚŽĚƐ ĂŶĚ ĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚƐ ŝƐ ŶŽƚ ĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƉƵďůŝĐ ? AM QAN t,K ?Ɛ ŝŵƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶ
ŵĞƚŚŽĚƐ ĂƌĞ ŶŽƚ ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚŝƐĞĚ ? ĂŶĚ AM QAN ?Ě ?ĞƚĂŝůĞĚ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĂďŽƵƚ ƚŚĞ
components used to generĂƚĞŝŵƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶƐǁĂƐŶŽƚƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚďǇt,K ? ?40 
This overstates the precision of the data.  
Unfortunately, after introducing the problem of missing data and proposing solving it using 
multiple imputation techniques, the authors average out the 100 imputed datasets and 
ĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞƚŚĞƉĂƉĞƌƐ ?ƌĞƐƵůƚƐ ĨƌŽŵǁŚĂƚĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůůǇ ŝƐĂƐŝŶŐůǇ ŝŵƉƵƚĞĚĚĂƚĂƐĞƚ ?ůƚŚŽƵŐŚ ŝŶ
ƚŚŝƐĐĂƐĞƚŚĞŵĞƚŚŽĚƐŽĨ ‘ƌĞĐŽǀĞƌŝŶŐ ?ƚŚĞŵŝƐƐŝŶŐĚĂƚĂĂƌĞŬŶŽǁŶ ?ŝ ?Ğ ?ƐƚĂƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞƉĂƉĞƌ ) ?
this reintroduces the issue of overstating the certainty of observation.  
tŝƚŚt,K ?ƐŚĞůƉŝŶŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇŝŶŐǁŚŝĐŚǀĂůƵĞƐǁĞƌĞŝŵƉƵƚĞĚĂŶĚǁŚŝĐŚǁĞƌĞŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚŝŶƚŚĞ
country financial reports, Lu et al. (2010) use a simple (though ad hoc) rule to code the 
government health expenditures (as agent) as missing or not. For a country year for which 
more than 10% information underlying the construction of the GHE-A observation is missing, 
the authors coded the observation as missing. For 1995-2006, this implies 33% of GHE-A 
observations missing in the WHO sample (442 out of 1332 country-year observations), and 
about 19% of GHE-A observations missing in the IMF sample (249/1332). The correlation 
                                                          
40  “ŶĚ ŝŵƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ǁĞƌĞ ŽĨƚĞŶ ďĂƐĞĚ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ĂƐsumption that the ratio of government health 
ƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐƚŽŐĞŶĞƌĂůŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐǁĂƐĐŽŶƐƚĂŶƚǁŝƚŚƚŝŵĞ ? ?Lu et al., 2010:1377).  
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between the GHE-A samples reported by WHO and IMF is only 70.8 per cent, with only 84 
observations coded as missing simultaneously in both samples. The remaining variables are 
implicitly assumed to be fully observed. This is reflected in the missingness map below, 
where red colour indicates an observed variable, whilst the observations coded as missing 
are coloured in yellow (Figure 2.3). Next section discusses analytical tools available to handle 
missing data statistically.41 
Figure 2.3: The Missingness Map 
 
4. Tools to Tackle Missing Data 
Regarding the issue of missing data (i.e. when one or more variable is not recorded or 
observed for a particular observation), three types of concern are generally considered:  
 “i) loss of information, efficiency or power due to loss of data; 
ii) complication in data handling, computation and analysis due to irregularities in 
the data patterns and non-applicability of standard software; and, most 
fundamentally, 
                                                          
41 CSV file ImputationChapter113Amelia.csv 
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iii) very serious potential bias due to systematic differences between the observed 
data and the unoďƐĞƌǀĞĚĚĂƚĂ ? ?ĂƌŶĂƌĚĂŶĚDĞŶ ?1999:17)42.  
The problem of missing data has been widely recognised  W and statistical developments 
applied  W in the context of medical statistics, as non-response in health surveys due to 
attrition or other problems may cause serious biases and inefficiency of coefficients in 
longitudinal analysis if not accounted for correctly. 43 Meanwhile, the majority of empirical 
studies within social sciences assume the absence of missing data (Honaker and King, 
2010:3), or ignore the problem altogether, and analyse the data for which all variable values 
are observed.  
ZĞůŝĂŶĐĞŽŶ ‘ĚĞĨĂƵůƚ ? methods such as complete-case analysis (listwise deletion), where the 
observation is discarded if values are not observed for one or more variables for that datum, 
has been criticised on several grounds. Firstly, data are costly to collect; therefore discarding 
observations for which at least some information is available is regarded as wasteful. 
Secondly, in cases where a large fraction of data is missing, discarding this data may reduce 
statistical efficiency through sample reduction44. Thirdly, depending on the reasons why data 
are missing, the practice of listwise deletion may invoke severe biases.45 Literature (see, for 
instance, Graham et al., 1994:15) also discusses missing data situations of omission, 
attrition, or planned missing data, among other topics related to coarsened46 data; this, 
however, is more related to the survey data, and is of little direct relevance here. 
Several alternative approaches to treating missing data have been suggested during last 
three decades, including single (SI) and multiple imputation (MI) techniques. The material 
below thus first provides a summary of the missingness mechanism, and how that may 
                                                          
42  “hŶĨŽƌƚƵŶĂƚĞůǇ ? ŝƚ ŝƐ ĂůƐŽ ƚŚĞ ŵŽƐƚ ĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚ ƚŽ ŚĂŶĚůĞ ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ? ƚǇƉŝĐĂůůǇ ? ƚŚe reasons for not 
observing the full data (i.e. the so-called missing-data mechanism) are often at best partially 
understood (except for cases where missing data are induced by the design or latent-variable 
ŵŽĚĞůůŝŶŐ ) ? ?ĂƌŶĂƌĚĂŶĚDĞŶŐ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) 
43  “/ŶĨĂĐt, the problem is so universal that an unusually high response rate (e.g.95%) should make the 
investigator worry about possible design flaws in the survey, such as selection bias in the sample or a 
substantial amount of untrustworthy responses induced by tŽŽŵƵĐŚŵŽŶĞƚĂƌǇ ŝŶĐĞŶƚŝǀĞ ?  ?ĂƌŶĂƌĚ
and Meng, 1999:18) 
44 See Section 6.  
45 EŽƚĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĨŽĐƵƐŚĞƌĞŝƐŽŶŵŝƐƐŝŶŐĚĂƚĂƚŚĂƚĚŽĞƐĞǆŝƐƚ ‘ŝŶĂƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐŵĞƚĂƉŚǇƐŝĐĂůƐĞŶƐĞ ?ďƵƚŝƐ
unobserved (e.g. government spending on health does actually exist in a given country, even if it is 
close to zero, provided there exists a country with an established government; whether that data are 
recorded or revealed by the government, may define whether that data is observed, or missing). 
46 Schafer and Graham (2002: 148) note ƚŚĂƚ “DŝƐƐŝŶŐǀĂůƵĞƐĂƌĞƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞŵŽƌĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ
coarsened data, which includes numbers that have been grouped, aggregated, rounded, censored, or 
ƚƌƵŶĐĂƚĞĚ ?ƌĞƐƵůƚŝŶŐŝŶƉĂƌƚŝĂůůŽƐƐŽĨŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ?,ĞŝƚũĂŶĂŶĚZƵďŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? 
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influence the choice of treatment applied to the missing data; several popular methods for 
treating missing data problem are briefly summarised; and the MI framework is introduced.  
4.1 The Missingness Mechanism  
 “<ŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ? Žƌ ƚŚĞ ĂďƐĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ? ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵƐ ƚŚĂƚ ůĞĚ ƚŽ ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ ǀĂůƵĞƐ
being missing is a key element in choosing an appropriate analysis and in interpreting the 
ƌĞƐƵůƚƐ ? (Little and Rubin, 1987:8).  Three types of the underlying missingness mechanisms 
are distinguished in statistical literature (see Little and Rubin, 1987:8, Schaffer, 1997:11): 
Missing Completely at Random (MCAR), Missing at Random (MAR), and Non-Ignorable (NI). 
In the first (MCAR) case, the pattern of data missingness cannot be predicted by either the 
values of dependent or independent variable: missing values are a simple random sample of 
all values.47 If the data are missing at random (MAR), the probability of missingness depends 
on the observed data, but not on the unobserved data.48 The missingness process is non-
ignorable when the probability that a cell is missing depends on the unobserved value of the 
missing response. For a more extended and technical discussion see Appendix Table A1.  
The underlying missingness mechanism (or the respective assumption) may determine the 
validity of the methods employed in the empirical analysis. For instance, the default option 
of listwise deletion may bias the results unless the MCAR holds, whilst the inferences from 
analyses using MI are not biased under MCAR or MAR. All econometric estimates may be 
biased under NI. The methods applied in this chapter assume that data are MAR. Usually, 
MCAR can be rejected in favour of MAR. Unfortunately,  ?ŝt is not possible to relax the MAR 
assumption in any meaningful way without replacing it with other equally untestable 
assumptions ?AM QANIn the vast majority of studies, principled methods that assume MAR will 
tend to perform better than ad hoc procedures such as listwise deletion or imputation of 
ŵĞĂŶƐ ? ? ?^ĐŚĂĨĞƌĂŶĚKůƐĞŶ ?1998:553).49 Similarly, the presence or absence of NI can never 
be demonstrated using only the observed data. Thus, in most circumstances it is possible to 
verify (in statistical simulations) whether multiple imputation will outperform (or rather will 
                                                          
47 An example of this could be if a proportion of observations are randomly deleted; or hard copies 
are kept in cellar in which some parts are exposed to intense humidity which over a period of time 
destroys a proportion of files arranged in disorderly fashion. 
48 For instance, war. In our sample, Rwanda exhibits missing data for several years after the 1994 
genocide. Increments in government (military) spending (if recorded), or the very fact that other data 
are missing (i.e. the observed missingness matrix) could be used to predict the missingness of the 
data in other variables). 
49 WŽƚƚŚŽĨĨ ĞƚĂů ?  ? ? ? ? ? )ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĂ  “ƚĞĐŚŶŝƋƵĞ ĨŽƌĂƐƐĞƐƐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞĚĞŐƌĞĞ ƚŽǁŚŝĐŚDZĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶ ŝƐ
ƚĞŶĂďůĞ ? ? <ůŝŶĞ ĂŶĚ ^ĂŶƚŽƐ  ? ? ? ? ? ) ĂƐƐĞƐƐ ƚŚĞ ƐĞŶƐŝƚŝǀŝƚǇ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞĚ ƌĞƐƵůƚƐ ƚŽ ĚĞǀŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĨƌŽŵ 
MAR. 
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be expected to perform at least as well as) listwise deletion, but it is not possible to verify 
absolutely the validity of any multiple imputation model King et al. (2001:50-51). Relating to 
Lu et al. (2010), the variable for which a significant proportion is missing is government 
spending (as agent) on health. In this case, it seems plausible to reject the MCAR assumption 
in favour of the MAR, whilst discussion between MAR and NI remains open. 
4.2 Analysis Possibilities with Missing Data 
As missing data are not specific to developing countries  W essentially, data in any field are 
likely to have some observations missing  W numerous solutions to tackle the issue have been 
be designed by statisticians (econometricians), increasingly so with developments in 
computing technologies. Three broad categories of available methodologies can be 
distinguished: non-imputation methods; single imputation methods; and multiple 
imputation methods. These are discussed in turn in the following paragraphs. 
Non-imputation Methods 
The standard (default) practice50 of treating the observations containing missing data items 
is the complete-case analysis or listwise deletion, whereby an observation with at least one 
missing data point is discarded. If the rate of missingness is high, this results in a loss of 
statistical power. Where the question of missing data arises in context of a panel dataset, 
the waste of the data may be even higher, as, after discarding the country-year observations 
with missing data, the remaining scattered country years with fully observed information 
may, depending on panel method, be useless, and therefore eventually, too,  be discarded.  
Unless the underlying missingness mechanism is MCAR, this method can yield biased results 
and underestimated variance51. Little and Rubin (1987:41) suggest that the most common 
strategy to deal with this bias in the selection of complete cases (at least in dealing with 
sample survey) is to assign the case weights in the subsequent analysis. 
                                                          
50 &Žƌ ŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞ ? <ŝŶŐ Ğƚ Ăů ?  ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ?  ƌĞǀŝĞǁŝŶŐ  ‘ƌĞĐĞŶƚ ? ůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞ ŝŶ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ? ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚ ƚŚĂƚ
 “ĂƉƉƌŽǆŝŵĂƚĞůǇ ? ?A?ƵƐĞůŝƐƚǁŝƐĞĚĞůĞƚŝŽŶƚŽĞůŝŵŝŶĂƚĞĞŶƚŝƌĞŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ůŽƐŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚŽŶĞ-third of 
their data, on average) when any one variablĞ ƌĞŵĂŝŶƐ ŵŝƐƐŝŶŐ ĂĨƚĞƌ ĨŝůůŝŶŐ ŝŶ ŐƵĞƐƐĞƐ ĨŽƌ ƐŽŵĞ ? ?
therefore losing valuable information, reducing standard errors and possibly causing selection bias.  
51 <ŝŶŐĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) P “/ŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐĨƌŽŵĂŶĂůǇƐĞƐƵƐŝŶŐůŝƐƚǁŝƐĞĚĞůĞƚŝŽŶĂƌĞƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞůǇŝŶĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶt, no 
matter which assumption characterises the missingness, and they are also biased unless MCAR holds. 
Inferences based on multiple imputation are more efficient than listwise deletion (since no observed 
data are discarded), and they are not biased under MCAR or MAR (Little and Rubin, 1989; Little and 
Schenker, 1995). Both listwise deletion and basic multiple imputation approaches can be biased under 
NI, in which case additional steps must be taken, or different models must be chosen, to ensure valid 
inferences. Thus, multiple imputation will normally be better than, and almost always not worse than, 
ůŝƐƚǁŝƐĞĚĞůĞƚŝŽŶ ? ?
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The relative performance of listwise deletion compared to other methods such as multiple 
imputation under different missingness mechanism in theory is possible through comparison 
of the associated minimum square errors. Clearly, in practice such comparisons cannot be 
made due to the nature of the problem itself (the complete dataset is not available). 
Furthermore, related to the discussion above regarding the missingness mechanism, with a 
rare exception of highly controlled experiments, the missingness mechanism (i.e. MAR 
versus NI) cannot be verified, further reducing the validity of comparison of methods 
altogether.   
An alternative strategy, which is somewhat less wasteful (at least in the case of univariate 
analysis), is the available-case analysis, which includes all the cases where the variable of 
interest is observed. However, the sample base changes from variable to variable, therefore 
yielding potential problems of comparability across different sample bases. The problem is 
again exacerbated when panel dataset is used. Little and Rubin (1987:55) also discuss some 
weighting methods, which are essentially based on probability sampling.52 
Generally, unless the MCAR assumption holds, and the missingness rate is very small, these 
simple methods provide biased inference, result in loss of statistical power and too small 
standard errors, and, as discussed above, may contain other problems or restrictions. 
Single Imputation Methods 
Imputation refers to the class of methods that impute (i.e. fill in) the values of the items that 
are missing. Several examples of single imputation are summarised below (Little and Rubin, 
1987:60-62): 
i. Mean imputation refers to the popular case where missing values are simply 
substituted by the sample (or sub-sample) mean (estimated from the observed 
data). Clearly, this underestimates the magnitude of both variances and covariances.  
ii. Hot deck imputation refers to the method where a missing value is replaced by a 
value from estimated distribution: in practice, the empirical distribution consists of 
values from observed units, such that hot deck imputation substitutes the missing 
values with values drawn from similar responding units. 
iii. Substitution replaces non-responding units with units previously not selected into 
the sample. It is worth noting that the resulting sample should not be treated as 
                                                          
52  “ƵŶŝƚƐĞůĞĐƚĞĚǁŝƚŚƉƌŽďĂďŝůŝƚǇߨi ŝƐ “ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŝŶŐ ?ߨi-1 units in the population, and hence should 
be given the weight ߨi-1 in estŝŵĂƚĞƐŽĨƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶƋƵĂŶƚŝƚŝĞƐ ? ?dŚŝƐŵĞƚŚŽĚ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐ ƚŚĞ
assumptions of underlying distribution of missing values or the entire population. 
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complete, as the substituted units are respondents and therefore may systematically 
differ from non-respondents.  
iv. Cold deck imputation: a missing value is replaced by a constant value from an 
external source (e.g. a value from a previous realisation from the same survey). 
v. Regression imputation  “ƌĞƉůĂĐĞƐ ŵŝƐƐŝŶŐ ǀĂůƵĞƐ ďǇ ƉƌĞĚŝĐƚĞĚ ǀĂůƵĞƐ ĨƌŽŵ Ă
regression of the missing item on items observed for the unit, usually calculated 
ĨƌŽŵ ƵŶŝƚƐ ǁŝƚŚ ďŽƚŚ ŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚ ĂŶĚ ŵŝƐƐŝŶŐ ǀĂƌŝĂďůĞƐ ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ?  ?Little and Rubin, 
1987:61).  
vi. Stochastic regression imputation  “ƌĞƉůĂĐĞƐ ŵŝƐƐŝŶŐ ǀĂůƵĞƐ ďǇ Ă ǀĂůƵĞ ƉƌĞĚŝĐƚĞĚ ďǇ
regression imputation plus a residual, drawn to reflect uncertainty in the predicted 
ǀĂůƵĞ ? ?Little and Rubin, 1987:61). 
vii. Composite methods, as implied by the name, combine ideas from the different 
ŵĞƚŚŽĚƐ ŵĞŶƚŝŽŶĞĚ ĂďŽǀĞ  ?Ğ ?Ő ?  “ŚŽƚ ĚĞĐŬ ĂŶĚ ƌĞŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ ŝŵƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶ ĐĂŶ ďĞ
combined by calculating predicted means from a regression but the adding a 
residual randomly chosen from the empirical residuals to the predicted value when 
forming the values for ŝŵƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?>ŝƚƚůĞĂŶĚZƵďŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ) ?
However, even when the imputation model is correct, single imputation inference tends to 
overstate precision of imputed observation because it omits the between-imputation 
component of variability (Schafer, 1999:7)  ?ƐĞĞƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ ‘ŽŵďŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ^ƚĞƉ ?ďĞůŽǁ ) ? 
Multiple Imputation Methods 
If one was to rely on the default method of complete-case analysis using the dataset in 
question and discard any country for which at least one yearly observation is missing, the 
sample size would be reduced by 62% in the case where IMF data were used, 65% in the 
case where the WHO data were used, and by 90% if a conservative researcher were only to 
trust data simultaneously fully observed in both samples. Single imputation methods would 
overstate the precision of the missing data. Thus we explore the third alternative. 
Multiple imputation (MI) is a simulation-based approach used for analysing incomplete data. 
MAR assumption is often key to the validity of MI, although some frameworks have been 
developed to accommodate cases where the missingness of data is non-ignorable (NI). The 
methods used in this chapter are built on the MAR assumption.  
Any MI analysis involves three steps: an imputation step, where imputation model is 
formulated and M distinct imputed datasets are created; an analysis step, where each of the 
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imputed datasets is analysed separately using the usual econometric techniques; and a 
combination step, where the results of the separate analysis are combined to generate a 
single set of estimates, according to the rules proposed by Rubin (1987).  
The Imputation Step 
The imputation step refers to creation (simulation) of M>1 imputed datasets, where the 
observed values are fixed across the M datasets, but the missing values in each dataset are 
replaced by imputed values that vary across the datasets to reflect uncertainty associated 
with the missing value.  
The validity of the method hinges on how the imputations were generated: different MI 
methods undertake different distributional assumptions of completed (that is, observed and 
unobserved) data; they also rely on different algorithms53 and different computational 
techniques54 ? ^ĐŚĂĨĞƌ  ? ? ? ? ? P ? ) ĂƌŐƵĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ  “ƚŚĞ ŝŵƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ƐŚŽƵůĚ ? ŽŶĂǀĞƌĂŐĞ ? ŐŝǀĞ
reasonable predictions for the missing data, and the variability among them must reflect an 
ĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞĚĞŐƌĞĞŽĨƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇ ? ?&Žƌ instance, in cases where a variable in question can 
only have non-negative values in reality (e.g. government expenditure on health), it is not 
plausible for the multiple imputation procedure to lead to negative imputed values. Thus 
distributional assumptions, computational techniques, and modelling are all to be carefully 
considered.  
Imputation models account for other variables in the model to be analysed, and the quality 
of that data may define the levels of uncertainty associated with the imputed value: if a sole 
datum is missing for one variable, and all other variables  W as well as the imputed one  W 
ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƐŽŵĞ ‘ƐƚĂďŝůŝƚǇ ?ŝŶƚŚĞŽǀĞƌĂůůĚĂƚĂƐĞƚ ?Ğ ?Ő ?ĂůůŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚǀĂůƵĞƐĂƌĞŐƌŽǁŝŶŐĂƚĂ
constant rate), the uncertainty associated with the imputed datum (that is, the variability of 
the imputed datum across the M datasets) will be smaller than in cases where there is a lot 
of variability in the observed data itself). 
In terms of modeling at the imputation step, the consensus in statistical literature is that the 
imputation model should contain at least all the variables (and their transformations) that 
are going to be used in the analysis model. The consideration regarding the inclusion of 
auxiliary variables (up to potentially all the information available in the dataset) is twofold. 
On one hand, building the imputation model that contains the information of the entire 
                                                          
53 Expectation-maximisation (EM) versus data-augmentation (DA) algorithms. 
54 E.g. Markov Chain Monte Carlo. 
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dataset has the advantage that the resulting multiple-imputed dataset may be used for any 
analysis regarding that dataset. On the other hand, if one builds an imputation model to be 
used for a specific analysis, there is an advantage of being able to include various non-linear 
and interaction terms relevant for a specific research question, which, however, add to 
computational complexity. In the context of survey design, for instance, one may plan for 
auxiliary variables that may help predict the missing value of a related variable (e.g. it may 
be useful to include some questions about number of rooms in a house of individual or a 
type of a car they drive, if the researcher anticipates that some individuals may decline to 
indicate their income).55 
The dependent variable containing missing values should not be imputed. However, Lu et al. 
(2010) effectively use the MI technique to construct the dependent variable. 56 The outline 
and the discussion regarding the MI paradigm are mainly related to the missing observations 
in the explanatory variables. It is arguably beneficial to include the dependent variable in the 
imputation model (whilst imputing the explanatory variables), so that the relationships 
between the dependent and independent variables ĂƌĞ ƉƌĞƐĞƌǀĞĚ ĂŶĚ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĞĚ ĨŽƌ P  “/Ĩ
values of X [independent variables] are missing as well as Y [the dependent variable], then 
cases with Y missing can provide a minor amount of information for the regression of 
ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ? ďǇ ŝŵƉƌŽǀŝŶŐ ƉƌĞĚŝĐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŵŝƐƐŝŶŐ y ?Ɛ  ?ƐŝĐ ? ĨŽƌ ĐĂƐĞƐ ǁŝƚŚ z ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ?  ?>ŝƚƚůĞ
1992:1227). However, in cases where the dependent variable itself has missing values, the 
imputation ŝƐ ŽĨ ůŝƚƚůĞ ǀĂůƵĞ P  “/Ĩ ƚŚĞ y ?Ɛ  ?ƐŝĐ ? ĂƌĞ ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞŵŝƐƐŝŶŐ ǀĂůƵĞƐ ŽĨ z ĂƌĞ
missing at random, then the incomplete cases contribute no information to the regression of 
Y on X1 ? Q ?yp ? ?>ŝƚƚůĞ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ?, where p denotes the number of independent variables). As 
noted above, in Lu et al. (2010), the explanatory variables (the Xs) are assumed to be fully 
observed, and the outcome variable is assumed to be missing at random. Von Hippel 
 ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ  “ƵƐŝŶŐ ŝŵƉƵƚĞĚ zƐ ĐĂŶ ĂĚĚ ŶĞĞĚůĞƐƐ ŶŽŝƐĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞƐ ?
ĂŶĚ ?ĐŽŵƉůǇŝŶŐǁŝƚŚ>ŝƚƚůĞ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? )ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ ?ƉƌŽƉŽƐĞƐĂŶŝŵƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇǁŚĞƌĞďǇall 
cases are used for imputation, but following imputation cases with imputed Y values are 
excluded from the analysis. This way, he argues, the relationships between dependent and 
explanatory variables are maintained during the imputation process (imputed explanatory 
variables (or Xs) that are later used) when Y is used to impute Xs. When the explanatory 
                                                          
55 http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/seminars/missing_data/mi_in_stata_pt1.htm 
56 The authors apply multiple imputation technique to the GHE-A/GDP variable; they then subtract 
the DAH-G/GDP measure from the completed (observed and imputed) GHE-A/GDP variable to arrive 
to an estimate of GHE-S/GDP, which is the dependent variable in their analysis. For further 
explanation refer to the Data section above.  
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variables are fully observed, there is no need for imputation, because maximum-likelihood 
estimates can be obtained by deleting cases with missing Y (note, however, that this is more 
true for cross-section analysis rather than panel structure). The author argues that such 
strategy is more efficient compared to an ordinary MI (i.e. the one retaining imputed Ys): 
 “[it] tends to give less variable point estimates, more accurate standard-error estimates, and 
ƐŚŽƌƚĞƌĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶĐĞŝŶƚĞƌǀĂůƐǁŝƚŚĞƋƵĂůŽƌŚŝŐŚĞƌĐŽǀĞƌĂŐĞƌĂƚĞƐ ? (Von Hippel, 2007:85). 
This argument issues an important warning for the practice undertaken by Lu et al. (2010), 
as the authors rely on multiple imputation to generate values only for the dependent 
variable (based on the view that explanatory variables are fully observed), which are all 
subsequently used in the analysis (and combination) step. The issue is aggravated by the fact 
that, despite slight alteration to the dependent variable, given the recommendations 
regarding the imputation step that at least all the variables to be used in the analysis step 
must be used in the imputation model, the resulting outcome is that imputation model is 
(nearly) (at least economically) identical to the analysis model in the Lu et al. (2010) study. 
dŚĞ  ‘ƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞ ? ĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚ ǀĂƌŝĂďůĞ ŝƐ ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĞĚ ďǇ ƐƵďƚƌĂĐƚing DAH-G/GDP (used also in 
both in the imputation and analysis models as an explanatory variable), from the multiply 
imputed GHE-A/GDP variable. This is clear from equations (2.1)-(2.3). 
Imputation model: 
GHE-A/GDP  =  DAH-Gov/GDP + DAH-nG/GDP + GGE/GDP + GDPpc +DR + HIV + e  
(2.1) 
Construction of the  ‘ƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞ ?ĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚǀĂƌŝĂďůĞ P 
GHE-S/GDP = GHE-A/GDP57 W DAH-Gov/GDP 
(2.2) 
Analysis model 
GHE-S/GDP  =  DAH-Gov/GDP + DAH-nG/GDP + GGE/GDP + GDPpc +DR + HIV + e 
(2.3) 
Overall, Lu et al. (2010) imputation procedure goes rather radically against the proposition 
that the imputed values of the dependent should not be used in the analysis model 
(equation 2.1). Their imputation and analysis models are effectively (economically) identical 
and thus may be forcing the fit of the model used at the analysis step (equations 2.1 and 
2.3 ) ? dŚĞ  ‘ĂůƚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚ ǀĂƌŝĂďůĞ  ?equation 2.2) for the ultimate analysis 
                                                          
57 Completed = observed plus imputed. 
Chapter 2  W Missing Data   Emilija Timmis 
28 
 
model by using the key variable of interest (health aid to government, DAH-G/GDP) on both 
right and left hand side may further disrupt sound estimates and their economic 
interpretation.  
Analysis Step 
Analysis is performed using each of M imputed datasets, treating each completed dataset as 
if it was complete (i.e. no data was missing) to obtain a set of completed-data estimates ෠ܾH?ൌ  ෠ܾሺH?ሻǡ ෠ܾሺH?ሻǡ ǥ ǡ ෠ܾሺH?ሻ. In this chapter, for comparability with Lu et al. (2010), the Arellano-
Bover/Blundel-Bond (ABBB) linear generalised method of moments estimator, designed for 
panels with large cross-sectional dimension and few periods, is employed.58  
The analysis model, following Lu et al. (2010) can be summarised as: 
 ൬ܩܪܧ െ ܵܩܦܲ ൰H?H?ൌ ߚH?൬ܩܪܧ െ ܵܩܦܲ ൰H?H?H?H?൅ ߚH?൬ܦܣܪ െ ܩܩܦܲ ൰H?H?൅ ߚH?൬ܦܣܪ െ ݊ܩܩܦܲ ൰H?H?൅ ߚH?൬ ܦܴܩܦܲ൰H?H?൅ ߚH?ܩܦܲ݌ܿH?H?൅ ߚH?൬ܩܩܧܩܦܲ൰H?H?൅ ߚH?ܪܫ Hܸ?H?൅ ߤH?൅ ߝH?H? (2.4) 
where variables are as described in Section 2.  
Combination Step 
The main difference and advantage of multiple imputation, as opposed to single imputation 
techniques, lies in the third step where the M sets of estimates from analysis step are 
combined in such manner that the standard errors reflect the uncertainty associated with 
the underlying missing data.  
The parameter estimates are usually just a simple average across the results from all 
imputed datasets: 
 തܾ ൌ  ܯH?H?෍ ෠ܾሺH?ሻH?H?H?H?  (2.5) 
where ෠ܾሺH?ሻ denotes estimates from each complete (observed plus imputed) individual 
dataset m; and M denotes the total number of imputed datasets. 
                                                          
58 ƐŶŽƚĞĚďǇ>ƵĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? ) ?ƚŚĞŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇŝƐƐƵŝƚĂďůĞĨŽƌ “ŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚǀĂƌŝĂďůĞƐƚŚĂƚĂƌĞ
correlated with past and present realisations of the error; fixed effects; and heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation within indŝǀŝĚƵĂůƉĂŶĞůƐ ? ?
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The standard errors account not only for the within imputation variance (the average of 
variance across imputations) (Schafer, 1997)59: 
 ܷH?෠ ൌ  ? ܵܧH?෠ሺI?ሻH?H?H?ܯ  (2.6) 
where ܷH?෠denotes the within variation of a particular regression coefficient, ෠ܾ, and is simply 
an average of the squared standard error (SE) over M imputed datasets; 
but also the between imputation variance (a function of the variance of the parameter 
estimate across the imputed datasets and the number of imputations, M): 
 ܤH?෠ ൌ  ?ሺܯ െ  ?ሻ෍ ሺ෠ܾ െ തܾሻH?H?H?H?H?  (2.7) 
where ܤH?෠  denotes the sample variance of the parameter estimate, ෠ܾ, over M imputed 
datasets, 
therefore accounting for the uncertainty related to the imputed values.60 The final 
combination of these two variances is described by the following formula (Graham et al. 
2007:207): 
 ܶH?෠ ൌ ܷH?෠ ൅ ൬ ? ൅  ?ܯ൰ ܤH?෠  (2.8) 
The resulting standard error is a square root of the two variance components added 
together. 
It has been previously argued that good statistical inference could be achieved with 
sufficiently small number of imputations, M (that is, M=3 or M=5). This is based on the 
argument that gains to relative efficiency (itself based on the concept of mean-square error 
(MSE)) (Graham et al. 2007:207), summarized as: 
 ቀ ? ൅ ߛܯቁH?H? (2.9) 
whereߛ denotes the fraction of the data that is missing, diminish rapidly after the first few 
imputations (Rubin 1987:114). Graham et al. (2007:208) conduct a series of Monte Carlo 
                                                          
59 Note, however, that the SE components related to the model itself are not reported separately 
from the SE component related to the imputation.  
60 http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/seminars/missing_data/mi_in_stata_pt1.htm 
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simulations to demonstrate that, whilst the empirical estimates of efficiency are fairly close 
ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂů ƉƌĞĚŝĐƚŝŽŶƐ ŐŝǀĞŶ ďǇ ^ĐŚĂĨĞƌ ĂŶĚ KůƐĞŶ  ? ? ? ? ? ) ?  “ŽƚŚĞƌ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ
quantities, such as standard errors of the estimate, p-values, and power all vary rather 
markedly with the number of imputations (M), [and] statistical power can vary rather more 
dramatically with M than is implied by the efficiency tables presented in the previous 
ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶƐŽĨD/ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ? ?Their resulting recommendations are, especially concentrating on 
preventing the statistical power falloff, that M shŽƵůĚďĞ  ? ? ?  ? ? ?  ? ? ?  ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚAN ? ? ? ĨŽƌɶA?
0.10, 0.30, 0.50, 0.70, and 0.90, respectively (Graham et al. 2007:212).61 As, given the 
current state of available computing power, a larger M does not require much (if any) of 
additional time or resources of a researcher, the choice of M=100 is applied throughout this 
chapter.   
Multiple Imputation Software 
A number of software packages have been developed to perform the task of multiple 
imputation. Some of those would only perform the imputation step; some would be 
designed to handle all three steps. The early developments were mostly responding to the 
demand in the context of medical statistical analysis, followed by those designed towards 
the problems is social sciences, and have now been incorporated in the leading statistical 
software packages, such as Stata or SAS. Clearly, developments are eased by the increasing 
computing power, enabling the creators and users to both introduce more complicated 
methods, as well as speed up the process itself. Statistical packages for multiple imputation 
ĚŝĨĨĞƌŽŶƚŚĞďĂƐŝƐŽĨ  “ŝŶƚĞƌĨĂĐĞ ?ĨĞĂƚƵƌĞƐ ?ĂŶĚƌĞƐƵůƚƐ ? (Horton and Lipsitz, 2001: 244). For 
instance, they assume different distributions of completed (observed62 plus imputed) data, 
rely on different algorithms, and differ in flexibility of which features of the vast array in 
multiple imputation they can accommodate. Some examples and comparison of software 
packages (such as SOLAS, NORM, or MICE) that implements multiple imputation may be 
found in Horton and Lipsitz (2001). The analyses of this chapter follow Lu et al. (2010) and 
thus employ Amelia II (King et al., 2001) MI software, developed specifically for use in social 
sciences.  
                                                          
61 Similar recommendations are provided in the STATA 11 manual for multiple imputation (p. 5): it is 
argued that the actual M required depends not only on the rate of missingness, but also on the 
analysis model and the data itself, with some of analysis requiring M to be 50 or more; generally, the 
ŚĂŶĚďŽŽŬ ĂĚǀŝƐĞƐ  “ƵƐŝŶŐ Ăƚ ůĞĂƐƚ  ? ? ŝŵƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ƚŽ ƌĞĚƵĐĞ ƚŚĞ ƐĂŵƉůŝŶŐ ĞƌƌŽƌ ĚƵĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ
ŝŵƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?
62 The observed data contains the observed data and the missingness indicator matrix.  
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At the time of development of Amelia II, the methodology of multiple imputation was 
 “ůĂƌŐĞůǇƵŶŬŶŽǁŶĂŶĚƵŶƵƐĞĚ ? ?^ĐŚĂĨĞƌĂŶĚKůƐĞŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?ĂƐĐŝƚĞĚŝŶ,ŽŶĂŬĞƌĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ?
and used by a few applied statisticians or social scientists, although the concept of multiple 
imputation had been around for several decades (if one takes Rubin, 1987, as the departure 
point). Back in 2001, the lack of computing power (compared to today) was still an issue 
ŚŽůĚŝŶŐ ďĂĐŬ Ă ǁŝĚĞƌ ŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŵƵůƚŝƉůĞ ŝŵƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶ P  “ ? ? ? ? ? ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚ ƚŚŝƐ ŵĞƚŚŽĚ
[multiple imputation] is easy to use in theory, in practice it requires computational 
ĂůŐŽƌŝƚŚŵƐƚŚĂƚĐĂŶƚĂŬĞŵĂŶǇŚŽƵƌƐŽƌĚĂǇƐƚŽƌƵŶĂŶĚĐĂŶŶŽƚďĞĨƵůůǇĂƵƚŽŵĂƚĞĚ ? ?63 
Amelia II assumes that complete data is distributed as multivariate normal. Clearly, this is an 
ĂƉƉƌŽǆŝŵĂƚŝŽŶ ?ďƵƚ “ŵĂŶǇƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌƐŚĂǀĞĨŽƵŶĚƚŚĂƚŝƚworks as well as more complicated 
ĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞƐƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇĚĞƐŝŐŶĞĚĨŽƌĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝĐĂůŽƌŵŝǆĞĚĚĂƚĂ ?64. This assumption is used in a 
large fraction of multiple imputation software.  Amelia II also assumes that data is missing at 
random (MAR)65 ? ďĂƐĞĚ ŽŶ ĂƵƚŚŽƌƐ ? ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ ƚŚĂƚ  “DZ ĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶ ĐĂŶ ďĞmade more 
ƉůĂƵƐŝďůĞďǇŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůǀĂƌŝĂďůĞƐ ? (Honaker et al., 2012:4). 
The attractiveness of Amelia II seems to lie in its algorithm. Most of the multiple imputation 
implementing software packages rely on expectation-maximisation (EM) or data-
ĂƵŐŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ  ? ) ĂůŐŽƌŝƚŚŵƐ ? ŵĞůŝĂ // ĐŽŵďŝŶĞƐ ƚŚĞ  “ĐůĂƐƐŝĐ ? D ĂůŐŽƌŝƚŚŵ  ?Žƌ ? ŵŽƌĞ
specifically, expectation maximisation with importance sampling (EMis)) with bootstrap 
approach to take draws from its posterior. For each draw, Amelia II bootstraps the data to 
ƐŝŵƵůĂƚĞĞƐƚŝŵĂƚŝŽŶƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇĂŶĚƚŚĞŶƌƵŶƐƚŚĞDĂůŐŽƌŝƚŚŵ  “ƚŽ ĨŝŶĚƚŚĞŵŽĚĞŽĨ ƚŚĞ
ƉŽƐƚĞƌŝŽƌĨŽƌƚŚĞďŽŽƚƐƚƌĂƉƉĞĚĚĂƚĂ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŐŝǀĞƐĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇƚŽŽ ? (Honaker et 
al., 2010:5). Bootstrapping essentiĂůůǇ ƌĞƉůĂĐĞƐ  “ƚŚĞ ĐŽŵƉůŝĐĂƚĞĚ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ŽĨ ĚƌĂǁŝŶŐ ʅ
 ?ŵĞĂŶ ?ĂŶĚɇ ?ǀĂƌŝĂŶĐĞ ?ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŝƌƉŽƐƚĞƌŝŽƌĚĞŶƐŝƚǇ ? (Honaker and King, 2010:564). 
The representation of bootstrap-based EM, and the overall summary of MI analysis is 
provided in Figure 2.4. Note, however, that Amelia II only implements the first (imputation) 
                                                          
63 There are further issues noted by King et al. (2001:50) that postpones the wider application of 
ŵƵůƚŝƉůĞ ŝŵƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ĚĂƚĂ P  “ĞĐĂƵƐĞ ƚŚĞƐĞ ĂůŐŽƌŝƚŚŵƐ ƌĞůǇ ŽŶ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐ ŽĨ ƐƚŽĐŚĂƐƚŝĐ  ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ
deterministic) convergence, knowing when the iterations are complete and the program should be 
stopped requires much expert judgment, but unfortunately there is little consensus about this even 
among the experts. 
64 Ezzati-Rice et al. (1995); Graham and Schafer (1999); Rubin and Schenker (1986); Schafer (1997); 
Schafer and Olsen (1998)) as cited in King et al. (2001:53). 
65 Although MAR is not directly testable, we can compare the basic variable descriptions (means, 
standard deviation, and correlation) between the fully observed data and observations containing 
some missing values. These are provided in the Appendix Table A3.  
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step of the MI, whilst the analysis and combination steps must be performed in other 
statistical software packages (e.g. STATA 13, using mi estimate commands). 
Figure 2.4: The Process of Multiple Imputation Analysis in Amelia II 
 
Source: Honaker et al. (2012:6.) 
 
5. Results 
Lu et al. (2010) claim to use multiple imputation techniques using Amelia II (version 1.2-13.0) 
to generate 100 imputations for each missing value of GHE-A. However, they then average 
the imputations into what becomes a singly imputed dataset (where each missing value is 
replaced by one average imputation), and conduct the analysis without exploiting the 
additional variation arising from the uncertainty assigned to missing values.  
Having replicated the original Lu et al. (2010) results and confirmed that the dataset66 is 
ŝŶĚĞĞĚŽŶĞƵƐĞĚŝŶƚŚĞŽƌŝŐŝŶĂůƉĂƉĞƌ ?ǁĞ ‘ƌĞŝŶƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƚŚĞŝĚ ŶƚŝĨŝĞĚŵŝƐƐŝŶŐǀĂůƵĞƐŝŶ',-A 
variable in WHO and IMF datasets. Using Amelia II (version 1.6.4)67, we carry out imputations 
based on varying underlying assumptions, to demonstrate the sensitivity of Lu et al. (2010) 
                                                          
66 ŽǁŶůŽĂĚĞĚ ĨƌŽŵ  ? ZŽŽĚŵĂŶ ?Ɛ ďůŽŐ Phttp://www.cgdev.org/blog/cross-post-aid-fungibility-
debate-and-medical-journal-peer-review  
67 Latest available; no structural changes, mostly just bugs addressed. 
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findings.68 Each variation of multiple imputed dataset contains 100 imputations (M=100). 
The imputed values are bounded to fall within the range of observed value. This rather ad 
hoc assumption has both positive aspects (i.e. avoiding irrational outlier imputed values) and 
negative aspects (such as imposing an upper bound that may not be correct). However, this 
is done following Lu et al. (2010), and is potentially as good as any other ad hoc bounds.  As 
noted in Section 4, the dynamic panel estimator (ABBB) is used.  
Figure 2.6 illustrates the observed and imputed values of the government health spending 
as agent as proportion of GDP (GHE-A/GDP) for WHO and IMF samples. The GHE-A summary 
statistics are provided in Appendix Table A4. Table 2.5 reports the estimation results for IMF 
samples for the short run (with full sets of short- and long-run estimates for WHO and IMF 
datasets reported in Appendix Tables A5a and A5b, respectively).  Subsections 5.(1)  W 5.(5) 
discuss multiple imputation under varying assumptions taken during imputation step. 
Subsection 5.(6) estimates the results only from (reportedly) completely observed cross-
sectional units (countries). Subsection 5.(7) illustrates a widespread single imputation 
technique of sub-period averaging.  
5.(1) MI: following Lu et al. (2010) assumptions 
Lu et al. (2010) report generating 100 imputations for missing GHE-A/GDP simultaneously 
for WHO and IMF measures using all the right-hand-side variables of the analysis model,  
and including lags and leads69 of the outcome variables.70 Furthermore, although authors do 
not report this, it is obvious from their data they also impose imputation bounds equal to 
minima and maxima of the observed samples,71 ƚŽ ĂǀŽŝĚ  ‘ŽƵƚůŝĞƌ ? ŝŵƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ  ?ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ
negative values,72 or government health spending as proportion of GDP approaching one).73  
Figure 2.6 illustrates the observed and imputed values of the government health spending 
as agent as proportion of GDP (GHE-A/GDP) for WHO and IMF. The imputed values tend to 
centre around the observed mean (0.0258 for WHO, and 0.0205 for IMF), and be less 
dispersed towards the tales, compared to the observed values. For individual countries (not 
depicted here), the uncertainty associated with the imputed missing value can be rather 
                                                          
68 Missing values in WHO and IMF samples are imputed simultaneously, as suggested by Lu et al. 
(2010:1378). 
69 As the imputation models are predictive, and not cause (Amelia manual, Honaker et al. (2012:22). 
70 ET common seed 0128 is set across imputations for replication purposes. 
71 These are (0.002708; 0.09551) for WHO sample and (0.001712; 0.0867) for IMF sample.  
72 This imputation, nevertheless, returns some negative values for GHE-S/GDP.  
73 Dataset [Amelia2014OneA]. 
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substantial. Summary statistics do not seem to change dramatically (see Appendix Table 
A4). 
5.(2): Single imputation (averaged MI) 
How much does estimating the multiple imputed dataset appropriately matter? Given that 
results of (1) are fairly different from Lu et al. (2010) despite following their claimed (and 
implied) assumptions, we average the imputed datasets of (1) into one, to construct a 
 ‘ƐŝŶŐůǇ-ŝŵƉƵƚĞĚ ?averaged dataset74 and estimate the results.  The estimated coefficients are 
reported in column (2) in Table 2.4.  
5.(3) MI: Assuming common time trend 
As an alternative to inclusion of lags and leads of the missing variable, Amelia has an option 
to include time polynomials (up to third order) in the imputation model. This option allows 
for an assumption that observed values vary smoothly over time75 and share a common 
trend.76 Although an appealing option in theory, in our sample even the reportedly fully 
obsĞƌǀĞĚĐĂƐĞƐĚŽŶŽƚĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞ  ‘ƐŵŽŽƚŚŶĞƐƐ ?ŽǀĞƌƚŝŵĞ  ?ƐĞĞ Figure 2.5 for examples), 
let alone trying to fit a common trend. Partly, this may be due to scaling by GDP; partly, it 
may reflect an indeed varying health spending; partly, it could be driven by other reasons, or 
their combinations.   
The comparisons between observed and imputed values of GHE-A are provided in Figure 
2.6. Compared to multiple imputation assumptions discussed and reported in (1) (that 
includes lags and leads of variables) assuming a common time trend across countries during 
the imputation process (3) even more strongly centres the imputed values around the 
sample mean, deviating further from the observed distribution.  
  
                                                          
74 Dataset [Amelia2014OneA_Average]. 
75 If further interacted with the cross-section, this option would allow the pattern vary over time 
within the cross-sectional unit. However, given the small time series dimension this is not feasible, 
because of the amount of the extra parameters to be estimated. 
76 Dataset [Amelia2014ThreeK3.dta].The imputations with one (k=1) and two (k=2) time polynomials 
in the model were also carried out, but there were no seeming difference across them. Here only the 
results of the imputation model with three time polynomials are reported.  
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Figure 2.5: Example of GHE-A/GDP Country Patterns (WHO Data, selected countries) 
Chile Côte d'Ivoire Georgia 
   
Jamaica Cambodia China 
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5.(4) MI: Assuming fixed effects 
Given the panel structure of our dataset (i.e. small time-series and large cross-sectional 
dimensions), cross-sectional observation fixed effects may be preferable to fitting a 
 ?ĐŽŵŵŽŶ ) ƚƌĞŶĚ ŽǀĞƌ Ă ƐŚŽƌƚ ƐĂŵƉůĞ  ?ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇ ŐŝǀĞŶ  ‘ƵŶƐŵŽŽƚŚŶĞƐƐ ?exacerbated by 
expressing variables as proportion of GDP). Fixed effects simply imply that every cross-
sectional unit (i.e. country) has a uniquely estimated constant term. This is a reasonable 
setting, unless one is strongly convinced that all cross-sectional units have the same patterns 
over time in all variables including the same constant term77 (Honaker et al., 2012:21). The 
imputations are bounded as before. 
Panel (4) of Figure 2.6 portrays the imputed distributions. Especially in the IMF sample (with 
lower fraction of missing data), modelling the imputation stage based on the fixed effects 
assumption seems to deliver the closest distribution of the imputed values to the observed 
ǀĂůƵĞƐƚŚƵƐĨĂƌ ?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚŶŽƚŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞŵŽƐƚ ‘ĐŽƌƌĞĐƚ ?ŝŵƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? 
5.(5) MI: No (extra) assumptions 
As a simple check we also impute a model with no assumptions regarding any of the 
determinants (country-specific constant or common trend). Although without bounding the 
range of imputed values the upper values comply with upper limits, between 7-8% of the 
135600 observations are now imputed as negative. The imputed values are highly centred 
around the mean.78   
5.(6) Complete-case analysis 
Complete-case analysis discards observations for which any data are missing. Given our 
panel structure, we discard countries for which at least one value of GHE-A/GDP variable 
was identified as missing. GHE-A/GDP variable is reportedly fully observed (over the sample 
period) for 38 countries in the WHO sample and in 41 countries in the IMF sample. This 
corresponds to about a third (34-37 per cent) of the initial sample.  
5.(7) Three-year sub-period averages 
Given the pervasiveness of missing data in the context of developing economies, sub-period 
averages seem to be accepted as one of the standard solutions to compensate for some of 
                                                          
77 Dataset [Amelia2014FourFEA.dta]. 
78 Dataset [Amelia2014FiveNoAs.dta]. 
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the missing data. In this approach, the sample period is divided into smaller subsamples 
(here, the 12 year sample period is divided into four three-year sub-periods). In each sub-
period, the values across (potential maximum of) three observations are averaged. If at least 
one yearly observation in the sub-period is non-missing, the observation takes the average 
value derived from the non-missing yearly observations.79 This is a variant of single 
imputation methodology, and thus overstates the precision of the imputed value. It 
decreases the time-series dimension, and reduces the variance of the variables across time. 
In our sample, following this approach leads to a sample of 64 (83) countries observed over 
the four periods in the WHO (IMF) sample. 
 
 
                                                          
79 The remaining variables are also averaged into sub-period observations.  
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Figure 2.6: Observed and Imputed Values of GHE-A/GDP 
 (1): 100 imputations according to Lu et 
al. (2010) assumptions (lags and leads) 
(3): 100 imputations assuming three 
time polynomials/common trend 
(4): 100 imputations assuming country 
fixed effects  
(5): No additional assumptions (only 
multivariate normality and MAR) 
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The table depicts observed and multiple imputed (M=100) values of the government health spending as agent as proportion of GDP (GHE-A/GDP) for WHO and IMF samples. The variation in the 
imputed values results from different assumptions taken during the multiple imputation process. The imputed values in (1)-(4) are bounded to the observed range; imputed values in (5) are 
unbounded.  
Note that if imputed values in (1) were not bounded as described (not reported here), the imputed values would provide a much close correspondence between observed and imputed values, 
especially so for WHO, where the rate of data missingness is higher. 
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Table 2.4 provides the estimated results from variations of multiple and single imputation 
methods, and complete case analysis (for brevity, only results from IMF sample are 
discussed; WHO results are reported in the Appendix Table A5a and lead to comparable 
conclusions). The first column reproduces the Lu et al. (2010) estimates (significant 
ĐŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƐĂƌĞŝŶďŽůĚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐĂƌĞŝƚĂůŝĐŝƐĞĚ ) ?dŚĞŽƌŝŐŝŶĂůƉĂƉĞƌ ?ŽůƵŵŶ ‘>Ƶ ?ŝŶ
Table 2.4) concluded that each dollar of health aid disbursed through the government (DAH-
' ?'W )ƌĞĚƵĐĞƐŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐĂůůǇĨƵŶĚĞĚŚĞĂůƚŚƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐ ?GHE-S/GDP) by $0.43 in 
the short run (and by $1.01 in the long-run, see Appendix Table A5). Meanwhile, each dollar 
of health aid disbursed through non-governmental organisations (DAH-nG/GDP) was found 
to increase ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐĂůůǇ ĨƵŶĚĞĚ ƉƵďůŝĐ ĞǆƉenditures on health by $0.58.80 
'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚ ƚŽ ĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐĂůůǇ ĨƵŶĚĞĚ ŚĞĂůƚŚ ƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐ ǁĂƐ ĂůƐŽ ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚ ĂƐ
the size of the government grew. GDP per capita, disease burden, or debt relief with its 
associated pro-poor spending strategies were estimated to have no sizeable effect on 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐĂůůǇĨƵŶĚĞĚŚĞĂůƚŚƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐ ?
The results from seven alternative strategies of handling missing data described in sub-
sections 5.(1)-(7) are provided in the corresponding columns (1) through (7) in Table 2.4. As 
depicted in Figure 2.6, multiple imputed data following the Lu et al. (2010) assumptions (1) 
and those based on fixed effects (4) delivered the imputed distribution most comparable to 
observed data. Compared to the original Lu et al. (2010) estimates, there is little qualitative 
ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ  ?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚ ŶŽǁ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ƐŝǌĞ ĚŽĞƐ ŶŽƚ ƐĞĞŵƚŽ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ
domestically funded health expenditure)81. Therefore, had Lu et al. (2010) used the MI 
techniques appropriately, their conclusions on aid fungibility would have been graver: each 
health aid dollar82 assumed to be going through the recipient government83 would be 
estimated to reduce government own health spending by $0.66 in the short run, and by 
$1.12 dollar in the long run84. Unless the estimates would have been met with higher 
                                                          
80 sĂŶ ĚĞ ^ŝũƉĞ  ? ? ? ? ?Ă P  ? ? ? ? ) ƐŚŽǁƐ ĂŶ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐ ƌĞƐƵůƚ P “ŝĨ ŽŶ- and off-budget health aid [here 
proxied (to some extent) by DAH-G and DAH-nG, respectively] are equally fungible, we see that ߚመH?H?H?ൌ ߚመH?H?െ  ? ? ?dŚŝƐŝƐǁŚĂƚǁĞƐĞĞŝŶ>ƵĞƚĂů ? ?ƐĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞƐ ?&ŽůůŽǁŝŶŐsĂŶĚĞ^ŝũƉĞ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?
Lu et al. (2010) find that on and off budget aid are equally fungible. Van de Sijpe (2013a:1748) further 
ŶŽƚĞƐƚŚĂƚ “ ?Đ ?ŽŶƚƌĂƌǇƚŽ>ƵĞƚĂů ? ?s interpretation, a marginal effect of DAH-G smaller than 0 does not 
ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇŵĞĂŶĂŝĚŝƐĨƵŶŐŝďůĞ ?ŝƚĐŽƵůĚƐŝŵƉůǇŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞƚŚĂƚŶŽƚĂůůŚĞĂůƚŚĂŝĚŝƐƌĞĐŽƌĚĞĚŽŶďƵĚŐĞƚ ? ?
81 In fact, this is a common conclusion across our estimations. 
82 Or, more correctly, each percentage point increase in health aid as percentage of GDP.  
83 Recall that DAH-G includes non-cash components, and health aid that cannot be traced to a 
particular channel.  
84 Note that the estimated long term effects are somewhat milder than (yet still comparable to) Lu et 
al. (2010) original estimates.  
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scepticism, this may have attracted even more attention and caused even graver policy 
implications.  
Table 2.4: The Estimated Results (IMF, ABBB) 
Dependent variable: Domestically funded public health spending (GHE-S) 
 (Lu) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Original 
Lu et al. 
(2010) 
MI acc. 
to Lu et 
al. (lags 
and 
leads) 
average
d (SI) (1) 
MI 
commo
n time 
polyno-
mials 
MI 
Fixed 
effects 
MI with 
No 
(extra) 
assump-
tions 
Comple-
te Case 
Analysis  
 3-year 
average
s 
(SI) 
Logged 
GHE-
S/GDP 
.573*** 
(.055) 
 
.406*** 
(.084) 
 
.603*** 
(.060) 
 
.293*** 
(.084) 
 
.414*** 
(.065) 
 
.259*** 
(.081) 
 
.582*** 
(.047) 
 
.704*** 
(.184) 
 
DAH-
G/GDP 
-.433*** 
(.090) 
 
-.663*** 
(.141) 
 
-.597*** 
(.107) 
 
-.716*** 
(.156) 
 
-.603*** 
(.117) 
 
-.729*** 
(.158) 
 
-.560*** 
(.165) 
 
-.536*** 
(.146) 
 
DAH-
nG/GDP 
.580*** 
(.147) 
 
.563*** 
(.215) 
 
.571*** 
(.173) 
 
.520* 
 (.260) 
 
.551*** 
(.190) 
 
.497* 
(.264) 
 
.428** 
(.179) 
 
.320 
(.293) 
 
DR/GDP -.010 
(.030) 
 
.018 
(.061) 
 
.023 
(.034) 
 
.019 
(.064) 
 
.012 
(.044) 
 
.006 
(.068) 
 
-.002 
(.026) 
 
-.071 
(.042) 
 
GDPpc -.000 
(.000) 
 
-.000 
(.000) 
 
-.000 
(.000) 
 
-.000 
(.000) 
 
-.000 
(.000) 
 
-.000 
(.000) 
 
-.000 
(.000) 
 
-.000 
(.000) 
 
GGE/ 
GDP 
.020** 
(.009) 
 
.020 
(.018) 
 
.019* 
(.011) 
.030 
(.019) 
.018 
(.012) 
.031 
(.020) 
.000 
(.013) 
.026 
(.018) 
HIV .028 
(.026) 
 
.026 
(.041) 
 
.027 
(.024) 
 
.060 
(.046) 
 
.048 
(.033) 
 
.060 
(.048) 
 
.048** 
(.023) 
 
.003 
(.041) 
 
constan
t 
.005*** 
(.002) 
 
.009** 
(.003) 
 
.005** 
(.002) 
 
.009** 
(.004) 
 
.008*** 
(.002) 
 
.009** 
(.004) 
 
.008** 
(.003) 
 
.005 
(.005) 
 
N 
T 
111 
12 
111 
12 
111 
12 
111 
12 
111 
12 
111 
12 
41 
12 
83 
4 
Each cell reports the estimated coefficients from ABBB. Standard errors are reported in brackets. 
N denotes number of countries (not observations). 
 
Simply averaging multiple imputed dataset into a singly imputed one (2)85 (as Lu et al., 2010, 
have done) reduces the standard errors on multiple variables, in both short and long term. 
So, as predicted in theory, using single imputation for a missing value overstates precision 
associated with the unobserved value. The other single imputation solution of splitting the 
sample into three-year averages provides the most contrasting results: only the coefficient 
                                                          
85 EŽƚĞ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞƐĞ ĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞƐ ĂƌĞ ŶŽƚ ŝĚĞŶƚŝĐĂů ƚŽ >Ƶ Ğƚ Ăů ? ?Ɛ ƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚ ĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞƐ ? ŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ
ƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ƚŚĂƚ ƐŽŵĞ ƵŶƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚ ĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶƐ ǁĞƌĞ ƚĂŬĞŶ ĚƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĂƵƚŚŽƌƐ ? ŵƵůƚŝƉůĞ ŝŵƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶ 
process, i.e. complete replication was not possible. 
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of health aid disbursed through the government is estimated to be significant, rendering 
zero effect from all the remaining variables, including aid channelled through non-
governmental organisations, (in fact, the significance of the DAH-nG coefficient appears to 
be sensitive across the treatments). 
Overall, there appears to be little difference between the variations of assumptions taken 
during the multiple imputation step (though slightly more so in the WHO sample, where the 
fraction of the missing data is higher). The estimated effects of health aid variables are larger 
in absolute terms across the MI treatments than in the case of complete case analysis or 
mean imputation in three-year averaging. Applying multiple imputation methods in this 
context aggravates the estimated fungibility of health aid.  
6. Check: Direction of Bias  
The results section demonstrated that different approaches taken to tackle the missing data 
issue can alter the quantitative results. Two points are worth noting. Firstly, as we do not 
have the fully observed data, we cannot conclude which approach brings the estimates 
closest to the truth. Secondly, statistical literature (see Section 4) issues a warning against 
imputing the dependent variable (the case in Lu et al. and thus the focus of this chapter). To 
 ‘ĐŚĞĐŬ ? ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ ŵƵůƚŝƉůĞ ŝŵƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶ ďƌŝŶŐƐ ƚŚĞ ĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞƐ ĐůŽƐĞƌ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƵŶĚĞƌůǇŝŶŐ
parameters compared to ĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞ  ‘ĚĞĨĂƵůƚ ? ŽƉƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞ ĐĂƐĞ ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ  ?ůŝƐƚǁŝƐĞ
deletion) or expressing data in sub-ƉĞƌŝŽĚĂǀĞƌĂŐĞƐ ?ǁĞĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĂ ‘ƐĞŶƐŝƚŝǀŝƚǇĐŚĞĐŬ ?ŽĨƐŽƌƚƐ ?
(Note that we keep the estimation methods as before to isolate the differences arising from 
the missing data issue. Fixed effects estimates, however, are also shown, to see whether the 
bias would move consistently across empirical strategies. The results are available in the 
Appendix Table A8).86 
We take the largest subsample in which the variables are fully observed during the sample 
period of 1995-2006: the IMF sample of 41 countries (492 yearly observations); this 
corresponds to 37% of the Lu et al. (2010) sample. We completely randomly (complying with 
a more restrictive MCAR assumption) delete a fraction (about 19%, namely 90 out of 492 
yearly observations, and then 33 % (161/492) for comparison purposes) of observations, to 
establish a missingness rate consistent with the initial IMF full sample (of 111 countries). We 
                                                          
86 In terms of the bias, the FE results comply with the discussion of the subsection based on the ABBB 
estimates. Interestingly, however, FE estimates lead to conclusion that DAH-nG does not have a 
significant effect on government health spending (economically sound result, given that government 
is less likely to be aware of these flows; see Chapter 3 for discussion).  
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then impute the missing (discarded) data following the assumptions and structure of Section 
5 (repeating the analysis 10 times87 for robustness, ŬĞĞƉŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŽĨŵŝƐƐŝŶŐǀĂůƵĞƐ
identical, i.e. observation is coded as missing across repetitions). Although the sample is 
smaller, and the missingness assumptions are milder (and known, i.e. MCAR), we can now 
compare the estimated results using the imputation/amputation techniques to those of the 
fully observed sample. Table 2.5 reports the estimated results (and the Appendix Table A6 
reports the range of estimates from the 10 imputations/estimations).88  
Figure 2.7 contains the observed and imputed distributions for each variant of imputation 
assumptions. The upper panel reflects sample where the imposed missingness rate is 18.3% 
(as in the IMF sample). The lower panel conducts the equivalent exercise with the higher 
missingness rate (33%, as in the original WHO sample) imposed. As with the full Lu et al. 
(2010) sample of 111 countries (Section 5), the Lu et al. assumptions of including lags and 
leads of the variables and bounding the estimates to observed sample range (1), and fixed 
effects (also bounded to sample range) (4) assumptions return the imputed values closest to 
the observed distribution, on average. Imputations based on imposing a common trend 
across countries (3) perform poorly, potentially signalling substantial heterogeneity within 
the sample. Relying on the multivariate normality and MAR assumptions alone (5) tends to 
return imputations centred around a common observed mean, as depicted in column (3). 
The higher missingness rate in this sample does not seem to result in poorer multiple 
imputation performance, although modelling the imputation stage based on the fixed 
effects assumption seems to provide the best option across those considered here.  
Table 2.5 lists the short run results from the ABBB estimations (the full set are reported in 
the Appendix Table A7). The first column reports the results from the fully observed sample 
of 41 countries over the period 1995-2006. Assuming that dynamic panel estimator (ABBB) is 
ƚŚĞ ĐŽƌƌĞĐƚ ĞĐŽŶŽŵĞƚƌŝĐ ŵŽĚĞůůŝŶŐ ĐŚŽŝĐĞ ? ƚŚĞƐĞ ĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞƐ ǁŽƵůĚ ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƚƌƵĞ ?
estimated effects: health aid channelled through the recipient government would reduce 
domestically funded public health spending, and the ODA health funds delivered through 
E'KƐ ǁŽƵůĚ ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůǇ ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ŚĞĂůƚŚ ƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐ ? The disease burden, 
proxied by HIV prevalence rates would also be positively associated with GHE-S/GDP89. 
Changes in GDP per capita, government size (GGE/GDP) or debt relief would be estimated to 
ŚĂǀĞŶŽƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚĞĨĨĞĐƚŽŶŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐĂůůǇĨƵŶĚĞĚŚĞĂůƚŚƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐ ? 
                                                          
87 Random seed. 
88 Dataset [AmeliaEx2IMF.dta]. 
89 Note that HIV variable was insignificant in the original sample of 111 countries. 
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Unsurprisingly, none of the missing data handling approaches return results equivalent to 
those estimated from the fully observed data. However, some perform better than others: 
multiple imputation methods, based on Lu et al. (2010) assumptions (1) or fixed effects (4), 
deliver estimated coefficients that are qualitatively closest to the full sample estimates. 
Single imputation (sub-period averages) approach seems to perform particularly poorly, with 
the key coefficients of interest (health aid variables) are estimated as insignificant,90 possibly 
because this particular approach wipes out the majority of year-on-year variation (and 
noise). Finally, complete case (listwise deletion) analysis could not be conducted at all, as 
only 2 out of 41 countries were fully observed for the 12 year period, impeding the use of 
panel estimation techniques, particularly illustrating the complications that can arise from 
the missing data in the limit.  
Most importantly, imputing the dependent variable biases the results in unpredictable 
directions. Some assumptions at the imputation step result in higher (columns (3), (4), and 
(5)), some lower (column (1)) fungibility estimates in absolute terms. So whilst the multiple 
imputation seems to provide estimates most consistent to the full sample estimates, 
imputing dependent variables does bias the results, and does so in an ambiguous manner, 
even when the values are missing completely at random.  
                                                          
90 As before, the significant of the DAH-nG/GDP coefficient is particularly sensitive. In fact, if the Fixed 
Effects model is used, DAH-nG/GDP is estimated to be insignificant consistently across treatments of 
missing data.  
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Figure 2.7: Observed and Imputed Values (Fully Observed Sample Only) 
 (1)AmeliaEx2IMFone 
(As in Lu et al.) 
(3)AmeliaEx2IMFthree 
(imposing common time trend) 
(4)Fixed Effects (5) No additional assumptions 
(no bounds, no time trends, or FE) 
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Table 2.5: Relative Performance across Missing Data Solutions (IMF, ABBB) 
Dependent variable: Domestically funded public health spending (GHE-S) 
 Full 
sample 
(1) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Fully 
observed 
MI acc. 
to Lu et 
al. (lags 
and 
leads) 
MI 
common 
time 
polyno-
mials 
MI 
Fixed 
effects 
MI with 
No (extra) 
assump-
tions 
Complete 
Case 
Analysis 
3-year 
averages 
(SI) 
Logged 
GHE-
S/GDP 
.582*** 
(.047) 
 
.584*** 
(.066) 
 
.188** 
(.092) 
 
.440*** 
(.070) 
 
.162* 
(.091) 
 
- 
.867*** 
(.321) 
 
DAH-
G/GDP 
-.560*** 
(.165) 
 
-.531** 
(.215) 
 
-.637*** 
(.242) 
 
-.616*** 
(.224) 
 
-.641*** 
(.236) 
 
- 
-.540 
(.328) 
 
DAH-
nG/GDP 
.428** 
(.179) 
 
.312* 
(.189) 
 
.408 
(.376) 
 
.457* 
(.254) 
 
.348 
(.372) 
 
- 
.093 
(.388) 
 
DR/GDP -.002 
(.026) 
 
-.0001 
(.035) 
 
.019 
(.064) 
 
-.005 
(.043) 
 
.001 
(.076) 
 
- 
-.100* 
(.055) 
 
GDPpc -.000 
(.000) 
 
-.000 
(.000) 
 
.000 
(0.000) 
 
-.000 
(.000) 
 
.000 
(.000) 
 
- 
.000 
(.000) 
 
GGE/GDP .0002 
(.013) 
 
-.0001 
(.018) 
 
-.003 
(.029) 
 
-.011 
(.025) 
 
.001 
(.033) 
 
- 
-.006 
(.024) 
 
HIV .048** 
(.023) 
 
.058** 
(.026) 
 
.013 
(.047) 
 
.040 
(.032) 
 
.028 
(.048) - 
.131** 
(.062) 
 
constant .008** 
(.003) 
 
.008* 
(.004) 
 
.015*** 
(.006) 
 
.013*** 
(.005) 
 
.014** 
(.006) - 
.0002 
(.009) 
 
N 
T 
41 
12 
41 
12 
41 
12 
41 
12 
41 
12 
2 
12 
40 
4 
Each cell reports the estimated coefficients from ABBB. Standard errors are reported in brackets. 
 
7. Check: Better Observed  ? Better Quality? 
Finally, we look at the quality of the data in the sub-sample in which both IMF and WHO 
health spending variables (GHE-A/GDP) are coded as fully observed in a country for the 
whole sample period simultaneously in both WHO and IMF samples. In theory, this sub-
sample should reflect the best quality of the data. Specifically, we look at the discrepancy 
(absolute difference) between the GHE-A/GDP variable across the WHO and IMF samples, 
and try to elicit which explanatory variables may predict such discrepancies. Unfortunately, 
GHE-A/GDP measure is simultaneously fully observed over the entire sample period in only 
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11 countries91 (132 country-year observations across 11, constituting 10% of the total 
sample). Therefore, we also report statistics for all the country-year observations for which 
the variable is simultaneously coded as observed (725 country-year observations across 110 
countries). To see whether these form a representative sample (this is elaborated in 
Appendix Table A10), we also provide the sample statistics of explanatory variables for the 
total sample (1332 yearly observations across 111 countries).  Table 2.6 reports the 
(average) absolute differences between WHO and IMF records (as proportion of GDP); for a 
more contextualised measure, we also report these discrepancies expressed as percentage 
of the average value (IMF and WHO combined) of the GHE-A/GDP variable itself. The table 
also provides averages (and standard deviations) for all explanatory variables, for the fully 
simultaneously observed sample of 11 countries; pooled simultaneously observed yearly 
observations; total sample; and for each of the fully simultaneously observed countries. 
Even  in the sub-sample with the supposedly best quality of data, the data discrepancies can 
be substantial, signalling either substantial differences between reporting ministries (WHO 
data more likely to be based on Ministry of Health data, whilst IMF would tend to rely on 
Ministry of Finance), or even more underlying missing data that are not identified as such. In 
the 11 simultaneously fully observed countries, the average discrepancy between IMF and 
WHO measure of government total spending on health is 0.5% of GDP, or 20% of the 
average value of the GHE-A/GDP itself; in the sub-sample where all yearly observations for 
which both sources code GHE-A/GDP as observed, this increases to nearly 0.7% GDP, or 32% 
of the average value of GHE-A/GDP.  
Country-wise, the discrepancies seem to be (but not always are) larger the poorer the 
country: for Cambodia, the discrepancies between the GHE-A/GDP measure across sources 
average to about 0.8% GDP (of 64% of the average GHE-A/GDP value); for Lesotho, the 
discrepancies reach nearly 2% GDP (42% of the average GHE-A/GDP value). However, some 
of the poorer countries have rather consistent data (e.g. Uzbekistan), and some of the richer 
ones (e.g.) Turkey exhibit above average discrepancies.  
                                                          
91 Burundi, Cambodia, Côte d'Ivoire, Kazakhstan, Lesotho, Malaysia, Maldives, Namibia, South Africa, 
Turkey, and Uzbekistan. The full list of the differences of the observed country-years is reported in 
Appendix Table A9. 
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Table 2.6: Sub-sample Simultaneously Fully Observed in Both Sources (WHO, IMF) 
  Discrepancies across sources  Health Spending Health Aid Other Explanatory 
     
 Absolute 
discrepancy 
(GHE-A WHO - IMF) 
(proportion of GDP) 
Discrepancy as % 
of average* GHE-
A/GDP 
GHE-
A/GDP 
(IMF) 
GHE-
A/GDP 
(WHO) 
DAH-G/GDP DAH-
NG/GD
P 
DR GGE/GD
P 
HIV GDP 
pc 
Fully observed 
(N=11, YO=132) 
 .0051 ? 
(.0076) 
20%  .0260 
(.0156) 
.0270 
(.0134) 
.0023  
(.0044) 
.0004 
(.0011) 
.0017 
(.0044) 
.1661 
(.0745) 
.0582 
(.0735) 
2181 
(1858) 
Pooled simulta-
neously  observed  
(N=110; YO=725)  
.0067 
(.0082) 
32% .0219 
(.0128) 
.0258 
(.0131) 
.0028 
 (.0050) 
.0006 
(.0019) 
.0051 
(.0152) 
.1458 
(.0635) 
.0273 
(.0539) 
2250 
(2635) 
Full Sample  
(N=111; YO=132) 
- - .0203  
(.0122) ? 
.0259 
(.0134)  ? 
.0027 (0045) .0007 
(.0019) 
.0048 
(.0139) 
.1445 
(.0635) 
.0275 
(.0516) 
2285 
(2825) 
   
 1: Burundi  .0008 
(.0009) 
11% .0070 
(.0010) 
.0066 
(.0010) 
.0092 
(.0098) 
.0016 
(.0025) 
.0070 
(.0064) 
.2098 
(.0407) 
.0367 
(.0105) 
134 
(39) 
 2: Cambodia .0083 
(.0038) 
64% .0087 
(.0021) 
.0170 
(.0048) 
.0077 
(.0024) 
.0012 
(.0017) 
.0004 
(.0002) 
.0501 
(.0070) 
.0167 
(.0042) 
379 
(59) 
 3: Côte d'Ivoire .0022 
(.0016) 
20% .0099 
(.0016) 
.0113 
(.0021) 
.0009 
(.0005) 
.0005 
(.0007) 
.0116 
(.0047) 
.0806 
(.0133) 
.0572 
(.0080) 
865 
(99) 
 4: Kazakhstan .0021 
(.0034) 
8% .0225 
(.0035) 
.0244 
(.0042) 
.0003 
(.0002) 
.0001 
(.0001) 
.0000 
(.0000) 
.1189 
(.0104) 
.00059 
(.0005) 
2266 
(1216) 
 5: Lesotho .0195 
(.0122) 
42% .0534 
(.0138) 
.0339 
(.0045) 
.0033 
(.0031) 
.0001 
(.0001) 
.0001 
(.0001) 
.2800 
(.0344) 
.2212 
(.0298) 
626 
(122) 
 6: Malaysia  .0010 
(.0009) 
6% .0177 
(.0042) 
.0183 
(.0034) 
.0000 
(.0000) 
.0000 
(.0000) 
0 
(0) 
.1167 
(.0108) 
.0030 
(.0014) 
5082 
(699) 
 7: Maldives .0029 
(.0054) 
5% .0407 
(.0073) 
.0433 
(.0123) 
.0002 
(.0003) 
.0000 
(.0000) 
0 
(0) 
.2116 
(.0338) 
.0001 
(.0000) 
2556 
(266) 
 8: Namibia .0109 
(.0052) 
26% .0369 
(.0056) 
.0469 
(.0058) 
.0026 
(.0011) 
.0010 
(.0016) 
0 
(0) 
.2599 
(.0406) 
.1295 
(.0292) 
2513 
(494) 
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 9: South Africa .0024 
(.0015) 
7% .0317 
(.0025) 
.0330 
(.0029) 
.0002 
(.0001) 
.0001 
(.0001) 
0 
(0) 
.1885 
(.0050) 
.1461 
(.0419) 
4045 
(851) 
10: Turkey .0056 
(.0082) 
30% .0300 
(.0142) 
.0340 
(.0070) 
.0000 
(.0000) 
.0000 
(.0000) 
0 
(0) 
.1185 
(.0071) 
.0284 
(.0076) 
4913 
(1159) 
11: Uzbekistan .0002 
(.0002) 
0.6% .0280 
(.0050) 
.0282 
(.0051) 
.0009 
(.0007) 
.0001 
(.0002) 
0 
(0) 
.1934 
(.0175) 
.0004 
(.0003) 
612 
(136) 
Table reports averages (proportion of GDP) over the sample period (1995-2006); standard errors are reported in parentheses. N denotes the number of countries. YO 
denotes the number of yearly observations 
*The average value between IMF and WHO observations across time.  
 ? On average, the absolute value of difference between IMF and WHO values for government health spending as agent as proportion of GDP (GHE-A/GDP) differ about 20% 
of average value of GHE-A/GDP (average between IMF and WHO). 
 輀 YO=1083 
 退 YO=890 
 
Table 2.7: Sub-sample Simultaneously Fully Observed in Both Sources (WHO, IMF): What Determines the Discrepancies? 
 Absolute discrepancy 
(GHE-A WHO - IMF) 
(proportion of GDP) 
Absolute discrepancy 
(GHE-A WHO - IMF) 
(proportion of GDP) 
DAH-G/GDP 0.1932 0.2180 
DAH-NG/GDP -0.0043 0.2029 
DR -0.1617 0.2029 
GGE/GDP 0.3110 0.0686 
HIV 0.5686 0.2401 
GDP pc -0.1648 0.0217 
N 
YO 
11 
132 
110 
725 
Table reports correlation coefficients between the absolute values  
of the discrepancies, and explanatory variables. 
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Table 2.7 reports the correlation coefficients between the absolute value (as proportion of 
GDP) of discrepancies between IMF and WHO records of GHE-A/GDP. For the 11 
simultaneously fully observed countries (left column), the differences tend to be (but not 
always are) larger the poorer the country, and the more aid flows through the government. 
The data are also less consistent the larger the government, and the higher the disease 
burden. (However, these correlations change rather dramatically in the pooled 
simultaneously observed sample, where more data seems to be associated with higher 
discrepancies, but the GDP is no longer a clear determinant of the size of such 
discrepancies). 
Thus even the supposedly better quality data (in terms of being simultaneously observed 
across sources) exhibits substantial discrepancies. Nearly inevitably some fraction of data 
originating in developing countries is likely to be imputed.  
8. Conclusions  
Three key issues have been raised in this chapter: missing data; geographical and 
institutional traceability of aid data; estimating fungibility of (health) aid.  
Missing data is a pervasive problem in development economics. Data are costly to collect 
ĂŶĚ ƚŽ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚŝƐ ŚĂƐ ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůůǇ ŶŽƚ ďĞĞŶ Ă ƚŽƉ ƉƌŝŽƌŝƚǇ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚƐ ?
perspective (which can be seen as rational given the array of pressing issues faced by 
developing countries). We have shown that, depending on statistical solutions applied to 
tackle the problem of missing data, the estimated results do vary. In the context of aid 
fungibility, and especially in such donor priority area as health, this may lead to substantial 
differences in the subsequent policy decisions. Furthermore, the missing data are often 
replaced by imputed estimates in a non-transparent way, and are typically not indicated as 
distinct from the truly observed data in the core international databases. As these 
international databases often are the source of data for research and evaluation, the 
resulting estimates may suffer from severe biases and overstated precision. When missing 
data afflicts the dependent variable and the (multiple) imputation methods are applied to 
 ‘ƌĞĐŽǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞŵŝƐƐŝŶŐŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƚŚĞĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞƐĐĂŶďĞďŝĂƐĞĚŝŶĂŶƵŶŬŶŽǁŶ ?ĂŵďŝŐƵŽƵƐ )
direction. We therefore reiterate the warning that dependent variable should not be 
imputed.92  
                                                          
92 Multiple imputation is not a panacea for dealing with missing value in explanatory variables either. 
As ^ĐŚĂĨĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? P ? )ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐ ?ǁŚŝůƐƚD/ŝƐĂ “ǀĂůƵĂďůĞĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶƚŽĂŶǇĚĂƚĂĂŶĂůǇƐƚ ?ƐƚŽŽůŬŝƚ ? ?ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇ
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dŚĞŵŝƐƐŝŶŐ ?ŽƌƉŽŽƌƋƵĂůŝƚǇ )ĚĂƚĂŝƐŶŽƚƐŽůĞůǇĂƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?ƐƉƌŽďůĞŵ ?hƐŝŶŐZĂǀŝƐŚĂŶŬĂƌĞƚĂů ?
(2009) data, we have illustrated that aid flows, predominantly controlled and recorded by 
the donors and their organisations, lack information that would allow tracing the aid flows 
geographically or identifying the end organisation by which the aid is spent. And yet, to 
estimate the true extent of (health) aid fungibility, one needs to be able to distinguish 
between aid actually flowing to the recipient country and that spent elsewhere. Moreover, 
as shown by Van de Sijpe (2013), one also needs to distinguish between the cash aid flowing 
through the budget, and that going through NGOs operating in the recipient country or 
spent elsewhere. We have illustrated that health aid data used by Lu et al. (2010) do not 
allow for such fine decomposition. This leads to the third point.  
We have argued that Lu et al. (2010) economic model biases the estimated effects of health 
aid fungibility towards the unfavourable conclusion. The likely overestimated health aid 
flows through the government, assumed to be spent in the year they were received, are 
ƐƵďƚƌĂĐƚĞĚ ĨƌŽŵ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ƚŽƚĂů ĂŝĚ ƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚ ƚŚĞ ĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚ ǀĂƌŝĂďůĞ
intended to describe the domestically funded component of the total public expenditures on 
health. This overlooks the fact that the receiving government would in practice implement 
forward-looking policy choices, which in turn implies that aid is fungible. This is the core 
topic in Chapter 3.  
 
 
Source: http://dilbert.com/strips/comic/2008-05-08/ 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
considering the simplicity and generality of the method), other  W simpler, more conventional, non-
simulation-based  W methods may often provide a more suitable alternative to MI in the face of 
missing data problem. 
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Chapter 3 
 
A Perspective on the Health Aid Fungibility Debate 
 
1. Introduction93 
Lu et al. (2010) argues that it is important to distinguish between aid flowing through the 
government, which is more likely to be fungible, and aid delivered through non-
governmental organisations. The authors find that these flows have opposing effects on 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐĂůůǇĨƵŶĚĞĚŚĞĂůƚŚƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐ ?Van de Sijpe (2013) formalises a similar 
binary distinction conceptually. He demonstrates ƚŚĂŶƵŶůĞƐƐƚŚĞ ‘ŽĨĨ-ďƵĚŐĞƚ ?ĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚŽĨ
ĂŝĚ ?ĚĞĨŝŶĞĚĂƐ “ĂŝĚŶŽƚƌĞĐŽƌĚĞĚŽŶƚŚĞƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐďƵĚŐĞƚ ?Ğ ?Ő ?ĚŽŶŽƌƐďƵŝůĚŝŶŐ
hospitals, training medical personnel, hiring consultantƐ Q ) ?94, is included (and appropriately 
ĚĞĐŽŵƉŽƐĞĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ ‘ŽŶ-ďƵĚŐĞƚ ?ĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚ )ŝŶƚŚĞĨƵŶŐŝďŝůŝƚǇĞƐƚŝŵĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƚŚĞĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞĚ
fungibility of aid would be biased.  
The fungibility debate interests many but is limited. Part of the problem arises from the 
differences in the (operational) definition of the issue itself. Lu et al. (2010:1376) define 
ĨƵŶŐŝďŝůŝƚǇĂƐ “ĂŝĚƐƵďƐƚŝƚƵƚ ?ŝŶŐ ?ĨŽƌĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚĐŽŶĚƵĐƚƚŚĞŝƌƐƚƵĚǇ
along the lines of this definition to assess whether health aid disbursed through the recipient  
government reduces the (estimated) domestically funded public health expenditures (the 
                                                          
93 I am grateful to Nicolas Van de Sijpe (Department of International Development and Centre for the 
Study of African Economies at the University of Oxford) for providing Van de Sijpe (2013) data. 
94 Van de Sijpe (2013:2) 
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limitations to their approach are discussed in Chapter 2). McGillivray and Morrissey (2004) 
distinguish between general fungibility (diversion of aid intended for public investment into 
government consumption spending), sector fungibility (whereby aid intended for a specific 
sector is (intentionally) spent under a different heading), and full additionality (assessing 
whether the total public spending in the sector increased by the amount of aid). See 
Morrissey (2012) for a review of recent literature. 
Given the current state of (donor) data, a complete binary distinction between on-budget 
(potentially fungible) and off-budget (less likely to be fungible) sector aid is not feasible (see 
Van de Sijpe, 2013). Fungibility, if defined as aid spent according to the intentions of the 
donors, thus cannot be accurately estimated due to non-accessibility of necessary data, 
primarily, how much of aid actually flows through the recipient government and whether its 
intended sector can be identified. If Lu et al. (2010) were to be careful about their 
conclusion, it should have read that they demonstrated that health aid was not fully 
additional during the period of 1995-2006 (although there are issues with the estimations 
and construction of variables, discussed in Chapter 2), whilst the current data (even if 
carefully constructed, as in Van de Sijpe, 2013) do not allow for (empirically) conclusive 
statements about the (actual) fungibility of health aid.  
Nonetheless, the current health aid data do allow for a certain degree of disaggregation (for 
instance, into sector support, technical cooperation, investment projects, and other, as in 
Van de Sijpe, 2013), allowing to explore the relationship between (sector) aid and spending, 
without invoking strict assumptions about the nature of such relationship. Approaching the 
question from the broader fiscal effects angle exerts less pressure on the data (though a 
clear distinction and correct disaggregation would indeed be useful): by denouncing the 
binary distinction underlying the aid fungibility studies, we can explore whether the 
(earmarked) health aid increases the total public spending on health, and, if so, which aid 
ŵŽĚĂůŝƚŝĞƐ ĚŽ ƚŚĞ ďĞƐƚ ũŽď ŝŶ ƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚĞŶŝŶŐ ƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ŽǀĞƌĂůů ĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚ ƚŽ ŚĞĂůƚŚ
spending. 
This chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces a simple (informal) conceptual 
framework of disaggregation of aid into its on-budget and off-budget components, 
commenting on the degree of potential fungibility. Section 3 discusses the different health 
aid disaggregation strategies given the available data.  Section 4 briefly summarises the 
empirical estimation strategy, and provides two sets of results: firstly, isolating the 
differences arising from the alternative strategies of disaggregating health aid in Lu et al. 
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(2010) and Van de Sijpe (2013), using identical modelling and estimation methods, we 
demonstrate that differences may not be as pronounced as currently stated; and secondly 
conducting a simple sensitivity check to assess how would such results be altered if a binary 
distinction proposed in Section 2 was enforced on the data we illustrate the potentially 
conflicting conclusions and policy implications. Both sets of results return briefly to the 
missing data issues raised in Chapter 2, also testing for the hypothesis of aid smoothing. 
Section 5 concludes. Sensitivity checks are provided in the Appendix B. 
2. Framework for Decomposition of On- and Off-budget Aid, and 
Data 
ŝĚĐĂŶĞŝƚŚĞƌďĞ  ‘ƐƉĞŶƚ ?  ?ŝŶďƌŽĂĚ ƚĞƌŵƐŽĨĞŶĚĚĞƐƚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ĐĂƐŚŽƌ direct provision of 
goods/some services) in Recipient country, or Donor country. If aid is spent in the Recipient 
country, it can either be delivered through the Government95, through Non-governmental 
organisations, or by the donor retaining control over the project. As Lu et al. (2010) did not 
explicitly consider the third possibility (delivery by the donor), our perspective reconciles the 
differences between ƚŚĞ ƚǁŽ ĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐ ƐƚƵĚŝĞƐ P >Ƶ Ğƚ Ăů ? ?Ɛ ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ĂŝĚ ĨůŽǁŝŶŐ
through the recipient government as opposed to non-governmental channels and Van de 
Sijpe (2013) aid at the discretion of the recipient government versus control retained by the 
donor. 
If aid delivered through the government is in cash, it (in theory) shows up on the recipient 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐ ? ĂŶĚ ĐĂŶ ďĞ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ ƚŽ ďĞ  ‘ŽŶ-ďƵĚŐĞƚ ? ? /Ĩ ĂŝĚ ŐŽĞƐ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ
budget, it is recorded as revenue, and can potentially be linked to spending; in such cases 
fungibility could in principle be established: it is possible to assess/check whether aid was 
spent as intended by the donors.  This component of (earmarked) aid is the most likely to be 
fungible, as the government (though not necessarily implementing ministry) is fully aware of 
these (liquid) flows. This is presented on the left side of Figure 3.1.96 
Aid delivered through the recipient government but not in cash (e.g. medicines or technical 
ĂƐƐŝƐƚĂŶƚƐ )ǁŽƵůĚƚŚĞŶƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂĨƌĂĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ ‘Žff-ďƵĚŐĞƚ ?ĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚ ?ƐƚŚĞZĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ
Government is (still) fully aware of such aid, it could in principle liquidate some of the goods 
                                                          
95 For simplicity, it is assumed here the core aid flows are delivered through central government, 
which then decides whether to transfer any of the funds to the local government.  
96 No seeming disagreement between Lu et al. (2010) and Van de Sijpe (2013), as both assign it to 
DAH-G/on-budget category. 
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received and divert the resulting funds, or divert the services to other sectors.97 
Nevertheless, such off-budget aid is less likely to be fungible than (earmarked) aid received 
in cash.  
Aid can be spent in the Recipient country through non-governmental organisations, and 
could be donated in cash (e.g. support to NGOs), or in direct provision of goods/services 
(say, books for a village school). Recipient Government may be at least partially, but 
ƉƌŽďĂďůǇŶŽƚĨƵůůǇĂǁĂƌĞŽĨƚŚĞƐĞĂŝĚĨůŽǁƐ ?ĂƐƚŚĞǇĂƌĞ ?ƚŽŽ ? ‘ŽĨĨ-ďƵĚŐĞƚ ? ?98 ^ƵĐŚ ‘ŽĨĨ-ďƵĚŐĞƚ ?
aid may be considered partially fungible at most: to the extent that the government is aware 
of the non-ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂŝĚĨůŽǁƐ ? ?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚƵŶůŝŬĞůǇƚŽďĞĂďůĞƚŽ ‘ĐĂƉƚƵƌĞ ?ĂŶǇŽĨƚŚĞŵ )ŝƚ
would be able to reduce its own (domestically funded) component of spending (in 
aggregate, or within sectors); however, such actions would refer to fungibility of domestic 
revenues (tax, fungible by definition) rather than aid.99  
A substantial fraction of aid is delivered through investment projects, where donors retain 
full (or a degree of) control of the project. In cases where donors retain full control of the 
project, aid would not flow through the recipient government as revenue, and thus could 
not be traced to expenditures. In such cases, aid would be spent as intended by the donor, 
and thus by definition be not fungible. More explicitly, if the government is aware of donor 
projects, it may reduce its own allocation, so aid through the donor may not be fully 
additional. The reason it is important to identify this component of aid is because it appears 
as part of (health) aid but cannot appear in public health spending; if not separated from on-
budget health aid, it leads to a spurious appearance that health aid is fungible. In practice, 
however, donor projects could overlap (from the accounting perspective) with any of the 
components discussed above (and aid spent in the Donor country, too) and could induce a 
limited degree of fungibility if part of the project funds does flow through the government; 
this it is not depicted in the stylised Figure 3.1. 
A considerable fraction of aid may be spent in the Donor country; for instance, paying for 
ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ĐŽƐƚƐ  ?Ğ ?Ő ? hE ƐƚĂĨĨ ? ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ? Žƌ ƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂů
                                                          
97 In Lu et al. (2010), such aid would be part of aid disbursed through the government(DAH-G), whilst 
in Van de Sijpe (2013:2) this would (conceptually) fall under the off-budget component (but would 
likely be unallocated to either on- or off-budget component assuming it is delivered through a donor 
project).  
98 See McGillivray and Morrissey (2000, 2001, 2004) for broader discussion of fungibility and related 
fiscal effects of aid.  
99 It is not exactly clear under which heading such aid would fall in either Van de Sijpe (2013)  W though 
most likely would be recorded under donor projects in the OECD data, nor in Lu et al. (2010).  
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assistance100).  The Recipient Government would be least likely to fund such activities itself; 
therefore the likelihood of averting such funds (including from own spending), assuming that 
it is even aware of it101, is also least likely. Such aid could be considered to be least (if at all) 
ĨƵŶŐŝďůĞ ? ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ŝŶ ĚŽŶŽƌ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐ ŝƚ ǁŽƵůĚ Ɛƚŝůů ďĞ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ  ‘ĂŝĚ ? ? dŚŝƐ ŝƐ ǀŝƐƵĂůůǇ
presented in Figure 3.1.102  
Note that in practice there will be some (conceptual or accounting) overlap between the 
components, such as Technical Assistance delivered as end services (e.g. training) in the 
recipient country; however, this would be unlikely to cross intŽƚŚĞ ‘ŽŶ-ďƵĚŐĞƚ ?ĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚ ?
Finally, Figure 3.1 also highlights the omission of financial flows from non-OECD donors (or 
 ‘ĐŽůůĂďŽƌĂƚŽƌƐ ? ? ƐĞĞ tĂůǌ ĂŶĚ ZĂŵĂĐŚĂŶĚƌĂŶ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ĨŽƌ Ă ƐƵŵŵ ƌǇ ŽĨ ƌĞĐĞŶƚ ůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞ ) ?
Some of the non-DAC financial flows (although more likely to be in the form of FDI rather 
than fall under the OECD definition of ODA) to the Recipient country may also be delivered 
in cash to the Government, and thus be fungible. However, as the financial flows from non-
OECD donors tend to be less conditional or earmarked (and less likely to meet the DAC 
definition of aid altogether), the resulting fiscal response may be more likely to take form in 
reduction of tax revenue or public borrowing, rather than diversion of spending from specific 
sectors. Such omission of potential non-DAC donor funds could bias the fungibility estimates 
upwards (i.e. the estimated extent of fungibility would be reduced). However, this currently 
cannot be tested, as non-traditional donor data are not consistently reported, and the 
financial flows are not clearly defined as aid.103  
KǀĞƌĂůů ?ƚŚĞĂŝĚĨƵŶŐŝďŝůŝƚǇƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƌĞĂůŝƐƚŝĐĂůůǇĂƉƉůŝĞƐŽŶůǇƚŽƚŚĞ ‘ŽŶ-ďƵĚŐĞƚ ?ĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚŽĨ
(sector )ĂŝĚ ?&ŽůůŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ƐƚƌŝĐƚ ?ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨĂŝĚĨƵŶŐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ?ŽĨĨ-budget aid is not fungible: 
by ƚŚĞǀĞƌǇĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚŝƚ ŝƐŶŽƚŐŽŝŶŐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐďƵĚŐĞƚ ?ƐƵĐŚĂŝĚŝƐ
spent as donors intended. It is also less likely to be fungible in practice: though in principle 
goods received in kind may be resold and the resulting revenue diverted, or provided 
services may be diverted to benefit a different sector, this would not be likely with donor 
projects or aid spent in donor countries. Furthermore, using EU and WB budget support 
                                                          
100 Technical assistance, as defined OECD, is, nevertheless, likely to deliver some end services to the 
Recipient country, but could also be regarded as intrusive if the donor-recipient views/priorities are 
not aligned.  
101 Van de Sijpe  ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? )ŶŽƚĞƐƚŚĂƚ “/ŶĨĂĐƚ ?^ƵŶĚďĞƌŐĂŶĚ'Ğůď ? ? ? ? ? )ĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĂƚŵĂŶǇĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨ
TC, such as finance for training programs, analytical reports and expert advice involve resources that 
ŶĞǀĞƌĞǀĞŶůĞĂǀĞƚŚĞĚŽŶŽƌĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ? ?dŚŝƐŝŵƉůŝĞƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚis least aware of these flows. 
102 In Van de Sijpe (2013) this would fall under the off-budget aid; this is not explicitly discussed in Lu 
et al. (2010). 
103 Humanitarian aid is excluded from both measures.  
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data, Clist et al. (2012) show that donors actually choose the modality of aid delivery based 
on their assessment whether aid can be expected to be fungible (delivering aid largely in 
form of donor projects) or not (delivering most funds through general budget support) 
ďĂƐĞĚŽŶƋƵĂůŝƚǇŽĨ ƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚ the alignment of aid spending preferences, 
thus (to some extent) limiting the potentiality of fungibility. Nonetheless, off-budget can 
have broader fiscal effects than fungibility  W aid can influence the level of spending through: 
complementarity; conditionality; aid illusion; strengthening of institutions resulting in 
subsequent changes in priorities; tax discretion (recipients reducing their own financing if 
what donors provide satisfy the level desired by the recipient) or improved collection; (see 
Morrissey 2012; McGillivray and Morrissey 2000, 2001, 2004).  
Figure 3.1: Which Aid is Fungible? A Visual Representation 
 
 
3. Existing Health Aid Disaggregation Strategies and Data 
Two recent studies advocate the importance of disaggregation of health aid data: Lu et al. 
(2010) and Van de Sijpe (2013), with a few follow-up publications, such as Van de Sijpe 
(2013a) and Dieleman et al. (2013).  
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As discussed in Chapter 2, based on Ravishankar et al. (2009) dataset Lu et al. disaggregates 
health aid spending into the flows disbursed through the government (DAH-G) and those 
delivered through non-governmental organisations (DAH-nG)104. They evaluate the effect of 
ƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚƐŽŶƚŚĞ ?ĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞĚ )ƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?ƐĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐĂůůǇĨƵŶĚĞĚŚĞĂůƚŚĞǆƉĞŶĚŝƚƵƌĞƐŝŶ
111 countries over 1995-2006, and conclude that health aid disbursed through the 
government is highly fungible (leading to less than one for one increments in total health 
spending), whilst health aid channelled through non-governmental organisations actually 
increases goveƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐĚĞǀŽƚĞĚƚŽŚĞĂůƚŚ ?dŚŝƐŝƐƐŬĞƚĐŚĞĚŝŶFigure 3.2. 
Chapter 2 outlined the argument that DAH-G measure is overestimated due to inclusion of 
funds not channelled through government with certainty or not channelled in cash.  
Figure 3.2: Lu et al. ?Ɛ (2010) Health Aid Decomposition 
 
Using a more precise definition of aid fungibility105, Van de Sijpe (2013) formalises the health 
aid disaggregation into on-budget and off-budget components. He demonstrates that unless 
(health) aid is disaggregated, the resulting estimates of (total) health aid fungibility would be 
biased, with the size of bias depending on the variances of and covariance between the on- 
and off-budget components.  
                                                          
104 /Ŷ ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ >Ƶ Ğƚ Ăů ? ?Ɛ ŚĞĂůƚŚ ĂŝĚ ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞ ŝŶĐůƵĚes funds spent in the donor country (unclearly 
allocated between DAH-G and DAH-nG) and potentially donor projects (see Chapter 2).  
105  “&ƵŶŐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ŽĐĐƵƌƐ ǁŚĞŶ ĂŝĚ ŝƐ ŶŽƚ ƵƐĞĚ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞ ŝŶƚĞŶĚĞĚ ďǇ ĚŽŶŽƌƐ  ?DĐ'ŝůůŝǀƌĂǇ ĂŶĚ
Morrissey, 2004). More precisely, targeted aid is fungible if it is transformed into a pure revenue or 
income augmenting resource that can be spent whichever way the recipient government chooses 
 ?<ŚŝůũŝĂŶĚĂŵƉĞůůŝ ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?sĂŶĚĞ^ŝũƉĞ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ) ?
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Using OECD CRS and DAC data, Van de Sijpe (2013) distinguishes between four types of 
(earmarked) health aid components: sector programme (SP), technical cooperation (TC), 
investment projects (IP), and other (no mark) health aid (ONM).  SP is a proxy for the on-
ďƵĚŐĞƚ ŚĞĂůƚŚ ĂŝĚ  “ĂƐ ďǇ ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶ ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞ ĂŝĚ ŝŶǀŽlves a government to government 
transfer of ƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ ?  ?sĂŶĚĞ^ŝũƉĞ ?  ? ? ? ?:13). TC is used as a proxy for off-budget health 
ĂŝĚ ?ĂƐƚŚŝƐǁŽƵůĚĞŝƚŚĞƌďĞƐƉĞŶƚŝŶĚŽŶŽƌĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐŽƌǁŽƵůĚŝŶǀŽůǀĞ “ĚŝƌĞĐƚƉĂǇŵĞŶƚƐĨƌŽŵ
the donor government rather than a tranƐĨĞƌŽĨŵŽŶĞǇƚŽƚŚĞƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?  ?sĂŶ
de Sijpe 2013:13). The other two health aid components (IP, ONM) are not allocated either 
to on- or off-budget components but are instead included in the model as separate 
explanatory variables (together with general aid, a measure of support for NGOs, and other 
non-health sector aid).  As donors tend to retain a certain degree of control over the donor 
projects (IP), it is much less likely to be disbursed through the recipient government than aid 
given as secƚŽƌƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞĂŝĚ ?ƐĞĞDĂŬŽƌŽ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ?ƚŚĞ “Ğǆ ĞŶƚƚŽǁŚŝĐŚ/WĂŶĚ
ONM aid are reported in government budgets is more uncertain, so [their estimated 
ĐŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƐ ?ĂƌĞůĞƐƐŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞƚŽŐĂƵŐĞƚŚĞĚĞŐƌĞĞŽĨĨƵŶŐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ? ?sĂŶĚĞ^ŝũƉĞ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ?
sĂŶĚĞ^ŝũƉĞ ?ƐŚĞĂůƚŚĂŝĚĚŝƐĂŐŐƌĞŐĂƚŝŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇŝƐĚĞƉŝĐƚĞĚŝŶFigure 3.3.106  
In effect, both studies (Lu et al., 2010, and Van de Sijpe, 2013) advocate a binary 
disaggregation of health aid, but draw the distinction along differing lines. Lu et al. end up 
doing the full approximation, attributing health aid flows to either category, without explicit 
statements which category IP or TC (or indeed any of the specific aid flows) is attributed. 
Alternatively, Van de Sijpe (2013) only allocates aid to a specific category when aid can be 
established as on- or off-budget from the OECD records (SP and TC, respectively). In effect, 
he demonstrates that, whilst important in avoiding biases of fungibility estimates, a binary 
distinction is currently not fully feasible in practice due to non-accessibility of necessary data 
(a fault in donor records). Even very carefully (de)constructed data (Van de Sijpe, 2013) does 
not allow for the full binary disaggregation of on- and off-budget data.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
106 Note that despite careful disaggreŐĂƚŝŽŶ ?sĂŶĚĞ^ŝũƉĞ ?ƐĚĂƚĂƐƚŝůů ŝŶǀŽůǀĞƐĂĚĞŐƌĞĞŽĨĞƐƚŝŵĂƚŝŽŶ
(where CRS data is not fully available) and scaling (to bring the overall numbers closer to DAC2 
disbursements). 
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Figure 3.3: sĂŶĚĞ^ŝũƉĞ ?Ɛ (2013) Health Aid Decomposition 
 
Data  
Lu et al. (2010) sample contains 111 countries over 1995-2006; IMF sample is chosen as it 
has a lower missingness rate in the dependent variable compared to their WHO sample, and 
also because Van de Sijpe (2013:10) reports using IMF GHE-A data (though not publicly 
available). IMF dataset is likely to represent data from Ministry of Finance, whilst WHO 
ƐĂŵƉůĞƐĂƌĞŵŽƐƚůǇďĂƐĞĚŽŶƌĞĐŽƌĚƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞDŝŶŝƐƚƌŝĞƐŽĨ,ĞĂůƚŚ ?sĂŶĚĞ^ŝũƉĞ ?ƐĚĂƚĂƐĞƚ
spans 108 countries over 1990-2004. We use the union of the two datasets to provide a 
directly comparable data. This resulting sample contains 108107 low- and middle-income 
countries over 1995-2004. The resulting disaggregation of health aid in Van de Sijpe (2013, 
into SP, IP, TC, and ONM) and Lu et al. (2010, into DAH-G and DAH-nG) for an average 
country (or on aggregate) are depicted in Figures 3.4 and 3.5, respectively; the individual 
distributions of variables are depicted in Appendix Figure B1. Table 3.1 provides the 
summary statistics for the key health aid variables of both studies.  
 
                                                          
107 Angola and Eritrea are dropped as in Lu et al. Libya is further excluded as contains 6 years of 
ŵŝƐƐŝŶŐĚĂƚĂĨŽƌsĂŶĚĞ^ŝũƉĞ ?ƐŚĞĂůƚŚĂŝĚǀĂƌŝĂďůĞƐ ?
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&ŝŐƵƌĞ ? ? ? PŝƐĂŐŐƌĞŐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ,ĞĂůƚŚŝĚĨŽƌĂŶ ‘ǀĞƌĂŐ ŽƵŶƚƌǇ ? ?sĂŶĚĞ^ŝũƉĞ ? ? ? ? ? ) 
 
The figure depicts Van de Sijpe (2013) disaggregation of health aid (OECD CRS and DAC2) into its 
Sector Programme (SP, on-budget health aid), Technical Cooperation (TC, off-budget health aid), 
Investment Projects (IP) and Other (Not Marked) health aid (ONM) for 108 low- and middle-income 
countries over the period of 1995-2004. All variables are expressed as percentage of GDP.   
&ŝŐƵƌĞ ? ? ? PŝƐĂŐŐƌĞŐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ,ĞĂůƚŚŝĚĨŽƌĂŶ ‘ǀĞƌĂŐ ŽƵŶƚƌǇ ? ?>ƵĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? ? ? ) 
 
The figure depicts Lu et al. (2010) disaggregation of health aid (Ravishankar (2009) data compiled 
from various sources) into health aid disbursed through the government (DAH-G) and health aid 
channelled through non-governmental organisation (DAH-nG)  for 108 low- and middle-income 
countries over the period of 1995-2004. All variables are expressed as percentage of GDP.   
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Table 3.1: Health Aid Summary Statistics 
 On-budget Off-budget Other (unclassified) Total 
Source Lu VDS Lu VDS VDS VDS Lu VDS 
Name DAH-G SP DAH-nG TC IP ONM DAH 
total 
Health aid 
total 
Mean .0026 .0005 .0004 .0016 .0011 .0013 .0030 .0045 
St.d. .0041 .0011 .0013 .0025 .0025 .0024 .0048 .0060 
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max .0386 .0175 .0140 .0269 .0398 .0205 .0392 .0736 
dĂďůĞƌĞƉŽƌƚƐŚĞĂůƚŚĂŝĚĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚƐ ?ƐƵŵŵĂƌǇƐƚĂƚŝƐƚŝĐƐ ?>ƵĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚsĂŶĚĞ^ŝũƉĞ ? ? ? ? ? ?
across the sample of 108 low- and middle-income countries during the period 1995-2004, 
ĞǆƉƌĞƐƐĞĚĂƐƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶŽĨ'W ?dŚĞ ‘dŽƚĂů ?ŚĞĂůƚŚĂŝĚĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚŝƐĂƐƵŵŽĨ,-G and DAH-nG 
in Lu et al. data, and a sum of SP, IP, TC, and ONM in Van de Sijpe (2013) data. 
Different disaggregation strategies result in stark differences. Lu et aů ? ?Ɛ ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞ ŽĨ  ‘ŽŶ-
ďƵĚŐĞƚ ?108 health (DAH-' ) ŝƐ ĂďŽƵƚ ĨŝǀĞ ƚŝŵĞƐ ŚŝŐŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ sĂŶ ĚĞ ^ŝũƉĞ ?Ɛ(SP), on average 
across countries over the sample period (also with higher variance)109. This likely reflects 
overestimation of DAH-G and potential underestimation of  ‘ŽŶ-ďƵĚŐĞƚ ?(SP) component in 
Van de Sijpe (2013 ) ?tĞ ĐŽŶĐƵƌ ǁŝƚŚ sĂŶ ĚĞ ^ŝũƉĞ  ? ? ? ? ?Ă ) ƚŚĂƚ >Ƶ Ğƚ Ăů ? ?Ɛ ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞ ŽĨŽŶ-
budget aid (DAH-G) is likely to be overestimated (this is discussed in Section 2 of Chapter 2), 
as it contains a substantial amount that is not channelled in cash and/or not through 
recipient government (potentially including some of the investment projects(IP), TC, and/or 
ONM).110 The likely underestimation of on-budget aid in Van de Sijpe is due to tracking 
sector programme funds only. 
The opposite is true for the off-ďƵĚŐĞƚĂŝĚŵĞĂƐƵƌĞ PsĂŶĚĞ^ŝũƉĞ ?Ɛd ŝƐĂďŽƵƚ ĨŽƵƌƚŝŵĞƐ
ŚŝŐŚĞƌƚŚĂŶ>ƵĞƚĂů ? ?Ɛ,-nG (also with higher variance). This is likely due to the fact that 
                                                          
108 Treating DAH-' ĂƐ ĂŶ  ‘ŽŶ-ďƵĚŐĞƚ ? ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞ ŝƐ Ă ƌŽƵŐŚ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂů ĂƉƉƌŽǆŝŵĂƚŝŽŶ P ĂƐ ĂƌŐƵĞĚ ŝŶ
Chapter 2 and outlined in Van de Sijpe (2013), this includes non-cash components and aid likely not 
disbursed through the recipient government.  
109 sĂƌŝĂďŝůŝƚǇ ŝƐ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ŝŶsĂŶĚĞ^ŝũƉĞ ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ? ) ĨƵŶŐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ĐŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ  ‘ĐŽƌƌĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?ĂŶĚĐůĞĂƌůǇ ŝƐ
ǀĞƌǇĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚƵƐŝŶŐ>ƵĞƚĂů ? ?ƐĚĞĐŽŵƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ? 
110 We do not, however, agree with Van de SijpĞ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? )ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ>ƵĞƚĂů ? ?ƐĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞƐ “ĚŽ
not account for the fact that a lot of health aid is off-budget (that is, not recorded on recipient 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐ ? ďƵĚŐĞƚƐ ) ? ? Ɛ ŶŽƚĞĚ ŝŶ ŝĞůĞŵĂŶ Ğƚ Ăů ?  ? ? ? ? ? ) ? Ă ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůůǇ ƐŝŵŝůĂƌ ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶ ŝƐ
partially recognised by decomposing the total DAH into DAH-G (roughly, on-budget) and DAH-nG (off-
ďƵĚŐĞƚ ) ĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚƐ ĂŶĚ ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞǇ ŚĂǀĞ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ĞĨĨĞĐƚƐ ŽŶ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ
domestically funded health expenditures. Nevertheless, as discussed in Van ĚĞ ^ŝũƉĞ ? >Ƶ Ğƚ Ăů ? ?Ɛ
disaggregation is severely limited.  
 
Chapter 3  W Fungibility of Health Aid  Emilija Timmis 
62 
 
DAH-nG may not include a substantial part of technical cooperation, estimated to be about 
40% of total earmarked health aid in Van de Sijpe (2013:13), with its potential (partial) 
inclusion in DAH-G measure instead; or limited geographical traceability of funds 
spent/administered by donors without involvement of the recipient government or aid 
funds spent in donor countries. 
The total health aid measure (sum over DAH-G and DAH-nG in Lu et al., and aggregate of SP, 
TC, IP and ONM in Van de Sijpe) is about 1.5 times higher (and slightly more variable) in Van 
ĚĞ ^ŝũƉĞ ?Ɛ ĚĂƚĂ ? ƉĂƌƚůǇ due to the inclusion of otherwise unclassified IP and ONM 
components (the sum of SP and TC components alone would instead be 30 % smaller than 
total DAH). The discrepancy between aggregate health aid measures illustrates further 
fragility of data, which stretches beyond disaggregation issues (although note that Lu et al. 
exclude health aid loans). Note that both measures exclude non- ĚŽŶŽƌƐ ? ĨƵŶĚƐ ? ĂŶĚ
thus the total health aid may be equally underestimated in both studies.  
KǀĞƌĞƐƚŝŵĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŽŶ-buĚŐĞƚ ? ĂŝĚ ĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚ  ?ďǇ Ăƚ ůĞĂƐƚ ƉĂƌƚůǇ ŵŝƐĐůĂƐƐŝĨǇŝŶŐ ŽĨĨ-
budget aid as on-budget, as in Lu et al.) may lead to overestimated fungibility of aid 
(especially if the over-estimated aid figure is used to infer the domestically funded 
expenditure component). Underestimation of on-budget (misclassifying some of the on-
budget aid as off-budget) component may, too, lead to distorted estimates, overestimating 
the positive effect of health aid. Such overestimation of the off-budget component may be 
seen as less harmful for the donor-recipient relations, and leading to less severe potential 
aid policy consequences (if the positive effect of aid on spending is overestimated, donors 
would not withdraw funds; although effectiveness of such funds may suffer). However, if 
such component is substantially overestimated (and the on-budget component severely 
underestimated), the resulting evaluation of relative performance of aid modalities may give 
misleading qualitative (rather than just quantitative) conclusions (attributing the positive 
effects on spending from on-budget aid to off-budget component), potentially discouraging 
ĚŽŶŽƌĨƌŽŵ ‘ƚƌƵƐƚŝŶŐ ?ƚŚĞƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞĚĞůŝǀĞƌǇŽĨĐĂƐŚĂŶĚƌĞĚƵĐŝŶŐƚŚĞŚĞĂůƚŚĂŝĚ
impact on spending.  
In the fungibility context (where binary distinction is vital) the priority is measuring the on-
budget aid component correctly, as only aid disbursed through the budget can appear as aid 
revenue and spending simultaneously. It matters whether the state of the data allows for 
binary disaggregation, or not. The residual un-allocable components in Van de Sijpe (2013), 
IP and ONM, amounting about a half (53%) of total (earmarked) health aid, lead to a 
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complication with respect to fungibility estimates, as this leaves a considerable fraction of 
health aid outside the vital binary distinction, leading to less interpretable coefficients of 
ƵŶĂůůŽĐĂƚĞĚ ĂŝĚ  ?ĂƐ ƚŚĞ ĞǆƚĞŶƚ ƚŽ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƐƵĐŚ ĂŝĚ ŝƐ ƌĞĐŽƌĚĞĚ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ďƵĚŐĞƚ ŝƐ
uncertain), and interdicting the corrections that the author proposes for correcting the 
fungibility estimates of total (disaggregated) aid given the remaining uncertainty in 
categorisation, and thus uncertainty in the relative variances of on- and off-budget aid. 
In broader context (i.e. in measuring the effect of various aid modalities on total health 
spending, thus moving towards fiscal effects studies), the binary distinction is not necessary: 
the effect of more than two aid modalities on total public health expenditures can be 
estimated; and the resulting coefficients have a clear economic interpretation. Whether aid 
is fungible is not a concern under this approach; the question addressed is whether total 
health spending increases in proportion to increases in health aid. 
4. Empirical Model and Results 
Firstly, we compare Lu et al. and Van de Sijpe (2013) fungibility (rather, effect of 
components of health aid on total health spending) estimates arising from their differing 
ĚĞĐŽŵƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽĨŚĞĂůƚŚĂŝĚ ?tĞƵƐĞƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƉĂƌƐŝŵŽŶŝŽƵƐŵŽĚĞůĂŶĚ>ƵĞƚĂů ? ?ƐĚĂƚĂƐĞƚ
to isolate the differences in fungibility estimates arising solely from alternative ways of 
constructing the health aid data (i.e. keeping identical the estimator, the data for all 
(dependent and control) variables, the omitted variables, sample size). Secondly, using the 
same model, we conduct a sensitivity check by proposing an alternative binary 
decomposition of health aid. We also return to the missing data problem raised in Chapter 2 
to inspect whether the estimated results differ depending on how the missing data are 
tƌĞĂƚĞĚ ? dŚĞ ŵŽĚĞů ŝƐ ŬĞƉƚ ƉĂƌƐŝŵŽŶŝŽƵƐ ĂŶĚ ŝƐ ďĂƐĞĚ ƉƌĞĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚůǇ ŽŶ >Ƶ Ğƚ Ăů ? ?Ɛ
specification to provide results that are comparable both to the Chapter 2 and Lu et al. 
(2010) and Van de Sijpe (2013) estimates. Lu et al. (IMF sample) and Van de Sijpe datasets 
overlap for 108 countries for 10 years (1995-2004), covering the majority of Lu et al. 
sample.111 The estimated model can be summarised as: 
                                                          
111 Lu et al. original findings are sensitive to this sample reduction (see Appendix Table B10); their 
core IMF results would be altered such that DAH-nG has no significant effect on GHE-S (the estimated 
domestically funded health spending), and GGE would no longer be significant. 
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 ܩܪܧ െ ܣH?H?ൌ  ߚH?ܣܫܦ݋݊H?H?H?H?൅ ߚH?ܣܫܦ݋݂ H݂?H?H?H?ሺ൅ߚH?ܣܫܦ݋ݐ݄݁ݎH?H?H?H?ሻ ൅ ߚH?ܦܴH?H?൅ ߚH?ሺܩܦܲ݌ܿሻH?H?൅ ߚH?ܩܩܧݎ݁ݏH?H?൅ ߚH?ܪܫ Hܸ?H?൅ ߤH?ሺ൅ߣH?ሻ ൅ ߳H?H? (2.1) 
for country ŝ A?  ? ?  ? ? E ?A? ? ? ? ?, year ƚ A?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ?d ?A? ? ? ? ? ?; lag k=0,1,2. ܩܪܧ െ ܣH?H? denotes 
recipient government spending on health (as agent, see below). ܣܫܦ݋݊H?H?H?H? measures health 
ĂŝĚ ĚŝƐďƵƌƐĞĚ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ďƵĚŐĞƚ ? ǁŚŝůƐƚܣܫܦ݋݂ H݂?H?H?H?denotes health aid not 
ƌĞĐŽƌĚĞĚŽŶƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?ƐŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚďƵĚŐĞƚ ?ܣܫܦ݋ݐ݄݁ݎH?H?H?H? denotes any other aid modalities  
of aid potentially included in the model. ܦܴH?H? refers to debt relief (assumed to be uniformly 
distributed across years for any given recipient) as in Lu et al. (2010). ሺܩܦܲ݌ܿሻH?H? is the 
natural logarithm of GDP per capita. ܩܩܧݎ݁ݏH?H? captures the total government expenditures 
less the ܩܪܧ െ ܣH?H?itself to compare the increments in health spending to rest of the public 
spending. ܪܫ Hܸ?H? measures HIV prevalence in the adult population, used as a proxy for 
disease burden. All variables, except HIV prevalence and GDP per capita are expressed as 
proportion of the GDP. ߤH? captures time-invariant country effects, and ߣH? denote a set of 
year dummies. ߳H?H? is assumed to be a transient error. Data, except ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ sĂŶ ĚĞ ^ŝũƉĞ ?Ɛ
(2013) measures of health aid variables, are as in Chapter 2 and Lu et al. (2010). 
In Chapter 2 we argued that GHE-S (domestically funded health spending) construction 
contains some flaws, and thus GHE-A (total health aid spending) is a preferred choice for the 
dependent variable. First, it is not always clear whether it is GHE-A or GHE-S that is reported 
to the international databases (Lu et al., 2010); using GHE-A would avoid double deduction 
of aid flows in GHE-S (especially if aid is not spent in the year it was received, or was not 
recorded on the budget). Secondly, we argued that it is likely that DAH-G is likely to be 
overestimated, primarily due to assumption that health aid funds for which the channel of 
delivery is unclear are going through the budget. If this is the case, subtracting DAH-G from 
GHE-A to construct GHE-^ ǁŽƵůĚ ĂƵƚŽŵĂƚŝĐĂůůǇ ƵŶĚĞƌĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞ ƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ
commitment to health (GHE-S) and overestimates the extent of fungibility (the opposite 
being true if sĂŶĚĞ^ŝũƉĞ ?ƐŽŶ-budget measure (SP) was used to construct GHE-A). Thirdly, if 
off-budget aid is to have any positive effect on government spending on health (increasing 
the efficiency of institutions, training of extra medical staff available to be employed, donors 
building the hospitals to be staffed by the government-paid staff, etc.), it would be more 
clearly reflected in the total measure (GHE-A) (a zero estimate would indicate no fungibility 
of off-budget aid). 
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We disagree with Dieleman et al. (2013) that GMM is the best estimator. Chapter 2 has 
demonstrated (see Figure 2.5) that the variables (expressed as a proportion of GDP) exhibit 
substantial year-on-year variation, the effect of which is exacerbated in GMM. This is in 
ĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ZŽŽĚŵĂŶ ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ?b) criticism that system GMM is over-instrumented. We 
estimate a fixed effects (FE) model (with robust standard errors).  
To check for the potential aid smoothing effects, we also estimate a variant of the model 
with lagged (and contemporaneous) aid included. If past health aid flows have a significant 
positive effect on total health spending in the model where contemporaneous health aid is 
also estimated to have a positive effect, we could conclude that we have found evidence of 
aid smoothing effects.  
Finally, Chapter 2 has raised the issue of missing data that permeates developing country 
data. The chapter has also outlined the argument against imputing the dependent variable, 
and argued that defying this warning may bias the resulting estimates in unknown direction. 
Thus, for each model specification, we provide three sets of estimates:  
a) Ă ƐĂŵƉůĞ ŽĨ ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ĨŽƌ ǁŚŝĐŚ Ăůů ǀĂůƵĞƐ ĂƌĞ ĨƵůůǇ ŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚ  ?ŝŶ >Ƶ Ğƚ Ăů ? ?Ɛ
coding), corresponding to complete case analysis estimates: although it does 
reduce the sample considerably (to 50 countries112), at least the direction of bias 
is predictable, compared to multiple imputation;  
b) a pooled (unbalanced) sample of country-years for which the dependent 
variable is coded as observed. This does not disrupt the fixed effects estimates, 
whilst allowing for a substantial increase in the sample size.  
c) A full multiple-ŝŵƉƵƚĞĚ ĂŶĚ ĂǀĞƌĂŐĞĚ >Ƶ Ğƚ Ăů ? ?Ɛ ƐĂŵƉůĞ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ŽǀĞƌůĂƉƉŝŶŐ
sample of 108 countries. This is done in acknowledgement that data as supplied 
by the international organisations (where missing observations are imputed and 
coded as observed) are continued to be used. This further serves as a more 
direct113 ĐŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶƚŽ>ƵĞƚĂů ?ĂŶĚsĂŶĚĞ^ŝũƉĞ ?ƐĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞƐ ?ĂƐƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌĂůƐŽ
uses IMF (though less accessible/not publicly provided) data).  
                                                          
112 This sample excludes all countries for which at least one of the GHE-A observations is coded as 
missing in Lu et al. (2010) dataset (also exclude Angola and Eritrea). Libya is also dropped as it 
contains missing data for all health aid variables in Van de Sijpe (2013) data.  
113 Except for limited truncation of the sample (both Lu et al. and Van de Sijpe), alteration to the 
model (w.r.t. Van de Sijpe), and different dependent variable and estimator (w.r.t. Lu et al.) 
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The estimates reported in the main body refer to full multiple-imputed and averaged Lu et 
Ăů ? ?Ɛ ƐĂŵƉůĞ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ŽǀĞƌůĂƉƉŝŶŐ ƐĂŵƉůĞ ŽĨ  ? ? ? ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ? ǁŝƚŚ  ƚŚĞ ƌĞƐƵůƚƐ ĨƌŽŵ ŽƚŚĞƌ
subsamples (a, b) reported in the Appendix B.  
4.1 If modelled in the same way, do Lu et al. (2010) and Van de Sijpe (2013) 
yield such different results? 
Table 3.2 ĐŽŵƉĂƌĞƐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĨƵŶŐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ? ƌĞƐƵůƚƐ ĂƌŝƐŝŶŐ ĨƌŽŵ >Ƶ Ğƚ Ăů ?ĂŶĚ sĂŶ ĚĞ ^ŝũƉĞ ?Ɛ
propositions on disaggregating health aid. We isolate the differences from health aid 
ǀĂƌŝĂďůĞ ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶƐ ďǇ ƵƐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƐĂŵĞ ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ŵŽĚĞů  ?Ă ǀĞƌƐŝŽŶ ŽĨ >Ƶ Ğƚ Ăů ? ?Ɛ
parsimonious model, with all of their data, except for the health aid), fixed effects estimator 
(Lu et al. used ABBB dynamic system GMM), only varying decomposition of health aid. 
Column I reports results from Lu et al. disaggregation into DAH-G and DAH-nG; column II 
ƌĞƉŽƌƚƐƌĞƐƵůƚƐĨƌŽŵsĂŶĚĞ^ŝũƉĞ ?ƐĚŝƐĂŐŐƌĞŐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŽŽŶ-budget (health SP) and off-budget 
 ?ŚĞĂůƚŚ d ) ĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚƐ ? ĂŶĚ ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ  ?ĂƐ ŝŶ ĂƵƚŚŽƌ ?Ɛ Žƌiginal specification) the residual 
(uncategorised) health aid variables (health IP and health ONM), as well as other aid 
variables (general aid, support to NGOs, and other non-health aid).  
Interestingly, results from Lu et al. and Van de Sijpe disaggregation strategies are very 
comparable. Both ways of health aid disaggregation imply that on-budget aid is somewhat 
ĨƵŶŐŝďůĞ ?ďƵƚƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůǇĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚ ŝŶĐƌĞŵĞŶƚƐ ŝŶŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŽǀĞƌĂůůĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚ
to health spending. Lu et al. disaggregation results in higher fungibility estimate. This is 
sensible given the argument that DAH-'ŝƐƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůůǇŽǀĞƌĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞĚ ?ǁŚŝůƐƚsĂŶĚĞ^ŝũƉĞ ?Ɛ
measure of on-budget health aid is potentially underestimated.114 sĂŶĚĞ^ŝũƉĞ ?ƐŵĞĂƐƵƌĞŝƐ
estimated less precisely. Both sets report narrowly defined off-budget (TC and DAH-nG) aid 
as having no significant effect on government health spending (not implausible). This 
effectively zero estimate indicates that either off-budget aid is not fungible (government 
chooses to maintain  GHE-A), or at least fails to provide any evidence that it is fungible; 
alternatively, it could indicate that recipient government is not fully informed about these 
off-budget aid flows (spending does not respond). The results are consistent irrespective of 
whether we recognise the missing data problem or ignore it altogether (see Appendix Table 
B1 for full set of Lu et al. disaggregation estimates and Appendix Table B2 ĨŽƌsĂŶĚĞ^ŝũƉĞ ?Ɛ
health aid measures). These findings effectively show that the key differences arise from 
modelling and estimator rather than basic disaggregation strategy. 
                                                          
114 dŚĞ ĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞ ŝƐ ŵƵĐŚ ƐŵĂůůĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ sĂŶ ĚĞ ^ŝũƉĞ ?Ɛ ŽǁŶ ŚŝŐhly significant 0.84***(0.31) and only 
weakly significant. The results are not directly comparable to Lu et al. (2010) as they used GHE-S and 
not GHE-A as a dependent variable (and GMM instead of fixed effects).  
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Note that the most significant variables are unallocated health aid (IP, and ONM), signalling 
their potential importance in influencing/association with GHE-A, consistent wŝƚŚ ‘ŵĂƚĐŚĞĚ
ĨƵŶĚŝŶŐ ? ?ƚŚŝƐŝƐĐŽŶƚƌĂƌǇƚŽsĂŶĚĞ^ŝũƉĞ ?ƐƌĞƐƵůƚƐ ?ǁŚĞƌĞ/WŝƐĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞĚĂƐŝŶƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ ) ? 
&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŶŽƚĞƚŚĂƚƌĞƐƵůƚƐďĂƐĞĚŽŶsĂŶĚĞ^ŝũƉĞ ?ƐŚĞĂůƚŚĂŝĚĚĂƚĂĂƌĞ ĨƌĂŐŝůĞĚĞƉĞŶĚŝŶŐŽŶ
whether other aid variables are included. If only health aid variables (column III in Table 3.2 
for inclusion of all health variables; column IV for only explicitly on- and off-budget ones) are 
included115, omitting other aid variables, the estimated effect of on-budget aid is 
insignificant, rendering only uncategorised health aid variables (health IP and ONM) bearing 
significant association (see Appendix Table B4 for correlation coefficient across health aid 
measures). Thus, if only binary distinction was allowed for (e.g. in fungibility studies), Van de 
^ŝũƉĞ ?ƐĚisaggregation could conclude no positive effects of aid and potentially full fungibility 
of on-budget aid (see section 4.2 for detailed discussion). 
Potential aid smoothing effects are tested for by including lagged aid variables (see 
Appendix Table B1 for Lu et al. disaggregation results, and Appendix Table B2 for Van de 
^ŝũƉĞ ?Ɛ ) ? ŽůƵŵŶƐ  ? ?  ? ?  ? ƌĞƉŽƌƚ ƚŚĞ ĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞƐ ǁŚĞƌĞ ĐŽŶƚ ŵƉŽƌĂŶĞŽƵƐ ǀĂůƵĞƐ ŽĨ ĂŝĚ
variables are used. Columns 2, 5, 8 use the lagged value of aid. Columns 3, 6, 9 report results 
where both contemporaneous and lagged values of aid are included; if both were estimated 
to be significant (and positive), we could conclude that government is potentially smoothing 
aid (i.e. hoarding back some of the health aid received to be spent over several years). Using 
Lu et al. disaggregation of health aid, we find evidence of some aid smoothing behaviour 
with respect to the health aid disbursed through the government (DAH-G), but only if the 
missing data problem is recognised (missing values of the dependent variable omitted rather 
than imputed as in Lu et al.). No such evidence is found if the missing data problem is 
ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇ ŝŐŶŽƌĞĚ ?hƐŝŶŐsĂŶĚĞ^ŝũƉĞ ?ƐŚĞĂůƚŚĂŝĚĚŝƐĂŐŐƌĞŐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ǁĞĨŝŶĚŶŽĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞŽĨ
aid smoothing behaviour in key explanatory variables (on-budget health aid, SP, and off-
budget aid, TC). 
Appendix Table B5 provides the (consistent) results with year dummies included in the 
estimation. Results are comparable, although ONM coefficient is no longer significant, 
strengthening the estimated differences of donor project funds from the rest of health aid.  
                                                          
115 See Appendix Table B3 for the full set of estimates across sample variations. 
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Table 3.2: Comparing Health Aid Disaggregation Strategies of Lu et al. and Van de Sijpe 
Dependent variable: GHE-A/GDP (Lu et al.) 
 FE, vce (R)   I 
Lu et al. disaggr. 
II 
VDS disaggr. 
III 
VDS disaggr. 
IV 
VDS disaggr. 
  c c c c 
 N, YO 108,1080 108,1080 108,1080 108,1080 
H
e
a
lt
h
 a
id
 
On-budget:  
DAHG/Health SP 
.3570*** 
(.0707) 
.5032* 
(.2825) 
.3074 
(.2970) 
.3182 
(.3225) 
Off-budget: 
DAHnG/Health TC 
.1676 
(.1646) 
.0642 
(.1128) 
-.0541 
(.1054) 
-.0307 
(.1399) 
Uncategorised: 
Health IP 
 
.3928*** 
(.0525) 
.3405*** 
(.0535) 
 
Uncategorised: 
Health ONM 
 .3016*** 
(.1098) 
.2368** 
(.1103) 
 
O
th
e
r 
a
id
 
General aid 
 
 .0054 
(.0204) 
  
Support to NGOs 
 
 -.1308 
(.1280) 
  
Other non-health aid 
 
 -.0114* 
(.0066) 
  
O
th
e
r 
co
n
tr
o
ls
 
Debt Relief 
 
-.0202 
(.0439) 
-.0094 
(.0493) 
-.0089 
(.0466) 
-.0089 
(.0509) 
Ln(GDPpc) 
 
-.0011 
(.0011) 
-.0013 
(.0012) 
-.0012 
(.0012) 
-.0020 
(.0012) 
GGEres 
 
-.0080 
(.0105) 
-.0086 
(.0109) 
-.0093 
(.0110) 
-.0082 
(.0111) 
HIV 
 
.0406 
(.0314) 
.0360 
(.0304) 
.0406 
(.0323) 
.0392 
(.0334) 
 Constant 
 
.0261*** 
(.0078) 
.0284*** 
(.0090) 
.0266*** 
(.0087) 
.0330*** 
(.0089) 
 R (w, b, o) 0.0624 
0.0001 
0.0014 
0.0603 
0.0009 
0.0001 
0.0518 
0.0002 
0.0016 
0.0202 
0.0114 
0.0074 
Table reports fixed effects (country-clustered robust standard errors) estimation results using full 
sample (108 countries, 1995-2004), and contemporaneous values of health aid (and other variables). 
Standard errors reported in the parentheses. Time dummies are not included. GGEres variable is 
constructing by deducting GHE-A/GDP from total government spending (GGE/GDP). 
Appendix Tables B6, B7, and B8 report the results from first-difference estimations (one-, 
two-, and three-year differences respectively). Three-year differenced data broadly support 
our baseline results (it is not the residual autocorrelation driving the results), reporting IP as 
the most (and only) significant determinant of government total spending; in Lu et al., DAH-
G coefficient is positive and significant at 5 per cent level (highlighting the potential 
ŵŝƐĐůĂƐƐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ĚŽŶŽƌ ƉƌŽũĞĐƚƐ ƵŶĚĞƌ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŽŶ-ďƵĚŐĞƚ ? ŚĞĂĚŝŶŐ ) ?  KŶĞ-year differences 
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provide less consistent results (estimating TC as the only significant variable). This is likely 
due to first-differencing on shorter time horizons amplifying a lot of noise and/or 
measurement error, which has been shown to be present in the data (see Chapter 2). 
4.2 Alternative health aid disaggregation: sensitivity analysis 
Van de Sijpe argued for effectively binary distinction of (health) aid into its on- and off-
budget components, but the data did not allow him to do so completely, resulting in 
inclusion not only of his on- and off-budget variables (SP and TC), but also other health aid 
components (namely, IP and ONM).  The upside of this is it avoids attributing other health 
aid components (IP and ONM) to either of the categories in an ad hoc fashion (given the 
ƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇƚŽǁŚŝĐŚĞǆƚĞŶƚƚŚĞǇĂƉƉĞĂƌŽŶƚŚĞƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?ƐďƵĚŐĞƚ ) ?dŚĞĚŽǁŶƐŝĚĞŝƐƚŚĂƚŝƚ
leaves the fungibility question largely unanswered: these unallocated health aid components 
 ?/WĂŶĚKED )ĂŵŽƵŶƚƚŽũƵƐƚŽǀĞƌĂŚĂůĨ ? ? ?A? )ŽĨƚŽƚĂůŚĞĂůƚŚĂŝĚ ?sĂŶĚĞ^ŝũƉĞ ?ƐŵĞĂƐƵƌĞ ) ?
ĂŶĚƚŚƵƐŚŝƐƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚĐŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ‘ĐŽƌƌĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂƌĞƐƚŝůůĨƌĂĐƚŝŽŶĂůůǇad hoc.  
In contrast to Van de SŝũƉĞ ?ƐƐƚƌŝĐƚĚŝƐĂŐŐƌĞŐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂƚƚƌŝďƵƚŝŶŐƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶĐŽŵƉŽŶĞ ƚƐƚŽƚŚĞ
on-budget aid would be as unadvisable as Lu et al. assuming that health aid with 
unidentified channel of delivery (potentially including some of the donor project funding, 
among other coŵƉŽŶĞŶƚƐ )ŝƐĨůŽǁŝŶŐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?ƐďƵĚŐĞƚ ?ŽǀĞƌĞƐƚŝŵĂƚŝŶŐĞǆƚĞŶƚ
of fungibility). But as Van de Sijpe only proxies for the off-budget component using TC, it is 
highly likely to be underestimated, and, crucially, largely exclude off-budget aid that would 
be most likely to influence health spending (and only including the least fungible health aid 
component). Should a broader definition of the off-budget health aid be used (even if it 
contains some on-budget data), if there is no evidence that its coefficient is negative (i.e. is 
estimated to be zero or above), we could conclude that such, most likely off-budget, aid 
component is not detrimental (non-fungible) to health spending, whilst still estimating the 
effect of fungibility on what is most certainly an on-budget measure (SP).116 
Effectively, this section provides a simple sensitivity check. Having a best-available 
disaggregated health aid data (Van de Sijpe, 2013), we can explore what are the effects of 
enforcing a binary distinction (as required by fungibility studies) of health aid data, or/and 
overestimating the off-budget component, and which components drive the differences in 
the results.   
                                                          
116 If off-budget is found to be fungible, it may just show that donors spend a high proportion of what 
recipients terŵĂƐ ‘ĞŶŽƵŐŚ ?ĨŽƌĂĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƐĞĐƚŽƌ ? 
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Six types of disaggregation of health aid are estimated: 
1) Original disaggregation between sector programme (SP), Investment (donor) 
Projects (IP), Technical Cooperation (TC), and other unmarked (ONM) health aid 
(Van de Sijpe, 2013). As noted before, this disaggregation renders the IP and ONM 
coefficients uninterpretable in terms of aid fungibility. 
2) Enforcing Ă ďŝŶĂƌǇ ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶ ŽŶ sĂŶ ĚĞ ^ŝũƉĞ ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ? ) ĚĂƚĂ P ^W ŝƐ ƚƌĞĂƚĞĚ ĂƐ ŽŶ-
budget aid, and the sum of IP, TC and ONM is considered to be off-budget (denoted 
 ‘ŽĨĨďƵĚŐĞƚs^ ? below). 
3) Sensitivity check on (2) to check whether it is the donor projects attributed to the 
off-budget component that are driving the results: SP is treated as on-budget aid, 
the sum of TC and ONM is considered to be off-budget (denoted  ‘ŽĨĨďƵĚŐĞƚs^ ? ? 
below), and IP is estimated separately. 
4) Descriptively, Lu et al. (2010) DAH measure (the sum of DAH-G  and DAH-nG) is more 
likely to capture a larger extent of (geographically traceable) off-budget health aid, 
as it includes some broader headings, such as research funding or private (US-based) 
ƉŚŝůĂŶƚŚƌŽƉǇĨƵŶĚƐ ?ĂƐsĂŶĚĞ^ŝũƉĞ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Ă) proxy for off-budget aid, (DAC) 
Technical Cooperation, TC, is likely to omit substantial components of what donors 
ĐůĂƐƐŝĨǇ  ?ĨŽƌ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐ ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƐ ) ĂƐ  ?ŚĞĂůƚŚ )  ‘ĂŝĚ ? ?  sĂŶĚĞ ^ŝũƉĞ ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ? ) ĐĂƌĞĨƵůůǇ
constructed measure of on-budget health aid (SP) should still provide a good proxy 
for the on-budget health aid. In this light, an alternative off-budget measure could 
be proposed by deducting SP from DAHtotal (a sum of DAH-G and DAH-nG minus SP; 
denoted  ‘ŽĨĨďƵĚŐĞƚ ?below). This measure results in some negative values (up to 1.3 
per cent of GDP in value, see Table 3.3), which are primarily likely to be due to 
exclusion of health aid loans in Lu et al. (2010) DAH measure. Furthermore, Lu et 
Ăů ? ?Ɛ ,ƚŽƚĂů ŝƐ ůŝŬĞůǇ ƚŽ ƵŶĚĞƌĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞ ƚŚĞ ďƌŽĂĚĞƌ ŽĨĨ-budget aid, as it would 
mostly consider funds spent in the recipient country, and non-governmentally given 
aid from US-based organisations only. 
5) As in (4), but IP is estimated separately (and excluded from off-budget measure, 
 ‘ŽĨĨďƵĚŐĞƚ ? ?).
6) Lu et al. (2010) original disaggregation into health aid disbursed through the 
recipient government (DAH-G) and non-governmental organisations (DAH-nG). 
Table 3.3 provides the summary statistics comparing the alternative health aid 
disaggregation strategies. The measures derived from mixing between Lu et al. (2010) and 
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Van de Sijpe (2013) health aid data yield some negative values (up to 1.3  W 1.8 per cent of 
GDP in value, see Table 3.3), which are primarily likely to be due to exclusion of health aid 
loans in Lu et al. (2010) DAH measure. 
Table 3.3: Alternative Disaggregation of Health Aid: Summary Statistics 
Variable Construction Estimation Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
DAH-G 
 
(6) 1080 0.0026 0.0041 0 0.0386 
DAH-nG 
 
(6) 1080 0.0004 0.0013 0 0.0140 
DAHtotal (DAHG + DAHnG) - 1080 0.0030 0.0048 0 0.0392 
Health IP 
 
(1,3,5) 1080 0.0011 0.0025 0 0.0398 
Health SP 
 
(1-5) 1080 0.0005 0.0011 0 0.0175 
Health TC 
 
(1) 1080 0.0016 0.0025 0 0.0269 
Health ONM 
 
(1) 1080 0.0013 0.0024 0 0.0205 
offbudgetVDS (IP + TC + ONM) (2) 1080 0.0040 0.0054 0 0.0688 
offbudgetVDS2 (TC + ONM) (3) 1080 0.0029 0.0040 0 0.0290 
offbudget (DAHtotal  W SP) (4) 1080 0.0025 0.0045 -0.0136 0.0386 
offbudget2 (DAHtotal  W SP  W IP) (5) 1080 0.0014 0.0038 -0.0182 0.0313 
Table reports summary statistics (mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values) for 
alternative disaggregation of health aid variables, using Van de Sijpe (2013) and Lu et al. (2010) data. 
All variables are expressed as proportion of GDP.    
We estimate the same country fixed effects model with country-clustered robust standard 
errors as in the previous section, for simplicity excluding non-health aid variables. Table 3.4 
reports the results, with columns corresponding to six (1) W(6) alternative disaggregation 
strategies outlined above.  
This primitive sensitivity check supports the postulated hypothesis about over- and under-
estimation of health aid components, and highlights the sensitivity of the empirical results of 
alternative disaggregation strategies. Columns (2), (4) and (6) report the conflicting results 
from three alternative strategies of binary disaggregation of health aid data into on- and off-
budget components, using best data available (Van de Sijpe, 2013, and Lu et al., 2010). A 
ƐŝŵƉůŝƐƚŝĐďŝŶĂƌǇĚŝƐĂŐŐƌĞŐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨsĂŶĚĞ^ŝũƉĞ ?ƐŚĞĂůƚŚ aid data (Column 2) reports that on-
budget aid has no significant impact on total health spending despite flowing through the 
budget, whilst the off-budget component (a sum of donor projects, technical cooperation, 
and other health aid) has a significant positive effect on total health spending despite not 
flowing through the budget (in full, or even at large). Lu et al. (2010) disaggregation (Column 
6) suggests the opposite: health aid channelled through the recipient government has a 
significant and positive (through less than one-or-one) effect on government public health 
expenditures; Lu et al. (2010) on-budget measure of aid (DAH-G) likely (though not explicitly) 
includes donor projects, potentially influencing the corresponding coefficient. 
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Unsurprisingly, combining the two data sources (Column 4) yields a conclusion that both on- 
and off-budget aid has a significant positive effect on GHE-A. This illustrates that conclusions 
(and thus policy recommendations) can depend drastically on the health aid disaggregation 
choices, especially if a binary distinction is enforced. 
Table 3.4: Health Aid Disaggregation - Sensitivity Check 
Dependent variable: GHE-A/GDP (Lu et al.)  
             
(1) 
VDS 
original 
disaggr. 
(2) 
VDS 
(binary) 
(3) 
VDS 
(4) 
Lu et al. 
+VDS 
(binary) 
(5) 
Lu et al. 
+VDS 
(6) 
 Lu et al. 
original 
disaggr. 
DAH-G       0.3570*** 
(on-budget)            (0.0707) 
DAH-nG       0.1676 
(off-budget)         (0.1646) 
Health SP  0.3075 0.1835 0.1946 0.5842* 0.5190  
(on-budget) (0.2970) (0.3454) (0.3333) (0.3170) (0.3160)  
Health IP  0.3405***  0.3127***  0.4103***  
(uncategorised) (0.0535)  (0.0556)  (0.0478)  
Health TC  -0.0541      
(off-budget) (0.1054)      
Health ONM  0.2368**      
(uncategorised)      (0.1103)      
offbudget     0.3172***   
(DAHt-SP)                 (0.0567)   
offbudget2      0.2743***  
(DAHt-SP-IP)     (0.0657)  
offbudgetVDS   0.2142***     
 (IP+TC+ONM)           (0.0538)     
offbudgetVDS2    0.1274    
 (TC+ONM)    (0.0903)    
Debt Relief -0.0089 -0.0038 -0.0027 -0.0179 -0.0145 -0.0202 
             (0.0466) (0.0458) (0.0456) (0.0400) (0.0396) (0.0439) 
Ln(GDPpc) -0.0012 -0.0011 -0.0010 -0.0011 -0.0009 -0.0011 
             (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
GGEres   -0.0093 -0.0082 -0.0081 -0.0084 -0.0084 -0.0080 
             (0.0110) (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0105) 
HIV 0.0406 0.0405 0.0407 0.0413 0.0416 0.0406 
             (0.0323) (0.0334) (0.0335) (0.0309) (0.0312) (0.0314) 
N            1080 1080 1080 1080 1080 1080 
r2_a         0.0447 0.0366 0.0384 0.0584 0.0602 0.0572 
Table reports country fixed effects estimates (country-clustered robust standard errors) for various 
disaggregation strategies of health aid. Column (1) reports estimates from Van de Sijpe (2013) 
disaggregation of health aid (identical to column III in Table 2); Column (2) enforces a binary 
ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶ ŽŶ sĂŶ ĚĞ ^ŝũƉĞ ?ƐĚĂƚĂ ďǇ ĂŐŐƌĞŐĂƚŝŶŐ /W ? d ĂŶĚ KED ĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚƐ ŝŶƚŽ  ‘ŽĨĨďƵĚŐĞƚs^ ?
variable; Column (3) estimates SP and IP separately, aggregating TC and OEDŝŶƚŽ ‘ŽĨĨďƵĚŐĞƚs^ ? ? ?
ŽůƵŵŶ ? ? ?ƵƐĞƐ ‘ŽĨĨďƵĚŐĞƚ ?ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĞĚďǇĚĞĚƵĐƚŝŶŐ^WĨƌŽŵ,ƚŽƚĂů ?ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞƵƐŝŶŐďŽƚŚ>ƵĞƚĂů ?
 ? ? ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚsĂŶĚĞ^ŝũƉĞ ?ƐŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐ ?^W ? ?ŽůƵŵŶ ? ? ?ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĚĞĚƵĐƚƐ/WĨƌŽŵ,ƚŽƚĂů ? ‘ŽĨĨďƵĚŐĞƚ ? ? ?
and including it separately in the estimation. Column (6) reports estimates from Lu et al. (2010) 
original disaggregation (and replicated Column I from Table 3.2). Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses.   
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Departing away from the binary distinction, primarily by disaggregating away the donor 
project component from the off-budget health aid (Columns 3 and 5 in Table 3.4), reiterates 
the previous result that IP has a robust significant positive effect on recipient health 
spending. This may be due to these flows potentially at least partially flowing through the 
budget, but is as likely (given the uncertainty to the extent of such flows appearing on the 
budget) to signal the positive effects of investment projects through complementarity 
(matched funding), conditionality, institutional and capacity building, and similar channels. 
The contrasting findings of the residual off-budget aid (after the removal of SP and IP 
components from the respective total measures of Van de Sijpe and Lu et al.) illustrates that 
the contents of Van de Sijpe (2013) and Lu et al. (2010) data differ substantially: the 
ĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞĚ ĞĨĨĞĐƚ ŽĨ  ‘ŽĨĨďƵĚŐĞƚ ? ?  ?>Ƶ Ğƚ Ăů ? ?Ɛ , ƚŽƚĂů ůĞƐƐ ƚŚĞ ƐĞĐƚŽƌ ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵ ĂŶĚ ĚŽŶŽƌ
ƉƌŽũĞĐƚƐ )ŝƐƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞĂŶĚƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ ?ǁŚŝůƐƚsĂŶĚĞ^ŝũƉĞ ?Ɛ ‘ŽĨĨďƵĚŐĞƚs^ ? ? ?ĂƐƵŵŽĨdĂŶĚ
ONM) portrays no sizeable effect. 
KǀĞƌĂůů ?ƵƐŝŶŐĂ  ?ůŝŵŝƚĞĚ )ƉĂƌƐŝŵŽŶŝŽƵƐŵŽĚĞůĂŶĚĂ ĨŝǆĞĚĞĨĨĞĐƚƐĞƐƚŝŵĂƚŽƌ ?sĂŶĚĞ^ŝũƉĞ ?Ɛ
on-budget component (sector programme, SP) is rather consistently estimated as having no 
(strongly) significant effect on total public health spending in low- and middle-income 
countries.  This highlights potential underestimation of such on-budget measure (though 
may, too, be due to fungibility effects, or omission of important variables, such as tax 
revenue and other forms of aid). The proposed alternative off-budget measures based on 
binary disaggregation of health aid are estimated to have a highly significant positive effect 
ŽŶ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ŚĞĂůƚŚ ƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐ  ?ĞǀĞŶ ŝĨ ŝƚ ŝƐ ƉƌŝŵĂƌŝůǇ ĚƌŝǀĞŶ ďǇ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶ ĨƌŽŵ
donor projects, as the latter does constitute off-budget aid unless it flows through the 
government). Two key interpretations are worth noting. Either this off-budget aid contains a 
significant proportion of on-budget aid, or off-budget aid actually has a positive effect on 
total health spending (e.g. through requirement of some complementary funds, monitoring, 
etc.). Finally, as noted above, Lu et al. (2010) on-budget measure of aid (DAH-G) likely 
(though not explicitly) includes donor projects, rendering the corresponding coefficient 
positive and highly significant  W ĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚŝŶŐĨŝŶĚŝŶŐƐĨƌŽŵsĂŶĚĞ^ŝũƉĞ ?ƐĚĂƚĂ ? 
5. Conclusions  
In evaluation of fiscal effects of aid (including fungibility), it is important to distinguish 
between on- and off-budget aid flows. We introduced a simple conceptual disaggregation of 
(health) aid into its on-budget and off-budget components, and argued that, if a careful 
definition of fungibility is adopted, off-budget aid is unlikely to be fungible. Given the current 
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state of donor data records, however, a binary disaggregation of (sector) aid flows is not 
feasible in practice, preventing conclusive statements about fungibility of aid. Even 
aggregate figures reveal stark differences, with even larger relative discrepancies in the 
disaggregated data.  
The existing health aid fungibility estimates (primarily those by Van de Sijpe, 2013, and Lu et 
al., 2010) yield less conflicting results than is currently stated. We showed that if the 
ĞƐƚŝŵĂƚŝŽŶ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ƐĂŵĞ ? >Ƶ Ğƚ Ăů ? ĂŶĚ sĂŶ ĚĞ ^ŝũƉĞ ?Ɛ ĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞƐ ůĞĂĚ ƚo very 
comparable  W qualitatively not conflicting  W conclusions: on-budget aid increases health 
spending (even if partially fungible); and the narrow definition of off-budget aid (i.e. at least 
excluding donor projects) has no significant effect on GHE-A. Quantitatively, the estimates 
inevitably differ slightly due to different health aid disaggregation strategies, and do so in 
expected direction. However, the disaggregation strategy is important:  if a simplistic (ad 
hoc) binary distinction was enforced on the data, policy recommendation using Van de 
^ŝũƉĞ ?Ɛ ĚĂƚĂ ǁŽƵůĚ ĚĞůĞŐĂƚĞ ŚĞĂůƚŚ ĂŝĚ ƚŽ ŽĨĨ-ďƵĚŐĞƚ ĐŚĂŶŶĞůƐ ? >Ƶ Ğƚ Ăů ? ?Ɛ  W through the 
recipient government, and constructing a measure using both datasets would conclude that 
both channels are suitable for (effective) health aid delivery.    
The lack of distinction between on- and off-budget aid may partly explain the mixed 
evidence of fungibility studies, especially if studies aiming to assess the relationship between 
fungibility and aid effectiveness are considered. Petterson (2007), who finds that despite 
high estimated sector fungibility, shows that aid effectiveness is not reduced in the face of 
such high aid fungibility. This is consistent with potentially over-estimated on-budget aid 
(leading to higher estimates of sector fungibility). The estimated effectiveness of aid would 
instead capture the effects of both on- and off-budget aid (e.g. by effectively taking into 
account impacts of technical cooperation), and thus the on- / off- budget disaggregation 
would be of lesser importance. The widely cited Feyzioglu et al. (1998), who assessed both 
general (or aggregate) fungbility (results sensitive to sample size) and sectoral fungibility (aid 
to agriculture, education, and energy found to be fungible, whilst aid to transport and 
communication sector were not), did not find any conclusive evidence of the fungibility of 
health aid. This may be partly due to their measure of aid: the authors used concessional 
loans to assess sector fungibility. Whilst concessional loans would likely be mostly on-budget 
(and most relevant to some of the other sectors such as energy), the health sector aid, 
especially during their sample period, is more likely to be disbursed in the form of grants, 
resulting in underestimating the on-budget component (and virtually omitting the off-
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budget component), and potentially resulting in inconclusive findings.  Given the key 
argument of distinguishing between on- and off-budget aid, the findings are not directly 
comparable to other estimates of aid fungibility. 
Departing from the limited fungibility question and approaching the problem from a broader 
(yet still limited) fiscal effects angle allows to analyse the issue and the data more plausibly. 
Relinquishing the binary disaggregation of aid required by the fungibility studies allows to 
explore the relationship between separate health aid components and total (domestically 
and externally funded) health spending, allowing to assess which health aid modality has the 
most sizeable effect on reciƉŝĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚ ƚŽ ŚĞĂůƚŚ ƐĞĐƚŽƌ ? ŽŶŽƌ  ?ŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚ )
projects are found to have the most robust strongly significantly positive effect. We 
postulated that this may be reflecting complementarity, conditionality, or institutional or 
capacity improvements possibly associated with such funds during the sample period. No 
health aid modality was found to have a significantly negative effect on total health 
spending. As Chapter 2 raised further aid recording issues and contested the assumption 
that received aid is ought to be spent in the current fiscal year, we also test for aid 
smoothing behaviour, and find little evidence to support such hypothesis. Acknowledging 
the incidence of missing data did not alter qualitative conclusions (although the size of 
estimated coefficients inevitably varies slightly). 
To fully assess the sector fungibility of aid, one would need to be able to track aid funds 
available to other sectors (if the concern is over aid awarded to one sector being diverted 
onto spending in another sector; to some extent attempted by Van de Sijpe, 2013), and over 
time (due to potential spending lags). Furthermore, in all currently available health aid 
fungibility studies discussed in this chapter, tax (and other domestic) revenue constitutes an 
importaŶƚŽŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĂƐƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐĂůůǇĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞĨƵŶĚƐĂƌĞŶŽƚĐŽŶƚƌŽůůĞĚĨŽƌ ?
In this chapter, we maintained the estimated economic model as close as possible to the 
existing ones for comparability purposes. In the two following chapters we turn our 
attention to fiscal response analysis (cases studies), with the final Chapter 6 returning to the 
issue of omitting non-DAC aid flows.  
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Chapter 4 
 
Fiscal Effects of Aid in Ethiopia:  
Evidence from CVAR Applications117 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter looks at fiscal dynamics in Ethiopia, particularly focusing on the fiscal effects of 
aid. Understanding of the fiscal effects of aid can be seen as a prerequisite to the analysis of 
the macroeconomics effects (and effectiveness) of aid. Since Osei et al. (2005), the 
Cointegrated Vector Auto  W Regressive (CVAR) has been increasingly used for the analysis of 
fiscal effects of aid in individual country setting.  We estimate a CVAR model including the 
following variables: government expenditure, disaggregated into recurrent and capital 
spending components, tax revenue, non-tax revenue, and aid, disaggregated into grants and 
loans. The VAR model is highly demanding of the data. Therefore we estimate two models 
with five variables at a time. Since our key interest is in whether aid has any adverse effects 
on tax revenue, the primary focus is on a model with disaggregated aid and revenue 
variables, and aggregated government spending. The alternative system then looks in more 
detail at the relationship between aid and public expenditure by disaggregating the latter 
into the capital and recurrent components, but aggregating government revenue, aiming to 
answer what is aid actually funding.  
                                                          
117 This chapter is a result of collaboration with Giulia Mascagni, at the time PhD Candidate in 
Economics, University of Sussex, who provided the data. 
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The key advantage of this study over similar CVAR applications for Africa lies in our unique 
data. We use annual observations from 1960 to 2009 compiled by the Ethiopian Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Development (MoFED). Not only the series are longer than those 
used in most existing studies in the literature, but also they are obtained from a single 
domestic source. By using national data we are able to capture the recipient ?Ɛ measure of 
aid  W what is effectively disbursed through the budget and the government is aware of. 
Therefore it is the component and the measure of aid most relevant for the analysis of its 
fiscal effects. The CVAR analysis is complemented by an in depth qualitative understanding 
of the Ethiopian context, which ensures sound model specification and sensible 
interpretation of estimated results.  
Our findings are three-fold. Firstly, our results provide evidence for the existence of 
domestic budget equilibrium: government spending decisions in the long run are driven by 
domestic revenue, and this is continual across the three political regimes covered in our 
sample.  Secondly, aid is positively associated with tax revenue118, thus failing to provide 
evidence for a disincentive or substitution effects. Thirdly, aid is positively associated with 
public expenditure. The system with disaggregated spending components shows that aid 
grants exhibit a stronger positive association with capital expenditure than loans, despite 
the conventional expectation that the opposite should be the case because of the 
repayment requirement attached to aid loans. Aid components exhibit a more uniform 
effect on recurrent spending. In these equilibria, aid also exhibits adjustment behaviour, 
ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐ ƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ ĚŽŶŽƌƐ ? ĚŝƐďƵƌƐĞŵĞŶƚ ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐĂƌĞ ďĂƐĞĚ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ĨŝƐĐĂů
behaviour, rather than aid driving fiscal trends. Interestingly, grants and loans do not seem 
to exhibit qualitatively differing effects on Ethiopian fiscal variables. Results are robust to 
alternative aggregation/disaggregation strategies and inclusions/exclusion of dummies. 
The Chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the fiscal effects of aid and 
reviews the relevant literature to date; Section 3 discusses the quantitative data, the 
quantitative dataset and introduces some relevant aspects of Ethiopian fiscal history to 
provide some qualitative context. Section 4 describes the CVAR methodology, and 
summarises the misspecification tests and the determination of the cointegration rank. The 
long run structure is identified in subsections 4.3 and 4.4; subsection 4.5 briefly discusses 
the short run results, and Section 4.6  W the common driving trends in the model. The results 
for alternative system specification where total expenditure is disaggregated into recurrent 
                                                          
118 Note that we use a measure of tax in (logged) levels rather than as a percentage of GDP, and 
therefore we cannot draw explicit conclusions on the effects of aid on tax effort. 
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and capital components are provided in section 5. Section 6 concludes. Additional 
information can be found in Appendix C.  
2. Fiscal Effects of Aid: Framework, Hypotheses, and Applications 
Last few decades of the research on fiscal effects of aid often relied on the seminal Heller 
(1975) framework of fiscal response models. The framework is based on the maximisation of 
ƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƵƚŝůŝƚǇĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶ, represented by deviations of actual fiscal aggregates from 
target levels. Criticisms (see Binh and McGillivray, 1993, among others) to this framework 
include both theoretical and empirical issues, such as equal treatment of overshooting and 
undershooting the government targets, or unavailability of the actual data on the 
government targets. 
With the aim of overcoming the problems inherent to ,ĞůůĞƌ ?Ɛ ĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬ ĂŶĚsingle 
equation models, the Cointegrated Vector Auto  W Regressive (CVAR) framework has 
attracted increased attention in the analysis of fiscal dynamics. CVAR offers several 
advantages: firstly, it does not require a strict theoretical economic structure but rather 
 ‘ĂůůŽǁƐ ĚĂƚĂ ƐƉĞĂŬ ĨƌĞĞůǇ ? ƚŽ ĚŝƐĐriminate between competing hypotheses or theories; 
secondly, it does not impose a priori assumptions and restrictions, such as residual normality 
or variable exogeneity, but allows to test for these in the dynamic multiple equation setting. 
However, since the estimation of simultaneous long W and short Wrun equations involves a 
large number of parameters, the CVAR ideally requires large samples, and this poses a 
challenge in the analysis of fiscal dynamics for developing countries. The framework is 
outlined in section 4 below. 
Given the lack of robust economic theoretical framework, we use a simple government 
budget identity to equip ourselves with a set of hypotheses of fiscal effects of aid to be 
tested in the parsimonious CVAR model. The basic accounting identity of the budget simply 
states that all revenues plus borrowing must equal all expenditures:  
 ܶܣܺ ൅ ܰܶܣܺ ൅ ܮܱܣܰܵ ൅ ܩܴܣܰܶܵ ൅ ܤܱܴܴܱܹ ൌ ܥܣܲܧܺܲ ൅ ܴܧܥܧܺܲ (4.1) 
where TAX denotes tax revenue, NTAX is non-tax revenue, LOANS are foreign aid loans, 
GRANTS denote foreign aid grants, BORROW is domestic (and, potentially, foreign non-
concessional) borrowing, also possibly including any seignorage revenue, and CAPEXP and 
RECEXP are ĐĞŶƚƌĂůŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛcapital and recurrent expenditure, respectively.  
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Together with the assumption of some government targets, previous literature of fiscal 
effects would often assume that aid is exogenous, putting some measure of tax (tax effort 
models) or expenditure variable (fungibility studies) on the left hand side. In this context, the 
CVAR framework has the clear advantage since it does not require any of these assumptions. 
The mechanism for the budget process does not have to be specified a priori, and therefore 
ƚŚĞsZĐĂŶ ‘ůĞƚƚŚĞĚĂƚĂƐƉĞĂŬ ?ŽŶƚŚĞĚǇŶĂŵŝĐƐƚŚĂƚĚƌŝǀĞƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ, and discriminate 
against competing potential mechanisms. 
Given the concessional nature of aid loans, (domestic) borrowing could be considered as the 
 ‘ďŽƌƌŽǁŝŶŐŽĨ ůĂƐƚ ƌĞƐŽƌƚ ?119. Following such reasoning, the equation (4.1) can be rewritten 
as: 
 ሺܶܧܺܲሻ െ ሺܦܱܯܴܧܸ ൅ ܣܫܦሻ ൌ ܤܱܴܴܱܹ (4.2) 
where, for simplicity, we aggregated all variables into total domestic revenue (DOMREV), 
total government expenditure (TEXP) and aid (AID). Borrowing is then a function of 
interactions between domestically collected revenue, aid, and expenditure decisions120. In 
effect, borrowing is bounded in the long run at some sustainable level (for instance, one that 
ensures the feasibility of servicing the outstanding public debt). Viewing borrowing as a 
residual decision would allow regarding it as potentially a stationary process (see Figure 4.2), 
and therefore focus hypothesis testing on interactions between the remaining variables.  
The equation (4.2) above suggests three main effects of aid. Firstly, we can expect a positive 
relation with expenditure  W aid should be spent. Given the limited availability of data and 
ĐŽŶƚĞŶƚŝŽƵƐ ŝƐƐƵĞ ŽĨ ǁŚĂƚ ŝƐ Ă  ‘ŐŽŽĚ ? ǁĂǇ ƚŽ ƐƉĞŶĚ ĂŝĚ ŵŽŶĞǇ ? ǁĞ ǁŝůů ŶŽƚ ĚĞůǀĞ ŝŶƚŽ
discussion of the fungibility of aid (see McGillivray and Morrissey (2000) for an overview of 
the debate). Our empirical focus is to simply test which  W the aid or the government 
expenditure  W adjust to the other if they form a long run equilibrium, and which spending 
component bears a stronger association with aid.  
Secondly, aid can influence tax revenue. Several competing hypotheses can be formed about 
this potential relationship. Foreign aid may provide a politically cheaper source of revenue 
                                                          
119 This, of course, is debatable if one accepts that both commitment and disbursement of aid loans 
takes time. 
120 Certainly, apart from the variables in the postulated system, each of the variables depends on 
other domestic (or foreign) factors; for instance, the revenue collection will depend on tax policy (e.g. 
tax base, rates, effectiveness of collection), whilst aid will in turn depend on the economic and 
political conditions in the donor country. 
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than taxation, and therefore discourage tax effort. This argument, in theory, is stronger for 
grants than for aid loans, as the latter  W at least in theory  W requires future repayments. On 
the other hand, aid may have a positive effect on tax revenue through its effect on income, 
expanding tax base, or strengthening tax administration or improving tax policies121. If the 
latter effect of aid on tax dominates the former, we would expect aid and tax to exhibit a 
positive long run association.  
Finally, aid may not be all spent as additional public expenditure but also be used to 
decrease borrowing: since aid relaxes the domestic budget constraint (i.e. the budget 
identity excluding aid variables), the government could achieve the same level of 
expenditure with less borrowing. As we do not have the full series on domestic borrowing 
(see section 3), we are unable to test for this potential fiscal effect of aid.  
Therefore, while the single equation 4.2, as accounting identity, would be expected to imply 
one cointegrating (or equilibrium) relationship between the variables, the economic 
perspective summarised in the paragraphs above would imply three cointegrating 
(equilibrium) relationships (see section 4 of this chapter). Firstly, a domestic budget 
relationship between expenditures and domestic revenue, where the government makes its 
spending decisions consistent with the planned revenue. Secondly, aid-spending relationship 
as described in the paragraph above. Finally, aid  W tax relationship (if the spending and 
domestic revenue are cointegrated, and spending and aid cointegrated, so must aid and tax 
revenue). These three relationships would describe the inter-variable dynamics of equation 
4.2, as such joint system of three cointegrating relationships would be expected to form a 
stationary system, with borrowing  W the excluded variable  W representing a stationary 
(adjusting) process. In a five variable system, this would imply two common trends driving 
the system (see section 4.6), with one potentially broadly representing the domestic agenda, 
and one  W donor aid-driven processes. 
In summary, the research questions we aim to explore are: 
x Does the budget identity hold as an equilibrium relation in the long run? 
x Is aid part of that long run equilibrium relation? 
x Does aid discourage tax revenue? 
x Does aid increase spending? 
                                                          
121 WĂƌƚŽĨƚŚŝƐĞĨĨĞĐƚǁŝůůŶŽƚďĞŵŽĚĞůůĞĚĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇĂƐƚŚĞƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?ƐŵĞĂƐƵƌĞŽĨĂŝĚǁŝůůĞǆĐůƵĚĞĂŶǇ
non-ĐĂƐŚĂŝĚĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞŝŐŶŽƌĞĚŽŶŽƌƐ ?ƐƚĂĨĨ ?ƐƉƌĞƐĞŶĐĞ ?ĞǆƉĞƌƚŝƐĞ ?ĐŽŶƐƵůƚŝŶŐ ?ĞƚĐ ? ) ? 
for instance.  
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x Which components of spending are most affected by aid? 
x Does aid heterogeneity (i.e. distinction between grants and loans) matter and 
what are the differences in the behaviour of the two aid components? 
It is important to note that the CVAR methodology has also some caveats. First of all, the 
CVAR is very demanding on the data and therefore the number of variables should be as 
limited as possible to allow estimation and inference, particularly in small samples.122 
Secondly, the results are sensitive to specification choices (Lloyd et al. 2009). To address 
these concerns, we formulate two distinct models: one to focus on the tax  W aid relationship; 
and one to examine which components of government spending are most affected by aid; 
and perform numerous robustness checks.  
Similar empirical applications 
Given the inconclusiveness of cross-country and/or panel evaluations of fiscal effects of aid, 
and as data improves, case-study approach is more often adopted in the literature. A 
number of authors have applied the CVAR analysis to investigate the fiscal effects of aid. 
Table 4.1 below outlines studies that applied the CVAR framework to developing country 
context (and one focusing on macroeconomic effects of aid), the length of their respective 
sample, variables employed and their data sources.  
Since a large part of aid flows into the public budget, analysis of the fiscal effects of aid can 
be seen as a prerequisite to understanding the macroeconomic effectiveness of aid 
(McGillivray and Morrissey, 2000; Mavrotas, 2002). Juselius et al. (2011) look at the 
macroeconomic effects of aid in a sample of sub-Saharan African countries. They do not find 
any adverse macroeconomic effects of aid in Ethiopia, but do not consider the fiscal 
system.123  
The common feature of the previous applications is that data come from various national 
and international sources and the time-series dimension is rather short. Also, given the 
aforementioned data requirements, the number of variables included in the models tends to 
be low, with a maximum of five. A notable exception is Martins (2010) who uses quarterly 
data (60 observations) to model a system of six fiscal variables. We favour of annual data for 
                                                          
122 ůƐŽ ŶŽƚĞ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ sZ ůĞŶĚƐ ŝƚƐĞůĨ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ  “ďƵŝůĚ-up of type I errors in a general-to-specific 
ŵŽĚĞůůŝŶŐƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ? ?>ůŽǇĚĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? ? ?:162). 
123 Several other studies also apply CVAR to developing countries, but their foci are beyond the fiscal 
system alone. These are, for instance, Mavrotas (2002), looking at the effect of aid on growth; 
D ?ŵĂŶũĂĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? ? ? )ŽŶĂŝĚ ?ŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚĂŶĚŐƌŽǁƚŚŝŶ<ĞŶǇĂ ? 
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two reasons: firstly, quarterly data for Ethiopia are available but they are not as reliable as 
they are only compiled seriously after the introduction of Protection of Basic Services (PBS) 
project in 2005 when donors became more careful about monitoring and reporting; 
secondly, budget decisions are taken annually and intra-year dynamics do not necessarily 
add relevant information. Therefore, while we take Martins (2010) paper as a reference 
point, as it analyses Ethiopia, we depart from it both by using annual data and by exploiting 
deeper qualitative information about the country context. 
Following from the submission of Osei et al. (2003), the set of studies by Overseas 
Development Institute (ODI) on Malawi, Uganda and Zambia all adopt the same approach of 
estimating a set of different models based on the CVAR methodology, including different 
sets of variables (although note that in Fagernas and Roberts (2004b) all variables were 
found to be stationary and only a simple VAR was implemented). For both Uganda and 
Malawi, Fagernas and Roberts (2004, 2004a) find that both grants and loans have the 
expected positive effect on total expenditure. They find no solid evidence that aid 
discourages tax effort in Malawi and that it may have reduced borrowing, and identify a 
positive long run effect of aid on domestic revenue in Uganda, with negligible effect on 
domestic borrowing. For Zambia, aid seems to be associated with weakened domestic 
revenue and increased borrowing.  
Osei et al. (2003) focus on the impact of aid on fiscal policy in Ghana using two models: first 
using a measure of aggregate expenditure, and the second one further disaggregated into 
capital and recurrent expenditure. In both cases they provide support for strong exogeneity 
of foreign aid. Aid in Ghana is associated with beneficial policy responses: increased tax 
effort and decreased domestic borrowing, resulting into increased public spending.  Results 
from the disaggregated system suggest that aid in Ghana is more strongly associated with 
current rather than capital expenditure, contrary to the evidence from Uganda and Malawi 
(Fagernas and Roberts, 2004a; Fagernas and Schurich, 2004).  
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Table 4.1: Summary of CVAR Fiscal Literature 
Paper Country Obs Variables Data source 
Fagernas and Schurich (2004) Malawi 31 Fiscal National, WDI, IMF 
Fagernas and Roberts (2004a) Uganda 26 Fiscal National, IMF 
Fagernas and Roberts (2004b) Zambia 27 Fiscal WDI, IMF-IFS, OECD-DAC 
Osei et al. (2003) Ghana 33 Fiscal IMF, OECD-DAC 
Bwire (2013) Uganda 37 Fiscal National, OECD-DAC 
D ?ŵĂŶũĂĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? ? ? ) Kenya 39 Fiscal and 
growth 
National 
Lloyd et al. (2009) 19 LIC and MIC 30 Fiscal WDI 
Martins (2010) Ethiopia 60* Fiscal National 
Juselius et al. (2011) 36 SSA countries  Macro-
economic 
WDI, OECD-DAC, PWT 
 EŽƚĞ P ‘ 踃?ĚĞŶŽƚĞƐƋƵĂƌƚĞƌůǇŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶƐ 
D ?ŵĂŶũĂet al. (2005) relate fiscal variables to growth in Kenya using a measure of aid 
disaggregated into grants and loans. While grants are positively associated with growth in 
the long run, loans are required to finance fiscal deficits. Consequently, loans were found to 
have negative effects on growth in the long run.  With weak significance of the effects of 
 ?ůŽǁĨůŽǁƐ )ŽĨŐƌĂŶƚƐ ?ĂƵƚŚŽƌƐĨŝŶĚƚŚĂƚ “ůŽĂŶƐƐƵďƐƚŝƚƵƚĞĨŽƌĚ ŵĞƐƚŝĐƚĂǆĞĨĨŽƌƚƚŽĨŝŶĂŶĐĞĂ
ĨŝƐĐĂů ĚĞĨŝĐŝƚ ? ĂŶĚ ĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞ that, in the case of Kenya is a potential obstacle to aid 
effectiveness and that grants seem to be a preferable aid modality than loans. 
/Ŷ ǁŝƌĞ ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ? ) ĚŽĐƚŽƌĂů ƚŚĞƐŝƐ ŽŶ hŐĂŶĚĂ ? ĂŝĚ ŝƐ ĨŽƵŶĚƚ  ďĞ ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚ
spending, increased tax revenue, and decreased domestic borrowing. Domestic revenue is 
found to be the main driver of spending plans, and the exogeneity of aid is not empirically 
supported.  
Martins (2010) models fiscal dynamics in Ethiopia using disaggregated measures of 
expenditure and aid but leaving the domestic revenue aggregated (containing both tax and 
non-tax revenue); the system also includes domestic borrowing, but excludes a number of 
residual items.124 For the period of 1993-2008, aid is found to be positively related to 
development expenditure, with aid adjusting to variations in expenditure and therefore 
suggesting that donoƌƐ ĨŽůůŽǁ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ĞǆƉĞŶĚŝƚƵƌĞ ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ ďǇ ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝŶŐ ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚ
                                                          
124 All papers exclude one or more variables from the analysis, most commonly domestic borrowing 
and/or non-tax revenue, to avoid estimating an identity. 
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expenditure. Domestic borrowing was found to be the most adjusting item, thus 
compensating for variations in both aid and other revenues. No evidence was found that aid 
may be discouraging tax revenue, and that government finances its expenditure in the order 
ŝŶ ůŝŶĞ ǁŝƚŚ ǁŝƌĞ ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ? ) ĨŝŶĚŝŶŐƐ ĨŽƌ hŐĂŶĚĂ ? ŶĂŵĞůǇ P ĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐ ƌĞǀĞŶƵĞ ? ĂŝĚ ? ĂŶĚ
borrowing. While quarterly data allows increasing the sample size and conveniently 
considering only a period of relative political stability while preserving the number of 
observations, our approach is in favour of annual data instead: budget decisions are taken 
annually and intra-year dynamics do not necessarily add relevant information. 
The discussed sƚƵĚŝĞƐ ĚŽ ŶŽƚ ĨŝŶĚ ŵƵĐŚ ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ĨŽƌ  ‘ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞ ? ĨŝƐĐĂů ĞĨĨ ĐƚƐ ŽĨ ĂŝĚ ? ďƵƚ
demonstrate that the underlying fiscal mechanisms differ across countries, and therefore 
justify a case-study approach. A general element emerging throughout CVAR applications is 
the importance of considering the country context, particularly when the number of 
observations is small. Knowledge of the historical and political context can help explain large 
residuals, and in designing the deterministic components of the CVAR, such as dummies and 
mean shifts related to country specific events. The next sections summarise our data, their 
advantages, and how the exploration of the qualitative context contribute to the 
quantitative set up.  
3. Data and Qualitative Context 
Data availability and reliability present a severe issue in African countries, and especially so 
its time-series dimension. Many African countries reached independence in the 1960s and 
only then did they start building national institutions, including statistical offices. Ethiopian 
case is different because the country has never experienced colonisation, but only a six-year 
invasion by Italian forces in 1935-1941. Upon his return, Emperor Haile Selassie embarked 
on a reform process with fiscal policy at its core, as public revenues were much needed for 
reconstruction and development. By the creation of the Central Statistical Office in 1961, 
Ethiopia had a well-established tradition in data collection with fiscal records dating back to 
1949, and, in fact, today  W together with South Africa  W Ethiopia has the highest Statistical 
Capacity Rating in Africa (African Economic Outlook 2010)125. This is of particular importance 
for the CVAR analysis, as the approach is highly reliant on the data. 
                                                          
125 http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/  
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Our dataset of 50 annual observations for the period of 1960  W 2009126 was compiled in 
Ethiopia on the basis of MoFED data.127 MoFED compiles National Accounts that may be 
then transferred to international institutions to apply the necessary modifications that make 
the data comparable across countries. Our choice to use national data has several 
advantages: firstly, the data series are consistent as they come from a single source, and 
thus avoid introducing any conversions or adjustments. Secondly, it is the one used for 
government decision making and is therefore relevant from a policy perspective. Finally  W 
and crucially  W it includes a measure of aid that represent the actual cash portion going 
through ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ďƵĚŐĞƚ  ?ŽƚŚĞƌ ĂŝĚ ĐŚĂŶŶĞůƐ ďĞŝŶŐ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ŶŽ -governmental 
organisations, or delivered in form of technical assistance or in-kind, to name a few).128 Note 
that in the measure of budget aid we include not only budget support, but also other 
sources of aid that flow through the budget. In particular, budget support was withdrawn in 
2005 due to the post-election tensions and has not been restored since; however, other 
types of aid were introduced, most notably a project called Protection of Basic Services 
(PBS). While PBS is a project, it flows through the budget and fully uses the country systems, 
thus exhibiting some similarities with general budget support. 
While only budget aid is considered, we are still able to further disaggregate it into grants 
and loans. Such disaggregation is motivated by the expectation that these two types of aid 
would exhibit different effects because of the repayment requirement associated with loans. 
Furthermore, whilst grants are largely donor-determined, loans may be sought out by the 
recipient, especially when deficits are higher. 
When disaggregating public expenditure into its capital and recurrent components, we 
ŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ŽƌŝŐŝŶĂů ĐůĂƐƐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ ĂŶǇ ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌŵĂŶŝƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ? tŚŝůƐƚ
the distinction between development expenditure and pure government consumption along 
the lines of Martins (2010) is theoretically appealing, it is very difficult to credibly impute 
single expenditure items to either of the categories. An obvious example is the public sector 
salaries: some components may be considered a developmental expenditure (e.g. wages in 
health and education), but the wage bill is classified under recurrent. 
                                                          
126 ĂƚĂƌĞĐŽƌĚƐĨŽůůŽǁƚŚŝŽƉŝĂŶĨŝƐĐĂůǇĞĂƌƐ ?ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞƚŚŝŽƉŝĂŶ'Ğ ?ĞǌĐĂůĞŶĚĂƌ ? 
127 While the data are of generally good quality, the quantitative data was reviewed during an 
extensive interview process (including with MoFED employees), and such qualitative information 
contributed to filling some prevailing data gaps, especially during the Derg period, were data were of 
poorer quality (see Mascagni, 2014). 
128 By omitting the off-budget aid, we ignore its potential indirect effects on government decisions. 
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Finally, we disaggregate domestic revenue into tax and non-tax revenue, and we show them 
to display different behaviour in Ethiopian fiscal dynamics. Unfortunately, we have to 
exclude domestic borrowing because full series for this variable is only available from 1974. 
Furthermore, given several negative values, its inclusion would be complicated given the log 
transformation applied to the data.  
In the CVAR applications discussed above, variables are either analysed in levels (Bwire, 
2013, Martins, 2010, Osei et al., 2003) or in logarithmic transformations (Juselius et al., 
 ? ? ? ? ?D ?ŵĂŶũĂĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?tĞĞǆƉůŽƌĞĚďŽƚŚŽƉƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚƐĞƚƚůĞĚŽŶĚĂƚĂŝŶůŽŐƐďĞĐĂƵƐĞ
it was superior in terms of model fit, such as no autocorrelation and normality in the 
residuals (discussed in section 4). The log transformation requires all variables to be strictly 
positive. Since the first three years in the grants series are reported to be effectively zero, 
we discard first three years of observations, reducing the sample to the period of 1963  W 
2009.129  
The key variables are depicted in Figure 4.1 below. For presentation purposes, the data is 
expressed as proportion of GDP. During the sample period, Ethiopia experienced several 
important events, including two major political regime changes that are distinct in the data. 
In the beginning of our sample, Ethiopia was under the Imperial rule of Haile Selassie, who 
had ruled the country since 1930, with a six Wyear interruption due to the Italian invasion in 
1935. After the 1974 revolution, the rule was assumed by the socialist military junta, known 
ĂƐ ĞƌŐ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝŶ ƚƵƌŶ ǁĂƐ ĞǀĞŶƚƵĂůůǇ ƌĞƉůĂĐĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ ƚŚŝŽƉŝĂŶ WĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ ZĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶĂƌǇ
Democratic Front (EPRDF) that is still in power today. A brief description of each regime (in 
terms of key fiscal components) is provided in Table 4.2.130 Table 4.3 provides regime 
averages for the key variables.  Consulting fiscal history, as well as economic and political 
calendar, complements econometric results and ensure that the interpretation of 
quantitative results is realistic. 
The first 11 years of data depict the feudal structure of the imperial rule. With 
ƵŶĚĞƌĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚ “ŵŽĚĞƌŶ ?ƐĞĐƚŽƌƐĂŶĚůŝƚƚůĞƌĞǀĞŶƵĞŽďƚĂŝŶĞĚŝŶƌƵƌĂůĂƌĞĂƐƚŚƌŽugh direct 
taxation (mainly due to widespread tax evasion), the imperial regime relied heavily on trade 
and indirect taxation. The sustained revenue mobilisation during this period was mainly 
                                                          
129 We specifically do not express the variables as proportion of the GDP. Whilst it would allow to 
facilitate the interpretation (both statistic and economic), as well as international comparisons, it may 
introduce more measurement error, given the difficulties related to GDP accounting (see, for 
instance, Jerven, 2013).  
130 A more verbose description of the key events and policies is available on request; an even more 
extended version can be found in Mascagni (2014) PhD thesis at the University of Sussex.  
Chapter 4  W Fiscal Effects of Aid in Ethiopia Emilija Timmis 
87 
 
driven by two elements of the government spending: expansion of the military and civilian 
bureaucracy. A large army (biggest military force in black Africa by 1960) was needed to 
address the tensions over borders, primarily with Eritrea (fully annexed by Ethiopia in 1962), 
but also with Somalia over the Ogaden region. The bureaucratic apparatus was expanding to 
meet increasing administrative and economic functions: the development planning  W a 
central issue in the international debate in 1950s  W included a succession five-year 
development plans. The importance of foreign investment was recognised by the 
government: fiscal incentives included exemptions from business income tax, duty free 
imports, and guarantees regarding the possibility of remitting a proportion of profits. Given 
ƚŚŝŽƉŝĂ ?Ɛ ƵŶŝƋƵĞ ŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞ ĨƌŽŵ ĐŽůŽŶial power, aid flows were comparatively low, 
with loans and grants contributing about a fifth of total expenditure on average. Although 
the US was the key ally and donor, Ethiopia could also turn for assistance to Federal Republic 
of Germany, Sweden, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and even the Soviet Union, as well as 
multilateral organisations such as the World Bank and UN missions. Finally, since mid-1960s, 
government systematically used domestic borrowing to finance its budget deficit, although 
still less than in subsequent regimes.  
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Figure 4.1: Data of Key Aggregated and Disaggregated Variables 
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After the 1974 socialist revolution and the establishment of the socialist military junta 
(Derg), the growth in state expenditure was at increasing imbalance with the growth of the 
economy. The public expenditures consistently shifted away from development and services 
(capital expenditure) towards control functions, including military expenditure (recurrent 
spending). Thus, the continuity with the Imperial regime became increasingly clear, at least 
in terms of strong state, repressive political apparatus and lack of independent institutions. 
Domestic revenue mobilisation remained a priority. Tax policy during the Derg mainly relied 
on: direct taxation with high marginal rates131 (personal incomes, and commercial profits, 
including those from state-owned enterprises); agricultural taxation (income and land use); 
and trade taxes (dominated by the revenues from taxes on exports). Although initially 
increasing, the tax revenue eventually declined, mainly due to shrinking tax base, and 
widespread avoidance and evasion. Non-tax revenues were also increased, initially due to 
expropriations and nationalisation, then through retaining the profits from state enterprises 
(that were already heavily taxed), and, towards the end of the regime, transfers from 
National Bank of Ethiopia as it had a large amount of accumulated reserves in domestic 
currency that were unused. Borrowing (Figure 4.2), both domestic and foreign, was also 
increasing to close the government resource gap; the situation deteriorated considerably 
towards the end of the regime (as the government was scaling up its military spending) and 
in 1990 payments of all debt obligations were frozen, except for those to international 
financial institutions and other critical ones. American aid (except its humanitarian 
component) was fully withdrawn from Ethiopia by 1977, mainly due to the uncompensated 
expropriation of American private assets. USSR became the largest foreign actor and the 
Western donors had little political leverage in the county. Nevertheless, trade mostly 
occurred with the western partners (Europe, the US, and Japan); Ethiopia was part of the 
Lomé agreement with European community, and thus a substantial fraction of aid was still 
Western. Foreign investment, however, decreased sharply, mainly due to non-compensatory 
expropriations and restrictions to private initiative. The end of the regime, 1989-1991 
period, was described by deteriorating economic, military132, and political situation in the 
country, as a decade of poor economic policies  W increasing war effort, overextension of the 
state, the lack of investment, and  deterioration of the terms of trade - resulted in economic 
crisis, accompanied by fiscal collapse (see Figure 4.1). 
                                                          
131 Up to 89%.  
132 BǇ ? ? ? ? ?ƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚůǇ ? “ƚŚĞĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚƐŝŶƚŚĞŶŽƌƚŚǁĞƌĞĐŽŶƐƵŵŝŶŐŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶƚwo-ƚŚŝƌĚƐŽĨƚŚŝŽƉŝĂ ?Ɛ
ĂŶŶƵĂůďƵĚŐĞƚ ? ?<ĞůůĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ) 
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Figure 4.2: Public Borrowing  
 
Coming to power in 1991 after 16 years of armed struggle, EPRDF embarked upon significant 
liberalisation and privatisation programmes, establishment of ethnic federalism and 
accompanied decentralisation, capacity building, and institution development, and the 
revenues and expenditure recovered rather quickly. As these efforts were supported by the 
Western donors (especially through Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in the 
1990s)133, the (budget) aid to Ethiopia increased substantially and consistently during the 
WZ&ƉĞƌŝŽĚ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚŝŽƉŝĂŶŽǁďĞŝŶŐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚĂŶ ‘ĂŝĚĚĂƌůŝŶŐ ? ?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚŝƚƐƚŝůůƌĞĐĞŝǀĞƐ
less official development assistance (ODA) per capita than most of other African countries). 
Both grants and loans each averaged to about 3% of GDP during the period, and aid 
dependency (expressed as total budget aid as a proportion of government expenditure) 
increased to about 28%. However, aid remains the most volatile source of revenue (Figure 
4.1). The fiscal situation inherited from the Derg was disastrous: the revenue was at pre-
revolution levels, and the level of debt exceeded 100% of GDP. However, EPRDF rapidly 
improved revenue performance, with the growth rate of revenue of 36% in 1992 already, 
and sustained at double rates until the Eritrean war. The deficit was also consistently 
decreased, with government budget producing surpluses in 1994-1996. The limited capacity 
for tax reform in the 1990s was further complicated by the 1993 secession of Eritrea. A 
                                                          
133 AůƚŚŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞƐĞ ǁĞƌĞ ŝŶƚĞƌƌƵƉƚĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƉĞĂĐĞ ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚŝĞƐ ? ĚƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĂƌŵĞĚ ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ ǁŝƚŚ
Eritrea (1998-2001, the latter year also coinciding with a drought). Furthermore, the general budget 
support was withdrawn following the aftermath of 2005 election, but was soon substituted by the 
Protection of Basic Services project aid, flowing through the budget. The decrease in loans in the 
2000s is due to debt relief under HIPC initiative. 
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major tax reform was eventually carried out in 2002 and represented a great effort of 
revenue mobilisation, which was falling short of the needs stemming from the 
administrative reforms, decentralisations and the re-militarisation of the late 1990s. IMF, 
along with other donors, played a crucial role in supporting the tax reform. Despite the 
expectations of annual tax growth rate of 24% on average (against the predicted GDP 
growth rate of 11%), the limitations to tax revenue mobilisation, such as low income and 
large share (40% GDP) of the agricultural sector, with further capacity and compliance 
constraints, remain. Supported by the emergence of developmental state, reflected 
especially in 2005 Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) 
and 2010 Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP), the (per capita) GDP growth rates also 
recovered following the stagnation and deterioration of the Derg regime. In fact, the post-
2003 trends (Figure 4.1) are described by fast GDP growth rates rather than actually 
deteriorating fiscal effort. Aid grants have also been consistently increasing under EPRDF, 
except for the period of war with Eritrea. 
Table 4.2: Key Qualitative 'Summary Statistics'134 
 Imperial Period Derg EPRDF 
 (1963-1974) (1974-1991) (1991-today) 
Key 
description: 
Feudal system Socialist military junta Ethnic federalism 
 Oppressive, inequality, 
large state 
Nationalisation, 
repressive, large state 
Liberalisation and 
privatisaƚŝŽŶ ?ŶŽƚůĂŶĚ ? ? ‘ĨƌĞĞ
ŵĂƌŬĞƚƐ ?ĂŶĚĐĞŶƚƌĂůŝƐƚƐƚĂƚĞ ? 
 
Expenditure: Expansion of military 
and civilian 
bureaucracy. 
ĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚƉůĂŶƐ ?
implementation 
limited. 
 
Further expansion of 
state control. 
ĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚƉůĂŶƐ ?
implementation limited. 
Development: commitment to 
poverty reduction (state-led). 
Demilitarisation  W 
remilitarisation. 
Tax (and 
non-tax): 
Rely heavily on indirect 
and trade taxes. 
Avoidance and evasion. 
Coercion. Extraction 
through non-tax revenue 
(expropriations; profits). 
Actual reforms since 2002 
(IMF); VAT; enforcement; 
rapid growth. 
 
Borrowing: Systematic but modest Increasing.  ‘ZĞůĂǆĞĚ ?ǁ ?ƌ ?ƚ ?/ŶĨƌĂƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ
investment. 
 
Aid: EŽ ‘ƉĂƚƌŽŶ ? ?ůŽǁĨůŽǁ ) ?
US, other bilateral and 
multilateral 
USSR; other bilateral and 
multilateral. 
Increasing but volatile; SAPs; 
peace conditionalities; PBS 
post-2005; HIPC. Strategic. 
 ‘EŽŶ-ƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůĚŽŶŽƌƐ ? ? 
 
Foreign inv.: Encouraged Expropriated Limited 
                                                          
134 Based on Mascagni (2014) PhD thesis submitted to University of Sussex. 
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Table 4.3: Regime Averages of Selected Variables 
Indicator Description Imperial Derg EPRDF 
GDP pc Deflated nominal 1001.2 995.8 1141.9 
Agriculture %GDP 71.3 59.3 49.9 
Manufacturing %GDP 3.7 5.5 5.1 
Trade openness %(Imports+Exports)/GDP) 10.5 13.4 29.4 
Fiscal pressure on trade %(Trade tax/( Imports+Exports)) 21.5 23.1 14.8 
Tax revenue %GDP 5.3 9.2 9.6 
Tax revenue growth Annual change 11.5 8.7 18.5 
Non tax revenue %GDP 0.9 3.3 3.8 
Fiscal Deficit %GDP - -2.1 -1.4 
Expenditure %GDP 8.2 18.2 20.8 
Grants135 %GDP 1.0 1.8 3.0 
Loans %GDP 0.7 1.9 2.9 
Aid dependency %(aid/expenditure) 21.1 19.7 28.2 
 
4. Econometric Framework: CVAR136 and Results 
Model with Disaggregated Aid, Disaggregated Revenue, and Aggregated Spending 
Using the data described in Section 3, we model a five-dimensional vector autoregressive 
ŵŽĚĞů ƚŚĂƚ ŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐ ĐĞŶƚƌĂů ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ƚŽƚĂů ĞǆƉĞŶĚŝƚƵƌĞ(texp); domestic revenue, 
disaggregated into the tax and non-tax revenue components (tax and non-tax, respectively); 
and budget aid disaggregated into grants and loans. Variables are transformed using natural 
logarithms.137 
In the VAR framework, each variable is modelled as endogenous, and is expressed as a 
function of past own values, as well as past realisations of other variables (and deterministic 
components). The vector error-correction model (VECM) representation of the VAR includes 
both the stationary first differences of variables in ݔ ( ?ݔH?), and their value in levels (ݔ), thus 
preserving both the long-run and short-run information in the data. In particular, the error 
correction form of the VAR (VECM) is represented by the following equation: 
 ȟݔH?ൌ ȫݔH?H?H?൅ ෍ ȞH?ȟݔH?H?H?H?H?H?H?H?H? ൅ ȰܦH?൅ ߝH? (4.3) 
                                                          
135 Note that aid figures reflect budget aid only. 
136 This section relies heavily on Juselius (2006). Analysis is conducted using CATS (Hansen and 
Juselius, 1995). 
137 In aggregate specification of Chapter 6, the three-dimensional VAR is used, where  
  ݔH?ൌ ݐ݁ݔ݌H?ǡ ݀݋݉ݎ݁ݒH?ǡ ܽ݅݀H?.  
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  ݔݐ ൌ ݐ݁ݔ݌ݐǡ ݐܽݔݐǡ ݊݋݊ݐܽݔݐǡ ݃ݎܽ݊ݐݏݐǡ ݈݋ܽ݊ݏݐ 
where ݔݐ is a  ൈ  ? vector of endogenous variables described above, ܦ is a vector of 
deterministic components (such as constant, deterministic trend, and dummy variables) with 
a vector of coefficients Ȱ; ݇ denotes the selected lag length; ɂ is a  ൈ  ? vector of 
unobservable error terms, that are assumed to be ߝݐ ?ܫܰሺ ?ǡ ȳሻ. VECM allows a clear 
separation between the long-run coefficients in ȫ and the short-run coefficients in Ȟ݅.  
The VECM representation illustrates that if variables are found to be I(1)  W and 
macroeconomic variables usually are  W stationary variables (ȟݔH?) are regressed on unit-root 
processes (ݔݐെ ?). In such case, the estimated coefficients would be spurious. However, if 
some variables in the system are driven by the same persistent shocks, there may exist 
linear combinations of these variables that are integrated of the lower order than the 
variables themselves (i.e. I(0)). These linear combinations would represent cointegrated 
relations, ߚԢݔH?, and could be interpreted as the long-run steady-state relationships. When 
cointegration exists, ȫ has reduced rank ݎ ൏ ݌ and is defined as follows:  
 ȫ ൌ ߙߚԢ (4.4) 
where ߙ and ߚ are݌ ൈ ݎ matrices (with ݎ ൏ ݌); ߚԢݔH? defines the stationary long-run 
cointegrating relationships ሺݎ ൈ  ?ሻ, and ߙ denotes the adjustment coefficients to the 
equilibrium error. Intuitively, if all ݔݐ ?ܫሺ ?ሻ and  ȟݔH? ?ܫሺ ?ሻ, then a full rank in ȫ would be 
logically inconsistent as it would imply that ݔݐ must be stationary.138 On the other hand,  ݎ ൌ ? implies that each variable in ݔݐ is non-stationary and is driven by its own individual 
stochastic trend and therefore no cointegration exists. In this case, a simple VAR model with 
the variables in first differences would not imply any loss in long-run information.  
The accompanying moving average (MA) representation of the VAR illustrates how the 
process can be described in terms of pulling and pushing forces. The steady state to which 
the process is pulled to is defined by the long run relations ߚԢݔݐ െ ߚ ? ൌ  ?. The forces ߙ 
represent adjustment and they activate as soon as the process is out of steady state, i.e. 
when ߚԢݔݐ െ ߚ ? ്  ?.139 The MA representation describes the non-stationary movement of 
                                                          
138 dŚĞsDƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞsZǁŝƚŚĨƵůůƌĂŶŬŝŶɅĂŶĚ xt~I(1) would imply that a stationary 
ǀĂƌŝĂďůĞ ȴxt equals a non-stationary variable xt-1 ? ůĂŐŐĞĚ ƐƚĂƚŝŽŶĂƌǇ ǀĂƌŝĂďůĞƐ ȴxt-1 and a stationary 
error term. Since a stationary variable cannot equal a non-ƐƚĂƚŝŽŶĂƌǇǀĂƌŝĂďůĞ ?ĞŝƚŚĞƌɅA? ?or it would 
have reduced rank.  
139 Juselius (2006:88-89). 
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the variables according to the common driving trends that represent the cumulated sum of 
ƚŚĞƐŚŽĐŬƐƚŽƚŚĞƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? “/ŶƚŚŝƐƐĞŶƐĞ ?ƚŚĞZĂŶĚDƌĞƉƌ ƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶĂƌĞƚǁŽƐŝĚĞƐŽĨƚŚĞ
ƐĂŵĞ ĐŽŝŶ P ƚŚĞ ƉƵůůŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƉƵƐŚŝŶŐ ĨŽƌĐĞƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?  ?:ƵƐĞůŝƵƐ ?  ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ? dŚĞ
inverted model can be summarised as: 
 ݔH?ൌ ܥ ෍ሺߝH?൅ ȰܦH?ሻ ൅ ܥכሺܮሻሺH?H?H?H? ߝH?൅ ȰܦH?ሻ ൅ ܺH? (4.5) 
 
where ܥ ൌ ߚH?ሺߙᇱH?ሺܫ െ ȞH?ሻߚH?ሻH?H?ߙᇱH? is the long-run impact matrix of rank p-r, with ߙԢC?ߝݐ 
describing the common driving trends; ܥכሺܮሻ is a stationary lag polynomial, and ܺ݋ depends 
on the initial values.  
4.1 Misspecification Tests140  
This section discusses the formal misspecification tests and the corresponding results from 
our model. These tests aim to assess the validity of the assumptions underlying the 
statistical VAR model.  The misspecification tests are also a helpful tool in guiding the analyst 
to correct model specification. Note that the residual autocorrelation tests and the ARCH 
tests are derived under the assumption of normally distributed errors and the normality 
tests are derived under the assumption of independent and homoscedastic errors and the 
lag length criteria are only valid under the assumption correctly specified model.141 The 
misspecification test procedure, in search of the correctly specified model, therefore is 
rather iterative. The results discussed below refer to the final specified five-dimensional 
VAR(k=2) model with an unrestricted constant (allowed to cumulated to a drift in levels). We 
tested a model allowing for a trend in cointegrating relationships (which would cumulate to 
quadratic trends in data in (logged) levels), but the tests suggested it can be excluded from 
the cointegrating space. See Juselius (2006, Chapter 6) for a detailed discussion of 
deterministic components in the I(1) model.  
 The political regime changes are modelled as shift dummies in 1974 (from emperor to Derg) 
and 1991 (from Derg to EPRDF), taking form of ܦ ൌ ሺǥ  ?ǡ ?ǡ ?ǡ ?ǡ ?ǡ ?ǡ ǥ ሻ, allowing for mean 
changes in equilibrium relatŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐ ?tŚŝůƐƚƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?ƐŚŝĨƚĚƵŵŵǇŝƐ ‘ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚ ?ďǇƚŚĞĚĂƚĂ
as an outlier, the 1974 one is not. However, we model it for consistency with the qualitative 
data. Results do not hinge on the exclusion/inclusion of this dummy. The model estimated 
                                                          
140 This section relies on Chapter 4 of Juselius (2006). 
141 Juselius (2006:77-71). 
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over the period of 1963-2009.142 The testing results in the sub-sections below refer to the 
unrestricted VAR (UVAR).  
4.1.1 Lag Length Determination 
We employ the standard lag length determination procedure, which relies on three 
information criteria and the likelihood ratio (LR) lag reduction test. (Note that the criteria for 
the lag length selection are only valid under the assumption of correctly specified model).143 
The sequential LR tests for the lag length determination can be formulated as:  
 െ ?݈݊ܳ ቀH?H?H?H?ൗ ቁ ൌ ܶ൫݈݊หȳ෡H?ห െ ݈݊หȳ෡H?H?H?ห൯ (4.6) 
where H? denotes the null hypothesis of lag truncation at ݇ against the alternative 
hypothesis of ݇ ൅  ?; ܶ defines the effective144 sample size; ȳ෡ is the residual covariance 
matrix. The test is asymptotically distributed as ߯H? with ݌H? degrees of freedom.  
Results are summarised in the upper part of Table 4.4. With maximum lag length of five 
selected (and hence effective sample of 1968-2009) the lag length reduction tests suggest 
the lag length of five. However, note that no penalising factor is applied in LR tests; also, 
small samples often suffer from size issues. The two information criteria defined below 
include a (different) penalising factor related to the number of estimated parameters.  
Schwartz information criterion (SC): 
 ܵܥ ൌ ݈݊หȳ෡ห ൅ ሺ݌H?݇ ሻ ݈݊ܶܶ (4.7) 
Hannan-Quinn information criterion (H-Q): 
 ܪ െ ܳ ൌ ݈݊หȳ෡ห ൅ ሺ݌H?݇ ሻ  ?݈݈݊݊ܶܶ  (4.8) 
As reported in the lower panel of Table 4.4, SC suggests ݇ ൌ  ?, whilst and H-Q favours ݇ ൌ ?. However, the LM tests indicĂƚĞƐŽŵĞƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů  ‘ůĞĨƚ-ŽǀĞƌ ?ƌĞƐŝĚƵĂůĂƵƚŽĐŽƌƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶĂƚ ůĂŐ
length of one. Indeed, the residuals from an equivalent five-dimensional UVAR (k=1) indicate 
inferior model specification as the multivariate normality is rejected, as is the null of 
                                                          
142 dŚĞŶŽƚĂƚŝŽŶŚĞƌĞŝƐƐŚŽƌƚŚĂŶĚĨŽƌƚŚŝŽƉŝĂŶ'Ğ ?ĞǌĐĂůĞŶĚĂƌǇĞĂƌƐŽĨ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
143 Juselius (2006:71). 
144 The effective number of observations must be identical when testing Hk against Hk+1 and hence is 
defined by the longest lag length selected by the analyst. This also holds for the following discussion 
of the information criteria. 
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homoscedastic errors of order one and two. Since the lag-length of two seems to provide a 
better description of the data generating process, we select ݇ ൌ  ?Ǥ145 
Table 4.4: Lag Length Determination (Effective Sample: 1968 to 2009) 
Lag Reduction Tests 
VAR(4) << VAR(5)     : ChiSqr(25)   = 85.214 [0.000] 
VAR(3) << VAR(5)     : ChiSqr(50)   = 124.005 [0.000] 
VAR(3) << VAR(4)     : ChiSqr(25)   = 38.792 [0.039] 
VAR(2) << VAR(5)     : ChiSqr(75)   = 198.140 [0.000] 
VAR(2) << VAR(4)     : ChiSqr(50)   = 112.927 [0.000] 
VAR(2) << VAR(3)     : ChiSqr(25)   = 74.135 [0.000] 
VAR(1) << VAR(5)     : ChiSqr(100)   = 259.290 [0.000] 
VAR(1) << VAR(4)     : ChiSqr(75)   = 174.076 [0.000] 
VAR(1) << VAR(3)     : ChiSqr(50)   = 135.284 [0.000] 
VAR(1) << VAR(2)     : ChiSqr(25)   = 61.149 [0.000] 
 
Model  k  T  Regr.  Log-lik  SC  H-Q  LM(1)  LM(k)  
VAR(5)  5  42  30  513.591  -11.11  -15.04  0.149  0.579  
VAR(4)  4  42  25  470.985  -11.30  -14.58  0.678  0.161  
VAR(3)  3  42  20  451.589  -12.61  -15.23  0.315  0.483  
VAR(2)  2  42  15  414.521  -13.07  -15.03  0.268  0.143  
VAR(1)  1  42  10  383.947  -13.83  -15.14  0.055  0.055  
Effective Sample: 1968:01 to 2019:01 
SC : Schwarz Criterion; H-Q  : Hannan-Quinn Criterion 
LM(k): LM-Test for autocorrelation of order k 
4.1.2 Residual Plots (Unrestricted VAR) 
Whilst the output of the test results is itself informative, the graphical analysis available in 
the software packages (both RATS/CATS, and PcGive) often provide additional information, 
possibly revealing specification problems that test results fail to discover (Juselius, 2006:66). 
This is especially relevant in our study, as the sample is rather small from the time-series 
perspective. 
For each equation, the Figure 4.3 below shows: (i) the plots of actual and fitted values of  ?ݔH?ǡH?, i=1,...,p (top left panel); (ii) the autocorrelogram of order 11 (top right panel); (iii) the 
standardised residuals (bottom left panel); and (iv) the empirical and normal distributions 
(bottom right panel). The graphs do not signal any particular issues.  
                                                          
145 EŽƚĞƚŚĂƚ:ƵƐĞůŝƵƐ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? )ĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚ “ĂůĂŐůĞŶŐƚŚŽĨƚǁŽŝƐŝŶŵŽƐƚĐĂƐĞƐƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƚŽĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞ
a very rich dynamic structure even in a small-ĚŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶĂůƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? ?
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Figure 4.3: Residual Plots (Unrestricted VAR) 
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4.1.3 Residual Autocorrelation, Heteroskedasticity, Normality, and Goodness of Fit 
As the VAR methodology is based on the idea of decomposing the variation in the data into a 
systematic part describing the dynamics in the model and an unsystematic random part, the 
assumption of uncorrelated residuals (and hence this test) is an important one. The ߯H? and ܨ test are derived under the assumption of independent errors; the violation of this 
assumption would result in the distribution of these tests deviating from ߯H? and ܨ in 
unknown ways Juselius (2006:74). 
The key test used to detect residual autocorrelation is the LM test of jth order 
autocorrelation, calculated using an auxiliary regression of estimated VAR residuals, ߝH?ෝ , on 
the ݇ lagged variables, xt-1, xt-2, ..., xt-k, and the jth lagged VAR residual, ߝH?H?I?ෞ : 
 ߝH?ෝ ൌ ࡭૚࢚࢞H?૚൅ ࡭૛࢚࢞H?૛൅ C? ൅ ࡭࢑࢚࢞H?࢑൅ ࡭ࢿߝH?H?I?ෞ ൅ ߝH?෥  (4.9) 
where the first j missing values ߝH?I?ෞ , ..., ߝH?H?ෞ  ĂƌĞƐĞƚƚŽ ? ?dŚĞ>DƚĞƐƚŝƐĐĂůĐƵůĂƚĞĚĂƐĂtŝůŬƐ ?
ratio test with a small-sample correction: 
 ܮܯሺ݆ሻ ൌ  െ ൬ܶ െ ݌ሺ݇ ൅  ?ሻ െ  ? ?൰ ݈݊ ቆหȳ෡ሺ݆ሻหหȳ෡ห ቇ (4.10) 
 
The test is approximately distributed with ߯H?  with ݌H? degrees of freedom; ܪH? assumes no 
(left-over) autocorrelation in the residuals. In Table 4.5 we report the test p-values until 
order four. The null of no autocorrelation is not rejected at any order.  
Table 4.5: Misspecification Tests 
Residual normality (p-values)  
 Multivariate  Univariate  
 
texp tax non-tax grants loans 
0.111  0.496 0.103 0.856 0.277 0.741 
Residual autocorrelation and ARCH effects (p-values)  
 LM(1)  LM(2)  LM(3)  LM(4)   
Residual autocorrelation   0.190  0.225  0.156  0.864  
ARCH  0.606  0.131  0.340  1.000  
Trace correlation  0.518  
       Note: All values are p-values.  
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To test146 for residual heteroskedasticity is the mth order ARCH test, calculated as ሺܶ ൅ ݇ െ݉ሻݔܴH?, where ܶ is the total sample zise, ݇ is the lag length of the VAR, and ܴ2 is from 
auxiliary regression: 
 ߝH?ǡH?H? ൌ ߛH?൅ ෍ ߛH?ߝH?ǡH?H?H?H?H?H?H?H? ൅ ݁ݎݎ݋ݎ (4.11) 
The test is approximately distributed as ߯H? with ݉ degrees of freedom, and the ܪH? assumes 
homoscedastic errors. The results in Table 4.5 demonstrate that no ARCH effects were 
detected at multivariate or univariate level, respectively. (The null of homoscedastic errors 
cannot be rejected)147. Note that the conditional heterogeneity testing is a standard 
procedure in CATS software, and no unconditional heteroskedasticity tests were performed. 
Also note that ARCH effects are more relevant when using financial data, rather than our 
small sample of annual fiscal data.  
The normality (univariate and multivariate) tests discussed in this section are based on the 
Shenton-Bowman transformation. The reported multivariate normality test is that suggested 
in Hansen and Doornik (1996). The multivariate normality is not rejected at 10% level (see 
Table 4.5). Juselius (2006:76-77) notes that VAR estimates are more sensitive to deviations 
from normality due to skewness than to excess kurtosis. The results reported in the 
Appendix Table C1 do not indicate any particular departures from normality in terms of 
skewness (expected to be around 0) or kurtosis (expected to be around 3).  
The measure for goodness of fit in the VAR model is the trace correlation, defined as: 
 ܶݎܽܿ݁ܿ݋ݎݎ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊ ൌ  ? െ ݐݎܽܿ ൫݁ȳ෡ሾܥ݋ݒሺȟݔH?ሻሿH?H?൯Ȁ݌ (4.12) 
Roughly interpreted as ܴH? in the linear regression model, the trace correlation for our data is 
0.518 (Table 4.5). CATS also calculates an ܴH? for each equation, ݅ ൌ  ?ǡ ǥ ǡ ݌, for the models 
in ECM form: 
 ܴH?H?ൌ  ? െ ȳ෡H?H?ȀܸܽݎȟݔH?ǡH? (4.13) 
where ȳ෡H?H? is the estimated residual variance of equation ݅. When the variables are 
integrated of order one, the ܴH? is only meaningful when the dependent variable is given as 
                                                          
146 Juselius (2006:74). 
147 Rahbek et al. (2002) simulation results have demonstrated that the cointegration rank tests are 
robust against moderate residual ARCH effects. (Juselius, 2006:75).  
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ȟݔH?ǡH?, in which case the ܴH? measures the explanatory power of the regressor variables as 
compared to the random walk model. 148  The results are reported in the Appendix Table C1. 
4.1.4 Parameter Constancy Tests (UVAR) 
Since parameter constancy is an important feature of the model149, we report the results 
from a battery of tests (for both full and reduced model) in the appendix. The tests for R-
form are more likely to accept the parameter constancy of the long-run as the effects of the 
non-constant parameters are averaged out. Meanwhile, the X-form150 tests are more likely 
to be influenced by the instability of the parameters of the short-run structure. The two are 
also more likely to differ where the baseline sample is very short (Juselius, 2006:150). The 
parameter constancy tests, reported in the Appendix Table C2, do not show evidence of 
non-constant parameters.  
4.2 Determination of Cointegration Rank 
The determination of cointegration rank, r, is crucial in the CVAR analysis, as it influences all 
the subsequent econometric analysis by dividing the data into ݎpulling and ݌ െ ݎ pushing 
forces, corresponding to, respectively, equilibrium relations and common driving trends. In 
other words, the testing procedure aims to discriminate between the stationary 
(equilibrium) and the non-stationary relations.  
The choice of cointegration rank is usually a difficult decision and in the context of 
developing countries it is aggravated by small samples. It is therefore preferable to consider 
additional information in addition to the formal testing procedure (Juselius, 2006:131). In 
the next paragraphs we consider all the available information for determining the 
cointegration rank.  
The Johansen test, also called the trace test (Table 4.6), is the formal test procedure. It is 
based on the concentrated form of the VAR model (or R-form), where all short-run dynamics 
and deterministic components are concentrated out using the Frisch-Waugh theorem.151 The 
                                                          
148 Juselius (2006:73). 
149  “^ŝŵƵůĂƚŝon studies have shown that valid statistical inference is sensitive to violation of some of 
the assumptions, such as parameter non-constancy, autocorrelated residuals (the higher, the worse) 
and skewed residuals, while quite robust to others, such as excess kurtosis and residual 
ŚĞƚĞƌŽƐŬĞĚĂƐƚŝĐŝƚǇ ? ?:ƵƐĞůŝƵƐ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ?
150 ůƐŽŶŽƚĞƚŚĂƚ  “ďĞĐĂƵƐĞy-form version re-estimates all parameters, the degrees of freedom are 
fewer than for the R-ĨŽƌŵ ? ?:ƵƐĞůŝƵƐ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ?tŚĞƌĞŽŶĞŝƐĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŝŶŐǁŝ ŚĂŵŽĚĞůĨŽƌǁŚich the 
recursive tests signal non-constancies (i.e. one did not choose to re-specify the model), the estimated 
parameters will measure average effects.  
151 For more details see Juselius (2006:116-117, 131-145). 
Chapter 4  W Fiscal Effects of Aid in Ethiopia Emilija Timmis 
101 
 
procedure is to test the hypothesis ܪH?ǣ ݎܽ݊݇ ൌ ݎ, implying that there are at least ݌ െ ݎ unit 
roots and r cointegrating relations. If the test statistic exceeds the critical value, we reject 
the hypothesis of ݌ െ ݎ unit roots and r cointegrating relations, and conclude that there are 
fewer unit roots and more cointegrating relations in the model.  
The distribution of this likelihood-ratio test is non-standard and it is influenced by the 
deterministic components of the VAR model. It therefore has to be simulated using our 
specified model (to account for the step dummies) in order to obtain critical values 
(reported in the Appendix Table C3). In addition, Juselius (2006:140-141) argues that in 
small samples the asymptotic distributions are generally a poor approximation to the true 
distributions and can therefore result in substantial size and power distortions. Therefore we 
apply the small sample Bartlett corrections to the trace statistic (see Johansen, 2002) that 
ensure a correct test size. 
The uncorrected trace statistic allows accepting the hypothesis that there are two unit roots ሺ݌ െ ݎሻ and three stationary relations ሺݎሻ, thus suggesting a rank of three (ݎ ൌ  ?) . The 
Bartlett-corrected values may suggest three unit roots ሺ݌ െ ݎሻ and two cointegrating 
relations ሺݎሻ, thus a rank of two (ݎ ൌ  ?) . However it is only possible to accept this 
hypothesis with a borderline p-value of 0.062. Juselius (2006:145) suggests that in small 
samples it is better to avoid choosing the rank based on small p-values close to the 5% 
threshold and it therefore imposes some caution in accepting ݎ ൌ  ?, whereas ݎ ൌ  ? would 
be a safest option. 
Table 4.6: Rank Test 
p-r r Eig. Value Trace Trace* Frac95 P-value P-value* 
5 0 0.561 102.992 89.83 75.45 0.000 0.003 
4 1 0.459 65.973 57.49 54.15 0.003 0.025 
3 2 0.364 38.306 34.60 35.87 0.026 0.062 
2 3 0.265 17.927 15.41 19.08 0.075 0.155 
1 4 0.087 4.095 3.55 5.86 0.123 0.163 
* denotes Bartlett corrections  
Juselius (2006:48-52, 131-145) suggests considering four additional pieces of information 
when deciding the cointegration rank: the characteristic roots of the model, the t-values of 
the ߙ coefficients of unrestricted VAR, the recursive graphs of the trace statistic, and the 
graphs of the cointegrating relations (as well as economic interpretability of the results). 
Such information, reported in the Appendix Table C4, seems to support the choice of ݎ ൌ  ?. 
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This choice is also confirmed by the parameter constancy tests of the model with ݎ ൌ  ?, that 
do not signal any particular problem (Juselius, 2006:145).  
Firstly, if the (r+1)th cointegrating vector is non-stationary and wrongly included in the 
model, then the largest characteristic root will be close to the unit circle). With  ݎ ൌ  ?, the 
modulus of largest characteristic root is 0.690. In such small sample it is difficult to make a 
ƐŚĂƌƉĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶƵŶŝƚ ƌŽŽƚƐ ?ŶĞĂƌƵŶŝƚ ƌŽŽƚƐ ?ĂŶĚ  ‘ǀery staƚŝŽŶĂƌǇ ? ƌŽŽƚƐ  ?:ƵƐĞůŝƵƐ ?
2006:145).152 Secondly, if all of t-ƐƚĂƚŝƐƚŝĐƐŽĨɲĐŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƐŽĨƚŚĞ(r+1)th cointegrating vector 
are small, say less than 2.6, then one would not gain a lot by including the (r+1)th vector as a 
cointegrating relation in tŚĞŵŽĚĞů ?  ?:ƵƐĞůŝƵƐ ?  ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ?ůů ĨŝƌƐƚ ƚŚƌĞĞĂůƉŚĂǀĞĐƚŽƌƐ ĨƌŽŵ
the unrestricted VAR have significant coefficients (with two significantly adjusting 
coefficients in the third alpha vector), whilst not really in the fourth. Thirdly, the recursively 
calculated components of the trace statistic should grow linearly for all i=1, ..., r, but stay 
constant form i=r+1, ..., p. The concentrated model illustrates that three components of the 
trace test statistic can be said to be growing linearly,153 while the remaining two exhibit 
some volatile behaviour. Fourthly, the graphs of cointegrating relations should not reflect 
distinctly non-stationary behaviour; if they do, the choice of r should be reconsidered, as the 
model specification may be incorrect.154 The final panel of Appendix Table C4 illustrate that 
whilst three (first (texp), second (tax), and fourth (grants)) relationships do look rather 
stationary, two of them do less so.  
Finally, in addition to the statistical tests to determine the rank of  ȫ, it is crucial to ensure 
that the resulting equilibrium relations are economically interpretable. Following the 
discussion of Ethiopian qualitative data (Section 3) and broader literature (Section 2), we 
may expect to find the following three equilibrium relations: 
1. A domestic budget equilibrium, where the government makes its spending decisions 
consistent with the planned domestic revenue. Whether aid is part of this 
equilibrium can and will be tested.  
2. A relationship between government spending and aid, which we can expect to be 
positive. Formulating an equilibrium relation between these variables would also 
allow to test hypotheses about aid spending and to identify the adjusting variables. 
                                                          
152 The modulus of largest characteristic root with r=2 is 0.584. 
153 Note that the unit root rejection line should be shifted from 1 to approximately 1.25 to account for 
Bartlett correction and the effect of a shift dummy (Juselius, 2006:145). 
154 Juselius (2006:142).  
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In particular, it is interesting to test whether it is government expenditure or aid that 
adjusts to deviations from such equilibrium relationship.  
3. A relation between aid variables and tax revenue. If such a long-run relation exists, it 
would be possible to test whether a disincentive effect of aid on tax could be found. 
In addition, by disaggregating grants and loans we can test whether aid 
heterogeneity matters.155 
The expected relations discussed here are only preliminary and they need to be tested 
empirically. In the next section, on identification of the long run structure, we assess their 
empirical validity and estimate the respective coefficients. .  
4.3 Long Run Identification: Hypothesis Testing 
We conduct a battery of long-run identification procedures to gain initial insight into the 
dynamics of the system. Namely, we test156 whether the variables are long-run excludable, 
stationary, weakly exogenous, or purely adjusting. The Table 4.7 below summarises these 
results for the selected rank (r=3). 
4.3.1 Long Run Exclusion157 
The long-run exclusion tests test for a zero row restriction on ߚ, i.e. whether the variable can 
be removed from the cointegration space without losing information. The tests of the same 
restriction in all cointegrating relations158 do not impose identifying restrictions as they 
impose identical restrictions on all cointegrating relations. The likelihood ratio procedure 
tests the null of same restrictions on all ݎ ߚ vectors against the alternative of no restrictions 
on ߚ. The test is approximately distributed as ߯H? with ݎ ൈ ݉ degrees of freedom, where ݉ 
denotes the number of restrictions.159 A variable is said to be long-run excludable if its long-
run coefficient can be accepted to be zero across all cointegrating vectors. For a system with 
                                                          
155 Note that we do not include GDP in the specified model. GDP would capture the tax base effects 
on taxation, but would generate a lot of omitted variables (GDP determinants). Although one could 
argue that it would represent a reduced form, we maintain the focus on the fiscal system only. 
156 All tests in this section are likelihood ratio tests. 
157 Note we are formulating a system where we allow for a trend in levels, but not in CI relations. 
Since this is a testable restriction, we perform a test of long-run exclusion of a trend in the CI 
relationships to confirm that the trend is not required for our system.  
158 These would also include, for instance, tests of long-run homogeneity between variables for all 
long-run relationships.  
159 Note that we can only impose p-ŵA?ƌon the xt endogenous variables without violating the rank 
condition (with no such constraint on the deterministic variables).  
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three cointegrating relationships, none of the variables of interest can be excluded (with a 
mild suggestion that the 1991 mean shift may be excludable).160  
Table 4.7: Long Run Identification Tests 
 texp tax non-tax grants loans 1991 1974 
Long run exclusion  [0.000] [0.002] [0.008] 0.001] [0.014] [0.055] [0.001] 
Stationarity  [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.011] Excluded 
Stationarity  [0.085] [0.021] [0.647] [0.059] [0.371] Included 
Weak exogeneity  [0.007] [0.096] [0.002] [0.020] [0.073]  
Unit vectors in alpha  [0.194] [0.061] [0.040] [0.007] [0.054]  
Note: Table reports p-values for r=3.  
4.3.2 Univariate Stationarity Tests 
The univariate stationarity tests assert whether any variable is stationary (here, around the 
mean) by imposing zero restrictions on all other variables in one cointegrating vector, 
leaving other r-1 vectors of long-run parameters unrestricted. For ݎ ൌ  ?, this is implemented 
by imposing the restrictions on one cointegrating relation to include only the variable with 
deterministic components, and leaving the remaining two cointegrating vectors 
unrestricted. Note that the test results are sensitive to both the choice of rank, ݎ, and the 
inclusion of the deterministic variables. We therefore report the results for all choices of 
rank (Appendix Table C5) and with shift dummies both included in and excluded from the 
cointegrating relations (Table 4.7). The LR test is asymptotically distributed as ߯H? with ሺ݌ ? െݎሻ ൈ ݊H? degrees of freedom, where p1 contains p endogenous variables and the level shift 
dummies, and ݊H? denotes the number of restricted vectors (here ݊H?ൌ  ?ሻ. The null is 
stationarity.  
For cointegration rank of our choice,ݎ ൌ  ?, none of the variables can be accepted as 
stationary if the mean shift dummies are excluded. However, if the dummies are included, 
the stationarity of non-tax and loans cannot be rejected. This is likely to be ĚƵĞƚŽ ‘ƐůŝĐŝŶŐ ?ŽĨ
an already small sample. The DF-GLS tests largely support the hypothesis that most variables 
are I(1) processes with a drift, with the exception of loans (see Appendix Table C5). 
                                                          
160 We consult the test statistics for the alternative (neighbouring) choices of rank: for r=2, none of 
the endogenous variables may be excluded either, although the exclusion of the 1991 shift dummy 
would be accepted. None of the variables could be excluded from a system with four cointegrating 
relations. 
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4.3.3 Weak Exogeneity Tests 
Weak exogeneity tests identify which variables may not adjust to the long-run equilibrium 
by imposing a zero row in alpha vector (without imposing any restrictions on betas). If the 
null hypothesis is accepted, a variable with a zero row in alpha defines a common driving 
trend as the cumulated sum of the empirical shocks to the (weakly) exogenous variable.161 A 
weakly exogenous variable therefore can be seen as having influenced the long-run 
stochastic path of the other variables without having been influenced by them itself. The LR 
test is asymptotically distributed as ߯H? with ݎ݉ degrees of freedom, where ݉ denotes the 
number of weakly exogenous variables.162 For ݎ ൌ  ?, tax revenue and loans are potentially 
weakly exogenous (but this will be re-tested once the long run structure is identified).  
4.3.4 Tests for Unit Vectors in Alpha 
Finally, mirroring the weak exogeneity test, unit vector in alpha test asserts whether a 
variable can be accepted as purely adjusting to the equilibrium error, with the remaining 
variables exclusively adjusting to the remainingݎ െ  ? cointegrating relations.163 Since a unit 
vector in alpha corresponds to a zero row in alpha orthogonal, the shocks to a variable that 
is purely adjusting to the cointegration relation would only have transitory (not permanent) 
effects on other variables, without any contribution to common stochastic trends. The LR 
test is asymptotically distributed as ߯H? with ݒ ൌ ݉ሺ݌ െ ݎሻ degrees of freedom, where ݉ 
denotes the number of known ࢻ vectors. For ݎ ൌ  ?, only government spending can be seen 
as purely adjusting, while such behaviour in tax and loans could only be borderline 
accepted.164  
4.3.5 Individual Hypothesis Testing 
In this section we test whether our hypothesised relationships are individually165 stationary. 
Keeping the remaining ݎ െ  ? cointegrating relationships unrestricted (and thus unidentified), 
                                                          
161 Therefore the test must comply with a condition that there at most can be (p-r) zero-row 
restrictions in alpha vector (Juselius, 2006:194). 
162 If more than one variable is found to be weakly exogenous, the joint test for weak exogeneity need 
to be performed. Should the individually weakly exogenous variables are found to be jointly weakly 
exogenous, then the cumulated shocks to these variables would completely define the autonomous 
driving trends (Juselius, 2006:202). 
163 Juselius (2006:201) 
164 In our identified system, a unit vector for government expenditure could be accepted as purely 
adjusting to beta 1 (internal budget equilibrium) with p-value of 0.19. The (unpredicted) shocks to 
government spending would be seen as having only transitory effects on other variables, which could 
be fairly plausible. 
165 As stated above, our main aim is to see whether the individually stationary cointegrating 
relationships hold together as an equilibrium system.  
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zero (or homogeneity) restrictions in a particular equilibrium relationship may be tested, 
allowing the remaining parameters to be estimated. The test is asymptotically distributed as ߯H? with ݒ ൌ ሺ݉ ? െ ݎ ൅  ?ሻ ൌ ሺ݌ ? െ ݎሻ െ ሺݏ ? െ  ?ሻ degrees of freedom, where m1 is the 
number of restrictions, and s1 denotes the free parameters.166 
The Table 4.8 below summarises the individually stationary (or not) relationships. Several 
variations of expected relationships are explored to check their  ‘ƐƚĂďŝůŝƚǇ ?ĂŶĚƌĞĚƵĐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ? 
Table 4.8: Stationarity (or otherwise) of Variable Combinations 
 texp tax nontax grants loans Ds1991 Ds1974 p-value 
H1 1 -0.703 -0.275 -0.013 -0.05056 0 0 1 - 
H2 1 -0.696 -0.338 0.001 0 0 0 0.391 
H3 1 -0.695 -0.338 0 0 0 0 0.692 
H4 1 -0.719 -0.281 0 -0.04538 0 0 0.765 
H5 1 -0.731 -0.190 0 0 -0.177 -0.156 1 - 
H6 1 -0.694 -0.330 0 0 -0.021 0 0.426 
H7 1 -0.689 -0.347 0 0 0 0.016 0.409 
H8 1 -0.785 0 0 0 -0.385 -0.361 0.630 
H9 0 0 1 0 0 -1.358 -1.265 0.647 
H10 1 0 0 -0.761 -0.4520 0.785 -0.145 1 - 
H11 1 0 0 -0.807 -0.5583 0.993 0 0.869 
H12 1 0 0 -0.607 -0.0117 0 -0.715 0.020 
H13 1 0 0 -0.325 -0.8734 0 0 0.003 
H14 1 0 0 -0.494 0 -0.258 -0.744 0.058 
H15 1 0 0 0 1.3419 -2.794 -2.491 0.385 
H16 0 0 0 1 2.0562 -4.337 -2.728 0.479 
H17 0 0 0 1 -2.5671 0 0 0.005 
H18 0 1 0 -0.9998 -0.7116 1.709 0.449 1 - 
H19 0 1 0 -0.884 -0.3932 1.135 0 0.628 
H20 0 1 0 -0.686 0.3080 0 -0.856 0.016 
H21 0 1 0 -4.428 10.6359 0 0 0.002 
H22 0 1 0 -0.559 0 0 0 0.002 
H23 0 1 0 0 -2.1007 0 0 0.005 
Note: Zeroes in the table are imposed and not estimated.  
Also note that where r  W1 = 2 conditions are imposed, the relationships are just-identified and 
therefore p-value is 1 by construction (i.e. restrictions are not testable) (Juselius, 2006:189). 
 
The three relationships of interest are bolded in the table. H3 (later Beta 1) represents the 
internal budgeting. The relationship is stationary with p-value of 0.69. This (irreducible) 
relationship is very stationary irrespective of whether the shift dummies are included or 
excluded. The estimated coefficients clearly vary, but do so mildly. Also, a relationship with 
ƚŚĞĞǆĐůƵĚĞĚƐŚŝĨƚĚƵŵŵŝĞƐǁŽƵůĚĂƉƉƌŽǆŝŵĂƚĞĂŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ‘ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂů ?ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶŵĂŬŝŶŐĂƐ
                                                          
166 EŽƚĞ ƚŚĂƚŶŽƌŵĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ŝƐŶŽƚ ĐŽƵŶƚĞĚĂƐĂ ƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚŝŽŶĂƐ ŝƚ ŝƐĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚĂŶƵŶƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚĞĚ ɲ
coefficient.  
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averaged over the whole sample. Importantly, such decision would release degrees of 
freedom, and test the remaining two long run equilibrium relationships. H10 (later Beta 2) 
summarises (positive) relationship between government total expenditure and aid variables. 
P-value is 1 by construction.167 Such relationship needs at least 1991 to be stationary (but 
stationary regardless of inclusion of 1974). H19 (later Beta 3) represents a potential positive 
relationship between tax and aid variables. H1 reflects that expenditure bears a non-
negative relationship with all the sources of funding.  
4.4 Long Run Identification: Results 
It is worthwhile to distinguish between a just-identified structure (withݎሺݎ െ  ?ሻ identifying 
restrictions), where ݎ െ  ? identifying (usually zero, or homogeneity) restrictions are imposed 
for each of ݎ cointegrating relationships; and over-identifying restrictions, whereby more 
than ݎ െ  ? identifying restrictions are imposed168 for at least one of the cointegrating 
vectors. Whilst just-identifying restrictions do not change the value of the likelihood function 
as they do not constrain the parameter space, the over-identifying restrictions do, and 
therefore can be tested. Note that normalisation on one element in each vector does not 
change the likelihood as the corresponding ߙH? coefficient is normalised on the same ߚH?  
coefficient. However, that once we have identified a long run structure, the normalisation is 
an important choice, as we do not want to normalise on an insignificant variable)169. 
The LR test procedure for such hypothesis testing is asymptotically distributed as ߯H? with ݒ ൌ  ? ሺ݉ H?െ ݎ ൅  ?ሻ ൌ  ? ሺ݌ ? െ ݎሻ െ ሺݏH?െ  ?ሻH?H?H?H?H?H?H?H?  degrees of freedom, where ݌ ? is the 
number of parameters in ߚH? CI relationship, ݉H? are the restrictions imposed on the ߚH? vector, 
and ݏH? are the parameters free to be estimated in each ߚH?.170 
Imposing (a variant of)171 just-identifying relations allows us to inspect whether the 
hypothesised (equilibrium) relationships represent economically sound system, i.e. whether 
the signs (and, possibly, magnitudes) of the coefficients are meaningful and significant. 
                                                          
167 H11 however demonstrates that if 1974 dummy is excluded from this relationship when the other 
relationships are completely unconstrained, the relationship is stationary. 
168 I.e. the rank conditions are met, meaning no linear combination of other r-1 CI relations may 
produce a vector that resembles the first one (see Juselius, 2006:209-210, which further cites 
Johansen and Juselius, 1994 and Johansen, 1995). For further discussion of three aspects of 
identification (generic, empirical, and economic) see Juselius (2006:208). 
169 Juselius (2006:214). 
170 See also a summary of the process and also the discussion of the calculations of the degrees of 
freedom in Juselius (2006:212). 
171 :ƵƐĞůŝƵƐ  ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) P  “ŝŶ ŐĞŶĞƌĂů ŽŶĞ ĐĂŶ ĨŝŶĚ ŵĂŶǇ ũƵƐƚ-identified structures by rotating the 
cointegratŝŶŐƐƉĂĐĞ ? ?
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Results are provided in Table 4.9. As an over-identifying restriction, we impose a zero 
restriction on the 1974 dummy from the third cointegrating relationship, ߚH?, as its 
coefficient is reported as insignificant (Table 4.9). Furthermore, although the two mean-shift 
dummies appear significant in the first cointegrating relation, ߚH?, as it is reasonable to 
accept that the political regime changes would indeed affect the internal budget dynamics, 
further excluding the dummy variables from the first cointegrating vector we will free two 
degrees of freedom (reducing the first cointegrating relationship to an irreducible stationary 
long-ƌƵŶ  ‘ĂǀĞƌĂŐĞ ? ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ between the fiscal variables) and will be able to test the 
system for stationarity. The results from the over-identified model are provided in Table 
4.10, and sum up our key findings.  
Long-run structure 
To answer the economic questions, we impose the following restrictions on the long-ƌƵŶ ?ɴ )
coefficients: 172 
x To test whether there exists an internal budget equilibrium in the very long 
ƌƵŶ ?ǁĞĞǆĐůƵĚĞĂŝĚĂŶĚĚƵŵŵǇǀĂƌŝĂďůĞƐĨƌŽŵɴ1; 
x To identify the relationship between aid and spending (with a special 
interest into which variables are adjusting), we exclude the domestic 
ƌĞǀĞŶƵĞǀĂƌŝĂďůĞƐĨƌŽŵɴ2; 
x To explore the equilibrium between aid and tax, we exclude government 
spending and non-ƚĂǆƌĞǀĞŶƵĞĨƌŽŵɴ3.  ߚ coefficients describe the stationary long-run equilŝďƌŝƵŵ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ƚŚĞ ĐŽƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚŝŶŐ ɲ
coefficients describe the adjustment behaviour of the variables173. Normalisation of the ߚ 
vectors is always done on a significant variable. In addition to this statistical criterion, 
normalisation is also decided to ease economic interpretability174. Note however that the 
results of the normalized beta should still be read as a vector and not as causal effects.  
                                                          
172 EŽƚĞƚŚĂƚŽƌĚĞƌŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞɴ vectors does not affect the results.  
173 Note that ɲ coefficient needs to be of opposite sign to its corresponding ɴ coefficient to be 
equilibrium correcting. 
174 Contrary to a regression model, a change in the normalization will not change the ratio between 
the coefficients (Juselius, 2006:120). 
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Table 4.9: Just-identified Model with Disaggregated Grants and Domestic Revenue 
 
texp  tax  nontax  grants  loans  1991  1974  
 
Beta1a  1 
-0.73 
(-18.19) 
-0.19 
(-7.02) 
- - 
-0.18 
(-5.04) 
-0.16 
(-3.21) 
~I(0) 
Beta2a  1 - - 
-0.76 
(-7.39) 
-0.45 
(-4.70) 
0.79 
(4.93) 
-0.15 
(-0.77) 
~I(0) 
Beta3a  - 1 - 
-1.000 
(-4.83) 
-0.71 
(-3.88) 
1.71 
(5.14) 
0.45 
(1.17) 
~I(0) 
Alpha1a  
-0.77 
(-3.21) 
0.60 
(1.94) 
0.86 
(1.32) 
-1.16 
(-1.26) 
-1.36 
(-1.08) 
- - 
 
Alpha2a  
0.13 
(0.68) 
-0.13 
(-0.54) 
-2.18 
(-4.15) 
2.33 
(3.16) 
2.30 
(2.26) 
- - 
 
Alpha3a  
-0.05 
(-0.42) 
0.19 
(1.38) 
1.21 
(4.13) 
-1.00 
(-2.42) 
-0.86 
(-1.51) 
- - 
 
 Normality  [p-value = 0.070]  
Stationarity  [p-ǀĂůƵĞA䄀  ‘-  ? 
 Log-Likelihood = 426.899 
    Note: t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
Table 4.10: Over-identified Model with Disaggregated Grants and Domestic Revenue 
 
texp  tax  nontax  grants  loans  1991  1974  
 
Beta1b  1 
-0.69 
(-11.30) 
-0.34 
(-8.56) 
- - - - ~I(0) 
Beta2b  1 - - 
-0.72 
(-9.50) 
-0.29 
(-5.15) 
0.53 
(4.91) 
-0.36 
(-8.72) 
~I(0) 
Beta3b  - 1 - 
-0.91 
(-5.82) 
-0.38 
(-3.35) 
1.16 
(5.23) 
- ~I(0) 
Alpha1b  
-0.42 
(-3.06) 
0.39 
(2.25) 
0.52 
(1.41) 
-0.45 
(-0.87) 
-1.07 
(-1.45) 
- - 
 
Alpha2b  
-0.22 
(-1.52) 
0.065 
(-0.35) 
-1.89 
(-4.81) 
1.718 
(3.15) 
1.69 
(2.18) 
- - 
 
Alpha3b  
0.24 
(3.20) 
0.08 
(0.89) 
1.05 
(5.17) 
-0.46 
(-1.63) 
-0.33 
(-0.81) 
- - 
 
 Normality  [p-value = 0.068]  
Stationarity  [p-value = 0.849]  
 Log-Likelihood = 426.498 
     Note: t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
dŚĞ ĨŝƌƐƚ ĞƋƵŝůŝďƌŝƵŵ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ĐŽŶĨŝƌŵƐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂů ĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐ ĞƋƵŝůŝďƌŝƵŵ ? ŚǇƉŽƚŚĞƐŝƐ P
government total expenditure is positively related to tax and non-tax revenue.175 Although 
the logarithmic transformation infringes the interpretation of the coefficients as the 
                                                          
175 Note that this cannot be strictly seen as identity given non-compliance with logarithmic 
transformation. 
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homogeneity condition (i.e. expenditure is equal to the sum of domestic revenues176), the 
equilibrium could be interpreted as a very long run budgetary process equating public 
expenditure to domestic revenue (or continuity of statehood across the regimes), as the 
mean shift dummies are excluded and thus the relationship holds across the political 
regimes. As depicted in the ɲ1 coefficients, expenditure exhibits the strongest and most 
significant adjustment behaviour, adjusting to the equilibrium error in just over two years, 
although the ɲ1 coefficient on tax is of similar magnitude, implying that in the (very) long run 
tax is also adjusting to equilibrium error. This is in line with a sensible expectation that 
expenditure decisions are more sensitive to planned revenue.   
The second identified equilibrium relationship reveals a positive association between both 
aid components and government spending.177 Crucially, ɲ2 indicates that aid  W and not 
expenditure  W adjusts to departures from this equilibrium.178 For instance, an increase in 
expenditure would result in increase in aid to restore the balance. Such behaviour suggests 
ƚŚĞ ŚǇƉŽƚŚĞƐŝƐ ƚŚĂƚ ĚŽŶŽƌƐ ŵĂǇ ĨŽůůŽǁ ƐŽŵĞ  ‘ĚŝƐďƵƌƐĞŵĞŶƚ ƌƵůĞ ? ďĂƐĞĚ on government 
spending decisions, whilst government spending behaviour does not seem to be conditional 
on disbursement of aid. Comparing between the aid modalities, the weaker relationship 
between expenditure and loans may reflect the fact that aid loans are often disbursed in 
lumps. The significance of the mean shift dummies reflects that the relationship has been 
changing across the political regimes.179 
Finally, the identified long-run relationship between aid and taxation reveals no adverse 
effects of aid: both grants and loans are positively associated with the tax revenue.180 Whilst 
expenditure and non-tax revenue exhibit some adjustment, grants can be seen as the most 
adjusting variable to departures from the equilibrium, consistent with the notion that 
donors support tax reforms by disbursing grants (potentially to relax some capacity 
constraints), with a significant change in 1991.181 The lack of adjustment to the equilibrium 
                                                          
176 And even then, assuming they are both fully measured.  
177 Note that the relationships that include non-zero aid coefficients require at least one mean shift 
dummy to be stationary, indicating important changes in aid behaviour and its relation to fiscal 
variables. 
178 In the light of this result, it might be more sensible to normalise on the (most adjusting) grants 
variable; however, normalising instead on government spending allows for the increased readability 
of the results.   
179 Note that non-tax revenue is also exhibiting some adjustment behaviour. This may be due to its 
 ‘ƐƚĂƚŝŽŶĂƌǇ-ůŝŬĞďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ?ǁŚĞŶďŽƚŚĚƵŵŵŝĞƐĂƌĞŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚ ? 
180 Again, the vector is normalised on tax coefficient for the purposes of readability.  
181 EŽƚĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?ĚƵŵŵǇǁĂƐŝŶƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚĂŶĚƚŚƵƐĞǆĐůƵĚĞĚĨƌŽŵɴ3. 
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error by aid loans indicates that shortfalls in taxation do not seem to be funded by 
concessional borrowing abroad.  
The significance and the plausibility of the sign of dummy coefficients (Table 4.10) support 
their inclusion in the system. In the aid-spending relationship (Beta 2b) the 1974 dummy is 
negative and significant, and the 1991 dummy is positive and significant. This indicates that 
association between aid and spending was much stronger once EPRDF came to power. More 
interestingly, the 1991 dummy is positive, significant and large in the aid-tax relationship 
(1974 being insignificant and excluded altogether). This soundly reflects the changes in the 
variable relationships across regimes (justifying the inclusion of the dummies), stressing the 
convergence in donor and recipient government agenda for Ethiopia once EPRDF has come 
to power. 
Keeping the identified long-run structure fixed, it is possible to test whether any of variables 
are weakly exogenous. Aid loans could be accepted as weakly exogenous (p-value=0.131), 
whilst weak exogeneity of tax is borderline rejected (p-value=0.049), likely due to the 
adjustment to the first equilibrium error. The remaining analysis in this chapter is conducted 
without imposing any weak exogeneity conditions. The joint stationarity of the over-
identified system is accepted with a p-value of 0.849. Stationarity of individual vectors is 
depicted in the Figure 4.4 below. The Doornik-Hansen test suggest that the assumption of 
multivariate normality cannot be rejected (p-value=0.068).  
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Figure 4.4: Stationarity of Cointegrating Relations (Over-identifying Restrictions)
 
 Note: (CIa= Beta1b, CIb= Beta2b CIc= Beta3b) 
The figures in Appendix Table C6 report the parameter constancy tests for the over-
identified model. The first thing to note is that the parameters, especially the alphas, were 
remarkably constant over time. In ߚH? and ߚH?, the only indicated instability may be seen in 
the coefficients on grants and the 1991 dummy around the year 1995 (although the 
proportional change between those variables is rather constant).  
4.5 Identification of the Short Run Structure182 
While the CI relations in our model are ݎ ൌ  ? long run equilibrium relations between 
endogenous variables with the same time index, the short-run equations are ݌ ൌ  ? relations 
between p current variables ሺȟݔݐሻ; ൫ ൈ ሺ െ  ?ሻ൯ lagged variables ȟݔH?H?H?ሺ݅ ൌ  ?ǡ ǥ ǡ ݇ െ  ?ሻ; 
and r lagged equilibrium errors, ߚሺݔH?H?H?ሻ, from the identified long-run structure. 
Identification of the short-run structure requires ሺ݌ െ  ?ሻ restrictions on each of the 
simultaneous equations.  
Two other important differences exist with respect to the long run identification. First of all, 
the distinction between endogenous and exogenous variables may change short run 
identification whereas it did not change the long run structure that is based on vectors. 
Secondly, identification of the short run structure requires uncorrelated residuals, whereas 
                                                          
182 Modelled in PcGive.  
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no such requirement existed in the long run structure. Therefore the residual covariance 
matrix plays an important role here. In particular, uncorrelated residuals of a short-run 
structural model may be interpreted as estimated shocks, whilst large off-diagonal elements 
of covariance matrix can be a signal of significant current effects between the system 
ǀĂƌŝĂďůĞƐ  ?:ƵƐĞůŝƵƐ ?  ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ? /ŶĚĞĞĚ ?  “ƚŚĞ sZ ŵŽĚĞůĐĂŶ ďĞ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ a reduced form 
model in the short run dynamics in the sense than potentially important current 
(simultaneous) effects are not explicitly modelled but are left in ƚŚĞ ƌĞƐŝĚƵĂůƐ ?  ?:ƵƐĞůŝƵƐ ?
2006:230). The high correlation coefficients in the residual covariance matrix may also be 
due to the omission of relevant variables, but in our system it is most likely that it reflects 
contemporaneous effects between the fiscal variables.  
As just-identified short-run structure is heavily over-parameterised, with many insignificant 
coefficients, in this section we report a parsimonious system, following Juselius (2006, 
Chapter 13), where the estimated coefficients with small t-statistics183 were set to zero. 
Since there are some non-negligible correlation coefficients in the residual covariance matrix 
(see Table 4.12), the interpretation of the short-run equations as causal relationships (or 
reactions to structural shocks) should be taken with caution. The equation results are shown 
in the Table 4.11. The 30 over-identifying restrictions were accepted with a p-value of 0.5.  
The government expenditure equation shows positive association with the past changes of 
ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶ ŐƌĂŶƚƐ ĂŶĚ ůŽĂŶƐ ? ĂůďĞŝƚ ǁŝƚŚ ůŝŵŝƚĞĚ ŵĂŐŶŝƚƵĚĞ ? dŚŝƐ ŵĂǇ ƌĞĨůĞĐƚ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ
smoothing decisions in the face of volatile aid flows.184 The tax equation indicates that even 
in the short run, aid is not inducing a reduction in tax revenue. This could well indicate a 
ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞ  ‘ŝŶĐŽŵĞ ĞĨĨĞĐƚ ? ŽĨ ĂŝĚ ŽŶ ƚĂǆ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƐŚŽƌƚ ƌƵŶ ? ĂƐ ĂŝĚ ĂůƐŽ ƐĞĞŵƐ ƚŽ ďĞ ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞůǇ
associated with non-tax revenue. Grants do not seem to be reacting to any of the shocks in 
the short run, consistent with the qualitative suggestion that aid may be issued for strategic 
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ŽƌƚŚĂƚĚŽŶŽƌƐƚĂŬĞƚŝŵĞƚŽƌĞĂĐƚƚŽƚŚŝŽƉŝĂ ?ƐĨŝƐĐĂůĚĞĐŝƐŝons. Finally, loans 
seem to be reduced in the face of higher tax (but not non-tax) revenues, which is a plausible 
prediction as the government need to borrow is reduced in the periods of growing revenues.   
                                                          
183 P-value < 0.1. 
184 Or, since the data is in logs, just reflect that a percentage change in each aid component, which 
together amount to about a fifth of governmenƚ ?Ɛ ƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐ ? ĐŽƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚƐ ƚŽ ĂďŽƵƚ Ă ĨŝĨƚŚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
percentage increase in the government spending, indicating that received aid is actually spent in one 
period.  
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Table 4.11: Short Run Equations (Over-identified Structure) 
   Note: t-statistics are reported in the parentheses 
Table 4.12: Residual Correlation Matrix (Parsimonious Structure) 
 ȴtexp ȴtax ȴnon-tax ȴgrants ȴloans 
ȴtexp 0.089     
ȴtax 0.356 0.100    
ȴnon-tax 0.410 -0.162 0.248   
ȴgrants -0.039 0.104 -0.010 0.321  
ȴloans 0.410 0.171 -0.043 0.122 0.420 
4.6 Identification of the Common Trends (MA) 
Unlike the identification of the stationary long run relationships, the identification185 of the 
MA is not invariant to the information set. Furthermore, given that some of the residual 
cross-correlations are non-negligible, the residuals cannot be strictly interpreted as 
structural shocks. Finally, we did not find enough evidence to substantiate the imposition of 
weak exogeneity restrictions, or identify variables that are purely adjusting to the identified 
long-run structure. Therefore the results in this section are to be taken with caution. The 
identified common trends and their loadings on other variables are provided in Table 4.13.  
  
                                                          
185 (p-r-1 = 1) restrictions are required to just-identify each common trend. 
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ȴtexpt=     0.16 
(4.3)  
0.11 
(4.5)  
-0.58 
(-5.6)  
0.25 
(6.0)  
  0.16 
(2.0)  
ȴtaxt=    0.2 
(3.6)  
0.08 
(1.8)  
0.46 
(2.8)  
 -0.17 
(-2.5)  
0.17 
(3.3)  
-0.26 
(-2.6)  
 
ȴnontaxt=     0.24 
(2.4)  
0.16 
(2.2)  
  0.19 
(2.2)  
 0.42 
(1.7)  
ȴgrantst=         0.46 
(4.0)  
  
ȴloanst=   -1.14 
(-2.6)  
0.48 
(2.8)  
  -1.74 
(-3.5)  
0.74 
(3.7)  
   
 LR test of over-identifying restrictions:  
Chi^2(30) =   29.325 [p-value=0.5006]   
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Table 4.13: Composition and Loadings of the Common Trends 
 texp tax non-tax grants loans 
The composition of common trends (CT) [ߙᇱH?] 
CT(1) 0.8 
(1.16) 
1 -0.46 
(-1.16) 
-0.44 
(-1.91) 
- 
CT(2) -1.29 
(-0.83) 
- 0.197 
(0.30) 
-0.93 
(-1.85) 
1 
The effect of the common trends on other variables [ߚH?ሺߙᇱH?ሺܫ െ ȞH?ሻߚH?ሻH?H?] 
CT(1) 0.54 
(2.85) 
0.69 
(2.84) 
0.20 
(2.89) 
0.62 
(2.30) 
0.33 
(0.60) 
CT(2) -0.03 
(-1.10) 
-0.04 
(-0.98) 
-0.02 
(-1.92) 
-0.30 
(-6.8) 
0.62 
(6.88) 
Note: t-statistics reported in the parentheses. 
 
Broadly, the first common trend (CT1) seems to be mostly constructed from the 
unanticipated shocks to tax revenue, with a potential contribution from grants (other 
coefficients being insignificant). It seems to most strongly affect the domestic fiscal 
variables, notably, expenditure and tax revenue; and also grants, indicating support for 
potential donor response to tax mobilisation reforms. The second common trend seems to 
be composed from shocks to aid variables (loans), and loading to aid variables themselves, 
ĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚƚŽĂŝĚƉŽůŝĐǇďĞŝŶŐĨĂŝƌůǇŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚŽĨƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?ƐĨŝƐĐĂůĚǇŶĂŵŝĐƐ ?
dŚĞĐŽůƵŵŶƐŽĨŵĂƚƌŝǆŵŽƌĞďƌŽĂĚůǇŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚĞŚŽǁƵŶĂŶƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞĚ ‘ƐŚŽĐŬƐ ?ƚŽĞĂĐŚǀĂƌŝĂďůĞ
ripple through the system, with a significant coefficient indicating a permanent effect; 
otherwise, the effect is transitory at most. Likewise, the rows indicate how each variable is 
ĂĨĨĞĐƚĞĚ ďǇ ƐƵĐŚ  ‘ƐŚŽĐŬƐ ? ?dŚĞ ƌĞƐƵůƚƐ ĂƌĞ ƐƵŵŵĂƌŝƐĞĚ ŝŶ Table 4.14 below. Unanticipated 
 ‘ƐŚŽĐŬƐ ?ƚŽŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĞǆƉĞŶĚŝƚƵƌĞĐŽƵůĚďĞĞǆƉĞĐted to have persistent positive effects on 
expenditure itself, tax (and non-tax) revenue, and, especially, grants. The effect on loans can 
be expected to be temporary at most, and negative. The unanticipated shocks to tax 
revenue would have positive permanent effects on all domestic fiscal variables and grant 
aid. Shocks to non-tax revenue186 seem to affect all variables negatively, and, loans aside, 
permanently. This could be indicating of detrimental policies of expropriation or transfer of 
funds from the cĞŶƚƌĂůďĂŶŬ ?dŚĞĞĨĨĞĐƚƐŽĨĐƵŵƵůĂƚĞĚ ‘ƐŚŽĐŬƐ ?ƚŽŐƌĂŶƚƐĂƌĞ ŵŽƌĞĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚƚŽ
interpret, as they seem negatively affect both expenditure and tax, whilst a permanent 
negative effect on loans could indicate that grants and loans are substitutes, perhaps from 
the donor perspective. Loans, on the other hand, do not seem to have permanent effects on 
the domestic fiscal variables, but they seem to negatively affect grants (again, consistent 
                                                          
186 This may be driven by changes associated with nationalisation or privatisation programmes.  
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with the substitution between the aid modalities), and have a positive effect on loans 
themselves, possibly signalling repayment or servicing difficulties. Note again, that these 
results are indicative at most.  
Table 4.14: Long Run Impact Matrix  
 texp tax non-tax grants loans 
texp 0.49 
(1.85) 
0.54 
(2.85) 
-0.26 
(-2.00) 
-0.21 
(-2.20) 
-0.03 
(-1.10) 
tax 0.61 
(1.83) 
0.69 
(2.84) 
-0.32 
(-2.00) 
-0.26 
(-2.23) 
-0.04 
(-0.98) 
non-tax 0.19 
(2.00) 
0.20 
(2.89) 
-0.09 
(-2.07) 
-0.07 
(-1.99) 
-0.02 
(-1.92) 
grants 0.89 
(2.39) 
0.62 
(2.30) 
-0.34 
(-1.90) 
0.01 
(0.05) 
-0.30 
(-6.76) 
loans -0.53 
(-0.70) 
0.33 
(0.60) 
-0.03 
(-0.08) 
-0.72 
(-2.68) 
0.62 
(6.88) 
                                        Note: t-statistics reported in the parentheses. 
 
5. Alternative Model with Disaggregated Aid, Aggregated Domestic 
Revenue, and Disaggregated Spending 
To get more insight into what aid might be actually funding, or, alternatively, which spending 
decisions does it seem to be more adjusting to, we re-specify the system in a different way: 
keeping the aid flows disaggregated as above, we aggregate the domestic revenue (domrev) 
variables (given that they did not exhibit highly contrasting long-run behaviour) and 
disaggregate government expenditure into its capital (cexp) and recurrent components 
(rexp), keeping the total number of variables in the system to p=5. The structure of the 
deterministic terms is identical to that of the model above. The selected lag length is k=2 
(Table 4.15). Although lag length selection tests support k=1, and such choice would not 
present residual autocorrelation issues, k=2 is superior in terms of normality. Although the 
Johansen trace test suggest r=4 (Table 4.16), such system lacks economic identification.  The 
choice of cointegration rank is r=3, and it is supported by additional information (for 
instance the largest modulus of root is 0.8 for r=4, and for r=3 it is 0.648). For briefness, we 
focus on the long-run results only187, as the fit of the system is slightly inferior188 to the 
model above.  
                                                          
187 Short-run structure is summarised in the Appendix Table C7. 
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Table 4.15: Lag Length Determination (Alternative System) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Effective Sample: 1971:01 to 2012:01 
SC : Schwarz Criterion; H-Q  : Hannan-Quinn Criterion 
LM(k): LM-Test for autocorrelation of order k 
Table 4.16: Rank Determination (Alternative System) 
p-
r  
r  Eig. 
Value  
Trace  Trace*  Frac95  P-
value  
P-
value*  
5  0  0.536 105.570 90.497 76.896 0.000     0.003 
4  1  0.439 70.972 61.131 54.245    0.001     0.011 
3  2  0.362   44.973 39.571 35.296    0.004     0.017 
2  3  0.350   24.734 21.395 19.817    0.011     0.032 
1  4  0.112    5.328   5.144   5.805    0.067     0.074 
Note: * denotes Bartlett corrections  
Table 4.17: Misspecification Tests (Alternative System) 
Residual normality (p-values)  
 Multivariate Univariate 
 
cexp rexp domrev grants loans 
0.012 0.291 0.002 0.120 0.597 0.956 
Residual autocorrelation and ARCH effects (p-values)  
 LM(1)  LM(2)  LM(3)  LM(4)   
Residual autocorrelation   0.664 0.383 0.248 0.429 
ARCH  0.937 0.397 0.493 1.000 
Trace correlation 0.509 
Note:  all values are p-values. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
188 Table 4.17 provides a summary of the long-run identification tests: loans are reported as long run 
excludable, but will be kept in the system as it is one of the key variables. For most of the variables 
(though not cexp), weak exogeneity and unit vector in alpha tests provide conflicting results). 
However, if the dummies are excluded, none of the variables are found to be stationary. 
Lag Reduction Tests 
VAR(4) << VAR(5)     : ChiSqr(25)   = 105.487 [0.000]  
VAR(3) << VAR(5)     : ChiSqr(50)   = 152.346 [0.000]  
VAR(3) << VAR(4)     : ChiSqr(25)   = 46.860 [0.005]  
VAR(2) << VAR(5)     : ChiSqr(75)   = 206.752 [0.000]  
VAR(2) << VAR(4)     : ChiSqr(50)   = 101.265 [0.000]  
VAR(2) << VAR(3)     : ChiSqr(25)   = 54.406 [0.001]  
VAR(1) << VAR(5)     : ChiSqr(100)   = 253.858 [0.000]  
VAR(1) << VAR(4)     : ChiSqr(75)   = 148.371 [0.000]  
VAR(1) << VAR(3)     : ChiSqr(50)   = 101.512 [0.000]  
VAR(1) << VAR(2)     : ChiSqr(25)   = 47.106 [0.005]  
Model  k  T  Regr.  Log-lik  SC  H-Q  LM(1)  LM(k)  
VAR(5)  5  42  30  532.201 -11.994 -15.925 0.346 0.637 
VAR(4)  4  42  25  479.458 -11.707 -14.983 0.128 0.051 
VAR(3)  3  42  20  456.028 -12.816 -15.437 0.042 0.649 
VAR(2)  2  42  15  428.825 -13.746 -15.711 0.367 0.336 
VAR(1)  1  42  10  405.272 -14.849 -16.159 0.288 0.288 
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Table 4.18: Long run Identification Tests (Alternative System) 
 cexp  rexp  domrev  grants  loans  1991  1974  
Long run exclusion  0.139 0.012 0.020 0.035 0.480 0.140 0.192 
Stationarity  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.005 Excluded  
Stationarity  0.019 0.212 0.051 0.010 0.883 Included  
Weak exogeneity 189 0.548 0.014 0.711 0.164 0.896  
Unit vectors in alpha  0.009 0.796 0.806 0.153 0.142  
Table reports p-values for r=3. 
 
Results from the over-identified system are summarised in Table 4.19 below. The first 
cointegrating vector (normalised on domestic revenue for readability purposes) mimics the 
previously identified domestic budget equilibrium: domestic revenue is positively associated 
with both components of government expenditure. Interestingly, the relationship is stronger 
ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ĐĂƉŝƚĂů ĞǆƉĞŶĚŝƚƵƌĞ ? ƉŽƐƐŝďůǇ ƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ƉĞƌŝŽĚƐ ǁŝƚŚ  ‘ŐŽŽĚ ? ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ
policies targeting the collection of revenue tend to be reflected in more capital 
 ? ‘ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ? ) ƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐ ? dŚĞ ƌĞĐƵƌƌĞŶƚ ƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ƐŝŶŐůĞ ĂĚũƵƐƚŝŶŐ ǀĂƌŝĂďůĞ ƚŽ
ĚĞƉĂƌƚƵƌĞƐ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚŝƐ ĞƋƵŝůŝďƌŝƵŵ ? sĞĐƚŽƌƐ ɴ2 ĂŶĚ ɴ3 roughly correspond to the second 
equilibrium in the previous model, with aid variables now related separately to capital and 
recurrent expenditure to identify any potentially differing effects. Both aid variables seem to 
be positively related to both components of government spending. Particularly, grants seem 
to be more strongly associated with capital expenditures than loans. With grants being the 
most adjusting variable to this equilibrium error, it potentially signals the accordance of 
donors and recipients on financing priorities and donors backing the commitment to 
increased domestic capital expenditures with more grants, rather than successful aid 
conditionality. Finally, the third equilibrium relationship indicates positive associations 
between aid and government recurrent expenditures. While some would argue this may 
point to  ‘ŐĞŶĞƌĂů ĨƵŶŐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ? ŝƐƐƵĞƐ ? ŽƵƌ ǀŝĞǁ ŝs that some aid is indeed intended to fund 
recurrent spending components (such as health, and education), although the positive 
relationship between loans and recurrent expenditure could in principle reflect war 
financing through loans both in Derg and EPRDF period.  
  
                                                          
189 For r=4, the picture is different, with only capital expenditure reported as weakly exogenous. 
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Table 4.19: Long Run Results (Alternative System, Over-identified) 
 
cexp  rexp  domrev.  grants  loans  1991  1974  
 
Beta1c 
-0.60 
(-14.09) 
-0.13 
(-1.84) 
1 - - - - ~I(0) 
Beta2c 1 - - 
-0.89 
(-15.03) 
-0.18 
(-3.10) 
0.17 
(2.06) 
-0.71 
(-6.88) 
~I(0) 
Beta3c - 1 - 
-0.36 
(-7.82) 
-0.20 
(-4.62) 
-0.05 
(-0.74) 
-0.472 
(-6.13) 
~I(0) 
Alpha1c 
-0.21 
(0.53) 
0.84 
(4.98) 
-0.16 
(-0.73) 
0.08 
(0.13) 
0.42 
(0.44) 
- - 
 
Alpha2c 
-0.22 
(-1.17) 
0.33 
(4.14) 
0.08 
(0.77) 
0.75 
(2.64) 
-0.21 
(-0.47) 
- - 
 
Alpha3c  
-0.11 
(-0.42) 
-0.59 
(-5.13) 
-0.25 
(-1.64) 
0.56 
(1.37) 
0.53 
(0.83) 
- - 
 
 
Normality  [0.068]  
Stationarity [0.564] 
         Note: t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
The positive and strong relation between grants and capital expenditure is consistent with 
other findings in the literature (Fagernas and Roberts, 2004a; Fagernas and Schurich, 2004; 
Martins, 2010). On the one hand, this result may seem counterintuitive: indeed it may be 
ƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞĨŽƌůŽĂŶƐƚŽďĞŵŽƌĞƌĞůĂƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞŵŽƌĞ “ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝǀĞ ?ĐĂƉŝƚĂůĞǆƉĞnditure since 
they have to be repaid in the future. In practice, however, loans to Ethiopia are largely 
concessional, making repayment an issue rather distant in time that therefore might not 
have direct policy implications. On the other hand, grants may come with more 
conditionality, in thĞĨŽƌŵŽĨƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞƚŽƐƉĞŶĚŽŶ ‘ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝǀĞ ? capital rather than recurrent 
 ? “ĐŽŶƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶ ? ) ĞǆƉĞŶĚŝƚƵƌĞ ? ƉƌĞĐŝƐĞůǇ ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ƚŚĞǇ ĚŽ ŶŽƚ ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞ ƌĞƉĂǇŵĞŶƚ ? dŚĞ ŝĚĞĂ
that capital spending is preferable to recurrent expenditure may be slowly fading in the 
international debate. However, in historical perspective, this distinction may be behind the 
result of grants being mostly associated with capital expenditure. This suggests that donors 
back a commitment to increased domestic capital expenditure with grants. 
Figure 4.5 displays the identified cointegrated relationships.  
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Figure 4.5: Cointegrating Relations (Alternative System)  
 
Note: CI1=CI1c; CI2=CI2c; CI3=CI3c . 
6. Conclusions 
Using unique dataset of domestically collected Ethiopian fiscal data and paying particular 
attention to the quantitative context, this chapter shed light on the fiscal effects of aid in 
Ethiopia and it answered the questions raised in Section 2 on the hypothesised effects of aid.  
We provide evidence for the existence of a domestic budget equilibrium that includes 
domestic revenues and government expenditure, but excludes aid. The domestic budget 
equilibrium between total expenditure and domestic revenue is confirmed in the two 
models estimated in this chapter as well as in the alternative systems used for checking 
robustness. This relation holds regardless of the political regime changes across the whole 
period considered. By looking at adjustment coefficients we also find that spending plans are 
mainly driven by tax revenue, while expenditure is the most adjusting variable.  
Most crucially, we find no evidence of an adverse effect of aid on tax revenue, which implies 
that the government of Ethiopia is not substituting taxes with aid, nor has it discouraged in 
its tax revenue collection. On the contrary, we find a positive and robust relation between 
tax revenue and both grants and loans in the long run, which is also largely confirmed in the 
short run structure. This relation may be explained by a complementary beneficial effect of 
aid in improving tax administration and strengthening domestic institutions. Indeed, 
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throughout the whole period the government of Ethiopia has received foreign advice on tax 
matters and this remains today one of the policy areas of highest agreement between the 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂŶĚĚŽŶŽƌƐ ?DŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ ?ƚŚŝŽƉŝĂ ?ƐŚŝƐƚŽƌǇŽĨŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞĨƌŽŵĐŽůŽŶŝĂůƉŽǁĞƌƐ
has profoundly shaped the national character and pride, making financial independence a 
core priority of the current government. As a consequence, the case for a substitution or tax 
displacement effect of aid is particularly ill-grounded in Ethiopia as confirmed by this 
analysis.  
Both aid variables are found to have a positive and robust relation with public expenditure. 
This relation is stronger between capital expenditure and grants, as shown in the alternative 
system using disaggregated expenditure data. This finding is consistent with the results in 
the literature and with the idea that donors may have a preference for grants to be spent on 
ƚŚĞ ŵŽƌĞ ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝǀĞ ĐĂƉŝƚĂů ĞǆƉĞŶĚŝƚƵƌĞ ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ ŽŶ  ‘ĐŽŶƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶ ?  ?ƌĞĐƵƌƌĞŶƚ )
ĞǆƉĞŶĚŝƚƵƌĞ ? tĞ ĂƌĞ ĂůƐŽ ĂďůĞ ƚŽ ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇ Ă  ‘ĚŽŶŽƌ ĚŝƐďƵƌƐĞŵĞŶƚ ƌƵůĞ ? ŽĨ ƐŽƌƚƐ ǁŚĞƌĞďǇ
donors back proven commitment to increased expenditure with additional funding, 
particularly grants.  
The key differences between this study and Martins (2010) is the data frequency (and thus 
period covered, 1993-2008), and the (number of) variables used. Using quarterly data 
increases sample size. As the author notes, fiscal decisions are indeed taken throughout the 
year; however, the key aid, tax, and even spending decisions (e.g. large projects) would be 
decided on annual (or, at most, semi-annually during the official budget-revisions) rather 
than quarterly basis. The author uses the all the variables used in Chapter 4 of this thesis, 
plus public borrowing. In theory, adding another variable should not change the already 
identified cointegrating relationships. However, as the period covered differs between the 
studies, this can be expected to affect the results (as well as model specification), especially 
when both samples are very small. Two key results are identified in both studies: the 
absence of a negative association between domestic revenue and aid; and a positive 
association between aid grants and development expenditure. 
All the results presented here are robust to different variations in the system, which is 
particularly valuable in the CVAR context where results are often very model-specific. We 
are able to test and confirm all the underlying statistical assumptions of the VAR model, 
more so in our main system than in the alternative one, thus supporting the validity of our 
results. Using exclusively national data sources we are able to avoid problems related to the 
different international measures of aid and capture exactly the component that is most 
Chapter 4  W Fiscal Effects of Aid in Ethiopia Emilija Timmis 
122 
 
relevant for the analysis of its fiscal effects. Our dataset also presents an advantage in terms 
of the length of the time series available, which is the longest in the CVAR fiscal literature for 
developing countries. Last but not least, the findings of this chapter are largely rooted and 
consistent with the Ethiopian context and with the qualitative evidence on the political 
economy of the country.  
In efforts to reconcile the cross-country aid-tax estimates with country case studies 
conducted in this thesis, one should consider three aspects: the political economy 
arguments; the soundness of empirical estimates; and the appropriateness of the statistical 
techniques to available data.   
The prevailing argument from the political economy perspective suggests that aid is 
expected to crowd-out tax collection because in the fledgling state it is less politically risky 
(or costly) to increase aid flows than to raise taxes190 (Brautigam and Knack, 2004; Gupta et 
al., 2004). It is the main argument behind the empirical estimates of a negative aid 
coefficient in tax effort equations. The usual counter-argument is that aid-tax association 
could be positive if aid increases the domestic revenue mobilisation through support for 
reforms, and through increased tax base (Gupta, 2007; Brun et al., 2009; Clist and Morrissey, 
2011). Returning to the first argument, Morrissey and Torrance (2015) consolidate the 
argument why may the political cost of aid dependence actually exceed the cost of tax 
collection, once the bureaucratic, accountability, and reduction-in-the-polity-autonomy 
costs are properly accounted for.191 Overall, taken sufficiently broadly, political literature 
does not give robust prediction over the direction or sign of the tax-aid association.  
From the empirical perspective, consistent with the political economy arguments, the 
studies find negative (Gupta et al., 2004; Benedek et al., 2012) or positive (Clist and 
Morrissey, 2011; Morrissey et al., 2014) association between tax effort and aid. Through 
replication, Morrissey and Torrance (2015) demonstrate that the empirical negative cross-
country relationship between aid and tax is altogether not robust, being sensitive to 
specification, estimator, and introduction of lagged aid, or alteration of the sample or 
frequency of data. Crucially, the authors argue that it is not the amount of aid (the usual 
                                                          
190 The argument implicitly assumes a significant level of political accountability and other aspects of 
democratic rule, which may not be exactly the case. 
191 Namely, they consider bureaucratic cost (multiple donors with distinct procedures and 
requirements each intervening in several sectors and thus imposing cost on line ministries versus cost 
of tax administration); accountability cost (to donors ǀƐ ? ƚŚĞ  ‘ĞůĞĐƚŽƌĂƚĞ ? ) ? ĐŽƐƚƐ ŽĨ  ?ĂďƐĞŶĐĞ ) ŽĨ
autonomy (with any aid conditionality reducing the autonomy of the recipient government by 
constraining policy action). 
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measure of the aid variable) that has influence on the level of tax revenue, but the nature or 
the donor-recipient relationship and policy dialogue.  
From the statistical perspective, cross-country estimations ignore country heterogeneity; 
single equation tax effort models imply one-directional causality; existing estimations ignore 
the distinction between on- and off-budget aid, usually lumping the two together.  On the 
other hand, whilst the multiple equation setting (and thus estimated feedback effects) and 
the respect for the country heterogeneity of the CVAR overcomes some of these criticisms, 
enforcing the CVAR method on too small of a sample, potentially combined with 
ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌ ?Ɛ ?ůĂƚĞŶƚ )ƉƌŝŽƌƐǁŚĞŶŝŶǀŽŬŝŶŐ ‘ũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚ ?ǁŚĞƌĞƐƚĂƚŝƐƚŝĐĂůŐƵŝĚĂŶĐĞŝƐůĞƐƐƚŚĂƚ
crystal clear may too produce less than robust results.  
Taking that political economy arguments are not conclusive, empirical evidence is not 
robust, and the application of both panel and time-series statistical techniques each have 
their drawbacks, the task of reconciling the cross-country aid-tax effort evidence with those 
of country-case time-series application is both easier and less meaningful.  
The key result demonstrated in Chapter 4 (and Chapter 5)192 is that there is no negative 
association between aid and tax revenue. The key association is shown to be between the 
domestic variables (expenditures and tax revenue), and then aid and expenditures; only 
then do we identify a relationship between aid and tax. This is unsurprising. The primary 
purpose of on-budget aid is to finance expenditure; and one could consider the secondary 
aim to be doing so without reducing the domestic (tax) revenue.   
This positive (or non-negative) association between aid and tax is stronger in the final 
subsample, during the EPRDF period (as indicated by the 1991 significant positive shift 
dummy193). Although this period saw higher levels of total (on-budget) aid, from the 
qualitative information (as off-budget fraction of aid is not captured in the quantitative data) 
it is clear that Ethiopia also received much higher levels of technical assistance (including 
support for the considerable tax revenue reform), and saw much more aligned donor-
recipient dialogue with respect to fiscal and macroeconomic management, including tax 
reforms (see also Moore, 2014); this again resonates with Morrissey and Torrance (2015) 
                                                          
192 Although data limitations complicated the analysis, no testing indicated existence of a negative 
aid-tax relationship in Tanzania, instead consistently estimating a significantly positive association in 
various versions of the estimated system. See Chapter 5 for more detail.  
193 The analysis of the sub-sample is not possible due to much too smaůů ?ƐƵď )ƐĂŵƉůĞƐŝǌĞ ? ‘ƌƚŝĨŝĐŝĂůůǇ ?
increasing the sample size by using quarterly data (as in Martins, 2010) would not provide much 
insight, as neither aid not tax collection are likely to move meaningfully on quarterly basis from a 
policy perspective.  
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that the positive associations in the data can be driven by other (structural) characteristics of 
the country (here the change of political winds and broader reforms not captured in by the 
variables in the estimated system).   
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Chapter 5 
 
Fiscal Effects of Aid in Tanzania:  
Evidence from CVAR Applications 
 
1. Introduction 
Tanzania provides an interesting case for comparison to Ethiopia. There are similarities in that 
both countries followed socialist regimes (for longer in Tanzania) before severe liberalisation 
policies in the 1980s/early 1990s. Their relationships with donors developed along rather 
different paths: with Ethiopia never colonised, its aid policy shifted radically during the 1980s 
from the US to USSR, and then back to Western powers after the end of the Cold war; 
meanwhile, after gaining independence in 1961, Tanzania enjoyed support from the socialist-
oriented Scandinavian donors, as well as other Western donors (including the Netherlands, 
West Germany, and the World Bank). 
This chapter thus aims to conduct a CVAR exercise to evaluate the fiscal relationships in 
Tanzania during the independence period, covering the years 1966-2012. The motivation is 
largely the same as for the Ethiopian chapter: regarding the understanding of the fiscal 
mechanisms as a prerequisite to understanding the broader macroeconomic effects of aid, the 
aim of this chapter is to identify the fiscal effects of (or on) aid in Tanzania. The key advantage, 
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ĂƐďĞĨŽƌĞ ?ŝƐƚŚĂƚƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?ƐŵĞĂƐƵƌĞŽĨĂŝĚŝƐĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞ PƚŚĞ components of both cash grant and 
loan aid recorded as received by the Tanzanian government, and thus considered the most 
(directly) influential towards the fiscal policy. 194 As before, The CVAR analysis is complemented 
by a qualitative context, which ensures sound model specification and sensible interpretation of 
estimated results, especially in a small sample setting. The quality of the overall quantitative 
(even highly aggregated) data, however, is lower than that of Ethiopian data, which proves to be 
a severe challenge. In a way, this chapter demonstrates the limitations of the application of the 
CVAR method on the very small developing country sample.  
The framework for the analyses of fiscal effects and the review of the relevant literature is 
already provided in Section 2 of Chapter 4 and will thus not be repeated here. The remainder of 
this chapter is as follows: Section 2 discusses the data and provides a description of the 
Tanzanian qualitative context. The modelling choices and estimated results are provided in 
section 3; given the nature of the data and the resulting delicacy of the results only long-run 
identification is discussed. Section 4 concludes by comparing the results from the two case 
studies. The complementary information is provided in Appendix D.  
2. Data and Qualitative Context 
The dataset used here is an extension of that used by Kweka and Morrissey (2000) and was 
provided by Josaphat Kweka (at the time in the World Bank office in Tanzania). Following 
variables are available: government expenditures, decomposed into development and recurrent 
components;195 domestic revenue, decomposed into tax and non-tax revenue; government 
borrowing (budget financing); and aid, decomposed into grant and foreign financing 
components. The inclusion of GDP data in the study is complicated for two reasons. Firstly, with 
a system of fiscal variables alone, scaling by GDP would not add much information, whilst 
attempting to relate the fiscal system to GDP growth would imply (too) many omitted variables. 
                                                          
194 Note that, as before, the indirect effects of off-budget aid are not modelled. To some extent, then, the 
trade-off of aid absorption (increase in net imports) and spending (widening in the fiscal deficit) is also 
ignored (see Killick and Foster (2007), for instance), implicitly assuming that all aid that goes through the 
government is expected to be spent or used to reduce domestic borrowing or building reserves. In fact, 
Killick and Foster (2007) find that increases in aid in Tanzania were not at all absorbed but nearly fully 
spent. Meanwhile, for Ethiopia, they found that during the given period, aid surges were not at all spent, 
and only partially absorbed, rebuilding the forex reserves and reducing government debt, to some extent 
justifying our key focus ŽŶĂŝĚ ?ƐĞĨĨĞĐƚŽŶƚĂǆĂƚŝŽŶ ?
195 We maintain the distinction as it is coded in the original dataset.  
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Secondly, and more importantly, Tanzanian GDP was rebased in 1987, and all data predating this 
transformation appears to have been erased from the majority of data sources, including those 
of the Tanzanian government. The data could be recovered from the National Accounts from the 
UN data website, but it is not clear how credible or comparable this would be to the post-1987 
series, while the shift dummy included to account for the rebase in GDP would also capture the 
start of the liberalisation reforms (see below), although there is no reason to expect that these 
reforms would have had an immediate or even quick effect on GDP.  
All variables are expressed in domestic currency (Tanzanian shillings), so no conversion is 
necessary  W analysis is conducted using variables expressed in the domestic currency. However, 
the (urban) consumer price index (CPI) was used to convert the series into real values. Evidently, 
the GDP deflator was not available for the entire period studied due to aforementioned GDP 
data issues. Clearly, the CPI is severely distorted during the radical socialist regime (effectively at 
least until 1986), as nearly all nominal prices were set by the government bodies rather than 
market forces196. However, it is a measure available from IMF IFS database (with the base year 
in 2005) for the entire period in question.  
Log values are again preferred as the raw values resemble processes with quadratic trends and 
thus complicate the estimation. This introduces slight further complications on the estimation, 
as aid loans and the borrowing variable have negative values for several years, and grants and 
non-tax domestic revenue contain zero values.197 For the analysis where aid is disaggregated to 
grants and loans component, we scale the loans variable by adding a constant (80,000 TShs as 
the minimum value of loans observed is -73,365) so that all values are strictly positive, and 
shorten the sample to include only non-zero observations for grants (i.e. exclude 1966-67). 
Where the model includes domestic borrowing, this variable is also scaled by a constant 
(300,000 TShs). The non-tax variable is not used as a standalone variable as it is coded as 0 for 
the period 1968-1982.  
The fiscal trends are summarised in Figures 5.1-5.5.  Figure 5.1 depicts all fiscal variables and aid 
as a fraction of GDP to provide a conventional comparison between these variables, whilst 
                                                          
196 Clearly, this would severely distort the nominal (and real) fiscal variables, too, and thus the pro-market 
reforms need to be accounted for by adding a step dummy (although they essentially coincide with the 
GDP rebase, and thus perhaps could be entailed in the same dummy).  
197Interestingly in 1989, both loans and domestic borrowing are recorded as negative  W it could be that 
(some) additional aid was used to repay/reduce foreign and domestic borrowing. 
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Figures 5.2-5.5 provide information in levels. Figures in logs are reported in the Appendix Table 
D1. 
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Figure 5.1: Tanzanian Fiscal Aggregates Expressed as Proportion of GDP 
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Figure 5.2: Expenditures (Levels, deflated) 
 
Figure 5.3: Domestic Revenue (Levels, deflated) 
 
Figure 5.4: Aid (Levels, deflated) 
 
Figure 5.5: Aggregates (Levels, deflated) 
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The beginnings of independent Tanzania have been described as radically socialist, anti-
market and anti-ĐĂƉŝƚĂůŝƐƚĞĐŽŶŽŵǇ ?,ǇĚĞŶĂŶĚ<ĂƌůƐƚƌŽŵ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚEǇ ƌĞƌĞ ?ƐǀŝĞǁ
was that prices had little-to-no role in allocation of economic resources, so the nominal 
prices, exchange rates and nominal interest rates were fixed and unchanging. The majority 
of the population remained in the (subsistence) agricultural sector (and thus outside the 
monetary economy), with enforced villagisation process. The government size was 
increasing rapidly (see Figure 5.2); hoǁĞǀĞƌ ? EǇĞƌĞƌĞ ?Ɛ  ‘ĂŵďŝƚŝŽƵƐ ĂŶĚ ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐůǇ
ƵŶƌĞĂůŝƐƚŝĐ ? (Hyden and Karlstrom, 1993:1397) development plans soon had an adverse 
effect on the economy. Although some positive external shocks, such as the increases in the 
global coffee prices (following the frosts in Brazil), temporarily dampened the negative 
ƚƌĞŶĚƐ ?dĂŶǌĂŶŝĂ ?ƐƚĞƌŵƐŽĨƚƌĂĚĞƐƚĂƌƚĞĚĚĞĐůŝŶŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚĚĞďƚďƵƌĚĞŶŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐ ? by a surge 
of negative external shocks from 1979-onwards.  
In the early 1970s aid flows to Tanzania were increasing (see Figure 5.4). Although not all aid 
was from countries with a close political ideology, the top six donors accounting for over 50 
per cent of total cumulative aid flows during the period of 1970-84 were (in decreasing 
order) Sweden, the World Bank, West Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway 
(Hyden and Karlstrom, 1993). Aid flows peaked in around 1980, and were comparatively 
resilient, especially from Scandinavian donors, even with increasing pressure from the World 
ĂŶŬĂŶĚƚŚĞ/D&ƚŽ “modify the rigid domestic price system and exchange rate policy, the 
marketing policy in the agriculƚƵƌĂů ƐĞĐƚŽƌ ĂŶĚ ƌĞůĂƚĞĚ ŝƐƐƵĞƐ ?  ?,ǇĚĞŶ ĂŶĚ <ĂƌůƐƚƌŽŵ ?
1993:1398). Domestic borrowing, which remained low at the beginning of the period partly 
due to increasing inflows of aid, started to increase rapidly in late seventies (Figures 5.1, 
5.5). As the deficits were financed through the Central Bank, the inflationary pressures were 
rapidly increasing, and imports collapsing. The official statistics show a decline of 0.5 per 
cent in real GDP per capita during 1965-1985, although household surveys indicate a much 
more severe decline:  “over 15 year period to 1984, real income per household fell by 
ƌŽƵŐŚůǇ  ? ? ƉĞƌ ĐĞŶƚ ?(Hyden and Karlstrom, 1993:1399). As the government started 
saŶĐƚŝŽŶŝŶŐƚŚŽƐĞǁŝƚŚ ‘ĂďŽǀĞĂǀĞƌĂŐĞƉƌŝǀĂƚĞĐĂƉŝƚĂů ?ƚŽǁĂƌĚƚŚĞŵŝĚ-1980s, even the most 
loyal donors like Sweden started realigning their views towards the IMF.  
dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌŵƐƐƚĂƌƚĞĚŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?ĂĨƚĞƌEǇĞƌĞƌĞ ?ƐƌĞƐŝŐŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?Ă ĚƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŝŽŶŽĨDǁŝŶǇŝ ) ?ĂƐƚŚĞ
government launched a three year Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) and signed the 
agreement with the IMF. The programme entailed a mixture of short-term stabilisation 
measures (both fiscal and monetary), growth stimulating policies (with aid-funded 
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rehabilitation of physical infrastructure), liberalisation of both domestic and foreign trade 
policies, gradual adjustments to the exchange rate and agricultural prices. As the 
programme expired, the government negotiated the Economic and Social Adjustment 
Programme (ESAP) with the World Bank with similar conditionalities attached, further 
accelerating the reform process in the very early 1990s with privatisation of the key sectors 
in the economy, establishing a private banking system and allowing foreign ownership 
enterprises and a multiparty system. The pro-market policies, however, had some adverse 
effects on the government capacity, as the civil servants increasingly turned to private sector 
for employment. 
Although the programmes delivered economic growth and macroeconomic and structural 
reforms, the dialogue between the Tanzanian government and the donors deteriorated 
substantially in 1993-1994, due to poor fiscal performance in 1993/4, suspicions of 
corruption,198  ‘ůĂĐŬŽĨǁŝůů ? ?199 reached a critical decision (crisis) point in 1994, when IMF and 
World Bank programmes were put on hold, and non-project finance from the principle 
donors suspended (Helleiner et al., 1995:3). An independent committee, headed by 
,ĞůůĞŝŶĞƌ ?ǁĂƐƐĞƚƵƉ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ ‘ŵŝŶŝŵƵŵ ?ŝƐƐƵĞƐƚŽďĞĂƐƐessed being (with the emphasis on 
ƚŚĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞŽĨ ‘ŽǁŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ ? ) P 
 “ ? ?dŚĞĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇĂŶĚƌĞůĞǀĂŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞĐƵƌƌĞŶƚĚŝĂůŽŐƵĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶ'Kd ?'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ
of Tanzania  W E.T.] and donor community regularly taking place both inside and 
outside Tanzania.  
 “ ? ?dŚĞƌĞůevance and effectiveness of the totality of aid programmes, including the 
modes, composition and administration of cooperation (programme aid, project aid, 
technical assistance, etc.); conditionalities; donor cooperation; absorption capacity 
of the Tanzanian economy and the institutions through which the aid is channelled; 
problems of accountability ? ?,ĞůůĞŝŶĞƌĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ) ? 
The severity of the crisis is thus evident.  
                                                          
198 /ƚ ŝƐĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĚƚŚĂƚĂĐĐŽŵƉĂŶǇŝŶŐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ƚƌĂŶƐŝƚŝŽŶŵĂǇƐůŽǁ  ‘ƐŽŵĞĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐŽĨĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ
ƉŽůŝĐǇ ƌĞĨŽƌŵĂŶĚ ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂů ĐŚĂŶŐĞ ? ?ĂƐ ǁĞůůĂƐŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚ  W or exaggerate  W (for instance, though 
newly freer press) less attractive features of the transitional (i.e. from command to market) economic 
order (Helleiner et al., 1995:8). 
199 /Ŷ ƌĞƚƵƌŶ ? ƚŚĞ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ dĂŶǌĂŶŝĂ ƌĞŐĂƌĚĞĚ ĚŽŶŽƌƐ ? ĚĞŵĂŶĚƐ ƵŶƌĞĂůŝƐƚŝĐ ĂŶĚ ŝŵƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?
intrusive with respect to domestic pŽůŝĐǇ ?ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐĚŽŶŽƌƐ ? ‘ůĂĐŬŽĨƚƌƵƐƚ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƵŶǁŝůůŝŶŐŶĞƐƐƚŽƐŚĂƌĞ
ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?,ĞůůĞŝŶĞƌĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ) ?
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The newly elected government, led by President Mkapa, addressed the macroeconomic 
situation without much delay, restored fiscal control mainly though introduction ŽĨ “a cash 
management system which left no room for expenditures beyond the limits set by the 
ƌĞǀĞŶƵĞ ĐŽůůĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?(Helleiner, 2001:3), and responded to many recommendations of the 
Helleiner et al. (1995) report, and by the end of 1996 agreed on a three year Enhanced 
^ƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĂůĚũƵƐƚŵĞŶƚ&ĂĐŝůŝƚǇ ?^& )ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ/D& ?dŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĨƌĞĞŵĂƌŬĞƚ-oriented 
policies included privatisation of state-owned enterprises, among other liberalisation 
policies and structural and institutional reforms. The relationships with key Nordic donors 
were also restored by the beginning of 1997 (essentially rendering the composition of the 
ŬĞǇĚŽŶŽƌƐƵŶĐŚĂŶŐĞĚƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞ ) ?dŚĞƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?ƐƉŽlicy ownership was a clear 
characteristic of National Development Vision 2025, established in 1997, and National 
WŽǀĞƌƚǇ ƌĂĚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ? ŝƐƐƵĞĚ ŝŶ  ? ? ? ? ? ĂŶĚ ǁĂǇ ĂŚĞĂĚ ŽĨ /D& ?Ɛ WŽǀĞƌƚǇ ZĞĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ
^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇWĂƉĞƌƐ  ?WZ^WƐ )ŽƌtŽƌůĚĂŶŬ ?ƐŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶƐŝǀĞĞvelopment Frameworks (CDFs), 
although these were also later prepared in 2000 as part of the HIPC initiative200 (Helleiner, 
2001)201. Tanzanian Assistance Strategy (2002-2005), later developed into the Joint 
Assistance Strategy for Tanzania (JAST, 2006-2011) aimed to improve donor coordination 
and integrate more external resources under the government budget and exchequer 
system.202  
Most notably (Figure 5.1), post-1995 reforms, the total spending has accelerated without a 
matched increase in the collection of the domestic revenue (although that, too, was 
growing). Partly, the widening gap between expenditure and domestic revenue can be filled 
by increasing aid (although this may not be sustainable in the very long run); inevitably, 
however, the shortfalls have to be covered by public borrowing (both domestic, and, 
increasingly, non-concessional borrowing abroad), which has been increasing (and 
increasingly volatile) since early 2000s. On the other hand, in National Debt Strategy (2002) 
Tanzanian government claimed ƚŚĂƚ  “ ?Ő ?oing forward, and in the context of our move 
                                                          
200 HIPC for Tanzania was completed in November 2001 
(http://www.who.int/immunization_financing/analyses/debt_relief/country_data/Tanzania_datashee
t_final.pdf).  
201 EŽƚĞ ? ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐůǇ ? ƚŚĂƚ ƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂů ĂƐƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ ǁĂƐ ƌĞŐĂƌĚĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ 'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ dĂŶǌĂŶŝĂ  ‘ĂƐ
unnecessarily wasteful use of scarce aid resources, contributing little either to local human resource 
use (employment) or to capacity-ďƵŝůĚŝŶŐ ? ?,ĞůůĞŝŶĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ) ? 
202 Tanzanian Government Brochure  
https://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=6&cad=rja&ved=0CFUQFjAF
&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.tzdpg.or.tz%2Findex.php%3FeID%3Dtx_nawsecuredl%26u%3D0%26file%
3Duploads%2Fmedia%2FBusanBrochure_GoTDPG.pdf%26t%3D1455886306%26hash%3D2b95f4a30a
0e79cda11a9799656ac0783a2c4747&ei=QGl6Uo22MLPa4QSshID4DQ&usg=AFQjCNFpIKkE1dyhfLO9x-
qOUv65XBwGdw&bvm=bv.55980276,d.bGE 
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towards self-reliance, the domestic debt market is expected to become an increasingly 
important funding source for the government ? ?ƉĂƌƚůǇĞǆƉůĂŝŶŝŶŐŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐƉƵďůŝĐďŽƌƌŽǁŝŶŐ
since the HIPC Completion Point was reached in November 2001203, 204,205,206. 
Table 5.1 below provides the key summary statistics (means and standard deviations) for all 
variables used in the analyses. Variables are expressed as percentages of GDP to provide a 
conventional comparison, although one must note the GDP rebasing in 1987; and as 
percentage of total government expenditure to provide consistent information throughout 
the period (given the caveats of GDP data). Domestically collected government revenue  W 
mainly tax  W has been the key source of revenue throughout the whole period, constituting 
about three-quarters of government spending. Budget ĂŝĚ ?Ɛ contribution to total spending 
has increased post 1986 reforms from 12.2 to 30.95 per cent of total government 
expenditure. This was primarily driven by the increments in grants, as these average figures 
for contribution from loans remained relatively stable throughout the whole observed 
period.207   
The composition of government spending itself, too, has changed over time. Although in 
absolute terms both development and recurrent spending has increased, the relative 
ƌĞĐƵƌƌĞŶƚ ƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐ ŚĂƐ ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚ ĐŽŵƉĂƌĞĚ ƚŽ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐ ? 'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ
domestic borrowing (public financing) has differed substantially between the two periods: 
whilst before the market-oriented reforms government on average borrowed (excluding aid 
loans) nearly 16 per cent of its total expenditures, since 1987 the public borrowing only 
constituted 2.4 per cent  of total expenditures (and less than 1 per cent of GDP).208 
Overall, the fiscal relationships seem to change post mid-1980s, and, from the qualitative 
perspective, it would be ideal to analyse each period separately. However, each of the 
subsamples would be far too short for the quantitative (CVAR) analysis. As the next best 
                                                          
203 http://www.mof.go.tz/mofdocs/debt/nationaldebtstrategy.pdf  
204 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/dsa/pdf/2012/dsacr12185.pdf  
205http://www.mof.go.tz/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=48:finance-a-debt-
policy&Itemid=63  
206 The medium term report argues that increasing development spending needs motivate more 
borrowing (both domestic, and external); debt composition in 2010 was 0.7/0.3, domestic/foreign, 
respectively; domestic borrowing agreed with IMF not to exceed 1% GDP.  Government projected 
revenue increments. 
207 ŝĚůŽĂŶƐŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂůůǇĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ƚƌĂŶƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?ƉĞƌŝŽĚŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? 
208 Note that the revenue and spending components are not equal as some spending elements (such 
as loan servicing) are omitted from the original data.  
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alternative, a shift dummy will be added to the cointegrating space aiming to capture the 
different relationships before and after the 1986 reforms.209 
Table 5.1: Summary Statistics  
 Variable 
name 
Variables as proportion of  
GDP (%) 
 Variables as proportion of 
Total Government 
Expenditure (%) 
  Full 
sample 
(1966-
2012) 
Before 
GDP 
rebasing/ 
reforms 
(1966-
1986) 
Post GDP 
rebasing/ 
reforms 
(1987-
2010) 
 Full 
sample 
(1966-
2012) 
Pre-
1986 
reforms 
Post 
1986 
reforms 
Total 
expenditure 
TEXP 20.10 
(6.41) 
24.03 
(4.52) 
16.93 
(6.00) 
 1 1 1 
Development 
expenditure 
DEXP 5.86 
(3.27) 
7.77 
(2.83) 
4.32 
(2.79) 
26.98 
(9.28) 
31.63 
(7.41) 
23.22 
(9.04) 
Recurrent 
expenditure 
REXP 14.24 
(3.61) 
16.26 
(2.75) 
12.61 
(3.43) 
73.02 
(9.28) 
68.37 
(7.42) 
76.78 
(9.04) 
Total 
Domestic 
revenue 
DREV 14.31 
(3.18) 
16.83 
(2.08) 
12.27 
(2.34) 
75.01 
(16.37) 
71.22 
(7.97) 
78.06 
(20.51) 
Tax revenue TAX 13.46 
(3.74) 
16.36 
(3.11) 
11.12 
(2.29) 
69.47 
(14.28) 
68.45 
(9.50) 
70.30 
(17.36) 
Non-Tax 
revenue 
NTAX 0.85 
(1.01) 
0.47 
(1.41) 
1.15 
(0.26) 
5.53 
(6.61) 
2.77 
(8.41) 
7.76 
(3.49) 
Total budget 
aid 
AID 4.43 
(2.72) 
3.07 
(1.46) 
5.54 
(3.01) 
22.59 
(12.62) 
12.24 
(4.47) 
30.95 
(10.69) 
Grants GRANTS 2.66 
(1.79) 
1.34 
(1.03) 
3.73 
(1.55) 
14.56 
(10.30) 
5.11 
(3.73) 
22.20 
(6.97) 
Loans LOANS 1.77 
(1.37) 
1.73 
(0.70) 
1.81 
(1.76) 
8.03 
(7.28) 
7.13 
(2.34) 
8.76 
(9.59) 
Borrowing  BORROW 2.01 
(2.39) 
3.89 
(1.92) 
0.50 
(1.50) 
8.45 
(10.52) 
15.94 
(6.24) 
2.41 
(9.35) 
Note: standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
3. Empirical Analyses 
Using the data (logged values, denoted by lower case, deflated using the CPI) described in 
Section 2, the empirical analyses are conducted using the cointegrated vector autoregressive 
framework (CVAR, Juselius, 2006). In the VAR framework, each variable is modelled as 
                                                          
209 For a similar discussion on the macroeconomic (rather than) fiscal indicators and the related CVAR 
modelling, see Juselius et al. (2013). 
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endogenous, and is expressed as a function of past own values, as well as past realisations of 
other variables (and deterministic components). The vector error-correction model (VECM) 
representation of the VAR includes both the stationary first differences of variables in ݔH? 
( ?ݔH?), and their value in levels (ݔH?), thus preserving both the long-run and short-run 
information in the data. In particular, the error correction form of the VAR (VECM) is 
represented by the following equation: 
 ȟݔH?ൌ ȫݔH?H?H?൅ ෍ ȞH?ȟݔH?H?H?H?H?H?H?H?H? ൅ ȰܦH?൅ ߝH? (5.1) 
  ݔH?ൌ ݐ݁ݔ݌H?ǡ ݐܽݔH?ǡ ܽ݅݀H? 
where ݔH? is a  ൈ  ? vector of endogenous variables described above, ܦH? is a vector of 
deterministic components (such as constant, deterministic trend, and dummy variables) with 
a vector of coefficients Ȱ; ݇ denotes the selected lag length; ɂH? is a  ൈ  ? vector of 
unobservable error terms, that are assumed to be ߝH? ?ܫܰሺ ?ǡ ȳሻ. VECM allows a clear 
separation between the long-run coefficients in ȫ and the short-run coefficients in ȞH?.  
The VECM representation illustrates that if variables are found to be I(1)  W and 
macroeconomic variables usually are  W stationary variables (ȟݔH?) are regressed on unit-root 
processes (ݔH?H?H?). In such case, the estimated coefficients would be spurious. However, if 
some variables in the system are driven by the same persistent shocks, there may exist 
linear combinations of these variables that are integrated of the lower order than the 
variables themselves (i.e. I(0)). These linear combinations would represent cointegrated 
relations, ߚԢݔH?, and could be interpreted as the long-run steady-state relationships. When 
cointegration exists, ȫ has reduced rank ݎ ൏ ݌ and is defined as follows:  
 ȫ ൌ ߙߚԢ (5.2) 
where ߙ and ߚ are݌ ൈ ݎ matrices (with ݎ ൏ ݌); ߚԢݔH? defines the stationary long-run 
cointegrating relationships ሺݎ ൈ  ?ሻ, and ߙ denotes the adjustment coefficients to the 
equilibrium error. Intuitively, if all ݔH? ?ܫሺ ?ሻ and  ȟݔH? ?ܫሺ ?ሻ, then a full rank in ȫ would be 
logically inconsistent as it would imply that ݔH? must be stationary.210 On the other hand,  ݎ ൌ ? implies that each variable in ݔH? is non-stationary and is driven by its own individual 
                                                          
210 The VECM representation of the VAR with full rank in ȫ and ݔH? ?ܫሺ ?ሻ would imply that a 
stationary variable ȟݔH? equals a non stationary variable ݔH?H?H?, lagged stationary variables ȟݔH?H?H? and a 
stationary error term. Since a stationary variable cannot equal a non-stationary variable, either ȫ ൌ  ? 
or it would have reduced rank.  
Chapter 5  W Fiscal Effects of Aid in Tanzania  Emilija Timmis 
137 
 
stochastic trend and therefore no cointegration exists. In this case, a simple VAR model with 
the variables in first differences would not imply any loss in long-run information.  
The accompanying moving average (MA) representation of the VAR illustrates how the 
process can be described in terms of pulling and pushing forces. The steady state to which 
the process is pulled to is defined by the long run relations ߚᇱݔH?െ ߚH?ൌ  ?. The forces ߙ 
represent adjustment and they activate as soon as the process is out of steady state, i.e. 
when ߚᇱݔH?െ ߚH?്  ? (Juselius 2006: 88-89). The MA representation describes the non-
stationary movement of the variables according to the common driving trends that 
ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ƚŚĞĐƵŵƵůĂƚĞĚƐƵŵŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƐŚŽĐŬƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? “/Ŷ ƚŚŝƐ ƐĞŶƐĞ ? ƚŚĞZĂŶĚD
representation are two sides of the same coin: the pulling and the pushing forces of the 
ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? ?:ƵƐĞůŝƵƐ ? ? ? ? ?:88). The inverted model can be summarised as: 
 ݔH?ൌ ܥ ෍ሺߝH?൅ ȰܦH?ሻ ൅ ܥכሺܮሻሺH?H?H?H? ߝH?൅ ȰܦH?ሻ ൅ ܺH? (5.3) 
 
where ܥ ൌ ߚH?ሺߙᇱH?ሺܫ െ ȞH?ሻߚH?ሻH?H?ߙᇱH? is the long-run impact matrix of rank p-r, with ߙᇱH?ߝH? 
describing the common driving trends; ܥכሺܮሻ is a stationary lag polynomial, and ܺH? depends 
on the initial values.  
The VAR model is highly demanding of the data. Therefore, we aim to estimate four distinct 
models: 
x a three-dimensional VAR between total expenditure (texp), tax revenue (tax) and 
aggregated aid (aid): 
  ݔH?ൌ ݐ݁ݔ݌H?ǡ ݐܽݔH?ǡ ܽ݅݀H? 
x  a four-dimensional model with total central government spending disaggregated 
into its development and recurrent components (dexp and rexp, respectively), tax 
revenue, and aid: ݔH?ൌ ݀݁ݔ݌H?ǡ ݎ݁ݔ݌H?ǡ ݐܽݔH?ǡ ܽ݅݀H? 
x a four-dimensional model with aggregated government spending, tax revenue, and 
aid disaggregated into grants (grants) and loans (loans)211: ݔH?ൌ ݐ݁ݔ݌H?ǡ ݐܽݔH?ǡ ݃ݎܽ݊ݐݏH?ǡ ݈݋ܽ݊ݏH? 
                                                          
211 Transformed to allow for logarithmic transformation (See section 3.3). 
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x a four dimensional model with government spending, tax revenue, aid, and 
borrowing (borrow)212,  ݔH?ൌ ݐ݁ݔ݌H?ǡ ݐܽݔH?ǡ ܽ݅݀H?ǡ ܾ݋ݎݎ݋ݓH? 
The results of each model are discussed in the following subsections. As the relevant tests 
and other methodology are discussed in Section 4 of Chapter 4, we resist reproducing it at 
length here and discuss the results in parsimonious fashion, referring to the relevant 
sections of Chapter 4 where necessary.  
3.1 Aggregated model213 
As a point of departure, the simplest fiscal model is estimated with total expenditure, tax 
revenue and aggregated aid, all in logs. There are three reasons for such simplification. 
Firstly and most importantly, given the relatively small number of observations from a purely 
time-series perspective, a system with a minimal number of variables should yield the most 
robust results, as it would be least demanding on the limited data. Secondly, the 
disaggregation of domestic revenue is complicated as non-tax revenue is recorded as 0 for 
the period of 1968-1982, and thereafter is considerably smaller than tax revenue.214 In the 
light of this, the analysis is restricted to tax variable only. Thirdly, disaggregation of aid into 
grants and loans is complicated by the five years of negative recorded loans. Whilst it is not 
unusual to observe some years of net repayment, this complicates the analysis conducted in 
logs. The budget financing also contains negative values, and is thus also excluded from the 
analysis here. (The disaggregation of total expenditure into recurrent and development 
components is possible, and the analysis is conducted in the next section).  
3.1.1 Misspecification Tests 
Lag length 
Table 5.2 below provides the lag length testing results. Whilst both Schwarz and Hannah-
Quinn information criteria indicate preference for lag length of one (k=1), such a model 
would exhibit second order autocorrelation issues. Therefore, lag length of two (k=2) is 
chosen for this model.  
                                                          
212 Transformed to allow for logarithmic transformation (See Section 3.4).  
213 @cats(lags=2,det=drift,break=level,dum) 1966:1 2012:1 
# L_TEXP L_TAX L_AID 
# 1986:1 
# dum96p  
214 Non-tax revenue is equal to on average 10% of tax revenue for the period from 1983, with a 
maximum of 16%. 
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Table 5.2: Lag-length Determination 
Model k T Regr. Log-lik SC H-Q LM(1) LM(k) 
VAR(5) 5 42 19 283.719 -8.438 -9.932 0.233 0.587 
VAR(4) 4 42 16 273.227 -8.739 -9.997 0.060 0.300 
VAR(3) 3 42 13 265.643 -9.179 -10.201 0.114 0.025 
VAR(2) 2 42 10 261.010 -9.759 -10.546 0.367 0.018 
VAR(1) 1 42 7 257.954 -10.415 -10.965 0.559 0.559 
Effective Sample: 1971:01 to 2012:01 
SC : Schwarz Criterion; H-Q  : Hannan-Quinn Criterion 
LM(k): LM-Test for autocorrelation of order k 
Deterministics 
An unrestricted constant is included to allow for a non-zero mean in the cointegrating 
relations and for non-quadratic trends in levels.215 A permanent dummy in 1996, signalled by 
a large residual (over 3) in aid, captures the aid reforms following the Helleiner et al. (1995) 
report. Statistically, it ensures the normality of residuals in the aid equation. Finally, 
although not suggested by excessively large residuals, a shift dummy is included in 1986 to 
capture the introduction of market reforms to the economy. Whilst such inclusion is driven 
more by the economic rather than purely statistical reasoning and indeed affects the 
statistical results, it ensures economic interpretability of the estimated cointegrating 
relationships.216  
Residuals  
The residuals from the unrestricted VAR exhibit an excellent model fit (Table 5.3). The 
multivariate normality is not rejected (p-value = 0.766), nor is the univariate normality for 
each of the model variables. The trace correlation statistic of 0.480 indicates a good model 
fit. Table 5.3 also summarises the results for LM tests for autocorrelation up to fourth order. 
Whilst the second order test statistic is borderline, others indicated no residual 
autocorrelation. Whilst less relevant with annual data, the tests for residual 
heteroskedasticity are also supplied in Table 5.3 for completeness and indicate no significant 
ARCH effects. Appendix Figure D1 illustrates the residual fit visually.  
                                                          
215 A model with a trend restricted to cointegration space was tested for, and the variable exclusion 
tests concluded that such trend can be excluded from the model (see Appendix Table D2). However, 
the estimated long run results are qualitatively comparable from both models.   
216 Without the inclusion of the shift dummy, it is virtually impossible to statistically justify the choice 
of r=2 vs. r=1; with r=1, the result is incredibly difficult to interpret, as the total expenditure ends up 
being positively associated with tax in the long run (sensible) but negatively associated with aid 
(difficult to interpret without purely external speculation). 
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Table 5.3: Residuals from Unrestricted VAR 
Residual normality (p-values) 
 Multivariate Univariate 
 texp tax aid 
0.766 0.671 0.260 0.918 
Residual autocorrelation and ARCH effects (p-values) 
 LM(1) LM(2) LM(3) LM(4) 
Residual autocorrelation 0.477 0.045 0.106 0.424 
ARCH 0.891 0.682 0.401 0.308 
Trace correlation 0.480 
        Note: All values are p-values 
3.1.2 Determination of Cointegration Rank 
Given the small sample and the model deterministics, we simulate the critical values for the 
Johansen test for the cointegration rank. Irrespective of whether we use the Bartlett-
corrected values or not, the Johansen test suggests two cointegrating relationships (r=2) 
(Table 5.4). Juselius (2006:142) suggests consulting additional information for the critical 
choice of the cointegration rank (see Appendix Table D4). The characteristic roots of the 
model confirm this choice, indicating no large moduli once one common trend (p-r=3-2=1) is 
included in the model. The t-values of the alpha coefficients to the (r+1)th=3rd cointegrating 
vector are all below 2.6, whilst at least one exceeds this value in the second cointegrating 
vector, again supporting the choice r=2. The recursive graphs illustrate the linear growth 
over time for the two out of the three components. The graphs of potential cointegrating 
relationships also illustrate potential stationarity of two out of three relationships. As the 
criteria of economic interpretability of the results is also satisfied (see next section), 
cointegration rank of two (r=2) can be selected with confidence.  
Table 5.4: Trace Test 
p-r r Eig. value Trace Trace* Frac95 p-value p-value* 
3 0 0.526 57.363 50.889 28.295 0.000 0.000 
2 1 0.365 23.790 21.068 15.035 0.002 0.006 
1 2 0.072 3.346 3.136 3.870 0.063 0.072 
* denotes Bartlett corrections 
3.1.3 Long-run identification: Hypothesis Testing 
The formal discussion of the battery of long-run identification procedures is provided in 
Section 4.3 of Chapter 4. The tests of long-run exclusion (Table 5.5) demonstrate that none 
of the variables (nor the shift dummy) should be excluded from the cointegrating space. 
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Variable stationarity tests show that none of the variables are stationary around a (broken) 
mean or trend. Tests of weak exogeneity indicate that at the selected cointegration rank 
(r=2) none of the variables can be accepted as weakly exogenous (tax would be accepted as 
such if r=1 was chosen). This is taken as a mild indication when identifying the common 
trends. Finally, the unit vector in alpha tests indicate that, irrespective of the choice of the 
cointegration rank, aid may be accepted as purely adjusting to the long-run equilibrium 
error. 
Table 5.5: Long Run Identification Tests 
 r texp tax aid Shift 1986 
Long-run exclusion  r=2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
r=1 0.464 0.052 0.008 0.041 
Stationarity r=2 0.000 0.000 0.000 yes 
r=1 0.000 0.000 0.000 yes 
Stationarity r=2 0.000 0.000 0.000 no 
r=1 0.000 0.000 0.000 no 
Stationarity (trend) r=2 0.000 0.000 0.007 no 
r=1 0.000 0.000 0.007 no 
Stationarity (trend) r=2 0.000 0.000 0.002 yes 
r=1 0.000 0.000 0.004 yes 
Weak exogeneity r=2 0.003 0.027 0.000 - 
r=1 0.029 0.592 0.000 - 
Purely adjusting r=2 0.012 0.010 0.204 - 
r=1 0.000 0.000 0.092 - 
     The table reports p-values. 
Individual Hypothesis Testing 
In this section we test whether our hypothesised relationships are individually217 stationary. 
Keeping the remaining ݎ െ  ? cointegrating relationships unrestricted (and thus unidentified), 
zero (or homogeneity) restrictions in a particular equilibrium relationship may be tested, 
allowing the remaining parameters to be estimated. Table 5.6 below provides the results of 
testing for individually stationary or otherwise relationships among the variables for an 
unidentified long-run system with two cointegrating vectors. Such hypothesis testing 
indicates that while a strong positive very-long-run relationship between total government 
expenditure and tax revenue could be identified (although not one-for-one), any other 
variable combinations  (a positive relationship between expenditure and aid, or tax and aid) 
would require the inclusion of the 1986 shift dummy to be stationary.  
                                                          
217 As stated above, our main aim is to see whether the individually stationary cointegrating 
relationships hold together as an equilibrium system.  
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The ȫ matrix (Appendix Table D4) of unidentified system (with r=2) also contains interesting 
information for future long-run identification. The total expenditure may be significantly 
associated with tax but not necessarily aid. Tax in turn should bear a strong association with 
total government expenditure, and possibly aid. Aid exhibits a potential relationship with tax 
variable, but weaker relationship with the total expenditure. This confirms the unsurprising 
strong association between the domestically determined variables, and suggests somewhat 
counter-intuitively that the second equilibrium may be between aid and tax rather than aid 
and expenditure. 
Table 5.6: Stationarity (or otherwise) of Variable Combinations 
 texp tax aid Ds1986 p-value 
H1 1 -1.2505 0 0 0.48074 
H2 1 -1.3555 0.0610 0 1 
H3 1 -0 -0.8516 0.7511 1 
H4 1 0 -08159 0 0.0005 
H5 0 1 -0.6732 0.5541 1 
H6 0 1 -0.6400 0 0.0003 
H7 1 -1 0 0 0.0022 
Note: Zeroes in the table are imposed and not estimated.  
Also note that where r  W1 = 1 conditions are imposed, the relationships are just-identified and 
therefore p-value is 1 by construction (i.e. restrictions are not testable) (Juselius, 2006:189). 
 
3.1.4 Long Run Identification: Results  
It is worthwhile to distinguish between a just-identified structure (withݎሺݎ െ  ?ሻ identifying 
restrictions), where ݎ െ  ? identifying (usually zero, or homogeneity) restrictions are imposed 
for each of ݎ cointegrating relationships; and over-identifying restrictions, whereby more 
than ݎ െ  ? identifying restrictions are imposed218 for at least one of the cointegrating 
vectors. Whilst just-identifying restrictions do not change the value of the likelihood function 
as they do not constrain the parameter space, the over-identifying restrictions do, and 
therefore can be tested. Note that normalisation on one element in each vector does not 
change the likelihood as the corresponding ߙH? coefficient is normalised on the same ߚH?  
coefficient. However, once we have identified a long run structure, the normalisation is an 
important choice, as we do not want to normalise on an insignificant variable) (Juselius, 
                                                          
218 I.e. the rank conditions are met, meaning no linear combination of other r-1 CI relations may 
produce a vector that resembles the first one (see Juselius, 2006:209-210, which further cites 
Johansen and Juselius, 1994, and Johansen, 1995). For further discussion of three aspects of 
identification (generic, empirical, and economic) see Juselius (2006:208). 
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2006:214). Results are provided in Table 5.7. As an over-identifying restriction, we exclude 
the shift dummy from the first cointegrating vector, as it is reported as insignificant. Results 
are provided in Table 5.8. 
Table 5.7: Just-identified Model (Aggregated) 
 texp tax aid Shift 1986  
>ZĞƋƵŝůŝďƌŝƵŵƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ɴ1) 1.000 -1.27 
(-20.74) 
0 0.05 
(0.84) 
~I(0) 
>ZĞƋƵŝůŝďƌŝƵŵƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ɴ2) -1.17 
(-9.15) 
0 1.000 -0.88 
(-5.68) 
~I(0) 
ĚũƵƐƚŵĞŶƚĐŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƐ ?ɲ1) -0.37 
(-3.59) 
0.30 
(2.91) 
-1.20 
(-3.67) 
  
ĚũƵƐƚŵĞŶƚĐŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƐ ?ɲ2) -0.02 
(-0.46) 
-0.06 
(-1.56) 
-0.51 
(-4.5) 
  
Multivariate normality p-value =  ‘- ‘ 
Stationarity 0.481 
Trace correlation 0.463 
 Log-Likelihood = 272.046 
     Note: t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. 
 
Table 5.8: Over-identified Model (Aggregated) 
 texp tax aid Shift 1986  
>ZĞƋƵŝůŝďƌŝƵŵƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ɴ1) 1.000    -1.25 
(-20.75)    
0      0 ~I(0) 
>ZĞƋƵŝůŝďƌŝƵŵƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ɴ2) -1.18 
(-9.185)    
0    1.000     -0.871 
(-5.625) 
~I(0) 
ĚũƵƐƚŵĞŶƚĐŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƐ ?ɲ1) -0.38 
(-3.8)     
0.27 
(2.64)     
-1.183 
(-3.74)     
  
Adjustment coefĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƐ ?ɲ2) -0.01 
(-0.289 
-0.06 
(-1.54) 
-0.5 
(-4.395) 
  
Multivariate normality p-value = 0.862 
Stationarity 0.481 
Trace correlation 0.463 
 Log-Likelihood = 271.797 
     Note: t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. 
Guided by the previous indications, we identify the first cointegrating vector as a 
relationship between domestic variables (expenditure and tax) by imposing a zero restriction 
on aid (although coefficients are fairly similar, homogeneity restriction cannot be plausibly 
imposed). This relationship summarises the long run positive equilibrium relationship 
between government expenditure and tax revenue. Should there be a departure from this 
long-run equilibrium, both variables would adjust with similar speed (about 2.5 years), 
although the expenditure adjustment coefficient is estimated more precisely. Aid also 
adjusts, possibly quickly filling the deficit.  
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The second equilibrium is then identified as a positive relationship between aid and 
government total expenditure, by imposing a zero restriction on tax variable. Although the 
statistical results prioritise the association between aid and tax, the aid  W expenditure 
relationship is of primary focus as theoretically this should entail a more direct effect (and 
more economically interpretable result).219 The estimated result concurs with the postulated 
expectation: total government expenditure is positively related to aid in the long run, and 
deviations from this equilibrium would trigger aid to adjust: i.e. if there was an increase in 
government spending, aid would match the increase in about two years, and vice versa. The 
ƐŚŝĨƚ ĚƵŵŵǇ ?Ɛ ĐŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ŝƐ ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ ? ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚŵĂƌŬĞƚ ƌĞĨŽƌŵƐ ŚĂǀĞ ĂůƚĞƌĞĚ ƚŚĞ
relationship between these two variables. The cointegrating relationships are depicted in 
Appendix Figure D2.   
3.1.5 MA representation: common driving trends 
The moving-average representation of the VAR allows one to inspect the driving forces in 
the model. The p-r common trends (CT) describe the non-stationarity in the process, 
originating from the cumulative sum of the unanticipated shocks. The tests above indicated 
that only tax could be potentially considered as weakly exogenous variable. However, from 
alpha orthogonal corresponding to the over-identified model (without imposing weak 
exogeneity of the tax variable) (see Table 5.9), it does not seem that cumulated residuals to 
tax variable alone could be considered a common stochastic trend  W the total government 
expenditure residuals contribute, too, with a similar weight. 
By reading the C-matrix (Table 5.10), we can elicit how the cumulated residuals from each 
VAR equation load into each of the variables (column-wise inspection) and the weights with 
which each variable in the system has been affected by any of the cumulated empirical 
shocks (row-wise inspection) (Juselius, 2006:259).  Shocks (although note that residuals are 
correlated) to both government expenditure and tax revenue have comparable impact on 
the system variables, strongly, positively and permanently affecting all three variables. Aid, 
on the other hand, exhibits only a mild negative, transient at most effect.   
 
 
 
                                                          
219 The results from alternative identification are available in Appendix Table D5. 
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Table 5.9: Common Trends (Over-identified Model) 
  texp tax aid 
Composition of common trends ሺɲC?) CT1 1.139 
(1.745) 
1.000 -0.137 
(-1.110) 
>ŽĂĚŝŶŐƐŽĨĐŽŵŵŽŶƚƌĞŶĚƐ ?ɴC?) CT1 1.003 
(2.732) 
0.802 
(2.732) 
1.180 
(2.732) 
        Note: t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. 
Table 5.10: The Long Run Impulse Matrix C (Over-identified Model) 
(Over-)identified model 
 ࢿො࢚ࢋ࢞࢖ ࢿො࢚ࢇ࢞ ࢿොࢇ࢏ࢊ 
texp 1.143 
(2.428) 
1.003 
(2.732) 
-0.138 
(-1.192) 
tax 0.914 
(2.428) 
0.802 
(2.732) 
-0.110 
(-1.192) 
aid  1.344 
(2.428) 
1.180 
(2.732) 
-0.162 
(-1.192) 
       Note: t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. 
Overall, the aggregated system provides sensible core results. There exists a domestic fiscal 
equilibrium which describes that over the long run domestic revenue and expenditure are 
closely related. There is also a positive association between aid and government spending, 
with aid adjusting to domestic fiscal decisions rather than driving them. Alternatively, a 
positive association between aid and tax could be identified, reassuring donors that aid does 
not have adverse effects on domestically collected tax revenue.  
3.2 Model with Disaggregated expenditures220 
Ethiopian chapter asked whether aid has differing effects on the disaggregated government 
expenditure components, namely, development and recurrent spending. Whilst 
disaggregating aid into grants and loans poses some challenges, it is rather straightforward 
to formulate a model with disaggregated expenditure, and government tax revenue (or, 
alternatively, aggregated domestic revenue) and aid (grants plus loans). 
One interesting thing to note from the data is the collapse in the development spending in 
1996 coinciding with the collapse in the aid (Figure 5.6). Qualitatively, as there was no visible 
                                                          
220 @cats(lags=2,det=cidrift,break=level,dum) 1966:1 2012:1 
# L_DEXP L_REXP L_TAX L_AID  
# 1986:1 
# dum96p 
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ĚŝƉŝŶƚŚĞƌĞĐƵƌƌĞŶƚƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐ ?ŝƚŝƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐĂƐŝƚƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐƚŚĂƚĚŽŶŽƌƐ ?ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƚŽƐƵƐƉend 
aid translated predominantly (if not solely) in reduction in the category of spending arguably 
more important for the long run. Development expenditure then recovered in line with the 
recovery of aid flows (grants and loans). Visually, development expenditures tend to move 
more in tandem with aid flows compared to recurrent expenditures, which appear to be 
more stable. This is sensible considering that public sector salaries constitute a considerable 
proportion recurrent expenditure, and consistent with tax being linked to recurrent 
spending and aid more likely to finance development/investment.  
Figure 5.6: Selected Variables (Logs) 
 
3.2.1 Misspecification Tests 
Lag length 
Lag length of two (k=2) is selected for this model (Table 5.11). As before, the information 
criteria indicate preference for lag length of one, and even the autocorrelation test statistics 
for k=1 outperform those for k=2. However, for consistency, and improved economic 
interpretation of the results, k=2 is accepted as superior specification.221 
Table 5.11: Lag Length Selection (Model with Disaggregated Spending) 
Model k T Regr. Log-lik SC H-Q LM(1) LM(k) 
VAR(5) 5 42 25 400.270 -10.161 -12.782 0.109 0.108 
VAR(4) 4 42 21 375.760 -10.418 -12.619 0.004 0.020 
VAR(3) 3 42 17 361.396 -11.158 -12.940 0.081 0.321 
VAR(2) 2 42 13 348.785 -11.981 -13.344 0.038 0.040 
VAR(1) 1 42 9 334.377 -12.719 -13.662 0.251 0.251 
Effective Sample: 1971:01 to 2012:01. 
                                                          
221 k=1, although improves AC, completely disrupts the cointegration rank test results, and the 
estimated beta vectors are less sensible (no relationship between aid and development expenditure). 
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Deterministics 
As above, a permanent dummy in 1996, signalled by a large residual (over 3) in aid (and now 
development expenditures, see Figure 5.6), captures the aid reforms following the Helleiner 
et al. (1995) report. Again, although not suggested by excessively large residuals, a shift 
dummy is included in 1986 to capture the introduction of market reforms to the economy. A 
trend restricted to cointegrating space cannot be excluded from the model. An interesting 
indication following from Figure 5.6 here is that the reduction in aid predating the 1995/6 
reforms translated predominantly into reduction of development spending, having no visible 
effect on the recurrent expenditures.  
Residuals  
Compared to the aggregated model, the residuals (Table 5.12) illustrate a slightly inferior 
model fit, which is somewhat unsurprising given the extra demands on the data following 
from the increased number of variables. The multivariate normality is strongly rejected 
(p=0.001), primarily driven by the rejection of univariate normality in development 
expenditures variable, even with the aforementioned dummy structure. Model also exhibits 
some first order residual autocorrelation. The trace statistic of 0.575 suggests an acceptable 
model fit. The visual representation of the residuals is presented in Appendix Figure D3.  
Table 5.12: Residuals from Unrestricted VAR (Model with Disaggregated Spending) 
Residual normality (p-values) 
 Multivariate Univariate 
 dexp rexp tax aid 
0.001 0.020 0.833 0.104 0.449 
Residual autocorrelation and ARCH effects (p-values) 
 LM(1) LM(2) LM(3) LM(4) 
Residual autocorrelation 0.010 0.462 0.354 0.079 
ARCH 1.000 0.629 0.048 0.042 
Trace correlation 0.575 
      Note: The table reports p-values. 
3.2.2 Determination of Cointegration Rank 
Irrespective of whether we use the Bartlett-corrected values or not, the Johansen test (Table 
5.13) suggests two cointegrating relationships (r=2). Additional information supports this 
choice (reported in the Appendix Table D6).  
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Table 5.13: Trace Test 
p-r r Eig. value Trace Trace* Frac95 p-value p-value* 
4 0 0.744 129.632 114.691 71.725    0.000     0.000     
3 1 0.596   68.231   60.448 49.698    0.000     0.003 
2 2 0.339   27.490   24.675 30.508    0.109     0.205 
1 3 0.178    8.838    8.248 15.727    0.376     0.433 
* denotes Bartlett corrections 
3.2.3 Long Run Identification: Hypothesis Testing 
None of the variables are trend- or mean stationary, irrespective of whether the mean shift 
is accounted for, or not (see Table 5.14). None could be excluded at the selected 
cointegration rank. In terms of adjustment behaviour, tax is indicated as weakly exogenous 
(for r=2), and none of the variables can be accepted as purely adjusting.  
Table 5.14: Long Run Identification Tests (Model with Disaggregated Spending) 
p-values r dexp rexp tax aid Shift 1986 Trend 
Long-run exclusion  r=3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.073 
r=2 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.004 0.047 
r=1 0.000 0.041 0.881 0.006 0.001 0.419 
Stationarity r=3 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.006 no no 
r=2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 no no 
r=1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 no no 
Stationarity r=3 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.003 yes no 
r=2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 yes no 
r=1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 yes no 
Stationarity  r=3 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.029 no yes 
r=2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 no yes 
r=1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 no yes 
Stationarity  r=3 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.048 yes yes 
r=2 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 yes yes 
r=1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 yes yes 
Weak exogeneity r=3 0.000 0.004 0.096 0.000 - - 
r=2 0.000 0.004 0.316 0.000 - - 
r=1 0.006 0.006 0.955 0.879 - - 
Purely adjusting r=3 0.083 0.037 0.072 0.247   
r=2 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.004   
r=1 0.031 0.000 0.000 0.000   
                     Note: The table reports p-values. 
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3.2.4 Long Run Identification: Results (Model with Disaggregated Spending) 
The key interest in this specification222 is finding to which financing component  W domestic 
(tax) or foreign (aid)  W each of the government spending components are more strongly 
associated to.  Therefore, one of the vectors looks at the development expenditures 
(excluding the recurrent spending), and the second at the recurrent expenditures (excluding 
the development spending). Individual hypothesis testing (reported in Appendix Table D7) 
report that two such (over-identified excluding insignificant variables once the system is 
estimated) relationships would be individually stationary. For readability purposes, each 
vector is normalised on each of the spending components rather than the most adjusting 
variable. The results summarised in Table 5.15 indicate that trend is not significant in the 
first cointegrating vector, and the shift dummy is insignificant in the second relationship. 
They are therefore excluded from the respective vectors, and the results of the over-
identified model are provided in Table 5.16. 
dŚĞƌĞƐƵůƚƐƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƚŚĂƚĐĞŶƚƌĂůŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐ is strongly associated 
with domestic tax revenue, and, to a lesser extent, aid (which is sensible, as aid funded just 
over a fifth of total government spending over the full sample period). Should there be a 
departure from this equilibrium (e.g. a fall in tax revenue or aid), the development 
expenditure itself would be the most adjusting variable, which is consistent with Figure 5.6.  
The second cointegrating vector indicates that aid is positively associated with tax revenue 
and negatively related to the recurrent expenditure. This is consistent with a supposed 
donor behaviour whereby they would reward increasing tax collection efforts and be 
punitive towards recurrent expenditure excesses. Aid is the most adjusting variable, 
although the recurrent expenditures, too, adjust to equilibrium error.223 The identified 
system is accepted as stationary with p-value=0.531.224 
 
 
 
                                                          
222 /ƚ ŝƐ ĐůĞĂƌ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ Ă ƐƚƌŽŶŐ  ‘ƚƌĂĚĞ-ŽĨĨ ? ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƌĞĐƵƌƌĞŶƚ ĂŶĚ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ
expenditure: if any one unit is spent on one item, it cannot be spent on another. This is a generic and 
uninteresting relationship, and it will not be directly identified. 
223 See Appendix Table D8 for and alternative identification. 
224 (Only) Tax could be accepted as weakly exogenous with p-value=0.532). 
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Table 5.15: Just-identified Model (Model with Disaggregated Spending) 
 dexp rexp tax aid Shift 1986 Trend  
LR ĞƋƵŝůŝďƌŝƵŵƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ɴ1) 1.000    0.000    -1.105 
(-4.703) 
-0.212 
(-2.537) 
1.215  
(4.612) 
-0.017 
(-1.241) 
~I(0) 
>ZĞƋƵŝůŝďƌŝƵŵƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ɴ2) 0.000 1.000 -1.152 
(-7.177) 
0.329 
(5.757) 
0.282 
(1.568) 
-0.034 
(-3.701) 
~I(0) 
ĚũƵƐƚŵĞŶƚĐŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƐ ?ɲ1) -0.587 
(-4.339)      
0.186 
(3.741)      
-0.016 
(-0.303)     
0.248  
(1.640)      
   
ĚũƵƐƚŵĞŶƚĐŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƐ ?ɲ2) -0.528 
(-2.125) 
-0.301 
(-3.301) 
0.147 
(1.532) 
-1.647 
(-5.919) 
   
Multivariate normality 0.021 
Stationarity p-ǀĂůƵĞA? ?- ‘ 
Trace correlation 0.460 
    Note: t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. 
Table 5.16: Over-identified Model (Model with Disaggregated Spending) 
 dexp rexp tax aid Shift 
1986 
Trend  
LR equilibrium relation 
 ?ɴ1) 
1.000 0.000 -1.384 
(-7.594) 
-0.172 
(-1.965) 
0.828 
(8.711) 
0.000 ~I(0) 
LR equilibrium relation 
 ?ɴ2) 
0.000 1.000 -1.366 
(-10.029) 
0.372 
(5.695) 
0.000 -0.023 
(-6.225) 
~I(0) 
Adjustment coefficients 
 ?ɲ1) 
-0.655 
(-4.830) 
0.182 
(3.608) 
-0.011 
(-0.213) 
0.191 
(1.251) 
   
Adjustment coefficients 
 ?ɲ2) 
-0.334 
(-1.497) 
-0.298 
(-3.593) 
0.106 
(1.197) 
-1.439 
(-5.753) 
   
Multivariate normality 0.006 
Test of restricted model  0.531 
Trace correlation 0.456 
    Note: t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. 
3.2.5 MA Representation 
As tax could be accepted as weakly exogenous variable, identification of one of the common 
driving trends is fairly straightforward: cumulated shocks to tax constitute a common trend 
(CT2), which positively (and permanently) loads into all of the system variables (Table 5.17). 
The other common trend is more complicated to identify, and seems to contain significant 
contributions from shocks to all remaining system variables.  
The C matrix (Table 5.18) indicates that unanticipated shocks to aid may have permanent 
negative effects on recurrent spending, but no identifiable or permanent effect on 
development expenditure or tax revenue, consistent with aid funding specific projects rather 
than influencing the government investment levels in the long run. It would, nevertheless, 
have a positive and permanent effect on aid itself. An unanticipated shock to tax would have 
a strong, positive, and permanent effect on all variables. Similar shocks to development 
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spending would have a small positive and lasting effect on recurrent expenditure, and  W 
although perhaps transient only  W effect on aid, with virtually no effect on other variables. 
Cumulated shocks to recurrent spending would be translated into permanently higher 
recurrent spending and lower aid, with only transient small effect on development 
expenditures and tax.  
Table 5.17: Common Trends (Over-identified Model with Disaggregated Spending) 
  dexp rexp tax aid 
Composition of common trends ሺɲC?) CT1 0.204 
(2.950)     
1.000 0.000   -0.254 
(-3.465) 
 CT2 0.004 
(0.050)     
0.000 1.000    0.073 
(0.946) 
Loadings of common trends  ?ɴC?) CT1 0.125 
(0.343)     
0.766 
(3.881)     
0.237 
(1.105)     
-1.186 
(-2.422)     
 CT2 1.722 
(4.014) 
0.502 
(2.163) 
0.970 
(3.838) 
2.213 
(3.844) 
Note: t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. 
Table 5.18: The Long Run Impulse Matrix C (Over-identified Model with Disaggregated 
Spending) 
 ࢿොࢊࢋ࢞࢖ ࢿො࢘ࢋ࢞࢖ ࢿො࢚ࢇ࢞ ࢿොࢇ࢏ࢊ 
dexp 0.032  
(0.245)      
0.125  
(0.343)    
1.722 
(4.014)      
0.094 
(0.922) 
rexp 0.158     
(2.253)   
0.766 
(3.881)     
0.502 
(2.163)     
-0.158 
(-2.881) 
tax 0.052  
(0.680)      
0.237 
(1.105)     
0.970 
(3.838)      
0.010 
(0.172) 
aid -0.234 
(-1.343) 
-1.186  
(-2.422)    
2.213 
(3.844)     
0.463 
(3.396) 
Note: t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. 
3.3 Model with Disaggregated aid (1968-2012) 225 
Disaggregating aid poses two data challenges. Firstly, loans are observed as negative for 
several years in the sample. Whilst it is not unusual to observe some years of net repayment, 
this complicates the analysis conducted in logs. To overcome this issue, a constant (80,000 
local currency units) sufficiently large to render each observation positive is added to the 
                                                          
225 Lutkepohl (2007:193): There are two possible interpretations of why some estimated VAR 
ĐŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƐĂƌĞŶŽƚƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůǇĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĨƌŽŵǌĞƌŽ ?  “&ŝƌƐƚ ?ƐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞĐŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƐŵĂǇĂĐƚƵĂůůǇďĞ
zero and this fact may be reflected in the estimation results. For instance, if some variable is not 
Granger-causal for the remaining variables, zero coefficients are encountered. Second, insignificant 
coefficient estimates are found if the information in the data is not rich enough to provide sufficiently 
ƉƌĞĐŝƐĞĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞƐǁŝƚŚĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶĐĞŝŶƚĞƌǀĂůƐƚŚĂƚĚŽŶŽƚĐŽŶƚĂŝŶǌĞƌŽ ? ?
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variable. Secondly, grants variable is recorded as zero for the first two years of the sample, 
again complicating analysis in logs. Therefore, the first two years are omitted from the 
sample. Furthermore, grants seem to be stationary around the mean (albeit with low p-
value of 0.15). Thus unsurprisingly, nearly irrespective of model specification, it is estimated 
as the sole adjusting variable. No statistically acceptable or economically interpretable 
system was achieved, and thus model with both disaggregated expenditures and aid would 
not be estimated.  
3.4 Model with Borrowing226 
To model a system that includes borrowing (budget financing) without turning to a system in 
which variables are expressed as a proportion of GDP, the borrowing variable that contains 
some negative values (net repayment) is scaled by a constant (300,000 Tanzanian Shillings) 
to get rid of the negative values. The system further includes total government 
expenditures, total aid, and tax revenue.  
3.4.1 Misspecification Tests 
Lag length 
The selected lag length is two (k=2). Again, the information criteria indicate preference for 
lag length of one (k=1); however, such choice is inferior in terms of residual autocorrelation.  
Table 5.19: Lag Length Selection (Model with Borrowing) 
Model k T Regr. Log-lik SC H-Q LM(1) LM(k) 
VAR(5) 5 42 26 374.070 -8.558 -11.283 0.178 0.242 
VAR(4) 4 42 22 357.882 -9.211 -11.517 0.501 0.116 
VAR(3) 3 42 18 343.777 -9.963 -11.850 0.091 0.156 
VAR(2) 2 42 14 335.931 -11.013 -12.481 0.120 0.003 
VAR(1) 1 42 10 326.671 -11.996 -13.044 0.061 0.061 
                     Effective Sample: 1971:01 to 2012:01. 
Deterministics 
Guided by large residuals, three permanent dummies are included in the model: aid reforms 
in 1995/6; and large residuals in borrowing in 2001 (HIPC debt relief) and 2008 (to cover for 
shortfalls in tax revenue partly due to the global financial crisis). A trend restricted to the 
                                                          
226 @cats(lags=2,det=cidrift,break=level,dum) 1966:1 2012:1 
# L_TEXP L_TAX L_AID L_BORROWpos  
# 1986:1  
# dum96p dum08p dum01p 
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cointegrating space and an unrestricted constant are included in the model, allowing for 
trends both in levels of variables and the cointegrating relationships, as above. Finally, in line 
with the previous, a mean shift in 1986 is included to capture the 1986 pro-market reforms.  
Residuals  
Model fit is acceptable, with trace correlation of 0.644 (Table 5.20). Multivariate normality 
cannot be rejected (p-value=0.088). The tests indicate no residual autocorrelation. Model 
residuals are depicted in Appendix Figure D4. 
Table 5.20: Residuals from Unrestricted VAR 
Residual normality (p-values) 
 Multivariate Univariate 
 texp tax aid borrow 
0.088 0.788 0.487 0.985 0.004227 
Residual autocorrelation and ARCH effects (p-values) 
 LM(1) LM(2) LM(3) LM(4) 
Residual autocorrelation 0.280 0.054 0.536 0.446 
ARCH 0.555 0.376 0.306 0.042 
Trace correlation 0.644 
Note: Table reports p-values. 
3.4.2 Cointegration rank 
Johansen test indicates two cointegrating relationships (r=2) (Table 5.21). Such choice is 
supported by the additional information (Appendix Table D9). 
Table 5.21: Trace Test 
p-r r Eig. value Trace Trace* Frac95 p-value p-value* 
4 0 0.852 151.091 131.172 71.436 0.000 0.000 
3 1 0.551 65.218 55.090 49.065 0.001 0.011 
2 2 0.426 29.198 24.922 29.821 0.061 0.179 
1 3 0.090 4.221 3.712 15.862 0.857 0.899 
* denotes Bartlett corrections 
3.4.3 Long Run Identification: Hypothesis Testing 
The long run exclusion test report that with the selected cointegration rank of two (r=2), 
none of the variables could be excluded from the cointegration space, except for a mild 
indication for the shift dummy. None of the variables are reported as mean- or trend-
                                                          
227 [Kurtosis of 5.765] 
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stationary, irrespective of whether the 1986 shift dummy is included in the test. For r=2, tax 
is reported as potentially weakly exogenous variable. No variables are found to be purely 
adjusting, although the borrowing variable could be borderline indicated as such.  Results 
are provided in Table 5.22. 
Table 5.22: Long Run Identification Tests 
p-values r texp tax aid borrow Shift 1986 Trend 
Long-run exclusion  r=3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.006 
r=2 0.006 0.101 0.040 0.000 0.059 0.008 
 r=1 0.002 0.411 0.187 0.000 0.019 0.002 
Stationarity r=3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 no no 
r=2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 no no 
r=1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 no no 
Stationarity r=3 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 yes no 
r=2 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 yes no 
r=1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 yes no 
Stationarity  r=3 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.000 no yes 
r=2 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.000 no yes 
r=1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 no yes 
Stationarity  r=3 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 yes yes 
r=2 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000 yes yes 
r=1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 yes yes 
Weak exogeneity r=3 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.000 - - 
r=2 0.005 0.670 0.003 0.000 - - 
r=1 0.038 0.495 0.510 0.000 - - 
Purely adjusting r=3 0.002 0.031 0.049 0.032   
r=2 0.000 0.000 0.019 0.049   
r=1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.102   
 Note: Table reports p-values. 
 
3.4.4 Long Run Identification: Results (model with borrowing) 
Life would be easy if cointegration tests indicated a sole cointegrating vector. In such case, 
the vector would represent an intuitive positive relationship between total government 
expenditure and all the revenue components, with borrowing being the most adjusting 
variable, and adjusting (albeit in overshooting way) spending (Table 5.23). Alas. 
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Table 5.23: Long Run Identification Tests (Example if r=1) 
 texp tax aid borrow Shift 1986 Trend  
>ZĞƋƵŝůŝďƌŝƵŵƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ɴ1) 1.000 -0.237 
(-1.720) 
-0.114 
(-2.428) 
-0.718 
(-14.352) 
0.546 
(3.523) 
-0.032 
(-4.001) 
~I(0) 
ĚũƵƐƚŵĞŶƚĐŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƐ ?ɲ1) 0.106 
(2.292) 
0.033 
(0.714) 
0.139 
(0.744) 
1.173 
(12.389) 
   
Multivariate normality 0.001 
Trace correlation 0.446 
 Log-Likelihood = 328.928 
Note: t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. 
With two cointegrating vectors, we posit a simple identification strategy by asking two 
simple questions. Firstly, what sort of equilibrium is formed among the variables over which 
the government has direct control (i.e. government spending, tax revenue, and budget 
financing). Secondly, what are the dynamics among all the revenue variables (except non-tax 
revenue) available to the government. The results for the just-identified system are provided 
in Table 5.24. With insignificant trend further excluded from the second cointegrating 
vector, the over-identified system is achieved (Table 5.25).  
In the first cointegrating vector, the expenditure would positively depend on tax revenue 
ĂŶĚďŽƌƌŽǁŝŶŐ ?dŚŝƐĐĂŶďĞƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŽĨĂƐĂŶ ‘ĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚ ?ĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐĨŝƐĐĂůĞƋƵŝůŝďƌŝƵŵ ?ĂƐĂůůƚŚĞ
variables are under the direct control of the government. Following the theoretical 
(economic) postulated hypothesis, the borrowing is the most (and effectively only) adjusting 
variable: should the deficit (surplus) occur, the non-concessional borrowing would increase 
(decrease) quickly (in less than a year) to restore the budget.   
The second cointegrating relationship indicates that tax is positively related to both aid 
(potential income effect) and borrowing (repayment/servicing requirements). Furthermore, 
aid and borrowing can be regarded as substitutes. Should a departure from this revenue 
equilibrium occur (for instance, a shortfall in the tax revenue combined with overtly 
constrained/prohibitively expensive further public borrowing), aid (increase) and spending 
(decrease) would adjust to equilibrium error. The identified cointegrating vectors are 
depicted in Appendix Figure D5.228 
 
 
 
                                                          
228 A slightly differently identified model is summarised in Appendix Table D10. 
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Table 5.24: Just-identified Model (Model with Borrowing) 
 texp tax aid borrow Shift 
1986 
Trend  
LR ĞƋƵŝůŝďƌŝƵŵƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ɴ1) 1.000   -0.506  
(-4.422)      
0.000       -0.598 
(-12.739)      
0.421 
(2.896)     
-0.029 
(-3.822) 
~I(0) 
>ZĞƋƵŝůŝďƌŝƵŵƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ɴ2) 0.000    1.000    -0.423 
(-6.694)      
-0.448  
(-5.911)        
0.465 
(2.736)     
-0.014 
(-1.582) 
~I(0) 
Adjustment coefficients 
 ?ɲ1) 
-0.011 
(-0.200)      
0.061 
(1.053)     
-0.602 
(-3.677)      
1.232  
(10.186)      
   
Adjustment coefficients 
 ?ɲ2) 
0.215 
(3.982) 
-0.037 
(-0.624) 
1.225 
(7.283) 
0.222 
(1.787) 
   
Multivariate normality 0.138 
Trace correlation 0.534 
Note: t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. 
Table 5.25: Over-identified Model (Model with Borrowing) 
 texp tax aid borrow Shift 
1986 
Trend  
LR equilibrium relation 
 ?ɴ1) 
1.000   -0.441 
(-3.701)      
0.000       -0.654 
(-13.078)      
0.454 
(2.996)     
-0.031 
(-4.017) 
~I(0) 
LR equilibrium relation 
 ?ɴ2) 
0.000    1.000     -0.616 
(-11.901)      
-0.280 
(-2.857)        
0.416  
(3.526)      
0.000 ~I(0) 
Adjustment coefficients 
 ?ɲ1) 
0.067  
(1.493)     
0.039 
(0.795)     
-0.146  
(-1.059)      
1.225  
(12.297)      
   
Adjustment coefficients 
 ?ɲ2) 
0.152 
(3.334) 
-0.010 
(-0.202) 
0.986 
(7.062) 
0.107 
(1.064) 
   
Multivariate normality 0.099 
Test of restricted model  0.404 
Trace correlation 0.529 
Note: t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. 
3.4.5 MA Representation 
The moving-average representation of the VAR allows one to inspect the driving forces in 
the model. The p-r common trends (CT) describe the non-stationarity in the process, 
originating from the cumulative sum of the unanticipated shocks.  One rather clear common 
trend (CT1) in this model is composed from cumulated unanticipated shocks to tax variable, 
which positively loads to expenditures, tax and aid (Table 5.26). The second one (CT2) seems 
to predominantly arise from the cumulated shocks to expenditures, with small but 
nevertheless significant contributions from shocks to both aid and borrowing. The second 
pushing force loads positively and significantly into expenditure and borrowing variables.  
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Table 5.26: Common Trends (Over-identified Model with Borrowing) 
  texp tax aid borrow 
Composition of common trends ሺɲC?) CT1 0.000 1.000    0.013 (0.258)      -0.030 (-0.745) 
 CT2 1.000 0.000   -0.146 
(-4.234)      
-0.072 
(-2.691) 
Loadings of common trends  ?ɴC?) CT1 0.649 
(2.291)      
1.121 
(4.297)      
1.711 
(4.761)     
0.237 
(0.776) 
 CT2 1.549 
(4.100) 
0.482 
(1.387) 
-0.144 
(-0.301)  
2.042 
(5.014)  
Note: t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. 
 
The C matrix (Table 5.27) illustrates how a shock229 to each variable (each column) ripples 
through the system: a statistically significant coefficient would indicate that an 
unanticipated shock to the variable has a permanent effect on another variable; otherwise, 
the effect is transitory at most. An unanticipated shock to tax would positively and 
permanently affect expenditures, tax, and aid (latter perhaps indiĐĂƚŝŶŐ ĚŽŶŽƌƐ ? ƌĞǁĂƌĚ
policies or sustained tax revenue reform effort), and has no permanent effect on borrowing 
(if anything, it may temporarily increase domestic borrowing  W but not reducing it). Shocks 
to borrowing permanently (although not much) reduce total government expenditure, and 
borrowing itself, and have very small, and - if at all - transitory negative effects on tax and 
aid. Shocks to aid permanently reduce borrowing, but also spending, without permanent or 
sizeable effects on tax or aid itself. Cumulated unanticipated shocks to expenditure seem to 
translate into permanent and large increases in government spending itself, as well as 
borrowing, with some positive transitory effect of tax and no permanent effect on aid (if 
anything, the latter may be temporarily reduced, again underlining ĚŽŶŽƌƐ ? ƉƵŶŝƚŝǀĞ
behaviour towards recurrent spending excesses). It must be noted that these results need to 
be taken carefully, as, as in the other models discussed above, there is some residual 
correlation between the variables.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
229 One should again be wary of labelling them as empirical shocks given the highly correlated 
residuals.  
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Table 5.27: The Long Run impulse Matrix C (Over-identified Model with Borrowing) 
 ࢿො࢚ࢋ࢞࢖ ࢿො࢚ࢇ࢞ ࢿොࢇ࢏ࢊ ࢿො࢈࢕࢘࢘࢕࢝ 
texp 1.549 
(4.100) 
0.649 
(2.291) 
-0.218 
(-2.540) 
-0.132 
(-2.038) 
tax 0.482 
(1.387) 
1.121 
(4.297) 
-0.056 
(-0.705) 
-0.068 
(-1.151) 
aid -0.144 
(-0.301) 
1.711 
(4.761) 
0.044 
(0.403) 
-0.041 
(-0.496) 
borrow 2.042 
(5.014) 
0.237 
(0.776) 
-0.296 
(-3.195) 
-0.155 
(-2.227) 
      Note: t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Compared to the Ethiopian case study, the CVAR results on Tanzanian fiscal effects of aid are 
delicate, reflecting potential inferiority in terms of data quality, justifying focus on long run 
estimates only. Nevertheless, some reliable findings emerge.  
The most statistically sound results seem to be from the most aggregated specification 
modelling total expenditure, tax, and aid. Although no variables are clearly found to be 
ǁĞĂŬůǇĞǆŽŐĞŶŽƵƐ ?ƚĂǆĂƉƉĞĂƌƐƚŽďĞƚŚĞ ‘ŵŽƐƚ ?ĞǆŽŐĞŶŽƵƐǀĂƌŝĂďůĞ ?ŝ ?Ğ ?ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐŚĂve 
limited ability to alter tax in short to medium term), and aid is found to be mostly adjusting. 
Aid does appear to be positively associated with tax and spending in the long run (although 
shocks to aid may have a mild transient negative effect  W but the results are weak). Although 
on-budget aid, rather plausibly, does not drive the domestic revenue in either Ethiopia or 
Tanzania, it does not discourage or substitute for the domestically collected revenue. 
Unsurprisingly, tax is positively associated to expenditures in both countries.  
As in Ethiopia, in Tanzania aid has a positive association with spending, and aid seems to be 
adjusting to funding the excessive deficits in both countries. However, the fiscal mechanism 
exhibits differences if the spending is disaggregated into development and recurrent 
components. In Ethiopia, aid (and especially grants) adjusts to capital expenditures (the two 
are positively related in the long run), positively indicating donors rewarding sound public 
investment decisions. In Tanzania it is mainly the development expenditures that adjust to 
(shortfalls or windfalls in) aid. This is especially pronounced during the period of re-assessing 
the aid disbursements in mid-1990s, where development expenditures dwindled following a 
sharp decrease in aid. In contrast to a positive relationship in Ethiopia, aid is negatively 
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associated to recurrent spending in Tanzania. Although both variables adjust to departures 
from this long run equilibrium, the faster and stronger adjustment of aid indicates some 
potential punitive donor disbursement behaviour with respect to consumption spending 
excesses.  
Finally, we find evidence that aid and borrowing could be considered substitutes. However, 
as it is found to be less (and less quickly) adjusting to equilibrium error, it is possible that 
public borrowing is not borrowing of last resort, rather signalling (potentially non-DAC) 
donors funding the at least a fraction of the deficit.  
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Chapter 6 
 
Donor vs. Recipient Aid Records:  
Different Tales 
 
1. Introduction  
The opening chapters of this thesis argued for the importance of distinguishing between on-
budget and off-budget aid in analysing the fiscal effects of aid. Two country case studies in 
Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrated that using recipieŶƚ ?ƐďƵĚŐĞƚĂŝĚƌĞĐŽƌĚƐƚŚĞĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞĚĨŝƐĐĂů
effects of (and on) aid report much more sanguine results than is often estimated (or 
postulated) in the literature using the broader measures of aid.  We argued that the 
omission of off-budget aid flows are less of a concern in the reduced form cointegrated VAR 
than in the conventional panel estimations.  
ǀĞŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?ƐŵĞĂƐƵƌĞŽĨ ?ŽŶ-budget) aid available we cannot disaggregate DAC 
aid flows into on-and off-ďƵĚŐĞƚ ĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚƐ ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ĚĂƚĂinclude non-DAC 
flows (comprehensive and accurate non-DAC data are not available). We can, nevertheless, 
illustrate the differences in total recipient and conventional (DAC) donor total aid flows 
(used in the majority of studies), and demonstrate the effect these differences have on the 
estimated fiscal effects. Chapter 2 illustrated that even data from respectable international 
databases (such as IMF and WHO) can provide substantially different versions of the same 
(even in terms of definition) variable, whose underlying data source could in principal be 
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traced to the same developing country government. It would not be irrational to expect a 
certain degree of discrepancy arising from records originating from different sources.  
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 compares the aid data (grants and loans) 
recorded by two East African recipients (Ethiopia and Tanzania) to the OECD DAC aid 
disbursements, and demonstrates that the direction of the discrepancies can vary. In section 
3 simple cointegrated vector autoregressive models are estimated to expose the differences 
in the estimated fiscal effects of (and on) aid arising from the alternative sources of aid data. 
Section 4 concludes. Additional information is provided in Appendix E.  
2. Data 
Two counƚƌŝĞƐ ? ĚĂƚĂƐĞƚƐ ĂƌĞ ƵƐĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚŝƐ ĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ P dĂŶǌĂŶŝĂ  ?ĂƐ ŝŶ ŚĂƉƚĞƌ  ? ) ĂŶĚ ƚŚŝŽƉŝĂ
(Chapter 4). These datasets contain the fiscal variables, such as central government 
expenditures and domestic revenues, and Ă ƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞ ŽĨ ďƵĚŐĞƚ ĂŝĚ ? 
disaggregateĚŝŶƚŽŐƌĂŶƚƐĂŶĚůŽĂŶƐ ?dŚĞdĂŶǌĂŶŝĂŶĞŶƚƌĂůĂŶŬ ?ƐĚĂƚĂĨŽƌƚŚĞƉĞƌŝŽĚ ? ? ? ?-
2012 are recorded in domestic currency (Tanzanian Shillings), and are deflated using the CPI 
measure (base year 2005, see Chapter 5 for more details). The Ethiopian data are available 
for the period 1963- ? ? ? ? ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚŝŽƉŝĂ ?Ɛ DŝŶŝƐƚƌǇ ŽĨ &ŝŶĂŶĐĞ ĂŶĚ ĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ
(MoFED), in domestic currency (millions of Ethiopian Birr), and are deflated using the GDP 
deflator (base year 1998, see Chapter 4).  
OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
disbursement data, used in a large fraction of studies estimating various effects of aid, are 
readily available from the OECD DAC Table 2a230 for the whole period of interest. The DAC 
data are recorded in current US dollars231. To convert these data to domestic currencies 
(Tanzanian Shilling and Ethiopian Birr), IMF /&^ ? KĨĨŝĐŝĂů ĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞ ƌĂƚĞ  ?ƉĞƌŝŽĚ (yearly) 
average) is used. This measure is available for the whole period of interest from a single 
source. In principle, the official  W not an alternative measure of exchange rate  W should be 
used to convert the official flows of money (this clearly ignores any secondary effects of 
available foreign exchange flowing through the budget, such as increased forex reserves, 
etc.) and for the purpose of this exercise it will be held that such conversion would deem the 
                                                          
230 http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=Table2A  
231 A measure in constant (2012=100) USD is also available. The choice to use current values is driven 
by motivation to isolate data differences by using the same deflator on all series.  
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two  ?ƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?ƐĂŶĚ )datasets comparable.232,233 The DAC measures of aid for Tanzania 
(Ethiopia) are deflated by the CPI (GDP) deflator to isolate data differences by using the 
same deflator on all country series.  
It must be noted in the DAC measure of aid for Ethiopia, the values for aid loans are coded 
as missing for three years (1996, 1997, 1999). The only viable solution is to treat them as 0 
(this is realistic, as a lot of aid was suspended around 1998 due to Ethiopia-Eritrea war, and 
it is loans that would practically be withheld first (whilst humanitarian aid (a grant 
component) would be expected to be ceased last). This, however, does not pose severe 
complications, as only the measure of total aid is used in estimations (and for the purposes 
of summary statistics these observations are treated as missing).234 
dŚĞĚŽŶŽƌĂŶĚƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐŽĨĂŝĚĚŝĨĨĞƌƐ ?ZĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?ƐĂŝĚŵĞĂƐƵƌĞďǇĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽŶůy 
includes the on-budget aid, i.e. the aid (cash) receipts flowing through the (central) 
government (usually the ministry of finance). The donor measure of aid235 would further 
include off-budget aid (transfers to non-governmental organisations, payments to donor 
agencies, research bodies, aid in-kind, technical cooperation component236, etc.), but would 
exclude funds from non-traditional donors. Differences in the recorded aid would be 
                                                          
232  “ƚŚŝŽƉŝĂŶďŝƌƌǁĂƐƉĞŐŐĞĚƚŽƚŚĞh^ from its inception in 1945 until early 1990s. The Birr was 
valued at 2.50 per USD before the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, which forced an 
ŝŶŝƚŝĂůƌĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶƚŽ ? ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞŶŝŶ ? ? ? ?ƚŽ ? ? ? ?ƉĞƌh^ ? ?/ƚǁĂƐŽǀĞƌǀĂůƵĞĚƵŶĚĞƌĞƌŐ ?ĂŶĚƐĞǀĞƌĂl 
ĚĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶƐ ǁĞƌĞ ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĞĚ ǁŚĞŶ WZ& ĐĂŵĞ ƚŽ ƉŽǁĞƌ ?  “dŚĞ ĐƵƌƌĞŶƚ ĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞ ƌĂƚĞ ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ŝƐ
ĐůĂƐƐŝĨŝĞĚĂƐĂ ?ĚĞĨĂĐƚŽ )ĐƌĂǁůŝŶŐƉĞŐƚŽƚŚĞh^ ?ŝ ?Ğ ?ĂŵĂŶĂŐĞĚ ?ŽƌĚŝƌƚǇ )ĨůŽĂƚ ? ? ?DĂƌƚŝŶƐ ? ? ? ? ?ď P ? ? ) ?
233  “dŚĞ ŐƌĂĚƵĂů ĐŚĂŶŐĞ ŝŶ ƉŽůŝĐǇ ŽƌŝĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ĨƌŽŵ  “ĐŽŶƚƌŽůƐ ? ƚŽ  “ŵĂƌŬĞƚ ? ŝŶ dĂŶǌĂŶŝĂ ŝƐ ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚ
with a change from a highly controlled exchange rate (until 1985) to a more liberalized regime from 
1986 to the present (2002). The parallel exchange rate dominated price changes from the late 1970s 
to 1985; the parallel premium tapered off gradually from 1986, almost disappearing by 1992. The 
ƉƌŽďůĞŵŽĨ ŝŶĨůĂƚŝŽŶĐƵƚƐĂĐƌŽƐƐďŽƚŚ ƌĞŐŝŵĞƐĚĞƐƉŝƚĞ ŝŵƉƌŽǀĞŵĞŶƚƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞƉĂƐƚ ĨŽƵƌ ƚŽ ĨŝǀĞǇĞĂƌƐ ?
(Rutasitara, 2002: Abstract). 
234 For the CVAR analysis, the variables are logged. For the graphs, the deflated levels are depicted. 
235  “Official Development Assistance (ODA) is defined as those flows to developing countries and 
multilateral institutions provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by 
their executive agencies, each transaction of which meets the following tests: i) it is administered with 
the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main 
objective; and ii) it is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per 
ĐĞŶƚ ? ? ?K ?ŚƚƚƉ P ? ?ǁǁǁ ?ŽĞĐĚ ?ŽƌŐ ?ƐŝƚĞ ?ĚĂĐƐŵƉĚ ? ? ?ŐůŽƐƐĂƌǇ ?Śƚŵ ) 
236  “Technical Co-operation : This is defined as activities whose primary purpose is to augment the 
level of knowledge, skills, technical know-how or productive aptitudes of the population of 
developing countries, i.e., increasing their stock of human intellectual capital, or their capacity for 
more effective use of their existing factor endowment. Accordingly, the figures relate mainly to 
activities involving the supply of human resources (teachers, volunteers, experts in various sectors) 
and action targeted on human resources (education, training, advice). The supply of expertise 
designed primarily to support the implementation of capital projects ("Investment-Related Technical 
Co-operation'' - /Zd ) ŝƐ ŶŽƚ ŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚ ƵŶĚĞƌ ƚŚŝƐ ŚĞĂĚŝŶŐ ? ?  ?K ?
http://www.oecd.org/site/dacsmpd11/glossary.htm) 
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expected, but are often overlooked by researchers using the DAC data to estimate fiscal or 
growth effects of aid. Large discrepancies have indeed been confirmed for Uganda (up to 
10% of GDP, Fagernas and Roberts, 2004a), Zambia (up to 20-40 % GDP, Fagernas and 
Roberts, 2004b), Senegal (DAC figures twice as high as aid reported by the Ministry of 
Finance, Ouattara, 2006). 
Tables 6.1 and 6.3 record the ratio (period average, in percentages) of DAC aid (grants, 
loans, and the total of the two) observations to recipient aid data for Tanzania and Ethiopia, 
respectively. The statistics are further split into periods before and after pro-market 
reforms. Tables 6.2 and 6.4 report the correlation coefficients between donor (DAC) and 
recipient data for each country. Figures 6.1 and 6.2 depict the data (deflated levels) 
differences visually. 
Tanzania 
The OECD DAC records of aid grants for Tanzania consistently (for all years) exceed the 
ƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ĚĂƚĂ ? tŚŝůĞ ƚŚŝƐ ĨŽůůŽǁƐ ŝŶƚƵŝƚŝŽŶ ? ƚŚĞ ŵĂŐŶŝƚƵĚĞ ŽĨ ƚŚŝƐ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ŝƐ ĂůĂƌŵŝŶŐ P
the DAC grant measure is almost eight times the Tanzanian governmĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ĂŝĚ ƌĞĐŽƌĚƐ ŽŶ
average. The correlation coefficient between these two measures is, nevertheless, large, 
0.80.237 Two interpretations of this discrepancy are available: what DAC records as grants 
may be treated by the recipient as loans due to misperception or misinformation associated 
with these flows. Alternatively, the large differential between recipient and donor grant 
flows could be explained by a large proportion of DAC grants delivered through donor 
projects or as technical cooperation, therefore constituting off-budget aid (see Chapter 3 for 
more detailed discussion). 
Loans (net measure in both sources), on the other hand, provide opposite result: for the 
ŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇŽĨǇĞĂƌƐ ?ƚŚĞƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?ƐǀĂůƵĞĞǆĐĞĞĚƐƚŚĂƚŽĨ ?&ŽƌƚŚĞǇĞĂƌƐƚŚĂƚďŽƚŚǀĂůƵĞƐ 
are positive,238 DAC loans average about 75% of the value recorded by the recipient. The 
correlation between the two series is virtually zero (0.034). This may reflect borrowing from 
non-DAC donors (in the past USSR, and more recently China and Gulf countries would be 
good examples, and although the reasons for concessional lending would be less clear, it 
could be expected to follow similar strategic motives of DAC donors). Whilst some non-DAC 
donors (Arab countries and EU members) report their aid flows to OECD-DAC, others (such 
                                                          
237 Although it is acknowledged that correlation coefficient between I(1) variables is spurious, here the 
comparison is for the  ‘ƐĂŵĞ ?ǀĂƌŝĂďůĞĂŶĚŝƐƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞƐĞĞŶĂƐĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞ ? 
238 The net value of DAC records is negative for 11 years (out of 47); only one value below zero is 
ƌĞĐŽƌĚĞĚŝŶƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?ƐƌĞĐŽƌĚƐ ?ƉŽƐƐŝďůǇƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŶŐďŽƌƌŽǁŝŶŐĞůƐĞǁŚĞƌĞƚŽƌĞƉĂǇĚĞďƚ ? 
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as BRICs) do not follow the DAC reporting standards, and accounting for their aid flows (and 
the motivation) is more complicated. Reviewing a body of literature, Walz and 
Ramachandran (2011) estimate that the aid flows from non-DAC countries range from $11 
billion to $41.7 billion in 2009 (between 8 and 31% of global gross ODA).239 We limit our 
analysis to the use of DAC donor data, because: i) this is what has been traditionally used in 
the aid literature; ii) non-DAC flows are not recorded on a consistent basis; iii) if included, 
non-DAC data would only strengthen our points on the size of discrepancies. 
Table 6.1: Donor-to-Recipient Aid Measures Ratio (Tanzania) 
Ratio (%), Tz 1966-2012 Pre-1986 Post-1986 
Grants (DAC)-to-Grants (recipient) 783 % 1314 % 429 % 
Loans (DAC)-to-Loans (recipient) 75 % 82 % 66 % 
Total aid (DAC)-to-Total aid (recipient) 320 % 207 % 396 % 
Statistics reported for Loans exclude negative values. Including the negative values, the DAC 
loans would constitute abouƚĂƋƵĂƌƚĞƌ ? ? ?A? ?ŽĨƚŚĞƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?ƐǀĂůƵĞƐŽŶĂǀĞƌĂŐĞĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ
full sample period. 
Table 6.2: Correlation Coefficients between Donor and Recipient Measures (Tanzania) 
Correlation coefficient, Tz Grants 
(DAC) 
Loans (DAC) Total aid (DAC) 
Grants (recipient) 0.785   
Loans (recipient)  0.034  
Total aid (recipient)   0.778 
 
Whilst differences in grants measures for Tanzania decrease post 1986 reforms, the 
discrepancies in the loan records increase, together with the increasing volume of loans (as 
recorded by the recipient). This supports the hypothesis that this is driven by non-traditional 
ĚŽŶŽƌƐ ?ďƵƚĂůƐŽƉŽƐĞƐĂƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ƚŚĂƚ ƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ůŽĂŶŵĞĂƐƵƌĞŵĂǇ ŝŶĐůƵĚĞĐŽŵŵĞƌĐŝĂů
foreign borrowing that is not concessional in nature.  
Finally, the total aid, which is simply the sum of grants and (net) loans in both data sources, 
reflect astounding discrepancies in aid records. The donor measure of total disbursed aid 
                                                          
239 DAC 2a TĂďůĞƐŶŽǁ ŝŶĐůƵĚĞĂŶĂƚƚĞŵƉƚĞĚŵĞĂƐƵƌĞŽĨ ƚŽƚĂůĂŝĚ ĨƌŽŵ  ‘ĂůůĚŽŶŽƌƐ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ ũƵƐƚ
 ŵĞŵďĞƌƐ  ?ƚŚĞ ůĂƚƚĞƌ ?Ɛ K ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƐ ĂŵŽƵŶƚĞĚ ƚŽ  ? ? ?   ? ďŝůůŝŽŶ ŝŶ  ? ? ? ? ) ? ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ƚŚĞ
uncertainty associated with the estimation of non- ŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ? ŶƵŵďĞƌƐ ? ƌĞƉorted by Walz and 
Ramachandran, 2011, and especially considering the retrospective revisions, is not considered to be a 
 ‘ƌŽďƵƐƚ ? ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞ  ?ĨŽƌ ŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞ ? ŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ ƌĞĐĞŶƚ ĂŝĚ ĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞƐ  “ƌĂŶŐĞ ĂŶǇǁŚĞƌĞ ĨƌŽŵ  ? ? ? ? ƚŽ  ? ? ?
ďŝůůŝŽŶ ? ? Ɖ ? ? ) ? ĂƐ ƚŚĞǇ ŵĂǇ ŝŶĐůƵĚĞ &/ ? ŵilitary assistance, and other components that do not fall 
ƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞ ?ƐĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨK ? 
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ĞǆĐĞĞĚƐƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?ƐƌĞĐŽƌĚƐďǇ ? ? ?ƚŝŵĞƐ ?240 /ŶƐƚƵĚŝĞƐĂƚƚĞŵƉƚŝŶŐƚŽĞǀĂůƵĂƚĞĂŝĚ ?ƐĞĨĨĞĐƚŽŶ
growth, or the extent to which aid is spent in fungibility studies, using the OECD aid data 
would underestimate the beneficial effects of aid.  
Ethiopia 
For Ethiopia, the picture is rather different. Until about mid-to-late 1980s, DAC data for 
grants are lower than what is recorded by the Ethiopian Ministry of Finance. Though puzzling 
at first, the finding is explicable. As discussed in Chapter 4, during the Derg military junta 
regime (1974- ? ? ? ? ) ?ƚŚŝŽƉŝĂ ?ƐŵĂũŽƌĚŽŶŽƌǁĂƐh^^Z ?241 As the Russian Federation is not a 
DAC member even at present, these figures would not be included in the retrospective DAC 
tables. Since the late 1980s-early 1990s, that is, after the beginning of pro-market reforms 
and the fall of USSR, DAC grant measure are nearly twice larger thĂŶ ƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ƌĞĐŽƌĚƐ ?
reflecting increasing Western donor presence. Overall, during the full sample period, DAC 
ƌĞĐŽƌĚƐ ĞǆĐĞĞĚ ƚŚĞ ƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ŐƌĂŶƚ ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞ ďǇ  ? ?A? ŽŶ ĂǀĞƌĂŐĞ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĐŽƌƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶ
coefficient is 0.78.  
Table 6.3: Donor-to-Recipient Aid Measures Ratio (Ethiopia) 
Ratio (%), Eth 1963-2009 Pre-1991 Post-1991 
Grants (DAC)-to-Grants (recipient) 136 % 98 % 191 % 
Loans (DAC)-to-Loans (recipient) 24 % 31 % 13 % 
Total aid (DAC)-to-Total aid (recipient) 79 % 63 % 102 % 
Note: Statistics reported for Loans exclude negative values. Including the negative values, the 
ůŽĂŶƐǁŽƵůĚĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞĂďŽƵƚĂƋƵĂƌƚĞƌ ? ? ?A? ?ŽĨƚŚĞƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?ƐǀĂůƵĞƐŽŶĂǀĞƌĂŐĞĚƵƌŝŶŐ
the full sample period. 
Table 6.4: Correlation Coefficients between Donor and Recipient Measures (Ethiopia) 
Correlation coefficient, Eth Grants 
(DAC) 
Loans (DAC) Total aid (DAC) 
Grants (recipient) 0.894   
Loans (recipient)  0.016  
Total aid (recipient)   0.866 
 
                                                          
240 /Ĩ ƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ůŽĂŶ ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞ ŝŶĚĞĞĚ ŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐ ŶŽŶ-concessional borrowing abroad, the actual 
difference is even higher.  
241 While Tanzania was also socialist-oriented, its major inflows were from leftist Western donors, 
such as Scandinavian countries.  
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Ɛ ŝŶ dĂŶǌĂŶŝĂŶ ĐĂƐĞ ? ƚŚĞ ĚŽŶŽƌƐ ? ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞ ŽĨ  ?ŐƌŽƐƐ )242 loans is lower than the values 
ƌĞĐŽƌĚĞĚďǇƚŚŝŽƉŝĂŶDŝŶŝƐƚƌǇŽĨ&ŝŶĂŶĐĞ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŝŶƚŚŝŽƉŝĂ ?ƐĐĂƐĞĚŝƐĐƌĞƉĂŶĐǇ ŝƐĞǀĞŶ
ŚŝŐŚĞƌ PůŽĂŶƐĂŵŽƵŶƚƚŽŽŶůǇĂďŽƵƚĂƋƵĂƌƚĞƌ ? ? ?A? )ŽĨƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?ƐƌĞĐŽƌĚƐĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞĨƵůů
sample average. Rather than decreasing, the discrepancy again increases in the latter years: 
ƐŝŶĐĞ ? ? ? ? ?ůŽĂŶƐĂŵŽƵŶƚĞĚŽŶůǇƚŽ ? ?A?ŽĨƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?ƐƌĞĐŽƌĚƐ ?ŽŶĂǀĞƌĂŐĞ ?dŚŝƐĂŐĂŝŶ
signals the possibility of aid loans from non-traditional donors, as well as potential 
accounting of non-concessional loans under this heading.  
Overall, the total aid (sum of grants and gross loans) measure in DAC ODA disbursement 
measure is lower than Ethiopian records (although the correlation coefficient is a 
respectable 0.866). This finding provides interesting evidence contradicting the expectation 
that DAC measures, which include both on- and off-budget aid, would generally exceed 
ƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ŽǁŶ ŽŶ-budget aid records: the discrepancy is likely, but its direction is not 
certain. And whilst the two measures converge in the latter part of the Ethiopian sample 
(see Figure 6.2), this is shown to be by sheer coincidence. Overall, the data suggests that 
non-DAC aid is very important for Ethiopia, and not solely during the Derg. 
Aid data is often scaled by Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or Gross National Income (GNI), 
especially in the cross-country studies. The final exercise in this section briefly compares 
ƚŚƌĞĞŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐŽĨĂŝĚ PƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?ƐĂŝĚ-to-GDP243; DAC-2a Total net aid-to-GNI; and WDI ODA-
to-GNI244. The subsamples for which all measures are simultaneously available span 1988-
2009 for Tanzania, and 1981-2009 for Ethiopia.  
Although slightly dampened by the differences in GDP estimates, the differences between 
ƚŚĞĚŽŶŽƌĂŶĚƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?ƐĚĂƚĂĨŽůůŽǁƚŚĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶĂďŽǀĞ ?dŚĞŬĞǇĨŝŶĚŝŶŐŚĞƌĞŝƐƚhat 
WDI aid data substantially exceeds even DAC donor records. This is likely to be primarily due 
to the inclusion of non-DAC donor flows (although not always falling under the ODA 
                                                          
242 Only gross loans are available in Ethiopian recipient data. For consistency, DAC gross loans data are 
used for Ethiopia (whilst for Tanzania loans referred to net measures in both samples).  
243 For Tanzania, GDP data is only available post-1987 GDP rebasing (see Chapter 5 for discussion). 
Indeed, the DAC 2a tables only provide the measure of total aid to GNI from 1988 onwards. To 
ĞǆƉƌĞƐƐƚŚĞƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?ƐĂŝĚĂƐĂƉĞƌĐĞŶƚage of GDP IFS National Accounts data were used (note that IFS 
data records for GDP and GNI are highly similar; however, the data alterations to GDP measure in the 
 ĚĂƚĂ ĂƌĞ ƵŶŬŶŽǁŶ ) ?  &Žƌ ƚŚŝŽƉŝĂ ? 'W ĚĂƚĂ ŝƐ ĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞĨƌŽŵ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ŽǁŶ ƌĞĐŽƌĚƐ  ?Ɛee 
Chapter 4). 
244  “EĞƚ ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂů ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ĂƐƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ  ?K ) ĐŽŶƐŝƐƚƐ ŽĨ ĚŝƐďƵƌƐĞŵĞŶƚƐ ŽĨ ůŽĂŶƐ ŵĂĚĞ ŽŶ
concessional terms (net of repayments of principal) and grants by official agencies of the members of 
the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), by multilateral institutions, and by non-DAC countries 
to promote economic development and welfare in countries and territories in the DAC list of ODA 
recipients. It includes loand with a grant element of 25 per cent (calculated at rate of discount of 1- 
per cent ) ? ?tŽƌůĚĂŶŬ ?ŚƚƚƉ P ?ĚĂƚĂ ?ǁŽƌůĚďĂŶŬ ?ŽƌŐ ?ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŽƌ ?d ?K ?Kd ?'E ?^ ? 
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definition, as the latter may include FDI, military assistance, and other components that do 
ŶŽƚ ĨĂůů ƵŶĚĞƌ ƚŚĞ  ?Ɛ ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ODA).  The recipient measures, in theory, should 
include grants and loans from both DAC and non-DAC measures. The disparity between 
ƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?ƐĂŶĚt/ĚĂƚĂ ŝƐƚŚƵƐĞǀĞŶĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĞǆƚĞŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?Ɛ
ĂŶĚĚŽŶŽƌƐ ?ĂŝĚĚĂƚĂƌĞĐŽƌĚƐ ?245 
Table 6.5: Aid-to-GDP(GNI) Ratios Across Three Sources of Data 
Aid/GDP (GNI) 
 ZĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?ƐŵĞĂƐƵƌĞ DAC-2a 
Disbursement Data 
WDI 
Tanzania (1988-2009) 
Period Average 5.47 % 10.55 % 16.48 % 
Ethiopia (1981-2009) 
Period Average 5.55 % 5.12 % 10.28 % 
EŽƚĞ PƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?ƐŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŽĂŝĚ-to-GDP; DAC-2a Disbursement Data refers to DAC-2a Total net 
aid-to-GNI; and WDI refers to WDI ODA-to-GNI. 
 
 
                                                          
245 If non-DAC flows were indeed considered aid, using only the DAC-donor data in aid estimations 
would overestimate the actual cash flows from DAC donors (underestimating positive effect of aid), 
but underestimating the extent of total (DAC and non-DAC donor) aid (overestimating the positive 
effect of aid). 
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Figure 6.1: Recipient-Donor Data Comparisons (Tanzania) 
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Figure 6.2: Recipient-Donor Data Comparisons (Ethiopia) 
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3. Empirical Results 
We model a simple CVAR (VECM) (see Chapter 4 for methodology description) with three 
variables: (central) government total spending (texp), domestic revenue (sum of tax and 
non-tax revenues, domrev), and total aid (grants plus loans), transformed using natural 
logarithm. To isolate the discrepancies between the aid measures across sources, the data 
for the domestic fiscal variables (texp and domrev) are the same (i ?Ğ ?ƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?ƐŵĞĂƐƵƌĞ ) ?
&Žƌ ĞĂĐŚ ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ? ƚǁŽ ǀĂƌŝĂŶƚƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ sZ ŵŽĚĞů ĂƌĞ ĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞĚ P ŽŶĞ ǁŝƚŚ ƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?Ɛ
measure of aid (aid ) ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚǁŝƚŚĚŽŶŽƌƐ ?KĚŝƐďƵƌƐĞŵĞŶƚĚĂƚĂ ?aid_DAC).  
To best isolate the effect of data differences, for each country the simplest statistically 
plausible specification across the two variants is estimated. Only long-run coefficients are 
reported.  
For Tanzania, we model a CVAR with a lag length of one (k=1), an unrestricted constant to 
allow for a non-zero mean in the cointegrating relations and (non-quadratic) trends in 
levels246 (model specification test results are available in the Appendix Table E1). Although 
ƚŚĞƚĞƐƚŝŶŐƌĞǀĞĂůĞĚĂ ůĂƌŐĞ  ?ŽǀĞƌ  ? ) ƌĞƐŝĚƵĂů ŝŶ ƚŚĞŵŽĚĞůǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?ƐŵĞĂƐƵƌĞŽĨ
aid, the choice has been made not to include dummies into estimations to maintain the 
modelling choices consistent across the measures of aid. The model fit is not great in terms 
of low trace correlation and the rejection of multivariate normality, but crucially, there is no 
residual autocorrelation. Johansen (trace) test suggests cointegration rank of one (r=1), 
which would imply one long-run equilibrium relationship between fiscal aggregates and aid.  
For Ethiopia, a CVAR with a lag length of two (k=2) is modelled, as a lower lag length would 
imply some residual autocorrelation of order one and two (model specification test results 
for Ethiopia are available in the Appendix Table E2). An unrestricted constant is included, 
but the model revealed no large residuals (over 3), thus no dummies were included. The 
model fit is acceptable (trace correlation of 0.334 (0.25) for recipient (donor) measure of 
aid), although the null hypothesis of multivariate normality is rejected with p-value of 0.025. 
Johansen (trace) test here too suggests cointegration rank of one (r=1), which would imply 
one long-run equilibrium relationship between fiscal aggregates and aid.247 
The results are reported in Tables 6.6 and 6.7 (Tanzania) and Tables 6.8 and 6.9 for Ethiopia. 
                                                          
246 A model with a restricted trend was tested, and it was shown that it can be excluded.  
247 The political changes and/or pro-market reforms are not modelled here to keep the models as 
simple as possible. 
Chapter 6  W Donor  W Recipient Aid Data Discrepancies
  Emilija Timmis 
171 
 
Table 6.6: CVAR Estimates: Recipient's Aid Data (Tanzania) 
ZĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?ƐĚĂƚĂ ?d ) texp domrev aid_DAC  
>ZĞƋƵŝůŝďƌŝƵŵƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ɴ5.1) 1 -0.92 
(-4.43) 
-0.28 
(-3.07) 
~I(0) 
ĚũƵƐƚŵĞŶƚĐŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƐ ?ɲ5.1) -0.21 
(-2.88) 
-0.08 
(-1.27) 
0.10 
(0.32) 
 
Multivariate normality (p-value) 0.000 
Stationarity (p-value) No over-identifying restrictions 
Trace correlation 0.104 
Log-likelihood 242.771 
Note: t-values are reported in parentheses. 
Table 6.7: CVAR Estimates: DAC Donors' Aid Data (Tanzania) 
DAC data (TZ) texp domrev aid_DAC  
LR equilibrium relatŝŽŶ ?ɴ5.2) 1 -1.42 
(-13.19) 
0.113 
(1.76) 
~I(0) 
ĚũƵƐƚŵĞŶƚĐŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƐ ?ɲ5.2) -0.37 
(-4.21) 
0.03 
(0.36) 
-0.17 
(-0.89) 
 
Multivariate normality (p-value) 0.065 
Stationarity (p-value) No over-identifying restrictions 
Trace correlation 0.106 
Log-likelihood 268.382 
 Note: t-values are reported in parentheses. 
Table 6.8: CVAR estimates: Recipient's Aid Data (Ethiopia) 
ZĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?ƐĚĂƚĂ ?d, ) texp domrev aid_DAC  
>ZĞƋƵŝůŝďƌŝƵŵƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ɴ5.3) 1 -1.12 
(-12.85) 
0.04 
(0.64) 
~I(0) 
ĚũƵƐƚŵĞŶƚĐŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƐ ?ɲ5.3) -0.48 
(-3.23) 
0.12 
(0.63) 
-0.53 
(-1.09) 
 
Multivariate normality (p-value) 0.024 
Stationarity (p-value) No over-identifying restrictions 
Trace correlation 0.275 
Log-likelihood 278.926 
Note: t-values are reported in parentheses. 
Table 6.9: CVAR estimates: DAC Donors' Aid Data (Ethiopia) 
DAC data (ETH) texp domrev aid_DAC  
LR equilibrium relatŝŽŶ ?ɴ5.4) 1 -0.99 
(-16.18) 
-0.05 
(-1.42) 
~I(0) 
ĚũƵƐƚŵĞŶƚĐŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƐ ?ɲ5.4) -0.52 
(-2.64) 
0.09 
(0.40) 
0.96 
(2.19) 
 
Multivariate normality (p-value) 0.007 
Stationarity (p-value) No over-identifying restrictions 
Trace correlation 0.190 
Log-likelihood 280.33 
Note: t-values are reported in parentheses. 
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For Tanzania, the simple CVAR long run coefficients from models with alternative aid 
ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐ ƌĞǀĞĂů ĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚŝŶŐ ƌĞƐƵůƚƐ ? dŚĞ ǀĂƌŝĂŶƚ ǁŝƚŚ ƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞ ŽĨ ĂŝĚ ǇŝĞůĚ
economically plausible results: total government expenditure in the long run is positively 
(and significantly) related to domestic revenue and ĂŝĚ  ?ɴ5.1), with domestic expenditures 
ĂĚũƵƐƚŝŶŐ ƚŽ ĞƋƵŝůŝďƌŝƵŵ ĞƌƌŽƌ  ?ɲ5.1).  Using the DAC donor aid data, the relationship is 
(significantly) different and more complicated to interpret: total government expenditure is 
still positively (and significantly) related to domestic revenue, but negatively related to aid 
 ?ɴ5.2). That is, if the DAC data rather than Tanzanian aid data are used, the sign of the 
estimated effect of aid changes, consistent with DAC overstating aid amount that can 
finance spending.    
Ethiopian comparisons also reveal significant differences. In both variants of the model (with 
DAC donor data or recipient measure of aid), aid is estimated not to be significantly related 
ƚŽ ĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐ ĨŝƐĐĂů ĂŐŐƌĞŐĂƚĞƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ůŽŶŐ ƌƵŶ  ?ɴ5.3 ? ɴ5.4), with government total spending 
positively associated to domestically collected revenue. The two data sources, however, 
ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ĂĚũƵƐƚŵĞŶƚ ŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵƐ P ƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ĚĂƚĂƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐ ƚŚĂƚ ŽŶůǇ ƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐ
would be adjusting to shortfalls or excesses of revenues; the DAC data suggests that in 
events where revenues fall short (or expenses exceed the equilibrium levels), donors step in 
with extra aid (ɲ5.3 ?ɲ5.4). 
4. Conclusion  
The recipient and donor data differ, and not necessarily in a direction predictable from the 
outset ? dǁŽ ŬĞǇ ĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂŶƚƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞƐĞ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ ǁĞƌĞ ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚ ? &ŝƌƐƚůǇ ? ƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ĂŝĚ
records by definition solely account for on-budŐĞƚ ĂŝĚ ? ŵĞĂŶǁŚŝůĞ ? ƚŚĞ  ĚŽŶŽƌƐ ? ƚŽƚĂů
flows include both on-budget and off-ďƵĚŐĞƚĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚƐ ?^ĞĐŽŶĚůǇ ?ĚŽŶŽƌƐ ?ĚĂƚĂŽŶůǇ
ŝŶĐůƵĚĞĨůŽǁƐĨƌŽŵŵĞŵďĞƌĚŽŶŽƌƐ ?ŵĞĂŶǁŚŝůĞ ?ƚŚĞƌ ĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ?ŽŶ-budget) records will 
ŝŶĐůƵĚĞĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů ĨůŽǁƐĨƌŽŵ ‘ŶŽŶ-trĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů ?  ?ŽƌŶŽŶ-DAC) donors, which were increasingly 
ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚ ƚŚĞ ƐĂŵƉůĞ ƉĞƌŝŽĚ  ?ƌĞŶĚĞƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŶŽŶ-ƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů ? ůĂďĞů ƐŽŵĞǁŚĂƚ
faulty).248  
                                                          
248 The latter flows do not always fall under the current definitions of ODA; there are also little (or no) 
incentive for some non-DAC donors (or, rather, co-operators) to report the destination, purpose, or 
ŵĂŐŶŝƚƵĚĞŽĨƚŚĞƐĞ ‘ĂŝĚŝĐ ?ĨůŽǁƐ ?ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚŶŽǁ ‘ƌĞƉŽƌƚƐ ?ĂŝĚĚĂƚĂ ?ĂůƐŽƌĞƚƌŽƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇ )
ĨƌŽŵ ‘ĂůůĚŽŶŽƌƐ ? ?ƚŚĞƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƐĞƌĞĐŽƌĚƐŝƐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůĞ ?ƚŚĞĚĂƚĂĂƌĞĐůŽƐĞƚŽ
speculation) (see Walz and Ramachandran, 2011). Therefore a solution to the second factor may take 
a while to be realised. 
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Depending on which source is relied upon for aid data, the results can differ substantially. 
The comparison of the CVAR estimates of models with recipient versus DAC donor aid data 
revealed that the two aid measures do not even covariate sufficiently to yield qualitatively 
consistent estimates. The estimated effects of aid can contrast in terms of sign (as in the 
Tanzanian case) or reflect different adjustment behaviour (the Ethiopian case). 
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 Conclusion 
 
There are many forms in which aid can be delivered. It could be given in monetary form, or 
as delivery of goods or services directly paid for by the donor. Aid can be disbursed in grants 
that require no repayment, or in subsidised loans. One can distinguish between aid delivered 
ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ ƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ? ĐŚĂŶŶĞůůĞĚ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ŶŽ -governmental organisations, 
or spent in the donor country. Aid could be earmarked for a specific heading or sector of 
ĚŽŶŽƌ ?ƐĐŚŽŝĐĞ ?ŽƌŐŝǀĞŶĂƐŐĞŶĞƌĂůďƵĚŐĞƚƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƚŽďĞĂůůŽĐĂƚĞĚĂƚƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?ƐĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶ ?
Conceptually and theoretically, we can postulate different fiscal (and, in turn, growth) 
effects of different modalities or components aid. Empirical evaluation, however, is in most 
cases infringed by the inaccessibility (or non-existence) of data necessary to fully and 
accurately disaggregate aid into its distinct components. Two running themes in this thesis 
therefore focus on data availability, quality, and consistency across sources, and to what 
extent it enables aid data disaggregation into its on-budget and off-budget components. We 
show that both contribute to inconclusiveness of the evidence.  
Chapter 2 of this thesis provides the first exploration of the sensitivity of health aid 
additionality effects to treatment of missing data, reassessing findings of Lu et al. (2010). We 
demonstrate that multiple imputation of the outcome variable (health spending) leads to 
results being biased in an ambiguous direction, while the alternative of expressing variables 
as sub-period averages (a technique commonly applied in development contexts) wipes out 
most of the variation required for estimation. Furthermore, we bring into light the severe 
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discrepancies in the health spending aggregates across core international data sources, 
namely WHO and IMF. This is in addition to the data deficiencies in health aid figures in 
terms of geographical and institutional traceability. These issues compromise the 
identification of the domestically funded health spending component, yielding conclusions 
that neither additionality nor fungibility of health aid can be accurately evaluated.  
Consequently, Chapter 3 argues that whilst fungibility of health aid cannot be estimated, the 
broader health aid Wspending relationship can be more successfully evaluated, as 
approaching the issue from the broader fiscal effects angle exerts less pressure on the data 
and produces interpretable coefficients. Using the best available disaggregated health aid 
data (Van de Sijpe, 2013), we show that none of the health aid components have a 
significantly negative effect on total (domestically and externally funded) health aid 
spending, and that donor projects have the most robust positive association with the 
ƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚ ƚŽ ƉƵďůŝĐ ŚĞĂůƚŚ. The size and/or significance of individual 
coefficients of the results are, nevertheless, sensitive to model specification. We do not 
identify any credible health aid smoothing effects. Using identical modelling and estimation 
strategies, we demonstrate that existing estimates of health aid fungibility depend largely on 
whether donor projects are counted as on- or off-budget.  
The existing evaluations of the health aid effects do not include tax revenue in the model. 
This constitutes an important omission as while the foreign source of (earmarked) revenue is 
accounted for, the domestic funds available for the government are not. While it is 
impossible to identify domestic funds committed to a particular sector prior to (or even 
after) the aid receipts, inclusion of total tax receipts in future evaluations could potentially 
ŝŵƉƌŽǀĞƚŚĞŵŽĚĞůďǇĐŽŶƚƌŽůůŝŶŐĨŽƌĂďƌŽĂĚĞƌŵĞĂƐƵƌĞŽĨŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƌĞǀĞŶƵĞ ? 
The thesis (Chapter 4 on Ethiopia and Chapter 5 on Tanzania) contributes to the growing 
body of evidence based on time-series methodology for evaluation of the broader fiscal 
effects of (and on) aid. The case study approach recognises the heterogeneity of developing 
countries in terms of fiscal dynamics, and allows pinning down the country-specific 
equilibrium and pushing forces and adjustment mechanisms. Contrary to many empirical 
applications, detailed understanding of the qualitative context is invoked in the thesis to 
complement the quantitative data. Not only does it offer guidance for sound statistical 
model specification and sensible economic interpretation of the estimated results, but it also 
ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐ Ă ǀĂůƵĂďůĞ ĐŚĞĐŬ ŽǀĞƌ ƚŚĞ ƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ŽĨ ƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?ƐƋƵĂŶtitative fiscal data. The 
cumulated evidence from the spectrum of country case studies will eventually allow drawing 
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more robust and reliable conclusions and identifying channels fostering or dampening the 
potential aid effectiveness. However, future applications should be careful to include the on-
budget rather than aggregate (donor) measure of aid, and pay more attention to the 
qualitative context. 
hƐŝŶŐƚŚĞƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?ƐŵĞĂƐƵƌĞŽĨĂŝĚĂůůŽǁƐŽŶĞƚŽ ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇƚŚĞŵŽƐƚĚŝƌĞĐƚĨŝƐĐĂů ŝŵƉĂĐƚŽĨ
aid. However, ignoring the off-budget component constitutes an important omission (even 
ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƌĞĚƵĐĞĚ ĨŽƌŵ ) ĂƐ ŝƚ ŶĞŐůĞĐƚƐ ƚŚĞ ůĞƐƐ ĚŝƌĞĐƚ ĐŚĂŶŶĞůƐ ŽĨ ĂŝĚ ?Ɛ ŝŵƉĂĐƚ ŽŶ ĨŝƐĐĂů
aggregates (e.g. institutional or capacity building, facilitating reforms, providing locally 
unavailable expertise or goods, etc.). Even with both recipient and donor aid data available 
for Ethiopia and Tanzania, Chapter 6 argues that it is not possible to disaggregate the 
standard (DAC) aggregate aid flows into on-budget and off-budget components. This is due 
to the (unmeasurable) presence of disbursements from non- ĚŽŶŽƌƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?Ɛ
data. Given that these flows do not need to comply with the DAC definition of aid, it is 
difficult to envisage a sizeable improvement to these records in the near future, even if the 
DAC has started imputing non- ĨůŽǁƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞŝƌ ƚĂďůĞƐ ? ZĞůǇŝŶŐ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ĂŝĚ
records, where available, would nevertheless constitute an improvement over the donor 
aggregates in tracing the most direct fiscal effects of aid.  
CVAR certainly provides an interesting tool to analyse the dynamic fiscal relationships. This 
thesis demonstrated both plausibility (Ethiopia) and limitations (Tanzania) of applying the 
method to developing country data: the samples are inevitably (very) small, especially if one 
accepts that the fiscal decisions follow yearly cycles.  Flawed data limits any statistical 
analysis, but this is even more exposed in the CVAR, where the researcher is supposed to be 
led by careful testing of the data. As retrospective data is unlikely to be credibly improved, 
the application of the CVAR to the long-span fiscal and aid dynamics will remain limited. 
Where analysis is possible, the thesis reiterated the need to use the understanding of the 
qualitative data in complementing the qualitative analysis. 
Inconclusive evidence may misguide policy responses and limit ability to evaluate the effects 
and effectiveness of aid. The use of less relevant or imprecise measures of aid has been 
shown to contribute to inconclusiveness of such evidence. In the final contribution, the 
recipient and donor aid data are directly compared. The anecdotal expectation is that DAC 
ĂŝĚƌĞĐŽƌĚƐǁŽƵůĚĞǆĐĞĞĚƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?ƐŽǁŶŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐ ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇĚƵĞƚŽĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨ
at least a fraction of the off-budget aid. This thesis has shown that the direction of the 
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donor-recipient record discrepancy is not necessarily predictable from the outset, and the 
explanation of such direction requires the knowledge of qualitative context.  
Understanding which data one needs to answer the research question  W or which questions 
can be answered with the data available to the researcher  W is as important as it has ever 
been. It is still at times lacking in the aid literature: donor aid aggregates simply cannot 
conclusively contribute to aid fungibility or additionality debates, and have been shown in 
this thesis to garble the evidence of broader fiscal effects of aid. Future research should 
attend to this rudimentary point and adopt the (disaggregated) aid measure relevant for the 
question. 
Attempts to disaggregate retrospective aid data, however, are likely to continue to be 
infringed by the lack of detailed data on how and where what aid was sent or spent. As 
demonstrated by Van de Sijpe (2013), (re)construction of disaggregated sector aid flows is 
feasible to an extent. Therefore the analysis of how different components of aid affect 
spending in other sectors   W and especially donor priority sectors such as education  W are 
also feasible. Clear description of such data disaggregation attempts is crucial, as then, at 
least in principle, it may be possible to ensure that the posed questions are feasible  W even if 
that entails adjusting the research question. The same call for detailed description applies to 
broader data records in the core data sources, including the international databases: 
signposting which observations were indeed reported and which (and how) were 
constructed in house could tame the blissful ignorance of the missing data and enable the 
results to reflect the uncertainty associated to the imputed data. 
In conclusion: 
 “/Ŷ'ŽĚǁĞƚƌƵƐƚ ?ĂůůŽƚŚĞƌƐŵƵƐƚďƌŝŶŐĚĂƚĂ ? W W. Edwards Deming 
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Appendix Figure A1: Distributions of Explanatory Variables  
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Appendix Table A1: Missingness Mechanism 
Relying on Schafer (1997:9), one may consider complete-data (both observed and 
ƵŶŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚ ) ĂƐ Ă  “ƌĞĐƚĂŶŐƵůĂƌ ĚĂƚĂƐĞƚ ǁŚŽƐĞ ƌŽǁƐ ĐĂŶ ďĞ ŵŽĚĞůůĞĚ ĂƐ ŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚ ?
identically distributed (iid) draws ĨƌŽŵ ƐŽŵĞ ŵƵůƚŝǀĂƌŝĂƚĞ ƉƌŽďĂďŝůŝƚǇ ĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶ ? ? dŚĞ
schematic representation of such dataset would resemble Appendix Figure A2 below: the n 
rows represent observational units (e.g. country-years), whilst p columns represent the 
variables recorded for these units. Question marks denote the values that are missing, with 
remaining matrix entries representing the observed values.  
Let D denote the complete-data matrix (n×p), including both dependent, Y, and explanatory, 
X, variables: D={Y, X}. Let Im  denote the missingness249 indicator matrix, that has the same 
dimensions as D (n×p), but for every observed corresponding cell entry in D ŚĂƐ “ ? ? ?ĂŶĚ “ ? ?
if the corresponding observation is missing. The schematic representation can be depicted 
as in Appendix Figure A3.  
Appendix Figure A2: Rectangular Dataset Appendix Figure A3: (non)Missingness  
Matrix 
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X1 X2 X3 ... Xp 
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 
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3 1 0 1 1 1 1 
. 1 1 1 1 0 1 
. 1 1 1 1 1 1 
. 0 1 1 1 1 1 
. 1 1 0 1 1 0 
. 1 1 1 1 1 0 
. 1 0 1 1 1 1 
n 0 1 1 0 1 1 
 
Three broad types of the underlying missingness mechanism can be distinguished. Following 
King et al. (2001:50), let Dobs and Dmis denote observed and missing portions of D, 
respectively, so that D={Dobs; Dmis}. The authors use the following table (Appendix Table A2) 
to summarise the three alternative missingness assumptionƐ ? ŝŶƚĞŶĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ  “ĐůĂƌŝĨǇ ƚŚĞ
ĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶƐĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽ ?ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ?ĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽƉƌĞĚŝĐƚƚŚĞǀĂůƵĞƐŽĨIm ? ?ŝ ?Ğ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǀĂůƵĞƐǁŝůůďĞ
missing.  
 
 
                                                          
249 Confusing name:  Rather non-missingness/response indicator matrix. 
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Appendix Table A2: Missingness Mechanism Assumptions 
Assumption Acronym One can predict Im with: 
Missing completely at random MCAR - 
Missing at random MAR Dobs 
Non-ignorable NI Dobs and Dmis 
In the first case (MCAR), the pattern of missingness cannot be predicted neither by the 
values of the dependent or independent variable. That is Im is independent of D  W the 
missing data values are a simple random sample of all data values.250 In the case of MAR251, 
the probability of missingness depends on the observed data, but not on the unobserved 
data, that is, Im is independent of Dmis.252  “DZ ŝƐ ůĞƐƐ ƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚŝǀĞ ƚŚĂŶ DZ ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ it 
requires only that the missing values behave like a random sample of all values within 
subclasses defined by observed data. In other words, MAR allows the probability that a 
datum is missing to depend on the datum itself, but only indirectly through quantities that 
ĂƌĞ ŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚ ?  ?Schafer, 1997:11). The missingness process is non-ignorable253 when the 
probability that a cell is missing depends on the unobserved value of the missing response, 
that is, Im is not independent of D.254  
The underlying missingness mechanism255 (or the respective assumption) may determine the 
validity of the methods employed in the empirical analysis. For instance, the default option 
of listwise deletion may contain bias in the results, unless the MCAR holds, whilst the 
                                                          
250 P(M|D) = P(M) 
251 <ŝŶŐĞƚĂů ?  ? ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ) P  “dŽĂŶĞǆƚĞŶƚ ?ƚŚĞĂŶĂůǇƐƚ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚƚŚĂƚŐĞŶĞƌĂƚĞƐƚŚĞĚĂƚĂ ?
controls the degree to which the MAR assumptions fit. It can be made to fit the data by including 
ŵŽƌĞǀĂƌŝĂďůĞƐŝŶƚŚĞŝŵƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶƉƌŽĐĞƐƐƚŽƉƌĞĚŝĐƚƚŚĞƉĂƚƚĞƌŶŽĨŵŝƐƐŝŶŐŶĞƐƐ ? ?
252 P(M|D) = P(M|Dobs) 
253 ^ĐŚĂĨĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) P “dŽƉƌŽĐĞĞĚĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ?ǁĞĂůƐŽŶĞĞĚƚŽĂƐƐƵŵĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƉĂƌĂŵĞƚĞƌƐɽŽĨthe data 
ŵŽĚĞů ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƉĂƌĂŵĞƚĞƌƐ ʇ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŵŝƐƐŝŶŐŶĞƐƐ ŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵ ĂƌĞ distinct. From a frequentist 
ƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ƚŚŝƐŵĞĂŶƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞũŽŝŶƚƉĂƌĂŵĞƚĞƌƐƉĂĐĞŽĨ ?ɽ ?ʇ ) ŵƵƐƚďĞƚŚĞĂƌƚĞƐŝĂŶĐƌŽƐƐ-product 
ŽĨƚŚĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƉĂƌĂŵĞƚĞƌƐƉĂĐĞƐĨŽƌɽĂŶĚʇ ?&ƌŽŵĂĂyesian perspective, this means that any joint 
ƉƌŝŽƌĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶĂƉƉůŝĞĚƚŽ ?ɽ ?ʇ )ŵƵƐƚĨĂĐƚŽƌŝŶƚŽŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚŵĂƌŐŝŶĂůƉƌŝŽƌƐĨŽƌɽĂŶĚʇ ?/ŶŵĂŶǇ
ƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŚŝƐŝƐŝŶƚƵŝƚŝǀĞůǇƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞ ?ĂƐŬŶŽǁŝŶŐɽǁŝůůƉƌŽǀŝĚĞůŝƚƚůĞŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĂďŽƵƚʇĂŶĚǀŝĐĞ-
versa. If both MAR and distinctness hold, then the missing-data mechanism is said to be ignorable 
 ?>ŝƚƚůĞĂŶĚZƵďŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?ZƵďŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? 
254 P(M|D) does not simplify; the observed data cannot alone predict whether a value is missing. 
255 Graham et al.(1994:15) ĂůƐŽĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚďĞƚǁĞĞŶ “ĂĐĐĞƐƐŝďůĞĂŶĚŝŶĂĐĐĞƐƐŝďůĞ ?ĚĂƚĂŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵƐ PĂ
mechanism is said to be accessible if the cause of missingness has been measured and is available for 
ƵƐĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ? ŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵ ŝƐ ƚĞƌŵĞĚ  ‘ŝŶĂĐĐĞƐƐŝďůĞ ? ŝĨ ƚŚĞ ĐĂƵƐĞ ŽĨ ŵŝƐƐŝŶŐŶess has not been 
measured or otherwise is unavailable for analysis. 
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inferences from analyses using MI are not biased under MCAR or MAR. However, both may 
be biased under NI.  
The methods applied in this paper assume that data are MAR. Usually, MCAR can be 
rejected in favour of MAR. Unfortunately,  “it is not possible to relax the MAR assumption in 
ĂŶǇ ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐĨƵů ǁĂǇ ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ ƌĞƉůĂĐŝŶŐ ŝƚ ǁŝƚŚ ŽƚŚĞƌ ĞƋƵĂůůǇ ƵŶƚĞƐƚĂďůĞ ĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶƐ ? and 
 “[i]n the vast majority of studies, principled methods that assume MAR will then perform 
better than ad hoc procedures such as listwise deletion of imputation ŽĨŵĞĂŶƐ ? ?  ?^ĐŚĂĨĞƌ
and Olsen, 1998:553).256  
 ^ŝŵŝůĂƌůǇ ?  “ƚhe presence or absence of NI can never be demonstrated using only the 
observed data. Thus, in most circumstances it is possible to verify whether multiple 
imputation will outperform (or rather will be expected to perform at least as well as) listwise 
deletion, but it is not possible to verify absolutely the validity of any multiple imputation 
ŵŽĚĞů ?Žƌ ?ŽĨĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?ĂŶǇƐƚĂƚŝƐƚŝĐĂůŵŽĚĞů ) ? (King et al. 2001: 50-51). Therefore the absolute 
validity of a multiple imputation model often cannot be proved in practice.  
Relating to Lu et al. (2010), the variable for which a significant proportion is missing is 
government spending on health. In this case, it seems plausible to reject the MCAR 
assumption in favour of the MAR, whilst discussion between MAR and NI remains open. 
 
Another issue to be considered in relation to missing data, mostly in the context of multiple 
imputation, is the pattern of missingness, as it may influence the simplicity of the method 
applied to the problem of missing data. Based on the data that is presented in a rectangular 
form (as above), consider an (n×p) data matrix X = (X1, X2, ... , Xp), where the ordering of 
variables is not meaningful in economic sense (e.g., it does not make any difference whether 
a particular variable is labelled X1 or X2 ). Consider a permutation of column indices (i1, i2, ... , 
ip) such that Xi1 is at least a s observed as Xi2, which in turn is at least as observed as Xi3. That 
is, Xi3 has missing values in the same observations as Xi2, and possibly more, whilst Xi2 has 
missing values in the same observations as Xi1, and possibly more. Provided such a 
permutation exists, the pattern of missingness in X is said to be monotone. This pattern is 
represented in Appendix Figure A4. Otherwise, the pattern of missingness is assumed to be 
arbitrary, as any set of variables may be missing for any unit (as in Appendix Figure A3): 
 
 
 
                                                          
256 WŽƚƚŚŽĨĨĞƚĂů ?  ? ? ? ? ? )ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĂ  “ƚĞĐŚŶŝƋƵĞĨŽƌĂƐƐĞƐƐŝŶŐƚŚĞĚĞŐƌĞĞƚŽǁŚŝĐŚDZĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶ ŝƐ
ƚĞŶĂďůĞ ? ? 
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Appendix Figure A4: Monotone Missingness Pattern 
 
Xi1 Xi2 Xi3 ... Xip 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2 1 1 1 1 1 0 
3 1 1 1 1 1 0 
. 1 1 1 1 1 0 
. 1 1 1 0 0 0 
. 1 1 1 0 0 0 
. 1 1 1 0 0 0 
. 1 1 0 1 0 0 
. 1 0 0 0 0 0 
n 1 0 0 0 0 0 
 
This sort of information about the pattern of missingness may be important if it has a 
potential of suggesting any reasons for the values to be missing. Also, from a practical 
perspective, distinguishing between missingness patterns may simplify the imputation 
ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ P  “ ?Ƶ ?ŶĚĞƌ Ă ŵŽŶŽƚŽŶĞ ŵŝƐƐŝŶŐ ƉĂƚƚĞƌŶ ? Ă ŵƵůƚŝǀĂƌŝĂƚĞ ŝŵƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶ ƚĂƐŬ ĐĂŶ ďĞ
formulated as a sequence of independent univariate (conditional) imputation tasks, which 
ĂůůŽǁƐƚŚĞĐƌĞĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂĨůĞǆŝďůĞŝŵƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶŵŽĚĞů ? (Stata 11 Handbook, Missing data: p. 7). 
In cases where the missingness pattern is arbitrary, one has to rely either on a multivariate 
normal model (see Little and Rubin, 2002), or use chained equations257. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
257 http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/seminars/missing_data/mi_in_stata_pt1.htm 
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Appendix Table A3: Inferring MAR 
The table reports correlation coefficients. If not MAR, the summary statistics would differ 
substantially between fully observed data and observations with some missing values. They 
do not seem to vary substantially.  
 
 
             | DAH-G/GDP DAH-nG/GDP  DR     GDPpc   GGE/GDP  HIV 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
DAH-G/GDP    |   1.0000 
DAH-nG/GDP   |   0.4805   1.0000 
    DR       |   0.2947   0.2534   1.0000 
GDPpc        |  -0.3482  -0.1924  -0.2000   1.0000 
GGE/GDP      |   0.0544   0.0232  -0.0696   0.0618   1.0000 
HIV          |   0.2250   0.1278   0.0399  -0.0775   0.1580   1.0000 
 
  
             | GHEA/GDPwho DAH-G/GDP  DAH-nG/GDP   DR     GDPpc  GGE/GDP  HIV   
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
GHEA/GDPwho  |   1.0000 
DAH-G/GDP    |   0.1616    1.0000 
DAH-nG/GDP   |   0.1724    0.4680   1.0000 
    DR       |   0.0339    0.3479   0.2853   1.0000 
GDPpc        |   0.2367   -0.3598  -0.1980  -0.2042   1.0000 
GGE/GDP      |   0.2513    0.0264   0.0273  -0.0432   0.0453   1.0000 
HIV          |   0.2252    0.2486   0.1439   0.0826  -0.0845   0.2115   1.0000 
(obs=907) 
 
             | GHEA/GDPimf GHEA/GDP DAH-G/GDP  DAH-nG/GDP  DR   GDPpc  GGE/GDP  HIV   
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
GHEA/GDPimf  |   1.0000 
DAH-G/GDP    |   0.1221   1.0000 
DAH-nG/GDP   |   0.0640   0.5111   1.0000 
    DR       |  -0.0258   0.2958   0.2122   1.0000 
GDPpc        |   0.1849  -0.3392  -0.1946  -0.1916   1.0000 
   GGE/GDP   |   0.3334   0.0438  -0.0253  -0.0935   0.0780   1.0000 
HIV          |   0.2411   0.2122   0.1403   0.0361  -0.0653   0.1653   1.0000 
(obs=1107) 
 
 
             | GHEA/GDPimf GHEA/GDP DAH-G/GDP  DAH-nG/GDP  DR    
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
GHEA_gdp_Who |   1.0000 
GHEA_gdp_Imf |   0.6864   1.0000 
DAH-G/GDP    |   0.2038   0.1111   1.0000 
DAH-nG/GDP   |   0.1971   0.0364   0.4993   1.0000 
   DR        |   0.0374  -0.0173   0.3443   0.2782   1.0000 
(obs=742) 
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Appendix Table A4:  GHE-A (Imputed variable) Summary Statistics across 'Treatments'  
GHE-
A/GDP 
(WHO) 
Missing Original 
paper 
Imputed        
 Fully 
observed 
pooled 
sample 
Lu et al. 
(imp ave, 
IHME) 
 (1) 
Amelia2014OneA 
as in Lu et al. 
 
(2) 
Amelia2014O
neA 
Averaged (SI) 
(3) 
Amelia2014ThreeK3 
Common trend (time 
poly k=3) 
(4) 
Amelia2014F
ourFEA 
Fixed effects 
(5) 
Amelia2014FiveNoAs 
No (extra) 
assumptions 
(6) Fully 
observed 
(7) 3-year 
averages 
  
 WHO WHO  WHO WHO WHO WHO WHO WHO WHO   
Mean .0257743 .0251097 .0252846 .0252846 .0252249 .0255207 .0250556 .0250816 .0254213   
Std d .0133041 .0121835 .0128206 .0120938 .0127951 .0124033 .0131121 .0126955 .0138871   
Min  .0027078 .0027078 .0027078 .0027078 .0027078 -.0254634 -.0238577 .0027078 .0033117   
Max  .0955123 .0955123 .0955123 .0955123 .0955123 .0955123 .0955123 .0731758 .0923938   
N 907 1356  135600 1356 135600 135600 135600 456  260    
m 0  100 100 100 100 100 0 0   
 
GHE-
A/GDP 
 (IMF) 
Missing Original 
paper 
Imputed        
 Fully 
observed 
pooled 
sample 
Lu et al. 
(imp ave, 
IHME) 
 (1) 
Amelia2014OneA 
(100 imp)bounded 
to observed 
min/max 
(2) 
Amelia2014O
neA 
Averaged (SI) 
(3) 
Amelia2014ThreeK3 
(4) 
Amelia2014F
ourFEA 
Fixed effects 
(5) 
Amelia2014FiveNoAs 
No (extra) 
assumptions 
Fully 
observed 
(7) 3-year 
averages 
  
 IMF IMF  IMF IMF IMF IMF IMF IMF IMF   
Mean .0204936 .0199258 .0206104 .0206104 .0207851 .0201403 .0205103 .0223602 .0208467   
Std d .0123881 .0120688 .0122574 .0118438 .0122372 .0121514 .0124485 .0130465 .0120211   
Min  .0017122 .0017122 .0017122 .0017122 .0017122 .0017121 -.0246588 .0017122 .0021134   
Max  .0867008 .0867008 .0867008 .0867008 .0867008 .0867008 .0867008 .0867008 .0709217   
N 1107 1356  135600 1356 135600 135600 135600 516  340    
m   100 100 100 100 100 0    
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Appendix Table A5a: The Estimated Results (WHO)  
Dependent variable: GHE-S/GDP 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
WHO 
Variable/ 
Treatment 
Original Lu et 
al. (2010) 
MI acc. to Lu 
et al. descr. 
(lags and 
leads) 
averaged (SI) 
(1) 
Amelia2014Th
reeK3 
3 common 
time 
polynomials, 
bounded 
Amelia2014
FourFEA 
Fixed effects 
Amelia2014Fi
veNoAs 
No (extra) 
assumptions 
Fully 
observed 
(Subsample) 
3-year 
averages 
N 111 111 111 111 111 111 38 64 
Logged GHE-
S/GDP 
.597*** 
(.098) 
.321*** 
(.096) 
.659*** 
(.061) 
.191** 
(.092) 
.368*** 
(.123) 
.164* 
(.082) 
.626*** 
(.074) 
.990*** 
(.280) 
DAH-G/GDP -.457*** 
(.107) 
-.629*** 
(.190) 
-.542*** 
(.089) 
-.677*** 
(.253) 
-.519** 
(.204) 
-.649** 
(.255) 
-.766*** 
(.123) 
-.693*** 
(.121) 
DAH-
nG/GDP 
.691*** 
(.155) 
1.166*** 
(.308) 
1.007*** 
(.170) 
1.098*** 
(.322) 
.818*** 
(.233) 
1.152*** 
(.328) 
.213 
(.254) 
.363 
(.357) 
DR/GDP .053 
(.038) 
.072 
(.064) 
.060* 
(.032) 
.076 
(.074) 
.083 
(.057) 
.090 
(.076) 
.028 
(.096) 
.033 
(.062) 
GDPpc -.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
GGE/GDP .026*** 
(.010) 
.022 
(.019) 
.022** 
(.009) 
.027 
(.023) 
.017 
(.017) 
.030 
(.023) 
.024 
(.015) 
.059* 
(.029) 
HIV .042 
(.0319) 
.066 
(.042) 
.0717** 
(.028) 
.060 
(.049) 
.039 
(.033) 
.052 
(.048) 
.010 
(.019) 
.092 
(.067) 
constant .005** 
(.003) 
.011*** 
(.004) 
.003* 
(.002) 
.014*** 
(.004) 
.012*** 
(.003) 
.013*** 
(.004) 
.007** 
(.003) 
-.006 
(.006) 
Each cell reports the estimated coefficient; Standard errors are reported in brackets; p-values are reported in square brackets. 
 
LR effects (continued on next page) 
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LR effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
DAH-G/GDP -1.135*** 
[p-value 0.000] 
-.930*** 
(.251) 
-1.592*** 
[p-value 
0.000] 
-.839*** 
(.285) 
-.825*** 
(.254) 
-.777*** 
(.282) 
 
-2.046*** 
[p-value  
0.000] 
-66.873 
[p-value 
0.971] 
DAH-
nG/GDP 
1.715** 
[p-value 0.013] 
1.723*** 
(.525) 
2.957*** 
[p-value 
0.000] 
1.361 *** 
(.436) 
1.304** 
(.523) 
1.379*** 
(.421) 
.570 
[p-value 
0.427] 
34.990 
[p-value 
0.971] 
DR/GDP .132 
[p-value 0.250] 
.107 
(.100) 
.177* 
[p-value 
0.098] 
.094 
(.094) 
.134 
(.103) 
.108 
(.093) 
.076 
[0.771] 
3.137 
[0.971] 
GDPpc -.000 
[N.A.] 
N.A 
 
-.000 
[N.A.] 
N.A. N.A. N.A. -.000 
[p-value 
0.564] 
-.000 
[p-value 
0.971] 
GGE/GDP .064*** 
[p-value 0.001] 
.032 
(.026) 
.064** 
[p-value 
0.014] 
.034 
(.027) 
.028 
(.025) 
.036 
(.027) 
.0634* 
[p-value 
0.0840] 
5.684 
[p-value 
0.970] 
HIV .104 
[p-value 0.273] 
.098 
(.064) 
 
.211** 
[p-value 
0.031] 
.074 
(.060) 
.061 
(.055) 
.062 
(.058) 
.027 
[p-value 
0.610] 
8.903 
[p-value 
0.970] 
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Appendix Table A5b: The Estimated Results (IMF) 
Dependent variable: GHE-S/GDP 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
IMF 
Variable/ 
Treatment 
Original Lu et 
al. (2010) 
MI acc. to Lu 
et al. descr. 
averaged 
(SI) (1) 
Amelia2014Th
reeK3 
3 common 
time 
polynomials 
Amelia2014Fo
urFEA 
Fixed effects 
Amelia2014Five
NoAs 
No (extra) 
assumptions 
Fully 
observed 
3-year 
averages 
N 111 111 111 111 111 111 41 83 
Logged GHE-
S/GDP 
.573*** 
(.055) 
.406*** 
(.084) 
.603*** 
(.060) 
.293*** 
(.084) 
.414*** 
(.065) 
.259*** 
(.081) 
.582*** 
(.047) 
.704*** 
(.184) 
DAH-G/GDP -.433*** 
(.090) 
-.663*** 
(.141) 
-.597*** 
(.107) 
-.716*** 
(.1562842) 
-.603*** 
(.117) 
-.729*** 
(.158) 
-.560*** 
(.165) 
-.536*** 
(.146) 
DAH-
nG/GDP 
.580*** 
(.147) 
.563*** 
(.215] 
.571*** 
(.173) 
.520* 
(.260) 
.551*** 
(.190) 
.497 * 
(.264) 
.428** 
(.179) 
.320 
(.293) 
DR/GDP -.010 
(.030) 
.018 
(.061) 
.023 
(.034) 
.019 
(.064) 
.012 
(.044) 
.006 
(.068) 
-.002 
(.026) 
-.071 
(.042) 
GDPpc -.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
GGE/GDP .020** 
(.009) 
.020 
(.018) 
.019* 
(.011) 
.030 
(.019) 
.018 
(.012) 
.031 
(.020) 
.000 
(.013) 
.026 
(.018) 
HIV .028 
(.026) 
.026 
(.041) 
.027 
(.024) 
.060 
(.046) 
.048 
(.033) 
.060 
(.048) 
.048** 
(.023) 
.003 
(.041) 
constant .005*** 
(.002) 
.009** 
(.003) 
.005** 
(.002) 
.009** 
(.004) 
.008*** 
(.002) 
.009** 
(.004) 
.008** 
(.003) 
.005 
(.005) 
Each cell reports the estimated coefficient; Standard errors are reported in brackets; p-values are reported in square brackets. 
 
 
LR effects (continued on next page) 
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LR Effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
DAH-G/GDP -1.013*** 
[p-value 
0.000] 
-1.119*** 
(.260) 
-1.506*** 
[p-value 
0.000] 
-1.017*** 
(.239) 
-1.032*** 
(.233) 
-.987*** 
(.2307) 
-1.337** 
[p-value 
0.001] 
-1.808 
[p-value 0.102] 
DAH-
nG/GDP 
1.359*** 
[p-value 
0.000] 
.954** 
(.376) 
1.440*** 
[p-value 
0.001] 
.740* 
(.380) 
.944** 
(.327) 
.673* 
(.365) 
1.023** 
[p-value 
0.011] 
1.080 
[p-value 0.405] 
 
DR/GDP -.022 
[p-value 
0.749] 
.031 
(.103) 
.060 
[p-value 
0.498] 
.027 
(.091) 
.021 
(.076) 
.008 
(.091) 
-.004 
[p-value 
0.942] 
-.238 
[p-value 0.220] 
GDPpc -.000 
[N.A.] 
N.A. -.000 
[N.A.] 
N.A. N.A. N.A. -.000 
[N.A.] 
-.000 
[p-value 0.266] 
GGE/GDP .047** 
[p-value 
0.026] 
.034 
(.030) 
.048** 
[0.078] 
.042 
(.026) 
.031 
(.021) 
[0.139] 
.043 
(.027) 
.000 
[p-value 
0.988] 
.086 
[p-value 0.231] 
HIV .066 
[p-value 
0.282] 
.043 
(.068) 
.068 
[p-value 
0.247] 
.085 
(.064) 
.082 
(.055) 
.081 
(.064) 
.116* 
[p-value 
0.041] 
.012 
[p-value 0.932] 
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Appendix Table A6: 10 Repetitions (Direction of Bias, IMF Sample) 
 
Dependent variable: Domestically funded public health spending (GHE-S), IMF; ABBB 
 (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) 
 MI acc. to 
Lu et al. 
(lags and 
leads) 
MI acc. to 
Lu et al. 
(lags and 
leads) 
MI acc. to 
Lu et al. 
(lags and 
leads) 
MI acc. to 
Lu et al. 
(lags and 
leads) 
MI acc. to 
Lu et al. 
(lags and 
leads) 
MI acc. to 
Lu et al. 
(lags and 
leads) 
MI acc. to 
Lu et al. 
(lags and 
leads) 
MI acc. to 
Lu et al. 
(lags and 
leads) 
MI acc. to 
Lu et al. 
(lags and 
leads) 
MI acc. to 
Lu et al. 
(lags and 
leads) 
Logged GHE-
S/GDP 
.584*** 
(.066) 
.590*** 
(.067) 
.589*** 
(.066) 
.588*** 
(.065) 
.588*** 
(.067) 
.589*** 
(.072) 
.589*** 
(.067) 
.589*** 
(.065) 
.591*** 
(.070) 
.580*** 
(.067) 
DAH-G/GDP -.531** 
(.215) 
-.531** 
(.216) 
-.534** 
(.217) 
-.539** 
(.215) 
-.537** 
(.215) 
-.536** 
(.217) 
-.537** 
(.217) 
-.544** 
(.215) 
-.531** 
(.216) 
-.546** 
(.217) 
DAH-nG/GDP .312* 
(.189) 
.320* 
(.191) 
.321* 
(.190) 
.315 
(.199) 
.322* 
(.193) 
.310 
(.198) 
.336* 
(.191) 
.335* 
(.195) 
.317* 
(.192) 
.322 
(.196) 
DR/GDP -.0001 
(.035) 
.003 
(.036) 
.001 
(.036) 
-.000 
(.034) 
.000 
(.035) 
.003 
(.036) 
.001 
(.035) 
-.001 
(.035) 
.001 
(.034) 
.000 
(.036) 
GDPpc -.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
GGE/GDP -.0001 
(.018) 
.001 
(.017) 
.001 
(.017) 
.001 
(.017) 
.002 
(.018) 
.001 
(.018) 
-.000 
(.018) 
.000 
(.018) 
-.000 
(.018) 
.000 
(.018) 
HIV .058** 
(.026) 
.057** 
(.027) 
.059** 
(.026) 
.059** 
(.027) 
.058** 
(.027) 
.059** 
(.026) 
.058** 
(.026) 
.059** 
(.026) 
.059** 
(.026) 
.059** 
(.027) 
constant .008* 
(.004) 
.007* 
(.004) 
.007* 
(.004) 
.007* 
(.004) 
.007* 
(.004) 
.007* 
(.004) 
.007* 
(.004) 
.007* 
(.004) 
.007* 
(.004) 
.008* 
(.004) 
N 
T 
41 
12 
41 
12 
41 
12 
41 
12 
41 
12 
41 
12 
41 
12 
41 
12 
41 
12 
41 
12 
Each cell reports the estimated coefficients from ABBB. Standard errors are reported in brackets. N denotes number of countries (not observations). 
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Dependent variable: Domestically funded public health spending (GHE-S); IMF, ABBB 
 (3) (3) (3) (3) (3) (3) (3) (3) (3) (3) 
 MI 
common 
time 
polyno-
mials 
MI 
common 
time 
polyno-
mials 
MI 
common 
time 
polyno-
mials 
MI 
common 
time 
polyno-
mials 
MI 
common 
time 
polyno-
mials 
MI 
common 
time 
polyno-
mials 
MI 
common 
time 
polyno-
mials 
MI 
common 
time 
polyno-
mials 
MI 
common 
time 
polyno-
mials 
MI 
common 
time 
polyno-
mials 
Logged GHE-
S/GDP 
.188** 
(.092) 
.178** 
(.090) 
.176* 
(.093) 
.184* 
(.095) 
.175* 
(.092) 
.181* 
(.094) 
.188** 
(.092) 
.175** 
(.092) 
.189** 
(.093) 
.170* 
(.091) 
DAH-G/GDP -.637*** 
(.242) 
-.636*** 
(.235) 
-.635*** 
(.230) 
-.644*** 
(.230) 
-.637*** 
(.238) 
-.631*** 
(.232) 
-.634*** 
(.236) 
-.636*** 
(.236) 
-.636*** 
(.229) 
-.624*** 
(.238) 
DAH-nG/GDP .408 
(.376) 
.406 
(.364) 
.378 
(.363) 
.395 
(.357) 
.367 
(.369) 
.371 
(.358) 
.394 
(.352) 
.363 
(.352) 
.385 
(.361) 
.363 
(.362) 
DR/GDP .019 
(.064) 
.022 
(.065) 
.015 
(.063) 
.011 
(.059) 
.017 
(.064) 
.023 
(.066) 
.020 
(.065) 
.020 
(.066) 
.019 
(.065) 
.014 
(.065) 
GDPpc .000 
(0.000) 
.000 
(0.000) 
.000 
(0.000) 
.000 
(0.000) 
.000 
(0.000) 
.000 
(0.000) 
.000 
(0.000) 
.000 
(0.000) 
.000 
(0.000) 
.000 
(0.000) 
GGE/GDP -.003 
(.029) 
-.002 
(.030) 
-.006 
(.030) 
-.004 
(.030) 
-.002 
(.029) 
-.003 
(.031) 
-.005 
(.030) 
-.006 
(.030) 
-.003 
(.029) 
-.003 
(.029) 
HIV .013 
(.047) 
.022 
(.050) 
.017 
(.048) 
.019 
(.048) 
.018 
(.048) 
.016 
(.048) 
.018 
(.049) 
.022 
(.048) 
.021 
(.050) 
.015 
(.048) 
constant .015*** 
(.006) 
.015*** 
(.006) 
.016*** 
(.006) 
.015*** 
(.006) 
.015*** 
(.006) 
.015*** 
(.006) 
.015*** 
(.006) 
.015*** 
(.006) 
.015*** 
(.006) 
.015*** 
(.006) 
N 
T 
41 
12 
41 
12 
41 
12 
41 
12 
41 
12 
41 
12 
41 
12 
41 
12 
41 
12 
41 
12 
Each cell reports the estimated coefficients from ABBB. Standard errors are reported in brackets. 
N denotes number of countries (not observations). 
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Dependent variable: Domestically funded public health spending (GHE-S); IMF, ABBB 
 (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) 
 MI 
Fixed 
effects 
MI 
Fixed 
effects 
MI 
Fixed 
effects 
MI 
Fixed 
effects 
MI 
Fixed 
effects 
MI 
Fixed 
effects 
MI 
Fixed 
effects 
MI 
Fixed 
effects 
MI 
Fixed 
effects 
MI 
Fixed 
effects 
Logged GHE-
S/GDP 
.440*** 
(.070) 
.445*** 
(.073) 
.446*** 
(.073) 
.438*** 
(.074) 
.439*** 
(.069) 
.441*** 
(.068) 
.441*** 
(.070) 
.438*** 
(.070) 
.441*** 
(.075) 
.439*** 
(.073) 
DAH-G/GDP -.616*** 
(.224) 
-.606*** 
(.228) 
-.617*** 
(.232) 
-.615*** 
(.231) 
-.619*** 
(.227) 
-.619*** 
(.231) 
-.612*** 
(.230) 
-.620*** 
(.228) 
-.619*** 
(.232) 
-.605*** 
(.227) 
DAH-nG/GDP .457* 
(.254) 
.465* 
(.242) 
.472* 
(.248) 
.469* 
(.254) 
.457* 
(.246) 
.455* 
(.242) 
.471* 
(.252) 
.466* 
(.245) 
.485** 
(.243) 
.453* 
(.253) 
DR/GDP -.005 
(.043) 
-.001 
(.043) 
.001 
(.042) 
.001 
(.041) 
-.002 
(.044) 
-.004 
(.042) 
-.006 
(.043) 
-.005 
(.042) 
-.006 
(.043) 
-.003 
(.043) 
GDPpc -.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
GGE/GDP -.011 
(.025) 
-.010 
(.024) 
-.010 
(.023) 
-.0010 
(.024) 
-.011 
(.024) 
-.012 
(.025) 
-.011 
(.024) 
-.013 
(.024) 
-.013 
(.024) 
-.012 
(.024) 
HIV .040 
(.032) 
.041 
(.032) 
.040 
(.032) 
.041 
(.033) 
.044 
(.033) 
.045 
(.031) 
.041 
(.032) 
.045 
(.032) 
.044 
(.033) 
.041 
(.032) 
constant .013*** 
(.005) 
.013*** 
(.005) 
.013*** 
(.005) 
.013*** 
(.005) 
.013*** 
(.005) 
.013*** 
(.005) 
.013*** 
(.005) 
.013*** 
(.005) 
.013*** 
(.005) 
.013*** 
(.005) 
N 
T 
41 
12 
41 
12 
41 
12 
41 
12 
41 
12 
41 
12 
41 
12 
41 
12 
41 
12 
41 
12 
Each cell reports the estimated coefficients from ABBB. Standard errors are reported in brackets. 
N denotes number of countries (not observations). 
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Dependent variable: Domestically funded public health spending (GHE-S); IMF, ABBB 
 (5) (5) (5) (5) (5) (5) (5) (5) (5) (5) 
 MI with 
No (extra) 
assump-
tions 
MI with 
No (extra) 
assump-
tions 
MI with 
No (extra) 
assump-
tions 
MI with 
No (extra) 
assump-
tions 
MI with 
No (extra) 
assump-
tions 
MI with 
No (extra) 
assump-
tions 
MI with 
No (extra) 
assump-
tions 
MI with 
No (extra) 
assump-
tions 
MI with 
No (extra) 
assump-
tions 
MI with 
No (extra) 
assump-
tions 
Logged GHE-
S/GDP 
.162* 
(.091) 
.157 
(.096) 
.167* 
(.095) 
.164* 
(.089) 
.159* 
(.090) 
.152 
(.092) 
.158* 
(.093) 
.163* 
(.092) 
.153* 
(.090) 
.155* 
(.092) 
DAH-G/GDP -.641*** 
(.236) 
-.633** 
(.245) 
-.637*** 
(.227) 
-.644*** 
(233) 
-.656*** 
(.239) 
-.643*** 
(.236) 
-.663*** 
(.239) 
-.639*** 
(.239) 
-.645** 
(.251) 
-.643*** 
(.240) 
DAH-nG/GDP .348 
(.372) 
.310 
(.398) 
.363 
(.389) 
.362 
(.388) 
.373 
(.417) 
.319 
(.388) 
.380 
(.382) 
.339 
(.370) 
.356 
(.419) 
.307 
(.382) 
DR/GDP .001 
(.076) 
-.007 
(.076) 
-.004 
(.074) 
.005 
(.076) 
.003 
(.073) 
-.004 
(.075) 
-.000 
(.076) 
.001 
(.075) 
-.004 
(.076) 
-.011 
(.079) 
GDPpc .000 
(.000) 
.000 
(.000) 
.000 
(.000) 
.000 
(.000) 
.000 
(.000) 
.000 
(.000) 
.000 
(.000) 
.000 
(.000) 
.000 
(.000) 
.000 
(.000) 
GGE/GDP .001 
(.033) 
-.001 
(.033) 
-.003 
(.032) 
-.000 
(.032) 
.001 
(.031) 
-.002 
(.032) 
-.002 
(.032) 
-.001 
(.032) 
-.003 
(.032) 
-.005 
(.032) 
HIV .028 
(.048) 
.026 
(.050) 
.023 
(.052) 
.020 
(.050) 
.028 
(.050) 
.019 
(.050) 
.019 
(.050) 
.024 
(.047) 
.024 
(.053) 
.027 
(.054) 
constant .014** 
(.006) 
.015** 
(.006) 
.015** 
(.006) 
.015** 
(.006) 
.015** 
(.006) 
.015** 
(.006) 
.015** 
(.006) 
.015** 
(.006) 
.015 
(.006) 
.016 
(.006) 
N 
T 
41 
12 
41 
12 
41 
12 
41 
12 
41 
12 
41 
12 
41 
12 
41 
12 
41 
12 
41 
12 
Each cell reports the estimated coefficients from ABBB. Standard errors are reported in brackets. 
N denotes number of countries (not observations). 
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Appendix Table A7: Full Set of Estimates of Direction of Bias (Including Long Run) 
  Multiple Imputation (N=41) Complete 
Case258 
(N=2) 
Single 
Imputation 
(N=40) 
 Full 
sample 
(fully  
observed, 
N=41) 
(1) 
Amelia2 
ExIMFone 
(3) 
Amelia2Ex 
IMFthree 
(4) 
Amelia2Ex 
IMFfourFE 
 
(5) 
Amelia2Ex 
IMFfive 
 
(6) 
 
(7) 
Sub-period 
averages 
(SI) 
 
 ABBB ABBB ABBB ABBB ABBB  ABBB 
Logged 
GHE-
S/GDP 
.582*** 
(.047) 
.584*** 
(.066) 
.188** 
(.092) 
.440*** 
(.070) 
.162* 
(.091) 
- .867*** 
(.321) 
DAH-
G/GDP 
-.560*** 
(.165) 
-.531** 
(.215) 
-.637*** 
(.242) 
-.616*** 
(.224) 
-.641*** 
(.236) 
- -.540 
(.328) 
DAH-
nG/GDP 
.428** 
(.179) 
.312* 
(.189) 
.408 
(.376) 
.457* 
(.254) 
.348 
(.372) 
- .093 
(.388) 
DR/GDP -.002 
(.026) 
-.0001 
(.035) 
.019 
(.064) 
-.005 
(.043) 
.001 
(.076) 
- -.100* 
(.055) 
GDPpc -.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
.000 
(0.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
.000 
(.000) 
- .000 
(.000) 
GGE/GDP .0002 
(.013) 
-.0001 
(.018) 
-.003 
(.029) 
-.011 
(.025) 
.001 
(.033) 
- -.006 
(.024) 
HIV .048** 
(.023) 
.058** 
(.026) 
.013 
(.047) 
.040 
(.032) 
.028 
(.048) 
- .131** 
(.062) 
constant .008** 
(.003) 
.008* 
(.004) 
.015*** 
(.006) 
.013*** 
(.005) 
.014** 
(.006) 
 .0002 
(.009) 
Long-Run Effects 
DAH-
G/GDP 
-1.337*** 
[0.0014] 
-1.283 
(.501) 
-.783 
(.287) 
-1.102 
(.398) 
-.767 
(.281) 
- -4.057 
[0.637] 
DAH-
nG/GDP 
1.023** 
[0.0114] 
.754 
(.473) 
.499 
(.458) 
.816 
(.453) 
.417 
(.445) 
- .702 
[0.872] 
DR/GDP -.004 
[0.942] 
-.000 
(.085) 
.024 
(.079) 
-.008 
(.077) 
.002 
(.091) 
- -.752 
[0.677] 
GDPpc -.000 
[N.A.] 
N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. - .000 [N.A.] 
GGE/GDP .0005 
[0.9879] 
-.000 
(.044) 
-.004 
(.036) 
-.020 
(.045) 
.001 
(.040) 
- -.043 
[0.824] 
HIV .116** 
[0.0407] 
.141 
(.058) 
.015 
(.058) 
.071 
(.055) 
.034 
(.058) 
- .985 
[0.668] 
Standard errors reported in parentheses, p-values reported in the square brackets. 
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Appendix Table A8: Fixed Effects Estimates of Direction of Bias  
  Multiple Imputation 
(N=41) 
Complete 
Case259 
(N=2) 
 
Sub-
period 
averages 
(SI) 
(N=40) 
 Full 
sample 
(fully  
observed, 
N=41) 
(1) 
Amelia2 
ExIMFone 
(3) 
Amelia2Ex 
IMFthree 
(4) 
Amelia2Ex 
IMFfourFE 
(5) 
Amelia2Ex 
IMFfive 
(6) (7) 
 FE 260 FE FE FE FE  FE 
DAH-
G/GDP 
-.605** 
(.229) 
-.589** 
(.262) 
-.678*** 
(.224) 
-.618** 
(.236) 
-.661*** 
(.225) 
- -.356 
(.453) 
DAH-
nG/GDP 
.169 
(.303) 
.016 
(.314) 
.190 
(.259936) 
.233 
(.238) 
.170 
(.252) 
- -.105 
(.468) 
DR/GDP .039 
(.049) 
.050 
(.044) 
.049 
(.041) 
.064* 
(.037) 
.036 
(.043) 
- .0338 
(.050) 
GDPpc -.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
.000 
(.000) 
- .000 
(.000) 
GGE/GDP .003 
(.019) 
.003 
(.020) 
.010 
(.015) 
.001 
(.016) 
.008 
(.015) 
- -.011 
(.031) 
HIV .054 
(.040) 
.047 
(.044) 
.071* 
(.037) 
.057 
(.036) 
.069* 
(.038) 
- .051 
(.049) 
constant .018*** 
(.004) 
.018*** 
(.004) 
.015*** 
(.003) 
.017*** 
(.003) 
.016*** 
(.003) 
- .019*** 
(.006) 
 R2=0.17 R2=0.18 R2=0.23 R2= 0.14 R2= 0.22 - R2=0.10261 
 
Standard errors reported in parentheses; p-values reported in the square brackets. 
The fixed effects results differ substantially from the ABBB estimates. Firstly, considering 
only the full sample estimates (first column), the only variable (constant aside) estimated to 
ŚĂǀĞĂ ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚĞĨĨĞĐƚŽŶŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ  ‘ĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐĂůůǇ ĨƵŶĚĞĚ ?ŚĞĂůƚŚĞǆƉĞŶĚŝƚƵƌĞƐ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ
health aid (assumed to be) flowing through the budget (however, this particularly may be 
affected by the fact that DAH-G/GDP is directly used in construction of the dependent 
variable). The insignificance of DAH-G/GDP is economically plausible: aid that does not flow 
through the government (DAH-Ŷ' ?'W ) ŝƐ ůĞƐƐ ůŝŬĞůǇ  ?ŝĨ Ăƚ Ăůů ) ƚŽ ĂůƚĞƌ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ
domestically funded spending as the government may not be fully aware of these flows. 
Debt relief, especially assumed to be uniformly distributed over 10 year period, constitutes 
ƐŵĂůů ƋƵĂŶƚŝƚŝĞƐŽĨ  ‘ƌĞůĞĂƐĞĚ ? ĨƵŶĚƐ ? dŚĞ ůĂĐŬ ŽĨ ĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞĚ ĞĨĨĞĐƚŽĨ 'W ƉĞƌ ĐĂƉŝƚĂ ŝƐ ůess 
explicable, as one would expect that public health bill would increase with increasingly 
wealthy population; Lu et al. do not log the variable. Lack of estimated association between 
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260 xtreg gheSgdpifmm govdisgdp pridisbgdp drdisgdp gdppc ggegdp hiv, fe vce(robust);  
261 Prob > F           =    0.3691, others=0. 
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HIV and GHE-S/GDP is not particularly surprising, as it may go in either direction in the first 
place. In terms of comparability of results across alternative methodological choices to 
handle the missing data, again, none performs ideally, but multiple imputation estimates 
seem to be overall closer to the full sample estimates than those from single imputation 
(sub-period averages), confirming the statistical prediction even in our small sample. 
Appendix Figure A5: The Resulting Distribution of Missing Values across Country-Year 
Observations 
 
Appendix Table A9: The Pattern of Missingness across Countries over the Entire Year 
Sample Period 
country 
# 
WHO 
miss 
# 
IMF 
miss country 
# 
WHO 
miss 
# 
IMF 
miss country 
# 
WHO 
miss 
# 
IMF 
miss 
Algeria 10 4 Gabon 6 2 Nigeria 5 0 
(Angola)  0 0 Gambia 2 0 Oman 11 0 
Argentina 0 7 Georgia 0 4 Pakistan 0 5 
Armenia 0 2 Ghana 11 0 Panama 1 0 
Azerbaijan 11 0 Guatemala 0 2 
Papua New 
Guinea 1 0 
Bahrain 5 0 Guinea 11 0 Paraguay 0 2 
Bangladesh 1 2 Guinea-Bissau 2 0 Peru 0 3 
Barbados 0 2 Guyana 0 1 Philippines 0 5 
Belize 4 1 Haiti 7 5 Rwanda 8 4 
Benin 5 0 Honduras 8 2 Samoa 8 3 
Bhutan 0 1 India 2 1 Saudi Arabia 2 0 
Bolivia 4 0 Indonesia 2 2 Senegal 6 0 
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Botswana 6 0 
Iran, Islamic 
Republic of 10 3 Sierra Leone 7 0 
Brazil 0 4 Jamaica 0 3 
Solomon 
Islands 2 1 
Burkina Faso 8 0 Jordan 4 3 South Africa 0 0 
Burundi 0 0 Kazakhstan 0 0 Sri Lanka 0 2 
Cambodia 0 0 Kenya 9 0 Sudan 10 5 
Cameroon 11 1 Kyrgyzstan 0 1 Suriname 11 8 
Cape Verde 3 6 
Lao People's 
Democratic 
Republic 1 1 Swaziland 9 0 
Central African 
Republic 2 3 Lebanon 8 2 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 7 0 
Chad 8 2 Lesotho 0 0 Tajikistan 0 1 
Chile 0 2 Liberia 3 5 
Tanzania, 
United 
Republic of 9 3 
China 0 2 
Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya 10 3 Thailand 1 5 
Colombia 1 8 Madagascar 11 0 Togo 11 2 
Comoros 7 4 Malawi 2 0 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 4 8 
Congo 7 11 Malaysia 0 0 Tunisia 7 0 
Congo, the 
Democratic 
Republic of the 12 12 Maldives 0 0 Turkey 0 0 
Costa Rica 0 8 Mali 7 0 Turkmenistan 12 0 
Côte d'Ivoire 0 0 Mauritania 1 1 Uganda 8 2 
Djibouti 11 5 Mauritius 1 1 Uruguay 2 7 
Dominican 
Republic 0 6 Mexico 0 6 Uzbekistan 0 0 
Ecuador 0 1 Mongolia 1 0 Vanuatu 0 5 
Egypt 10 4 Morocco 1 2 Venezuela 1 4 
El Salvador 0 7 Mozambique 4 0 Viet Nam 0 2 
Equatorial 
Guinea 10 8 Namibia 0 0 Yemen 10 1 
Eritrea 7 0 Nepal 0 1 Zambia 1 0 
Ethiopia 9 0 Nicaragua 0 2 Zimbabwe 9 1 
Fiji 1 4 Niger 9 0       
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Appendix Table A10: Correlation Coefficients between Dependent and Explanatory 
Variables 
corr Fully simultaneously observed Pooled simultaneously observed 
 GHE-A/GDP (IMF) GHE-A/GDP (WHO) GHE-A/GDP (IMF) GHE-A/GDP (WHO) 
DAH-G/GDP -0.2207 -0.3043 0.0869 0.2086 
DAH-NG/GDP -0.2417 -0.2172 0.0305 0.1987 
DR -0.4318 -0.5252 -0.0142 0.0353 
GGE/GDP 0.6604 0.5347 0.3969 0.3647 
HIV 0.5244 0.3119 0.2592 0.2649 
GDP pc 0.1769 0.3113 0.2350 0.2192 
Corr (WHO IMF) 0.8144  0.7075  
 N=11; YO=132 N=11; YO=132 N=111; YO=725 N=111; YO=725 
Table reports correlation coefficient between the government total health spending (GHE-A) and 
explanatory variables for subsamples where GHE-A data are coded as fully observed (11 countries, left 
part of the table), and at least partially observed (725 country-year observations, reported in the right 
part of the table.  
For only 11 (eleven) countries are the GHE-A variable simultaneously fully observed in the 
WHO and IMF samples. These countries (Burundi, CaŵďŽĚŝĂ ? ŽƚĞ Ě ?/ǀŽŝƌĞ ? <ĂǌĂŬŚƐƚĂŶ ?
Lesotho, Malaysia, Maldives, Namibia, South Africa, Turkey, and Uzbekistan (Angola 
dropped)) , although does not have a ring of a representative sample, have very comparable 
averages for key variables (and are geographically disbursed) to the full sample (but not in 
terms of covariates).  Importantly, they are not on average richer than the full sample of 111 
countries. 
The cross-variable correlations, however, reveal important differences. The correlation 
between WHO and IMF GHE-A/GDP measures is higher for these 11 countries (0.81) 
compared to the pooled sample where these two measures overlap (0.69). The key 
difference is in correlation between government health spending (GHE-A/GDP) and health 
aid variables: whilst in the pooled fully observed sample (YO=725) the correlation between 
health aid and government health spending is small but positive (between 0.04 and 0.2), in 
the 11 fully simultaneously observed country sample it is negative and larger in magnitude 
(between -0.30 and -0.22). 
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In the fully simultaneously observed sample of 11 countries over 12 year period262, the GHE-
A/GDP (for both IMF and WHO samples) seems to covariate relatively strongly with the 
independent variables. It bears considerable negative correlation with the aid variables 
(DAH-G/GDP, DAH-nG/GDP, and Debt Relief) (they received slightly less aid than the pooled 
sample, or full sample). Government total health spending is also strongly correlated with 
government total spending (GGE/GDP), and also recorded/estimated HIV prevalence, and 
indicating that in these countries health spending grows as government size increases an 
potentially with disease burden (although the latter may capture the reverse causality of 
higher spending leading to more attention to diseases). Potentially, this could reflect that 
other variables have different underlying missingness rate (although all recorded as fully 
observed): the countries outside the 11 fully observed country sample have poorer GHE-A 
data, and potentially poorer quality data across other variables.  
 
  
                                                          
262 Note that a fraction of this correlation may spurious due to some I(1)ness in the short sample; 
however, this would be the case in the full sample as well.  
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Appendix B 
Appendix Figure B1: Distributions of Health Aid Variables 
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The figure depicts disaggregated health aid variables (Lu et al., 2010; Van de Sijpe (2013); and the 
sensitivity check), for 108 low- and middle-income countries over 1995-2004.  
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Appendix Table B1: Lu et al. Distinction (FE Results) (Testing for Aid Smoothing and 
Missing Data Effects) 
The table reports fixed effects (with country-clustered robust standard errors) estimates for the model 
described in Section 2, using Lu et al. (2010, IMF) data for the period 1995-2004 for 108 countries (the 
overlapping sample with Van de Sijpe 2012) for all variables, including the health aid disaggregation. 
First three columns only use data where the dependent variable is fully observed for each country (50 
countries, 450 yearly observations). The middle three columns report results using pooled sample 
where the dependent variable is observed for all the country-year observations used. Last three 
columns ignore the missing data problem altogether and report the estimates from the full sample, 
where the identified missing values are multiple-imputed and averaged as in Lu et al. (2010).  
Potential aid smoothing effects are tested for by including lagged aid variables. Columns 1, 4, 7 report 
the estimates where contemporaneous values of aid variables are used. Columns 2, 5, 8 use the lagged 
value of aid. Columns 3, 6, 9 report results where both contemporaneous and lagged values of aid are 
included; if both were estimated to be significant (and positive), we could conclude that aid smoothing 
is taking place. We find evidence of some aid smoothing behaviour with respect to the health aid 
disbursed through the government (DAH-G), but only if the missing data problem is recognised. No 
such evidence is found if the missing data problem is effectively ignored.  
Estimates are not directly comparable to Lu et al. as they use GHE-S/GDP as a dependent variable. 
  
Dependent variable: GHE-A/GDP (Lu et al.) [Lu et al. health aid disaggregation]  
FE, vce (R)   a a a b b b c c c 
N 
YO 
50 
500 
50 
450 
50 
450 
107 
896 
107 
808 
107 
808 
108 
1080 
108 
972 
108 
972 
On-budget 
DAHG 
.3831*** 
( .1106) 
 .2419** 
(.1094) 
.3727*** 
(.0635) 
 .2362*** 
(.0770) 
.3570*** 
(.0707) 
 .2717*** 
(.0774) 
Lagged  
On-budget 
DAHG 
 .3560** 
(.1541) 
.2635* 
(.1553) 
 .3335*** 
(.0853) 
.1834* 
(.0996) 
 .3170*** 
(.0883) 
.1326 
(.0953) 
Off-budget 
DAHnG 
-.1544 
(.3133) 
 -.2764 
(.4101) 
.0265 
(.1830) 
 -.0799 
(.2166) 
.1676 
(.1646) 
 .0669 
(.1717) 
Lagged  
Off-budget 
DAHnG 
 .1023 
(.4921) 
-.0525 
(.3883) 
 .4341 
(.3198) 
.2823 
(.2849) 
 .3909* 
(.2183) 
.1641 
(.1682) 
DR -.0438 
(.0485) 
.0102 
(.0553) 
.0061 
(.0548) 
-.0658 
(.0495) 
-.0152 
( .0554) 
-.0201 
(.0544) 
-.0202 
(.0439) 
.0213 
( .0352) 
.0166 
(.0345) 
Ln(GDPpc) -.0021 
(.0020) 
-.0023 
(.0021) 
-.0016 
(.0020) 
-.0026 
( .0016) 
.0030* 
(.0016) 
-.0024 
(.0016) 
-.0011 
(.0011) 
-.0016 
(.0011) 
-.0011 
(.0010) 
GGEGDPre
s 
-.0102 
(.0162) 
-.0086 
(.0168) 
-.0085 
(.0165) 
-.0134 
(.0144) 
-.0137 
(.0153) 
-.0142 
(.0153) 
-.0080 
(.0105) 
-.0092 
( .0116) 
-.0096 
( .0116) 
HIV .0447 
(.0386) 
.0356 
(.0509) 
.0392 
(.0503) 
.0403 
( .0338) 
.0247 
(.0403) 
.0257 
(.0396) 
.0406 
(.0314) 
.0257 
(.0381) 
.0271 
(.0372) 
constant .0336** 
(.0136) 
.0354** 
(.0148) 
.0301** 
(.0138) 
.0377*** 
[.0114] 
.0408*** 
(.0113) 
.0363*** 
(.0111) 
.0261*** 
(.0078) 
.0297*** 
( .0084) 
.0261*** 
(.0079) 
R (w, b, o) 0.0664 
0.0073 
0.0017 
0.0457 
0.0206 
0.0115 
0.0575 
0.0045 
0.0011 
0.0752 
0.0119 
0.0057 
0.0564 
0.0320 
0.0266 
0.0662 
0.0185 
0.0125 
0.0624 
0.0001 
0.0014 
0.0463 
0.0101 
0.0046 
-0.3588 
0.0009 
0.0000 
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Appendix Table B2: Van de Sijpe's Distinction, Lu et al. Model; All VDS Aid Types Included 
(Testing for Aid Smoothing and Missing Data Effects) 
The table reports fixed effects (with country-clustered robust standard errors) estimates for the model 
described in Section 2, using Lu et al. (2010, IMF) data for the period 1995-2004 for 108 countries (the 
overlapping sample with Van de Sijpe 2012) for all variables, except the health aid disaggregation for 
Dependent variable: GHE-A/GDP (Lu et al.) [Van de Sijpe health aid disaggregation) 
FE, vce (R)   a a a b b b c c c 
N 
YO 
50 
500 
50 
450 
50 
450 
107 
896 
107 
808 
107 
808 
108 
1080 
108 
972 
108 
972 
On-budget 
(VDS SP) 
.5899** 
(.2581) 
 .4537 
(.2779) 
.6620** 
(.2783) 
 .5569* 
(.2875) 
.5032* 
(.2825) 
 .5981*** 
(.2880) 
Lagged  
On-budget 
(VDS SP) 
 .4059 
(.2795) 
.3945 
(.2739) 
 .4334* 
(.2471) 
.3791 
(.2370) 
 .2433 
(.2911) 
.1955 
(.2967) 
Off-budget 
(VDS TC) 
.0873 
(.2313) 
 -.0326 
(.2387) 
.0506 
(.1270) 
 .0072 
(.1393) 
.0642 
(.1128) 
 .0596 
(.1023) 
Lagged  
Off-budget 
(VDS TC) 
 .2478 
(.2907) 
.2145 
(.2942) 
 .1148 
(.1928) 
.1431 
(.1932) 
 .0257 
(.1632) 
.0634 
(.1555) 
Health IP .4019*** 
(.1399) 
 .4333*** 
(.1053) 
.3796*** 
(.0629) 
 .3101*** 
(.0680) 
.3928*** 
(.0525) 
 .3496*** 
( .0486) 
Lagged 
Health IP 
 .2713 
(.2073) 
.2278 
(.1861) 
 .3609*** 
(.0901) 
.1227 
(.1264) 
 (L).3406*** 
(.0941) 
.0957 
(.1059) 
Health 
ONM 
.2836* 
(.1631) 
 .0035 
(.2071) 
.3157** 
(.1260) 
 .0826 
(.1383) 
.3016*** 
(.1098) 
 .1801 
(.1098) 
Lagged  
Health 
ONM 
 .3985*** 
(.1401) 
.4078** 
(.1720) 
 .4277** 
(.1641) 
.3779** 
(.1604) 
 (L)  .3149** 
(.1194) 
.2523** 
( .1127) 
General 
AID 
.0197 
(.0254) 
 -.0056 
(.0239) 
.0088 
( .0214) 
 .0106 
(.0228) 
.0054 
(.0204) 
 .0141 
(.0184) 
Lagged 
General 
AID 
 .0333 
(.0246) 
.0213 
(.0239) 
 .0133 
(.0189) 
-.0009 
(.0176) 
 (L) .0099 
(.0171) 
.0035 
(.0154) 
Support to 
NGOs  
-.2631 
(.1775) 
 -.1409 
(.1397) 
-.1791 
(.1627) 
 -.1344 
(.1341) 
-.1308 
(.1280) 
 -.0449 
(.13654) 
Lagged 
Support to 
NGOs 
 .0727 
(.2531) 
.1272 
(.2814) 
 .1168 
(.2040) 
.1176 
(.2155) 
 (L) .0589 
(.1607) 
.0173 
(.1577) 
Other non-
health 
-.0204* 
(.0114) 
 .0074 
(.0151) 
-.0116 
(.0102) 
 .0111 
(.0104) 
-.0114* 
(.0066) 
(L)-.0150** 
(.0070) 
-.0014 
(.0057) 
Lagged 
Other non-
health 
 -.0269** 
(.0122) 
-
.0333*** 
(.0112) 
 -.0189* 
(.0112) 
-.0243** 
(.0110) 
  -.0158** 
(.0071) 
DR -.0549 
(.0642) 
-.0017 
(.0609) 
.0189 
(.0558) 
-.0645 
(.0532) 
-.0037 
(.0506) 
.0168 
(.0506) 
-.0094 
(.0493) 
.0249 
(.0320) 
.0410 
(.0304) 
Ln(GDPpc) -.0033 
(.0020) 
-.0023 
(.0022) 
-.0019 
(.0023) 
-.0032* 
(.0017) 
-.0031* 
( .0017) 
-.0024 
(.0018) 
-.0013 
(.0012) 
-.0016 
(.0012) 
-.0010 
(.0012) 
GGEGDPres -.0089 
(.0164) 
-.0070 
(.0166) 
-.0061 
(.0159) 
-.0114 
(.0142) 
-.0118 
(.0151) 
-.0106 
(.0144) 
-.0086 
(.0109) 
-.0087 
(.0119) 
-.0083 
( .0115) 
HIV .0364 
(.0352) 
.0249 
(.0457) 
.0263 
(.0461) 
.0364 
( .0319) 
.0185 
( .0378) 
.0205 
(.0369) 
.0360 
(.0304) 
.0184 
( .0365) 
.0199 
(.0347) 
constant .0434*** 
(.0145) 
.0364 
(.0154) 
.0330* 
(.0164) 
.0426*** 
(.0122) 
.0417*** 
(.0121 
.0360*** 
(.0129) 
.0284*** 
(.0090) 
.0310*** 
(.0092) 
.0263*** 
( .0091) 
R (w, b, o) 0.0678 
0.0322 
0.0147 
0.0535 
0.0487 
0.0257 
0.0808 
0.0132 
0.0028 
0.0755 
0.0224 
0.0133 
0.0593 
0.0537 
0.0420 
0.0881 
0.0190 
0.0102 
0.0603 
0.0009 
0.0001 
0.0478 
0.0307 
0.0154 
0.0796 
0.0029 
0.0000 
Appendix B Emilija Timmis 
203 
 
which data by Van de Sijpe (2013) is used. First three columns only use data where the dependent 
variable is fully observed for each country (50 countries, 450 yearly observations). The middle three 
columns report results using pooled sample where the dependent variable is observed for all the 
country-year observations used. Last three columns ignore the missing data problem altogether and 
report the estimates from the full sample, where the identified missing values are multiple- imputed 
and averaged as in Lu et al. (2010). 
Potential aid smoothing effects are tested for by including lagged aid variables. Columns 1, 4, 7 report 
the estimates where contemporaneous values of aid variables are used. Columns 2, 5, 8 use the lagged 
value of aid. Columns 3, 6, 9 report results where both contemporaneous and lagged values of aid are 
included; if both were estimated to be significant (and positive), we could conclude that aid smoothing 
is taking place. UsŝŶŐsĂŶĚĞ^ŝũƉĞ ?ƐŚĞĂůƚŚĂŝĚĚŝƐĂŐŐƌĞŐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ǁĞĨŝŶĚŶŽĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞŽĨĂŝĚƐŵŽŽƚŚŝŶŐ
behaviour in key explanatory variables (on-budget health aid, SP, and off-budget aid, TC).  
 
Appendix Table B3: Van de Sijpe's Distinction (Lu et al. Model); only Health Aid Included, 
other Aid Excluded (Testing for Missing Data Effects) 
dĂďůĞ ƌĞƉŽƌƚƐ ĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞƐ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ŵŽĚĞůƐ ĂŶĚ ƐĂŵƉůĞƐ ĂƐ ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚ ĂďŽǀĞ  ?sĂŶ ĚĞ ^ŝũƉĞ ?Ɛ
disaggregation of health aid), omitting aid variables other than health aid (Columns 1,2,3), and then 
also omitting unclassified health aid variables (Columns 4,5,6). 
 
 
 Dependent variable: GHE- ?'W ?>ƵĞƚĂů ? ) ?sĂŶĚĞ^ŝũƉĞ ?ƐĚŝƐĂŐŐƌĞŐĂƚŝŽŶ ? 
  Health aid only Only on-/off-budget health aid 
 FE, vce (R)   a b c a b c 
  
N 
YO 
Fully obs.  
50 
500 
pooled 
107 
896 
all 
108 
1080 
Fully obs.  
50 
500 
pooled 
107 
896 
all 
108 
1080 
H
e
a
lt
h
 a
id
 
On-budget  
SP 
.3329 
(.3563) 
.5167 
(.3256) 
.3074 
(.2970) 
.2781 
(.3861) 
.5186 
(.3612) 
.3182 
(.3225) 
Off-budget 
TC 
-.0959 
(.1713) 
-.0352 
(.1161) 
-.0541 
(.1054) 
-.1473 
( .1519) 
-.0200 
(.1450) 
-.0307 
(.1399) 
Health IP 
(unclassified) 
.2712* 
(.1490) 
.3296*** 
(.0549) 
.3405*** 
(.0535) 
   
Health ONM  
(unclassified) 
.1641 
(.1602) 
.2352* 
(.1240) 
.2368** 
(.1103) 
   
 DR -.0466 
(.0518) 
-.0574 
(.0494) 
-.0089 
(.0466) 
-.0540 
(.0557) 
-.0592 
( .0535) 
-.0089 
(.0509) 
 Ln(GDPpc) -.0029 
(.0020) 
-.0031* 
(.0017) 
-.0012 
(.0012) 
-.0034 
(.0021) 
-.0041** 
(.0017) 
-.0020 
(.0012) 
 GGEGDPres -.0102 
(.0167) 
-.0116 
(.0142) 
-.0093 
(.0110) 
-.0092 
(.0166) 
-.0114 
(.0145) 
-.0082 
(.0111) 
 HIV .0456 
(.0394) 
.0422 
(.0344) 
.0406 
(.0323) 
.0420 
(.0400) 
.0400 
(.0355) 
.0392 
(.0334) 
 constant .0394*** 
(.0141) 
.0407*** 
(.0119) 
.0266*** 
(.0087) 
.0438*** 
(.0147) 
.0484*** 
(.0122) 
.0330*** 
(.0089) 
 R (w, b, o) 0.0465 
0.0117 
0.0053 
0.0691 
0.0124 
0.0071 
0.0518 
0.0002 
0.0016 
0.0350 
0.0309 
0.0191 
0.0411 
0.0354 
0.0313 
0.0202 
0.0114 
0.0074 
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Appendix Table B4: Correlations across Aid Variables (Van de Sijpe and Lu et al.) 
 
             | HealthSP   HealthTC HealthIP HealthON GenAID  s.t.NGOs otherAOD DAH-Gov  DAH-nGov 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Health SP    |   1.0000 
Health TC    |   0.4690   1.0000 
Health IP    |   0.2780   0.3657   1.0000 
Health ONM   |   0.2701   0.2740   0.2065   1.0000 
General Aid  |   0.4513   0.5327   0.2794   0.4304   1.0000 
Supp.to NGOs |   0.5649   0.5958   0.3169   0.4706   0.5482   1.0000 
Othernohealth|   0.5909   0.7313   0.4631   0.5116   0.6502   0.6726   1.0000 
   DAH-Gov   |   0.3606   0.4498   0.6267   0.5975   0.4357   0.4569   0.5035   1.0000 
   DAH-nonGov|   0.2189   0.1838   0.1629   0.5599   0.2958   0.3159   0.2278   0.4541   1.0000 
 
Appendix Table B5: Comparing Health Aid Disaggregation Strategies of Lu et al. and Van de 
Sijpe (Country and Time Fixed Effects) 
Dependent variable: GHE-A/GDP (Lu et al.) 
FE, vce I   I 
Lu et al. disaggr. 
II 
VDS disaggr. 
III 
VDS disaggr. 
IV 
VDS disaggr. 
On-budget:  
DAHG/Health SP                  
0.2773*** 0.6194** 0.4472 0.4489 
(0.0758) (0.2583) (0.2902) (0.3315) 
Off-budget: 
DAHnG/Health TC  
0.0555 0.0384 -0.0588 0.0373 
(0.1749) (0.1182) (0.1064) (0.1378) 
Health IP (unclassified) 
             
 0.4050*** 0.3718*** 
  (0.0569) (0.0552) 
 Health ONM 
(unclassified) 
              
0.1401 0.0922 
 
 
(0.1189) (0.1163) 
 General aid 
              
-0.0011 
  
 
(0.0197) 
  Support to NGOs 
 
-0.2736** 
               
 
(0.1206) 
  Other non-health aid 
 
-0.0054 
               
 
(0.0064) 
  Debt Relief   -0.0424 -0.0375 -0.0347 -0.0394 
             (0.0499) (0.0537) (0.0491) (0.0510) 
Ln(GDPpc)     -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0006 -0.0015 
             (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0013) 
GGEres   -0.0094 -0.0100 -0.0106 -0.0100 
             (0.0096) (0.0093) (0.0094) (0.0096) 
HIV      0.0225 0.0149 0.0183 0.0171 
             (0.0307) (0.0302) (0.0312) (0.0320) 
Country fixed effects 
Time Fixed effects 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
N            1080 1080 1080 1080 
R2         0.0901 0.1049 0.1000 0.0761 
Table reports fixed effects (country-clustered robust standard errors) estimation results using 
full sample (108 countries, 1995-2004), and contemporaneous values of health aid (and other 
variables). Standard errors reported in the parentheses. Time dummies are included.  
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Appendix Table B6: Comparing Health Aid Disaggregation Strategies of Lu et al. and Van de 
Sijpe (First-Differenced Data, One-Year Differences) 
Dependent variable: GHE-A/GDP (Lu et al.) [one-year differenced] 
 
I 
Lu et al. 
disaggr. 
II 
VDS disaggr. 
III 
VDS disaggr. 
IV 
VDS disaggr. 
D1_DAH-G 0.1093 
                (0.0667) 
   D1_DAH-nG -0.0397 
                (0.1455) 
   D1_healthSP 
 
0.1547 0.1267 0.1151 
             
 
(0.1236) (0.1062) (0.1047) 
D1_healthTC 
 
0.1155** 0.1268** 0.1168** 
             
 
(0.0503) (0.0513) (0.0470) 
D1_healthIP 
 
0.0903 0.0907 
              
 
(0.0721) (0.0677) 
 D1_healthONM 
 
0.0425 0.0571 
              
 
(0.0701) (0.0695) 
 D1_generalaid 
 
0.0044 
               
 
(0.0113) 
  D1_supportto NGOs 
 
-0.0943 
               
 
(0.0612) 
  D1_othersectoraid 
 
0.0018 
  D1_drdisgdp  -0.0049 -0.0038 0.0024 -0.0013 
             (0.0310) (0.0394) (0.0354) (0.0329) 
D1_l_gdppc   -0.0020* -0.0019 -0.0020 -0.0021* 
             (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
D1_ggegdpRES -0.0127 -0.0128 -0.0130 -0.0126 
             (0.0086) (0.0082) (0.0083) (0.0084) 
D1_hiv       0.0348 0.0344 0.0347 0.0334 
             (0.0370) (0.0378) (0.0375) (0.0374) 
             
 
(0.0022) 
  N            972 972 972 972 
r2_a         0.0108 0.0117 0.0129 0.0124 
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Appendix Table B7: Comparing Health Aid Disaggregation Strategies of Lu et al. and Van de 
Sijpe (First-Differenced Data, Two-Year Differences) 
Dependent variable: GHE-A/GDP (Lu et al.) [two year-differenced] 
 
I 
Lu et al. 
disaggr. 
II 
VDS disaggr. 
III 
VDS disaggr. 
IV 
VDS disaggr. 
D2_DAH-G       0.1693**                                                  
                 (0.0673)                                                    
D2_DAH-nG      -0.0973                                                    
                 (0.1620)                                                    
D2_healthSP                       0.1888          0.1348          0.1319    
                                 (0.3053)        (0.2796)        (0.2910)    
D2_healthTC                       0.0674          0.0973          0.1032    
                                 (0.1293)        (0.1121)        (0.1086)    
D2_healthIP                       0.1513*         0.1427                    
                                 (0.0894)        (0.0864)                    
D2_healthONM                       0.0363          0.0528                    
                                 (0.1200)        (0.1134)                    
D2_generalaid                       0.0038                                    
                                 (0.0193)                                    
D2_supporttoNOGs                      -0.1896                                    
                                 (0.1521)                                    
D2_othersectoraid                       0.0028                                    
                                 (0.0042)                                    
D2_drdisgdp        0.0090          0.0065          0.0149          0.0109    
                 (0.0356)        (0.0441)        (0.0371)        (0.0372)    
D2_l_gdppc        -0.0021*        -0.0019         -0.0019*        -0.0021*   
                 (0.0011)        (0.0012)        (0.0011)        (0.0011)    
D2_ggegdpRES      -0.0148         -0.0139         -0.0146         -0.0144    
                 (0.0091)        (0.0088)        (0.0091)        (0.0091)    
D2_hiv             0.0223          0.0208          0.0216          0.0200    
                 (0.0314)        (0.0325)        (0.0318)        (0.0319)    
N                864.0000        864.0000        864.0000        864.0000    
r2_a               0.0165          0.0146          0.0144          0.0120    
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Appendix Table B8: Comparing Health Aid Disaggregation Strategies of Lu et al. and Van de 
Sijpe (First-Differenced Data, Three-Year Differences) 
 Dependent variable: GHE-A/GDP (Lu et al.) [three year-differenced] 
             
I 
Lu et al. 
disaggr. 
II 
VDS disaggr. 
III 
VDS disaggr. 
IV 
VDS disaggr. 
D3_DAH-G       0.1718**                                                  
                 (0.0731)                                                    
D3_DAH-nG       0.0313                                                    
                 (0.1496)                                                    
D3_healthSP                       0.3461          0.1965          0.2086    
                                 (0.3759)        (0.3557)        (0.3693)    
D3_healthTC                       0.0562         -0.0164          0.0223    
                                 (0.1303)        (0.1184)        (0.1197)    
D3_healthIP                       0.2645***       0.2366***                 
                                 (0.0775)        (0.0742)                    
D3_healthONM                       0.1072          0.0565                    
                                 (0.1049)        (0.1070)                    
D3_generalaid                      -0.0006                                    
                                 (0.0187)                                    
D3_supporttoNGOs                      -0.0623                                    
                                 (0.1685)                                    
D3_othersectoraid                      -0.0070                                    
                                 (0.0075)                                    
D3_drdisgdp       -0.0258         -0.0200         -0.0220         -0.0248    
                 (0.0516)        (0.0526)        (0.0504)        (0.0523)    
D3_l_gdppc        -0.0014         -0.0014         -0.0013         -0.0017    
                 (0.0012)        (0.0012)        (0.0012)        (0.0012)    
D3_ggegdpRES      -0.0125         -0.0132         -0.0132         -0.0131    
                 (0.0096)        (0.0097)        (0.0096)        (0.0097)    
D3_hiv             0.0164          0.0117          0.0140          0.0131    
                 (0.0271)        (0.0272)        (0.0277)        (0.0280)    
N                756.0000        756.0000        756.0000        756.0000    
r2_a               0.0128          0.0137          0.0148          0.0059    
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Appendix Table B9: Sensitivity Check on GGE Alteration and Inclusion of Second Lag of Aid 
(Lu et al. Data only) 
Dependent variable: GHE-A/GDP 
       
GHE-A/GDP 
(IMF) 
FE, Lu 
(DAHG, 
DAHNG) 
FE, Lu 
lagged 
Fe, Lu 
L2 
lagged 
FE, Lu 
lagged 
and no 
lagged 
  
       
DAH-G .361*** 
(.076) 
  .264*** 
(.085) 
 .281*** 
(.081) 
DAH-G, 
Lagged 
 .311*** 
(.099) 
 .141 
(.105) 
.280*** 
(.095) 
.112 
(.089) 
DAH-G, 
 L2 
  .178 
(.132) 
 .006 
(.099) 
-.045 
(.109) 
DAH-nG .097 
(.168) 
  -.016 
(.1755) 
 -.052 
(.177) 
DAH-nG, 
Lagged 
 .389* 
(.224) 
 .209 
(.173) 
.225 
(.188) 
.075 
(.156) 
DAH-nG, 
L2 
  .474 
(.309) 
 .218 
(.228) 
.188 
(.200) 
DR -.038 
(.043) 
.004 
(.032) 
.028 
(.018) 
.000 
(.032) 
.013 
(.022) 
.010 
(.022) 
Log(GDPpc) -.001 
(.001) 
-.001 
(.001) 
-.002 
(.001) 
-.001 
(.001) 
-.001 
(.001) 
-.001 
(.001) 
GGE/GDP .026*** 
(0.001) 
.025*** 
(.009) 
.025*** 
(.009) 
.025*** 
(.008) 
.025*** 
(.008) 
.024*** 
(.008) 
HIV .048 
(.031) 
.036 
(.037) 
.046 
(.035) 
.037 
(.036) 
.049 
(.034) 
.050 
(.033) 
constant .018** 
(.008) 
.021** 
(.009) 
.025*** 
(.009) 
.018** 
(.008) 
.022*** 
(.008) 
.019** 
(.008) 
R2 (w, b, o) W=0.0794 
B=0.0671 
O=0.0681 
0.0620; 
0.0371; 
0.0392 
0.0441; 
0.0232; 
0.0240 
0.0750; 
0.0659; 
0.0668 
0.0629; 
0.0364; 
0.0378 
0.0802; 
0.0660; 
0.0668 
YO; N=108 1080 972 864 972 864 864 
Table demonstrates that is sensitivity of the results if GHE-A is not removed from GGE. 
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Appendix Table B10: Sensitivity of Lu et al. Findings to Minor Sample Change and Change 
in Estimator  
Dependent variable: GHE-S/GDP 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM (xtabond2) 
Group variable: countryid                       Number of obs      =       972 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       108 
Number of instruments = 104                     Obs per group: min =         9 
Wald chi2(6)  =     43.45                                      avg =      9.00 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         9 
             |               Robust 
ghegdp_imf_s |      Coef.   Std. Err.      Z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ghegdp_imf_s | 
         L1. |  -.1014749   .0733773    -1.38   0.167    -.2452918    .0423421 
             | 
  DAH-G/GDP  |  -.6492609   .1195594    -5.43   0.000    -.8835931   -.4149287 
  DAH-nG/GDP |  -.0552009   .1827446    -0.30   0.763    -.4133737    .3029718 
    drdisgdp |    -.06056    .057819    -1.05   0.295    -.1738831    .0527632 
       gdppc |   3.33e-07   7.95e-07     0.42   0.676    -1.23e-06    1.89e-06 
      ggegdp |   .0160934   .0132397     1.22   0.224     -.009856    .0420427 
         hiv |   .0464201   .0467602     0.99   0.321    -.0452281    .1380684 
       _cons |   .0163449   .0032589     5.02   0.000     .0099575    .0227323 
 
Fixed effects 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      1080 
Group variable: countryid                       Number of groups   =       108 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.1094                         Obs per group: min =        10 
       between = 0.1983                                        avg =      10.0 
       overall = 0.1819                                        max =        10 
 
                                                F(6,107)           =     10.34 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.1506                         Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
                            (Std. Err. adjusted for 108 clusters in countryid) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
ghegdp_imf_s |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   DAH-G/GDP |  -.5201887   .0717725    -7.25   0.000    -.6624693   -.3779082 
  DAH-nG/GDP |    .145877   .1577036     0.93   0.357    -.1667521    .4585061 
    drdisgdp |  -.0233904   .0357358    -0.65   0.514    -.0942325    .0474516 
       gdppc |   1.09e-07   2.43e-07     0.45   0.655    -3.73e-07    5.91e-07 
      ggegdp |   .0278818   .0075316     3.70   0.000     .0129512    .0428124 
         hiv |    .037628    .027434     1.37   0.173    -.0167567    .0920128 
       _cons |   .0129522   .0012911    10.03   0.000     .0103927    .0155117 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .00987887 
     sigma_e |  .00446321 
         rho |  .83048387   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Sensitivity of Lu et al. finding to minor sample change (to 1995-2004, losing 2 years) and three 
countries removed. The upper section reports results from the original estimator, xtabond2. The lower 
section reports country-fixed effects estimates.  Lu et al. (2010) findings are sensitive to this sample 
reduction; their core IMF results would be altered such that DAH-nG has no significant effect on GHE-
S, and GGE would no longer be significant). Contrary to the original findings, GHE-A does not grow 
with the rest of GGE. 
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Appendix C 
Appendix Table C1: Residual Tests from Unrestricted VAR (Disaggregated Aid Model) 
Tests for Autocorrelation 
LM(1):                ChiSqr(25)  =  30.981 [0.190] 
LM(2):                ChiSqr(25)  =  29.974 [0.225] 
LM(3):                ChiSqr(25)  =  32.086 [0.156] 
LM(4):                ChiSqr(25)  =  17.479 [0.864] 
 
Test for ARCH: 
LM(1):                ChiSqr(225) = 218.679 [0.606] 
LM(2):                ChiSqr(450) = 483.740 [0.131] 
LM(3):                ChiSqr(675) = 689.582 [0.340] 
LM(4):                ChiSqr(900) = 675.000 [1.000] 
 
Univariate Statistics 
 
          Mean    Std.Dev Skewness  Kurtosis Maximum   Minimum 
DL_TEXP    -0.000  0.069      0.323   2.491      0.161  -0.140 
DL_TAX      0.000  0.086     -0.212   3.874      0.191  -0.264 
DL_NTAX    -0.000  0.185     -0.125   2.438      0.354  -0.403 
DL_GRANTS   0.000  0.250     -0.425   3.482      0.510  -0.702 
DL_LOANS    0.000  0.339      0.193   2.437      0.795  -0.657 
 
          ARCH(2)         Normality          R-Squared 
DL_TEXP     0.078 [0.962]     1.402  [0.496]     0.677 
DL_TAX      1.408 [0.495]     4.547  [0.103]     0.571 
DL_NTAX     3.078 [0.215]     0.310  [0.856]     0.509 
DL_GRANTS   0.114 [0.945]     2.566  [0.277]     0.511 
DL_LOANS    2.578 [0.276]     0.599  [0.741]     0.518        
 
 
 
Appendix Table C2: Parameter Constancy Tests of Unrestricted VAR (k=2) 
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Appendix Table C3: Simulation of the Asymptotic Trace Test Distribution 
Deterministic specification  : Unrestricted Constant (DRIFT) 
Level Shifts (2)             : 1991:01 (0.600) 1974:01 (0.222) 
Number of Replications (N)   : 2500 
Length of Random Walks (T)   : 400 
 
Quantiles of the Simulated Rank Test Distribution 
 p-r r  Mean   S.E.   50%    75%    80%     85    90%    95% 
  5  0 58.617 10.052 58.135 65.396 67.284 69.383 71.789 75.445 
  4  1 39.213  8.459 38.395 44.636 46.095 48.066 50.244 54.154 
  3  2 23.243  6.861 22.499 27.299 28.671 30.263 32.258 35.865 
  2  3 10.956  4.491 10.305 13.485 14.408 15.503 16.910 19.076 
  1  4  1.963  1.939  1.364  2.722  3.221  3.782  4.611  5.855 
 
I(1)-ANALYSIS 
 p-r r Eig.Value  Trace  Trace* Frac95 P-Value P-Value* 
  5  0     0.561 102.992 89.825 75.445   0.000    0.003 
  4  1     0.459  65.973 57.488 54.154   0.003    0.025 
  3  2     0.364  38.306 34.598 35.865   0.026    0.062 
  2  3     0.265  17.927 15.413 19.076   0.075    0.155 
  1  4     0.087   4.095  3.549  5.855   0.123    0.163 
 
Appendix Table C4: Additional Information for Rank Determination 
UVAR estimates (Alpha coefficients) 
@cats(lags=2,det=drift,break=level) 1963:1 2009:1 
# L_TEXP L_TAX L_NTAX L_GRANTS L_LOANS 
# 1991:1 1974:1 
 
CATS for RATS version 2 - 03/01/2013 16:16 
 
MODEL SUMMARY 
Sample:                      1963:01 to 2009:01 (47 observations) 
Effective Sample:            1965:01 to 2009:01 (45 observations) 
Obs. - No. of variables:     30 
System variables:            L_TEXP L_TAX L_NTAX L_GRANTS L_LOANS 
Shift-dummy series:          C(1991:01) C(1974:01) 
Constant/Trend:              Unrestricted Constant 
Lags in VAR:                 2 
 
I(2) analysis not available for the specified model. 
 
The unrestricted estimates: 
BETA(transposed) 
        L_TEXP L_TAX  L_NTAX L_GRANTS L_LOANS C(1991:01) C(1974:01) 
Beta(1) 14.465 -7.072 -0.404   -3.874  -1.650     -0.124     -4.601 
Beta(2)  8.717 -8.519 -4.150    2.553   0.633     -1.438      1.858 
Beta(3) -2.545  0.733  1.434    0.973   1.143     -2.914     -1.702 
Beta(4) -0.769  4.787 -1.412   -2.337   1.691      0.801     -2.027 
Beta(5)  2.256  1.985 -1.981   -1.542  -0.203     -1.098      0.711 
 
ALPHA 
       Alpha(1) Alpha(2) Alpha(3) Alpha(4) Alpha(5) 
DL_TEX  -0.023   -0.044   -0.033   -0.000   -0.004 
       (-2.267) (-4.303) (-3.197) (-0.014) (-0.356) 
DL_TAX   0.018    0.010   -0.046    0.016   -0.016 
        (1.427)  (0.764) (-3.564)  (1.276) (-1.235) 
DL_NTA  -0.119    0.024   -0.077    0.015    0.033 
       (-4.340)  (0.877) (-2.812)  (0.536)  (1.185) 
DL_GRA   0.122   -0.090   -0.073    0.075    0.039 
        (3.282) (-2.416) (-1.966)  (2.004)  (1.060) 
DL_LOA   0.114   -0.123   -0.144   -0.131    0.017 
        (2.257) (-2.430) (-2.851) (-2.597)  (0.327) 
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PI 
        L_TEXP   L_TAX    L_NTAX  L_GRANTS L_LOANS  C(1991:01) C(1974:01) 
DL_TEX  -0.650    0.512    0.154   -0.049   -0.027      0.167      0.079 
       (-3.651)  (4.048)  (2.962) (-0.859) (-0.956)    (4.586)    (1.350) 
DL_TAX   0.418   -0.199   -0.105   -0.104   -0.045      0.147     -0.033 
        (1.890) (-1.270) (-1.631) (-1.475) (-1.307)    (3.260)   (-0.449) 
DL_NTA  -1.258    0.718   -0.248    0.364    0.142      0.182      0.719 
       (-2.651)  (2.129) (-1.792)  (2.405)  (1.909)    (1.873)    (4.612) 
DL_GRA   1.202    0.284    0.036   -1.010   -0.224      0.344     -0.729 
        (1.871)  (0.623)  (0.190) (-4.924) (-2.223)    (2.621)   (-3.449) 
DL_LOA   1.084   -0.461    0.410   -0.614   -0.656      0.459     -0.230 
        (1.244) (-0.745)  (1.610) (-2.207) (-4.794)    (2.576)   (-0.803) 
Moduli of the roots of the companion matrix 
Rank Root 1 Root 2 Root 3 Root 4 Root 5 Root 6 Root 7 Root 8 Root 9 
Rank=5 0.971    0.633    0.633     0.605     0.605     0.593     0.593     0.300     0.300     
Rank=4 1.000     0.672     0.672     0.591    0.591    0.587     0.587     0.289     0.289     
Rank=3 1.000     1.000     0.690     0.562    0.562    0.525     0.525     0.395    0.376     
Rank=2 1.000     1.000     1.000     0.584    0.584    0.554     0.554     0.401    0.401    
Rank=1 1.000     1.000     1.000     1.000     0.505    0.505    0.323 0.307     0.307     
Rank=0 1.000     1.000     1.000     1.000     1.000     0.454    0.454    0.289    0.289    
 
Recursive Estimation Trade Test Statistic 
 
Graphs of Cointegrating Relations 
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Non-tax 
 
Grants 
 
Loans 
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Appendix Table C5: Univariate Stationarity Tests 
TEST OF STATIONARITY 
LR-test, Chi-Square(5-r), P-values in brackets. 
 
 r  DGF  5% C.V. L_TEXP   L_TAX  L_NTAX  L_GRANTS L_LOANS 
 1   4    9.488  21.021  24.328  16.523   22.114  18.204 
                 [0.000] [0.000] [0.002]  [0.000] [0.001] 
 2   3    7.815  12.200  14.988   7.902   12.811   8.954 
                 [0.007] [0.002] [0.048]  [0.005] [0.030] 
 3   2    5.991   4.926   7.741   0.872    5.646   1.984 
                 [0.085] [0.021] [0.647]  [0.059] [0.371] 
 4   1    3.841   4.953   7.560   0.727    4.760   0.658 
                 [0.026] [0.006] [0.394]  [0.029] [0.417] 
 
Restricted Shift-Dummies included 
in the cointegrating relation(s) 
 
TEST OF STATIONARITY 
LR-test, Chi-Square(7-r), P-values in brackets. 
 
 r  DGF  5% C.V. L_TEXP   L_TAX  L_NTAX  L_GRANTS L_LOANS 
 1   6   12.592  32.274  32.239  32.214   32.951  29.707 
                 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000] 
 2   5   11.070  23.096  22.889  23.099   23.642  20.372 
                 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.001] 
 3   4    9.488  15.811  15.685  16.145   16.498  13.153 
                 [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]  [0.002] [0.011] 
 4   3    7.815   9.565   9.481  10.492   10.350   7.037 
                 [0.023] [0.024] [0.015]  [0.016] [0.071] 
 
DF GLS 
Results of Dickey-Fuller GLS test for trend-stationarity: logs 
 
Variable 1 lag 2 lag 3 lag 4 lag 5 lag 
Total expenditure -2.05 -2.02 -2.16 -1.72 -2.26 
Capital expenditure -2.33 -2.20 -2.18 -2.33 -1.96 
Recurrent expenditure -2.79 -2.69 -2.91 -2.39 -3.24 
Tax revenue -1.02 -1.28 -1.13 -1.00 -0.89 
Nontax revenue -2.55 -2.65 -3.33 -2.87 -2.41 
Loans -3.91 -2.96 -3.65 -3.04 -2.56 
Critical values (5%): 3.223 -3.176 -3.120 -3.059 -2.993 

             H0: non trend-stationarity 
 
Appendix Table C6: Parameter Constancy Tests of Over-identified Model 
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Appendix Table C7: Alternative System: Short Run Results (Parsimonious Structure) ȟܿ݁ݔ݌H?ൌ െ ?Ǥ ? ?ȟܿ݁ݔ݌H?H?H?൅  ?Ǥ ? ?ܥܫ ?H?H?H?െ  ?Ǥ ? ?ܥܫ ?H?H?H?െ  ?Ǥ ? ?݀ݑ݉ ? ? ? ?݌ ൅  ?Ǥ ? ?݀ݑ݉ ? ? ? ?݌ 
                              (-3.13)          (4.02)              (-3.68)            (-3.62)                 (1.70) 
 ȟݎ݁ݔ݌H?ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ?ȟH?H?H?൅  ?Ǥ ? ? ?H?H?H?൅  ?Ǥ ? ? ?H?H?H?െ  ?Ǥ ? ? ?H?H?H?൅  ?Ǥ ? ?݀ݑ݉ ? ? ? ?݌ 
                             (3.90)              (7.25)             (5.38)             (-7.11)             (1.86) 
 ȟ݀݋݉ݎ݁ݒH?ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ?ܥܫ ?H?H?H?െ  ?Ǥ ? ?݀ݑ݉ ? ? ? ?݌ 
                                                                  (3.63)            (-3.17)     
 ȟ݃ݎܽ݊ݐݏH?ൌ െ ?Ǥ ? ?ȟܿ݁ݔ݌H?H?H?൅  ?Ǥ ? ?ȟݎ݁ݔ݌H?H?H?൅  ?Ǥ ? ?ܥܫ ?H?H?H?൅  ?Ǥ ? ?ܥܫ ?H?H?H? 
                                            (-3.34)              (2.75)              (5.15)             (1.94) 
 ȟ݈݋ܽ݊ݏH?ൌ  െ ?Ǥ ? ?ȟܿ݁ݔ݌H?H?H?൅  ?Ǥ ? ?ܥܫ ?H?H?H?െ  ?Ǥ ? ?݀ݑ݉ ? ? ? ?݌ 
                                                   (-3.31)              (2.37)                 (-1.83) 
 
LR test of over-identifying restrictions: Chi^2(31) =   22.956 [0.8507]   
BFGS using analytical derivatives (eps1=0.0001; eps2=0.005): 
Strong convergence 
 
correlation of structural residuals (standard deviations on diagonal) 
                  D_L_CEXP     D_L_REXP   D_L_DOMREV   D_L_GRANTS    D_L_LOANS 
D_L_CEXP           0.19032      0.24358      0.58971      0.50103      0.55183 
D_L_REXP           0.24358     0.082380      0.39629    -0.057387      0.45842 
D_L_DOMREV         0.58971      0.39629      0.12014      0.19295      0.27043 
D_L_GRANTS         0.50103    -0.057387      0.19295      0.28888      0.31010 
D_L_LOANS          0.55183      0.45842      0.27043      0.31010      0.45434 
The generically (just-identified) short run structure is heavily over-parameterised. Here we report a 
parsimonious system, where the estimated coefficients with small (in absolute terms) t-statistics (p-
value < 0.10) were set to zero (subject to passing a LR test). [30 restrictions]. Accepted with a p value 
0.5.  Since there are some non-negligible correlation coefficients in the residual covariance matrix, the 
interpretation of the short-run equations as causal relationships should be taken with caution. 
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Appendix D 
Appendix Table D1: Data Graphs (Tanzania) 
  
  
Variables in (logged) levels and their first differences 
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 Appendix Table D2: Testing for Trend in Cointegrating Space 
TEST OF EXCLUSION 
 r  DGF  5% C.V. L_TEXP   L_TAX   L_AID  C(1986:01)  TREND 
 1   1    3.841   0.633   3.630   4.714      0.169   0.135 
                 [0.426] [0.057] [0.030]    [0.681] [0.714] 
 2   2    5.991  18.939  22.134  22.305      6.600   2.981 
                 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]    [0.037] [0.225] 
 
Appendix Table D3: Unrestricted VAR Estimates 
 
@cats(lags=2,det=drift,break=level,dum) 1966:1 2012:1 
# L_TEXP L_TAX L_AID 
# 1986:1 
# dum96p CATS for RATS version 2 - 07/18/2014 12:08 
 
MODEL SUMMARY 
Sample:                      1966:01 to 2012:01 (47 observations) 
Effective Sample:            1968:01 to 2012:01 (45 observations) 
Obs. - No. of variables:     35 
System variables:            L_TEXP L_TAX L_AID 
Shift-dummy series:          C(1986:01) 
Dummy-series:                DUM96P{0} 
Constant/Trend:              Unrestricted Constant 
Lags in VAR:                 2 
 
I(2) analysis not available for the specified model. 
 
The unrestricted estimates: 
BETA(transposed) 
        L_TEXP L_TAX  L_AID C(1986:01) 
Beta(1)  1.512 -4.391 1.669     -1.297 
Beta(2) -7.780  7.389 1.650     -1.749 
Beta(3)  0.519 -1.745 0.501      1.988 
 
ALPHA 
       Alpha(1) Alpha(2) Alpha(3) 
DL_TEX  -0.046    0.037    0.021 
       (-3.071)  (2.442)  (1.420) 
DL_TAX   0.011   -0.045    0.022 
        (0.744) (-3.029)  (1.484) 
DL_AID  -0.321    0.014    0.027 
       (-6.708)  (0.292)  (0.574) 
 
PI 
        L_TEXP   L_TAX    L_AID   C(1986:01) 
DL_TEX  -0.344    0.436   -0.006      0.038 
       (-2.884)  (3.313) (-0.159)    (0.860) 
DL_TAX   0.380   -0.421   -0.045      0.109 
        (3.206) (-3.220) (-1.256)    (2.470) 
DL_AID  -0.580    1.466   -0.499      0.447 
       (-1.526)  (3.490) (-4.344)    (3.165) 
 
Log-Likelihood = 273.719 
 
RESIDUAL ANALYSIS 
 
Residual S.E. and Cross-Correlations 
         DL_TEXP     DL_TAX     DL_AID 
        0.10067445 0.10002541 0.32126552 
DL_TEXP   1.000 
DL_TAX    0.275      1.000 
DL_AID    0.675      0.111      1.000 
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LOG(|Sigma|)                      = -12.165 
Information Criteria: SC          =  -9.628 
                      H-Q         = -10.383 
Trace Correlation                 =   0.480 
Tests for Autocorrelation 
Ljung-Box(11):        ChiSqr(81)  = 146.090 [0.000] 
LM(1):                ChiSqr(9)   =   8.583 [0.477] 
LM(2):                ChiSqr(9)   =  17.212 [0.045] 
LM(3):                ChiSqr(9)   =  14.499 [0.106] 
LM(4):                ChiSqr(9)   =   9.147 [0.424] 
Test for Normality:   ChiSqr(6)   =   3.335 [0.766] 
Test for ARCH: 
LM(1):                ChiSqr(36)  =  25.975 [0.891] 
LM(2):                ChiSqr(72)  =  65.830 [0.682] 
LM(3):                ChiSqr(108) = 111.034 [0.401] 
LM(4):                ChiSqr(144) = 152.011 [0.308] 
Univariate Statistics 
        Mean    Std.Dev Skewness  Kurtosis Maximum   Minimum 
DL_TEXP  -0.000  0.101      0.080   2.228      0.192  -0.192 
DL_TAX   -0.000  0.100     -0.313   3.533      0.214  -0.259 
DL_AID   -0.000  0.321     -0.130   2.677      0.753  -0.781 
        ARCH(2)         Normality          R-Squared 
DL_TEXP   0.763 [0.683]     0.798  [0.671]     0.440 
DL_TAX    0.484 [0.785]     2.698  [0.260]     0.310 
DL_AID    0.462 [0.794]     0.171  [0.918]     0.682 
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Appendix Figure D1: Residual Plots (UVAR) 
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Appendix Table D4: Additional Information for Determination of Cointegration Rank 
Trace test statistics (recursive estimation) 
 
Moduli of the roots of the companion matrix 
Rank Root 1 Root 2 Root 3 Root 4 Root 5 Root 6 
Rank=3 0.990 0.497 0.497 0.359 0.223 0.223 
Rank=2 1.000 0.484 0.484 0.443 0.241 0.241 
Rank=1 1.000 1.000 0.507 0.265 0.265 0.190 
Rank=0 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.410 0.253 0.166 
 
Alpha matrix coefficients (UVAR) 
 L_TEXP L_TAX L_AID 
ůĨĂŵĂƚƌŝǆĐŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƐ ?ɲ1) -0.046 
(-3.071) 
0.011 
(0.744) 
-0.321 
(-6.708) 
ůĨĂŵĂƚƌŝǆĐŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƐ ?ɲ2) 0.037 
(2.442) 
-0.045 
(-3.029) 
0.014 
(0.292) 
ůĨĂŵĂƚƌŝǆĐŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƐ ?ɲ3) 0.021 
(1.420) 
0.022 
(1.484) 
0.027 
(0.574) 
 
Graphs of cointegrating relationships (UVAR) 
 
Pi matrix from UVAR with r=2 
        L_TEXP   L_TAX    L_AID   C(1986:01) 
DL_TEX  -0.355    0.473   -0.016     -0.004 
       (-2.919)  (3.589) (-0.456)   (-0.129) 
DL_TAX   0.368   -0.383   -0.056      0.065 
        (3.042) (-2.914) (-1.563)    (1.943) 
DL_AID  -0.595    1.514   -0.513      0.392 
       (-1.561)  (3.665) (-4.548)    (3.748) 
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Appendix Table D5: Alternative Identification of the Aggregated Model 
Aggregate model: not identified 
 texp tax aid Shift 1986  
LR equilibrium reůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ɴ1) 1.512 
 
-4.391 1.669     -1.297 ~I(0) 
>ZĞƋƵŝůŝďƌŝƵŵƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ɴ2) -7.780   7.389 1.650     -1.749 ~I(0) 
ĚũƵƐƚŵĞŶƚĐŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƐ ?ɲ1) 0.202    
(3.005) 
-0.049 
(-0.727)      
1.411 
(6.684)     
  
ĚũƵƐƚŵĞŶƚĐŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƐ ?ɲ2) -0.285 
(-2.389) 
0.351 
(2.958) 
-0.109 
(-0.291) 
  
Multivariate normality p-value = 0.862 
Trace correlation 0.463 
Aggregate model: just identified 
 texp tax aid Shift 1986  
>ZĞƋƵŝůŝďƌŝƵŵƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ɴ1) 1.000    -1.265 
(-20.733)    
0.000      0.050 
(0.837) 
~I(0) 
LR equiliďƌŝƵŵƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ɴ2) 0.000    -1.485 
(-8.594)    
1.000     -0.823 
(-4.842) 
~I(0) 
ĚũƵƐƚŵĞŶƚĐŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƐ ?ɲ1) -0.355 
(-2.919)     
0.368 
(3.042)     
-0.595 
(-1.561)     
  
ĚũƵƐƚŵĞŶƚĐŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƐ ?ɲ2) -0.016 
(-0.456) 
-0.056 
(-1.563) 
-0.513 
(-4.548) 
  
Multivariate normality p-value = 0.862 
Trace correlation 0.463 
 
Aggregated model: (over-)identified 
 texp tax aid Shift 1986  
>ZĞƋƵŝůŝďƌŝƵŵƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ɴ1) 1.000    -1.251 
(-20.744)    
0.000      0.000 ~I(0) 
>ZĞƋƵŝůŝďƌŝƵŵƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ɴ2) 0.000    -1.471 
(-8.455)    
1.000     -0.872 
(-5.472) 
~I(0) 
ĚũƵƐƚŵĞŶƚĐŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƐ ?ɲ1) -0.368 
(-3.102)     
0.337 
(2.780)     
-0.596 
(-1.590)     
  
ĚũƵƐƚŵĞŶƚĐŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƐ ?ɲ2) -0.010 
(-0.289) 
-0.057 
(-1.543) 
-0.499 
(-4.394) 
  
Multivariate normality p-value = 0.843 
Test of restricted model  p-value = 0.481 
Trace correlation 0.463 
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Appendix Figure D2: Plots of Cointegrating Relationships (Over-identified Aggregated 
Model) 
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Appendix Figure D3: UVAR Residuals (Model with Disaggregated Expenditures) 
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Appendix Table D6: Additional Information for Rank Determination (Model with 
Disaggregated Expenditures) 
Moduli of the roots of the companion matrix 
Rank Root 1 Root 2 Root 3 Root 4 Root 5 Root 6 Root 7 Root 8 
Rank=4 1.106     0.579     0.579     0.421    0.421    0.401    0.401    0.175     
Rank=3 1.000     0.548    0.548    0.420    0.420    0.378    0.259    0.259    
Rank=2 1.000     1.000     0.392    0.392    0.307     0.307     0.238     0.238     
Rank=1 1.000     1.000     1.000     0.338     0.338     0.316     0.308    0.082     
Rank=0 1.000     1.000     1.000     1.000     0.351     0.351    0.236    0.229     
 
Trace test statistics (recursive estimation) 
 
Alpha matrix coefficients (UVAR) 
 L_DEXP L_REXP L_TAX L_AID 
Alfa matrix coefficients (ɲ1) 0.233     
(5.793)   
-0.052 
(-3.802)      
-0.001 
(-0.074)     
-0.014 
(-0.309)      
ůĨĂŵĂƚƌŝǆĐŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƐ ?ɲ2) 0.230 
(5.736)     
0.029  
(2.073)      
-0.029 
(-2.045)     
0.308    
(6.985) 
ůĨĂŵĂƚƌŝǆĐŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƐ ?ɲ3) -0.050 
(-1.249)     
0.027 
(1.955)      
-0.040  
(-2.856)     
-0.095  
(-2.168)     
ůĨĂŵĂƚƌŝǆĐŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƐ ?ɲ4) 0.053 
(1.326) 
0.035 
(2.538) 
0.034 
(2.388) 
0.034 
(0.764) 
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Appendix Table D7: Individual Hypothesis Testing (Model with Disaggregated 
Expenditures) 
 
 
 
Appendix Table D8: Alternative Identification of the Model with Disaggregated 
Expenditures 
Alternatively, this system could be identified along the domestic/foreign funded motivation. 
dŚĞ ĨŝƌƐƚ ĐŽŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŶŐ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ǁŽƵůĚ ƐƵŵŵĂƌŝƐĞ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐ ? Ğquilibrium (aid 
excluded), where both development and recurrent expenditures would be positively related 
to tax revenue, with development expenditures adjusting more quickly (than recurrent 
revenue) to equilibrium error (although aid, excluded from the beta, indicates a very strong 
adjustment behaviour). The second equilibrium could be identified as expenditure-aid 
relationship, with aid positively related to development expenditures in the long run, and 
negatively associated to the recurrent spending.  
 
THE MATRICES BASED ON 2 COINTEGRATING VECTORS: 
 
BETA(transposed) 
         L_DEXP   L_REXP   L_TAX   L_AID C(1986:01)  TREND 
Beta(1)    1.000   0.645   -1.848  0.000     1.397   -0.039 
           (.NA)  (1.535) (-5.758) (.NA)    (3.143) (-1.595) 
Beta(2)   -1.892   1.816    0.000  1.000    -1.787   -0.030 
        (-20.802) (4.847)   (.NA)  (.NA)   (-4.144) (-1.244) 
ALPHA 
       Alpha(1) Alpha(2) 
DL_DEX  -0.680   -0.049 
       (-5.720) (-0.478) 
DL_REX  -0.077   -0.139 
       (-1.754) (-3.668) 
DL_TAX   0.082    0.052 
        (1.789)  (1.302) 
DL_AID  -0.878   -0.595 
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       (-6.595) (-5.162) 
PI 
        L_DEXP   L_REXP   L_TAX    L_AID   C(1986:01)  TREND 
DL_DEX  -0.587   -0.528    1.257   -0.049     -0.863    0.028 
       (-4.339) (-2.125)  (5.720) (-0.478)   (-6.641)  (3.867) 
DL_REX   0.186   -0.301    0.141   -0.139      0.141    0.007 
        (3.741) (-3.301)  (1.754) (-3.668)    (2.954)  (2.708) 
DL_TAX  -0.016    0.147   -0.152    0.052      0.022   -0.005 
       (-0.303)  (1.532) (-1.789)  (1.302)    (0.444) (-1.708) 
DL_AID   0.248   -1.647    1.623   -0.595     -0.163    0.052 
        (1.640) (-5.919)  (6.595) (-5.162)   (-1.121)  (6.452) 
 
Appendix Figure D4: Residuals from UVAR (Model with Borrowing) 
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Appendix Table D9: Additional Information for Rank Determination (Model with 
Borrowing) 
Trace test statistics (recursive estimation) 
 
Moduli of the roots of the companion matrix 
Rank Root 1 Root 2 Root 3 Root 4 Root 5 Root 6 Root 7 Root 8 
Rank=4 1.047     0.604     0.496    0.496    0.290    0.290    0.242     0.242     
Rank=3 1.000     0.710    0.518     0.518     0.325     0.325     0.242     0.242     
Rank=2 1.000     1.000     0.595     0.375     0.317     0.317     0.246     0.154    
Rank=1 1.000     1.000     1.000     0.629    0.327     0.258     0.258    0.170     
Rank=0 1.000     1.000     1.000     1.000     0.481     0.408     0.235     0.172     
 
Alpha matrix coefficients (UVAR) 
 L_TEXP L_TAX L_AID L_BORROWpos 
ůĨĂŵĂƚƌŝǆĐŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƐ ?ɲ1) -0.038    
(-2.794) 
-0.012 
(-0.835)     
-0.050 
(-1.096)     
-0.422 
(-13.536)       
ůĨĂŵĂƚƌŝǆĐŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƐ ?ɲ2) -0.052    
(-3.806) 
0.013     
(0.914)   
-0.331  
(-7.233)     
0.026  
(0.831)    
ůĨĂŵĂƚƌŝǆĐŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƐ ?ɲ3) -0.030  
(-2.210)     
0.051  
(3.623)      
0.012  
(0.253)      
-0.087  
(-2.798) 
ůĨĂŵĂƚƌŝǆĐŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƐ ?ɲ4) 0.022 
(1.576) 
0.023 
(1.615) 
0.021 
(0.450) 
-0.014 
(-0.440) 
 
(Potential) CI relations 
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Appendix Figure D5: Cointegrating Vectors (Over-identified Model with Borrowing) 
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Appendix Table D10: Alternative Over-identified Model with Borrowing 
Alternatively, this model could be identified as a system where the first cointegrating 
relationship describes a very long run equilibrium between expenditure and tax revenue, 
with all variables adjusting to departures from such equilibrium; and the second one 
describes long-run interactions between the revenue variables: tax is positively associated 
with both aid and borrowing in the long run, and aid and borrowing can be regarded as 
substitutes. The key difference form the identification in the main text is that now the most 
adjusting variable to the second cointegrating vector is borrowing rather than aid.  
 
 texp tax aid borrow Shift 
1986 
Trend  
>ZĞƋƵŝůŝďƌŝƵŵƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ɴ1) 1.000 -1.000    0.000        0.000  
 
0.320  
(3.899)         
-0.015 
(-4.647) 
~I(0) 
>ZĞƋƵŝůŝďƌŝƵŵƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ɴ2) 0.000   1.000   -0.154  
(-2.886)        
-0.929  
(-14.537)         
0.300  
(1.708)    
-0.023 
(-2.847) 
~I(0) 
Adjustment coefficients 
 ?ɲ1) 
-0.328 
(-3.013)      
0.322 
 (2.717)     
-1.715 
(-3.993)      
0.962 
(3.654)      
   
Adjustment coefficients 
 ?ɲ2) 
0.098 
(3.234) 
0.015 
(0.448) 
0.179 
(1.496) 
0.914 
(12.458) 
   
Multivariate normality 0.017 
Test of restricted model  0.100 
Trace correlation 0.550 
 
 
 
 
  
Beta1'*Z1(t)
1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
-0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
Beta1'*R1(t)
1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
Beta2'*Z1(t)
1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010
-1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
Beta2'*R1(t)
1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
Appendix E Emilija Timmis 
233 
 
Appendix E 
Appendix Table E1: Model Specification Testing (Tanzania)  ? Recipient Aid Data 
@cats(lags=1,det=drift) 1966:1 2012:1 
# L_TEXP L_DOMREV L_TOTAID  
Lag length determination (Tanzania) 
Model k T Regr. Log-lik SC H-Q LM(1) LM(k) 
VAR(5) 5 42 16 256.619 -7.948 -9.206 0.379 0.665 
VAR(4) 4 42 13 245.995 -8.243 -9.265 0.153 0.206 
VAR(3) 3 42 10 236.715 -8.602 -9.389 0.205 0.347 
VAR(2) 2 42 7 234.146 -9.281 -9.831 0.986 0.670 
VAR(1) 1 42 4 229.896 -9.880 -10.194 0.735 0.735 
 
Residuals from Unrestricted VAR 
 
Residual normality (p-values) 
 Multivariate Univariate 
 
texp domrev aid 
0.000 0.319 0.069 0.000 
Residual autocorrelation and ARCH effects (p-values) 
 LM(1) LM(2) LM(3) LM(4) 
Residual autocorrelation 0.617 0.703 0.381 0.046 
ARCH 0.416 0.232 0.074 0.028 
Trace correlation 0.198 
Determination of Cointegration Rank (Trace Test) 
 
p-r r Eig. value Trace Trace* Frac95 p-value p-value* 
3 0 0.311 32.102 31.066 29.804 0.026 0.035 
2 1 0.266 14.942 14.657 15.408 0.059 0.065 
1 2 0.015 0.688 0.683 3.841 0.407 0.408 
Long-Run Identification Tests (p-values) 
 r texp domrev aid 
Long-run exclusion  r=2 0.004 0.001 0.002 
r=1 0.170 0.342 0.231 
Stationarity r=2 0.001 0.001 0.029 
r=1 0.001 0.005 0.062 
Weak exogeneity r=2 0.001 0.275 0.004 
r=1 0.223 0.319 0.880 
Purely adjusting r=2 0.307 0.001 0.108 
r=1 0.554 0.001 0.155 
 
TEST OF RESTRICTED MODEL:    CHISQR(1) = 1.437 [0.231] 
BARTLETT CORRECTION:         CHISQR(1) = 0.960 [0.327] (Correction Factor: 1.496) 
        L_TEXP L_DOMREV  L_TOTAID 
Beta(1)  1.000   -1.369     0.000 
         (.NA) (-14.169)    (.NA) 
ALPHA 
       Alpha(1) 
DL_TEX  -0.324 
       (-4.138) 
DL_DOM  -0.017 
       (-0.222) 
DL_TOT  -0.766 
       (-2.060) 
        L_TEXP  L_DOMREV L_TOTAID 
DL_TEX  -0.324    0.443     0.000 
       (-4.138)  (4.138)    (.NA) 
DL_DOM  -0.017    0.024     0.000 
       (-0.222)  (0.222)    (.NA) 
DL_TOT  -0.766    1.049     0.000 
       (-2.060)  (2.060)    (.NA) 
Log-Likelihood = 242.053 
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Appendix Table E2: Model Specification Testing (Tanzania)  ? DAC Donors Aid Data 
@cats(lags=1,det=drift) 1966:1 2012:1 
# L_TEXP L_DOMREV L_TOTAID_DAC  
Lag length determination (Tanzania) 
Model k T Regr. Log-lik SC H-Q LM(1) LM(k) 
VAR(5) 5 42 16 266.308 -8.410 -9.668 0.836 0.623 
VAR(4) 4 42 13 262.592 -9.034 -10.056 0.695 0.847 
VAR(3) 3 42 10 259.595 -9.692 -10.478 0.765 0.999 
VAR(2) 2 42 7 255.720 -10.308 -10.859 0.613 0.756 
VAR(1) 1 42 4 249.856 -10.830 -11.144 0.282 0.282 
 
Residuals from Unrestricted VAR 
 
Residual normality (p-values) 
 
Multivariate 
Univariate 
texp domrev Aid_Dac 
0.046 0.454 0.074 0.120 
Residual autocorrelation and ARCH effects (p-values) 
 LM(1) LM(2) LM(3) LM(4) 
Residual autocorrelation 0.336 0.576 0.886 0.730 
ARCH 0.341 0.174 0.150 0.185 
Trace correlation 0.154 
Determination of Cointegration Rank (Trace Test) 
 
p-r r Eig. value Trace Trace* Frac95 p-value p-value* 
3 0 0.318 24.681 23.885 20.731 0.015 0.019 
2 1 0.139 7.079 6.943 9.751 0.144 0.151 
1 2 0.004 0.171 0.170 0.000 .NA .NA 
Long-Run Identification Tests 
 r texp domrev aid 
Long-run exclusion  r=2 0.000 0.000 0.057 
r=1 0.002 0.001 0.171 
Stationarity r=2 0.063 0.108 0.622 
r=1 0.001 0.003 0.005 
Weak exogeneity r=2 0.000 0.194 0.211 
r=1 0.002 0.749 0.421 
Purely adjusting r=2 0.307 0.001 0.108 
r=1 0.554 0.001 0.155 
 
TEST OF RESTRICTED MODEL:    CHISQR(1) = 1.870 [0.171] 
BARTLETT CORRECTION:         CHISQR(1) = 1.289 [0.256] (Correction Factor: 1.451) 
THE MATRICES BASED ON 1 COINTEGRATING VECTOR: 
BETA(transposed) 
        L_TEXP L_DOMREV  L_TOTAID_DAC 
Beta(1)  1.000   -1.364         0.000 
         (.NA) (-14.211)        (.NA) 
ALPHA 
       Alpha(1) 
DL_TEX  -0.326 
       (-4.135) 
DL_DOM  -0.016 
       (-0.206) 
DL_TOT  -0.045 
       (-0.261) 
PI 
        L_TEXP  L_DOMREV L_TOTAID_DAC 
DL_TEX  -0.326    0.444         0.000 
       (-4.135)  (4.135)        (.NA) 
DL_DOM  -0.016    0.022         0.000 
       (-0.206)  (0.206)        (.NA) 
DL_TOT  -0.045    0.062         0.000 
       (-0.261)  (0.261)        (.NA) 
Log-Likelihood = 267.447 
Trace Correlation                 =   0.097 
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Appendix Table E3: Model Specification Testing (Ethiopia)  ? Recipient Aid Data 
@cats(lags=2,det=drift) 1963:1 2009:1 
# L_TEXP L_DOMREV L_TOTAID 
Lag length determination (Tanzania) 
Model k T Regr. Log-lik SC H-Q LM(1) LM(k) 
VAR(5) 5 42 16 288.862 -9.484 -10.742 0.894 0.659 
VAR(4) 4 42 13 282.198 -9.967 -10.989 0.475 0.121 
VAR(3) 3 42 10 277.287 -10.534 -11.321 0.787 0.973 
VAR(2) 2 42 7 266.423 -10.818 -11.368 0.108 0.401 
VAR(1) 1 42 4 253.750 -11.015 -11.330 0.013 0.013 
 
Residuals from Unrestricted VAR 
 
Residual normality (p-values) 
 Multivariate Univariate 
 
texp domrev aid 
0.025 0.484 0.123 0.781 
Residual autocorrelation and ARCH effects (p-values) 
 LM(1) LM(2) LM(3) LM(4) 
Residual autocorrelation 0.153 0.444 0.151 0.214 
ARCH 0.172 0.146 0.217 0.401 
Trace correlation 0.334 
Determination of Cointegration Rank (Trace Test) 
 
p-r r Eig. value Trace Trace* Frac95 p-value p-value* 
3 0 0.396 34.298 31.183 29.804 0.013 0.034 
2 1 0.221 11.595 10.373 15.408 0.180 0.258 
1 2 0.008 0.377 0.351 3.841 0.539 0.554 
Long-Run Identification Tests (p-values) 
 r texp domrev aid 
Long-run exclusion r=2 0.000 0.000 0.004 
r=1 0.007 0.001 0.723 
Stationarity r=2 0.001 0.001 0.001 
r=1 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Weak exogeneity r=2 0.010 0.728 0.011 
r=1 0.002 0.536 0.392 
Purely adjusting r=2 0.717 0.004 0.688 
r=1 0.535 0.009 0.004 
 
TEST OF RESTRICTED MODEL:    CHISQR(1) = 0.126 [0.723] 
BARTLETT CORRECTION:         CHISQR(1) = 0.086 [0.769] (Correction Factor: 1.460) 
        L_TEXP L_DOMREV  L_TOTAID 
Beta(1)  1.000   -1.063     0.000 
         (.NA) (-44.946)    (.NA) 
ALPHA 
       Alpha(1) 
DL_TEX  -0.509 
       (-3.195) 
DL_DOM   0.115 
        (0.578) 
DL_TOT  -0.428 
       (-0.814) 
        L_TEXP  L_DOMREV L_TOTAID 
DL_TEX  -0.509    0.541     0.000 
       (-3.195)  (3.195)    (.NA) 
DL_DOM   0.115   -0.122     0.000 
        (0.578) (-0.578)    (.NA) 
DL_TOT  -0.428    0.455     0.000 
       (-0.814)  (0.814)    (.NA) 
Log-Likelihood = 278.863 
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Appendix Table E4: Model Specification Testing (Ethiopia)  ? DAC Donors Aid Data 
 
@cats(lags=2,det=drift) 1963:1 2009:1 
# L_TEXP L_DOMREV L_TOTAID_DAC  
Lag length determination (Tanzania) 
Model k T Regr. Log-lik SC H-Q LM(1) LM(k) 
VAR(5) 5 42 16 291.423 -9.606 -10.864 0.750 0.999 
VAR(4) 4 42 13 282.327 -9.973 -10.996 0.374 0.144 
VAR(3) 3 42 10 273.469 -10.353 -11.139 0.182 0.693 
VAR(2) 2 42 7 263.715 -10.689 -11.239 0.102 0.199 
VAR(1) 1 42 4 257.063 -11.173 -11.488 0.260 0.260 
 
Residuals from Unrestricted VAR 
 
Residual normality (p-values) 
 Multivariate Univariate 
 
texp domrev Aid_dac 
0.025 0.221 0.022 0.464 
Residual autocorrelation and ARCH effects (p-values) 
 LM(1) LM(2) LM(3) LM(4) 
Residual autocorrelation 0.236 0.372 0.192 0.028 
ARCH 0.049 0.111 0.170 0.159 
Trace correlation 0.251 
Determination of Cointegration Rank (Trace Test) 
 
p-r r Eig. value Trace Trace* Frac95 p-value p-value* 
3 0 0.337 29.084 25.711 20.696 0.004 0.011 
2 1 0.203 10.606 9.426 9.215 0.032 0.051 
1 2 0.009 0.414 0.391 0.000 .NA .NA 
Long-Run Identification Tests (p-values) 
 r texp domrev aid 
Long-run exclusion  r=2 0.000 0.000 0.005 
r=1 0.004 0.006 0.388 
Stationarity r=2 0.002 0.002 0.004 
r=1 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Weak exogeneity r=2 0.040 0.292 0.040 
r=1 0.013 0.721 0.069 
Purely adjusting r=2 0.202 0.451 0.186 
r=1 0.186 0.026 0.016 
 
TEST OF RESTRICTED MODEL:    CHISQR(1) = 0.747 [0.388] 
BARTLETT CORRECTION:         CHISQR(1) = 0.478 [0.489] (Correction Factor: 1.562) 
THE MATRICES BASED ON 1 COINTEGRATING VECTOR: 
BETA(transposed) 
        L_TEXP L_DOMREV  L_TOTAID_DAC 
Beta(1)  1.000   -1.068         0.000 
         (.NA) (-40.983)        (.NA) 
ALPHA 
       Alpha(1) 
DL_TEX  -0.468 
       (-2.432) 
DL_DOM   0.180 
        (0.828) 
DL_TOT   0.716 
        (1.650) 
PI 
        L_TEXP  L_DOMREV L_TOTAID_DAC 
DL_TEX  -0.468    0.500         0.000 
       (-2.432)  (2.432)        (.NA) 
DL_DOM   0.180   -0.192         0.000 
        (0.828) (-0.828)        (.NA) 
DL_TOT   0.716   -0.764         0.000 
        (1.650) (-1.650)        (.NA) 
Log-Likelihood = 279.959 
Test for Normality:   ChiSqr(6)   =  15.475 [0.017] 
Trace Correlation                 =   0.191 
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